Tibetan Grammar: Si tu Paṇchen and the Tibetan adoption of linguistic knowledge from India by Graf, Alexander
 Tibetan Grammar 
 
Si tu Paṇchen and the Tibetan adoption of linguistic 
knowledge from India 
 
 
 
Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde 
der Philosophischen Fakultät 
der Universität Heidelberg 
 
 
 
vorgelegt von: Mag. Alexander Graf 
 
 
 
Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Birgit Kellner 
Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Michael Radich 
 
 
 
Datum: 30.05.2019 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 i 
 
Contents 
Notes to the Reader .................................................................................................................. v 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. ix 
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................... xi 
Table of Figures ..................................................................................................................... xiii 
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Current State of Research .............................................................................................................. 4 
1.2 Methodological Remarks ............................................................................................................ 10 
Part I: Tibetan Grammaticography – A Scholastic Quest for the Analysis of the Literary 
Language ................................................................................................................................. 16 
2 Grammar in the History of Tibetan Scholarship ............................................................. 17 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 17 
2.2 The Beginnings of Literacy and Grammar According to Tibetan Historiography ...................... 18 
2.3 Early Linguistic Studies in Tibet and the Translation of Buddhist Sources ................................ 23 
2.3.1 On the Beginnings of Tibetan Autochthonous Grammatical Compositions ........................ 29 
2.3.2 Tracing the Role of Syntactic Knowledge in the Revision of Translation ........................... 34 
2.4 Linguistics and the Emergence of Tibetan Scholasticism ........................................................... 41 
2.5 Résumé on Grammar and Linguistics in the History of Tibetan Scholarship ............................. 47 
3 Si tu Paṇ chen Chos kyi ʼbyung gnas – His Life and Scholarship .................................. 51 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 51 
3.2 Tracing the Emphasis of Philology in Si tu’s Scholarship .......................................................... 53 
3.2.1 The Intellectual Environment of Si tu’s Era ......................................................................... 55 
3.2.2 Tracing Si tu’s Critique against the Lack of Linguistic Skills ............................................. 57 
3.3 Si tu’s Project of Tibetan Grammar, the Great Commentary ...................................................... 60 
4 Tibetan Scholastic Methodology and the Formation of Grammatical Theories in the 
Great Commentary .................................................................................................................. 65 
4.1 On the authority of Sum cu pa and Rtags kyi ’jug pa .................................................................. 65 
4.2 The rjes dpag gsum in the Great Commentary ............................................................................ 69 
4.3 Authorities in Si tu’s Grammatical Theory Formation ................................................................ 71 
4.4 The Disequilibrium of Authorities and their Reconciliation ....................................................... 78 
4.5 Résumé on Grammatical Theory Formation in the Great Commentary ..................................... 82 
5 Introduction to Tibetan Case Grammar ........................................................................... 87 
5.1 Introduction to the Tibetan Case Model ...................................................................................... 87 
5.2 Introduction to Modern Case Grammar ...................................................................................... 97 
5.3 The Derivation of Linguistic Expressions in Tibetan Grammar ............................................... 111 
5.3.1 Two Competing Sanskritic Systems for the Derivation of Linguistic Expressions ........... 113 
5.3.2 Renditions of the two Models in Tibetan Scholarship ....................................................... 122 
ii 
 
5.3.3 Si tu’s Approach to the Derivation of Word Forms in a Tibetan-specific Context ............ 132 
5.4 A Preliminary Note on the Notion of kāraka ............................................................................ 134 
Part II: The rnam dbye brgyad – Historical Survey and their Conception in the Great 
Commentary ........................................................................................................................... 137 
6 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 138 
7 Rnam dbye dang po ngo bo tsam ....................................................................................... 141 
7.1 Historical Survey ....................................................................................................................... 141 
7.2 The First Case in the Great Commentary .................................................................................. 153 
7.2.1 The Exclusion of any Syntactic Dimension from ngo bo tsam in the Great Commentary 156 
7.2.2 The First Case and Verbs in the Great Commentary .......................................................... 161 
7.2.3 Résumé on Si tu’s Conception of the First Case ................................................................ 166 
8 Rnam dbye gnyis pa las or las su bya ba ........................................................................... 168 
8.1 Historical Survey ....................................................................................................................... 168 
8.1.1 Conceptions of the Second Case in Pāṇini, Kātantra and Cāndra and the Problem of the 
Tibetan Adoption of karman ....................................................................................................... 169 
8.1.2 Early Conceptions of the Second Case ............................................................................... 173 
8.1.2.1 The Second Case las as yul in the Gnas brgyad ’grel pa ............................................ 175 
8.1.2.2 On the Notion of viṣaya (yul) in Sanskritic Conceptions of karman ........................... 176 
8.1.2.3 The Second Case las as (bya ba’i) gzhi in the Sgra’i rnam par dbye ba bstan pa ...... 181 
8.1.2.4 A First Résumé on the Early Conception of the Second Case .................................... 185 
8.1.2.5 On the Semantic Nature of the Second Case in the Sgra’i rnam par dbye ba bstan pa
 ................................................................................................................................................. 186 
8.1.2.6 Second Résumé on the Early Conception of the Second Case .................................... 197 
8.1.2.7 Three Hypotheses on the Prototypicality of la ............................................................ 198 
8.1.3 The Development of the Second Case up to Si tu .............................................................. 203 
8.1.4 A Note on the Notion of las su bya ba (‘to be done as the karman’) ................................. 209 
8.1.5 Résumé of the Second Case pre-Si tu ................................................................................. 210 
8.2 The Second Case in the Great Commentary ............................................................................. 211 
8.2.1 Two Definitions of the Second Case .................................................................................. 211 
8.2.1.1 First Definition ............................................................................................................ 211 
8.2.1.2 Discussion of Examples in the First Definition ........................................................... 213 
8.2.1.3 Si tu’s Second Definition of the Second Case ............................................................. 217 
8.2.2 On the Morphosyntactic Distribution of the Examples Classified as Second Cases .......... 219 
8.2.3 Résumé on Si tu’s Two Definitions and his Selection of Illustrations ............................... 224 
8.2.4 On the Relation between la don gyi las and dngos pos gzhan gyi las ................................ 226 
8.2.5 The Secondary or Subordinate karman .............................................................................. 238 
8.2.6 Conclusory Remark on Si tu’s Second Case ...................................................................... 243 
9 Rnam dbye gsum pa byed pa po ......................................................................................... 244 
 iii 
 
9.1 Historical Survey ....................................................................................................................... 244 
9.1.1 On the Fusion of Agent and Instrument under the Third Case ........................................... 248 
9.1.2 Résumé on the Third Case before Si tu .............................................................................. 251 
9.2 The Third Case in the Great Commentary ................................................................................ 252 
9.2.1 Addendum on the Relation between Agent, Instrument and Reason ................................. 259 
9.2.2 Résumé on Si tu’s Third Case ............................................................................................ 262 
10 Rnam dbye bzhi pa dgos ched .......................................................................................... 264 
10.1 Historical Survey ..................................................................................................................... 264 
10.1.1 The Development of the Tibetan Fourth Case out of Sanskritic Grammar ...................... 272 
10.1.1.1 On the Sanskritic Conception of the Fourth Case suffix ........................................... 272 
10.1.1.2 On the Relation of sampradāna and tādarthya in the Sanskritic Tradition .............. 276 
10.1.2 Two Early Tibetan Conceptions of the Fourth Case in Gnas brgyad ’grel pa and Sgra’i 
rnam par dbye ba bstan pa .......................................................................................................... 285 
10.1.3 Note on the Term yul in the Context of the Fourth Case .................................................. 290 
10.1.4 Résumé of the Tibetan Fourth Case pre-Si tu................................................................... 291 
10.2 The Fourth Case in the Great Commentary ............................................................................ 293 
10.2.1 Analysis of Si tu’s Examples ............................................................................................ 300 
10.2.2 Si tu’s Exclusion of phyag ’tshal ba from the Fourth Case .............................................. 309 
10.2.3 Résumé on the Fourth Case in the Great Commentary .................................................... 320 
11 Rnam dbye lnga pa ’byung khungs ................................................................................. 322 
11.1 Historical Survey ..................................................................................................................... 322 
11.1.1 The Development of the Category ’byung khungs out of Sanskritic Grammar ............... 327 
11.1.2 Early Accounts of the Fifth Case and the Transition from Sanskritic apādāna to Tibetan 
’byung khungs.............................................................................................................................. 329 
11.1.3 Résumé on the Fifth Case pre-Si tu .................................................................................. 340 
11.2 The Fifth Case in the Great Commentary ............................................................................... 341 
11.2.1 Two Additional Functions of the Fifth Case in the Great Commentary .......................... 349 
11.2.2 Summary and Résumé of Si tu’s Scaled Fifth Case ’byung khungs ................................. 358 
12 Rnam dbye drug pa ’brel ba ............................................................................................. 364 
12.1 Historical Survey ..................................................................................................................... 364 
12.1.1 The Tibetan Sixth Case function in the Rtags kyi ’jug pa ................................................ 371 
12.2 The Sixth Case in the Great Commentary ............................................................................... 373 
12.2.1 Résumé on the Sixth Case in the Great Commentary ...................................................... 376 
13 Rnam dbye bdun pa bnas gzhis or rten gnas .................................................................. 377 
13.1 Historical Survey ..................................................................................................................... 377 
13.1.1 The Tibetan Seventh Case in Relation to Sanskritic Grammar ........................................ 378 
13.1.2 Tibetan Conceptualizations of the Category Gnas gzhi/Rten gnas pre-Si tu .................... 383 
iv 
 
13.1.3 On the Linguistic Significance of the Seventh Case and the Distribution of the la don 
Morphemes in Old Tibetan .......................................................................................................... 387 
13.1.4 Résumé on the Tibetan Seventh Case pre-Si tu ................................................................ 388 
13.2 The Seventh Case in the Great Commentary .......................................................................... 389 
13.2.1 The Seventh Case and tshe skabs (‘time occasion’) ......................................................... 395 
13.2.2 The Seventh Case in the Great Commentary on the Rtags ’jug ....................................... 397 
13.2.3 Résumé on the Seventh Case in the Great Commentary .................................................. 405 
14 Rnam dbye brgyad pa bod pa ........................................................................................... 407 
14.1 Historical Survey ..................................................................................................................... 407 
14.1.1 The Eighth Case in Relation to Sanskritic Grammar ....................................................... 408 
14.1.2 Résumé of the Eighth Case pre-Si tu ................................................................................ 413 
14.2 The Eighth Case in the Great Commentary ............................................................................ 414 
14.2.1 Résumé on the Eighth Case .............................................................................................. 418 
15 Summary of  Part II – Major Features of Tibetan Case Grammar in and before Si 
tu’s GC .................................................................................................................................. 420 
16 Concluding Observations – On the Conceptual-Theoretical Mechanisms which 
Shaped the Development of the Tibetan Case Model and the Dis-/Continuation of 
Sanskritic Grammatical Knowledge................................................................................... 434 
Appendix – On the Numbering of ślokas in Sum cu pa and Rtags kyi ’jug pa ................ 442 
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 460 
 
  
 v 
 
Notes to the Reader 
This dissertation investigates the classical Tibetan case model based on Si tu Paṇchen’s Great 
Commentary (Si tu’i ’grel chen). Due to its historical and linguistic limitations (cf. chapter 1.2), 
this research is not intended to be a final word on all the historical and conceptual matters 
surrounding classical Tibetan case grammar. The main purpose of the current work is to raise 
awareness that this area of Tibetan intellectual history deserves closer attention with regard to 
both our understanding of Tibetan grammatical models in particular and Tibetan scholastic 
knowledge production in general. The following notes should be borne in mind by the reader 
to facilitate the reading and navigation of this dissertation. 
Terminological notes: 
A general note needs to be made on the use of the term ‘academia’ and its adjective ‘academic’ 
in this work. This notion exclusively refers to a certain methodological approach developed, 
practiced and shared in a specific institutionalized framework, typically universities and related 
research institutions. In the context of linguistics, chapter 5.2 provides more material on how 
such a conceptual and methodological approach has been conceived in this work. By and large, 
I tried to reduce the use of both terms and provide more specific references in terms of works 
and authors to avoid misleading generalizations, but certain contexts require a more general 
reference whenever theories or approaches cannot be reduced to only a single or few authors. 
It only needs to be emphasized that the distinction between academic and non-academic is by 
no means intended to express any sense of inferiority or superiority, nor is it meant to denounce, 
nor criticize academic or non-academic practices. Moreover, references to academia or 
academic methodologies always need to be regarded as relative and treated cautiously: first, 
there is no full agreement and consequently no absolute homogeneity within the academic 
sphere of knowledge production; second, the boundaries between academic and non-academic 
approaches are fluid and shaded. 
Likewise, ‘tradition’ is intended as a general reference to entities which can be demarcated 
through linguistic, historical and other parameters that establish a certain continuity or contact 
between the participants of a tradition. In the present dissertation, the use of this notion is more 
a pragmatic solution rather than a strict historical theory applied to phenomena under 
investigation. Typically, a tradition in the sense referred to here exhibits some form of self-
perception of its homogeneity (e.g. through sharing a language, through being part of the same 
institutional, political or other entity, or through reference to certain authoritative text corpora) 
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or such a perception is imposed by others. However, this means neither that a tradition is a 
closed off realm nor that a tradition lacks heterogeneity. In fact, both the features of extra-
traditional influx and heterogeneity are at the very center of this dissertation. In case of the 
‘Tibetan tradition’, for example, I refer to the time frame from the 7th to – in our case – the 
18th century, in which a variety of scholars have shared the same written form of Tibetan 
language and in which specific forms and means of knowledge production have been developed 
and maintained, which continue to exist in Tibetan monastic education even today. In contrast, 
the ‘Tibetan grammatical tradition’ is concerned with the topic of grammar, which in certain 
contexts could be further distinguished. ‘Sanskritic tradition’ refers only very generally to those 
scholarly circles in which Sanskritic literature was produced and which acted as a common 
reference for Tibetan scholars. Thus, it needs to be emphasized that in this dissertation 
‘tradition’ does not convey any notion of traditionalism or opposition to modernity and 
innovation, nor does it express the stagnation or end of a tradition. 
Speaking of the ‘classical Tibetan case model’ or the ‘classical eight Tibetan cases’ in this 
dissertation requires two specifications. First, the term ‘classical’ is simply a general reference 
to the eightfold case scheme as presented in chapter 5 (cf. e.g. figure 4). Its main purpose is to 
distinguish this very model from other forms of Tibetan case grammar developed in modern 
academia or elsewhere. Additionally, it indicates that this model enjoyed acceptance, renown 
and authority in a Tibetan scholastic environment from the early times up to the present. 
However, this term should not obscure the fact that there are noteworthy variations in the 
conceptions of this scheme throughout the centuries. The term remains historically and 
linguistically entirely neutral regarding any preferences, superiority or inferiority compared to 
other forms of grammatical knowledge production. Secondly, the term ‘Tibetan’ does not refer 
primarily to the language under investigation in this model but to the scholarly sphere in which 
it was developed. In fact, as will be discussed in chapter 5.1 and further demonstrated 
throughout part II, the classical Tibetan case model was commonly understood to not be 
restricted to Tibetan language. However, this does not change the fact that the classical Tibetan 
case model has been used in grammatical sources as a valid analytical tool for the description 
of Tibetan language-specific structures. 
In this dissertation, the attribute ‘Sanskritic’ indicates that a source, theory, literature, etc. has 
been composed in Sanskrit and goes back to the Sanskritic tradition in which Sanskrit language 
is the means of knowledge production. The attribute ‘Sanskrit’ indicates the topic under 
investigation. Thus, ‘Sanskritic grammar’ is the study of grammar as conducted in Sanskrit 
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language by Indian grammarians, whereas ‘Sanskrit grammar’ refers to the study of grammar 
concerned with Sanskrit language which may also be conducted by Tibetan grammarians and 
others. As is evident from the above definition of ‘tradition’, the demarcation between 
Sanskritic and non-Sanskritic scholars is blurry in certain contexts, since, for example, we know 
of Tibetan scholars such as Si tu Paṇchen who studied in South Asia and composed Sanskrit 
works. We also know of Indian scholars such as Smr̥tijñānakīrti who lived in Tibet, translated 
Sanskrit sources and composed Tibetan works. In any event, the two attributes ‘Sanskritic’ and 
‘Sanskrit’ are not mutually exclusive and often overlap. Therefore, it is a matter of emphasis 
which of these two aspects weighs more important in an argument or investigation. I have 
restricted the use of ‘Sanskritic’ to emphasize Sanskritic origins when important in the 
relationship between Tibetan knowledge production and Sanskritic authority. However, this is 
more a matter of scope and sometimes personal preference, and there remain instances where 
both attributes, Sanskrit or Sanskritic, can be used more or less interchangeably.  
Technical notes: 
To avoid confusion regarding the quotation of Si tu’s works, all references are based on his 
collected works published by Sherab Gyaltsen in 1990. While the Great Commentary contained 
in volume 6 has been quoted only by providing the title’s initials followed by the folio number 
and the first line (e.g. GC 450.6), all the remaining sources quoted from his collected works are 
without initials, but rather contain the volume number followed by the folio and first line (e.g. 
6.442.5). 
The two root texts Sum cu pa and Rtags kyi ’jug pa which are the foundation of Si tu’s 
commentary have been fully reproduced in the Appendix of this work. The cited versions of 
both texts are not those contained in Si tu’s Great Commentary but are based on Si tu’s separate 
edition which is also included in volume 6 of his collected works. 
In the context of the translation of Tibetan and Sanskrit sources, several renditions of terms and 
phrases are frequently provided to offer alternative readings of passages and point out different 
possible nuances and emphases. They are indicated by the use of slashes (/). Since parts of the 
classification of Tibetan case markers remain problematic also in modern linguistic research, 
the use of slashes such as in INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT or 
BENEFICIARY/DIRECTION equally indicates possible alternative categorizations whenever 
more detailed linguistic research was deemed to be required. 
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The Abbreviations and Bibliography explain and reference short forms as well as alternative 
names of authors and works to resolve possible confusions and avoid wrong associations of 
names and titles quoted in this dissertation. 
General note: 
A general note is required on the form and structure of this dissertation. The chapters of the 
main part II follow the traditional order of the Tibetan cases in order to provide a comprehensive 
and referenceable account of each of them which responds to open issues and questions in 
modern discourses. Following this approach, the study frequently offers a variety of historical, 
conceptual and linguistic options of explaining and understanding certain developments in 
order to avoid misinterpretation and imposition. Open questions or issues in the examination of 
theories are frequently indicated and delineated rather than conclusively resolved. Wherever 
applicable, it is made clear that the investigation is more speculative in nature than evidence-
based due to the current state of research. 
At times, the chosen sequence and structure of chapters interfere with a coherent and 
straightforward presentation of the major arguments in the dissertation, particularly in those 
instances where the investigation pursues the different historical, linguistic, philological and 
conceptual details connected to the cases. As a consequence, this dissertation may here and 
there give the impression of a work in progress. This was – at least in part – intended, because 
I see this approach as more representative of and responsive to the current state of research and 
the limitations outlined in chapters 1.1 and 1.2 respectively. 
However, the work has the strong ambition to present a representative account of Tibetan case 
grammar and those dynamics which shaped its transformation in relation to Sanskritic 
authoritative knowledge. It introduces thus far unstudied material and opens new avenues 
towards ways of reading and studying Tibetan grammatical sources – rather than having the 
final word on it. While the unpolished, preliminary character of this study may at times cause 
dissatisfaction in the reader, it is my sincere hope that this feeling will equally evoke the 
audience’s motivation to contribute further research on both sides, historical and linguistic, so 
that more conclusive answers will complement, refine and correct the present work wherever 
necessary. 
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1 Introduction 
There is little doubt among scholars – both past and contemporary, Tibetan and non-Tibetan, 
trained in monastic centers or universities – that Tibetan intellectual history was and still is 
significantly shaped by that of the Indian subcontinent. The Indian tradition, and amongst this 
especially the Sanskritic, served as a major source for both the contents and methodologies of 
a multifaceted array of knowledge fields north of the Himalaya, such as Buddhist philosophy, 
linguistics, logical reasoning and others, frequently appearing as the highest authority in 
questions of scholarly knowledge production. In the field of grammar (brda sprod, sum rtags), 
for example, but also Buddhism (nang rig), a variety of authenticated Sanskritic authors and 
sources form the conceptual foundation that Tibetan monastic scholars would not only build 
upon but committedly adhere to, invoke, and even defend as scriptural authority. 
Yet, the perception of the intellectual relationship between India and Tibet substantially 
diverges within time and space. While historically questionable, famous Tibetan 
historiographical narratives – such as minister Thon mi Saṃbhoṭa’s travel to India at the 
beginning of Tibetan literacy as we know it or the debate in Bsam yas at the dawn of the 
appropriation of Buddhism in Tibet – testify a self-declared and sometimes overstated 
orientation towards the Indian subcontinent that portrays India as the only valid and established 
source of inspiration.1 Thus, Tibetan monastic scholars commonly see a major task in their duty 
to preserve, unravel and defend such authoritative Sanskritic knowledge while avoiding, or at 
least often claiming to avoid, any form of deviation or self-fabrication (rang bzo) in their own 
work. From that perspective, the Indo-Tibetan cross-cultural relationship appears to be mainly 
one of unidirectional continuation and observance. The close proximity to Sanskritic corpora 
of knowledge in scholarly practices like translation and exegesis is widely acknowledged also 
outside the Tibetan cultural sphere, even to the extent that Tibetan Studies would frequently be 
degraded to a ‘Hilfswissenschaft’ or ancillary discipline of the field of Buddhist Studies.2  
However, despite the fundamental role of the Indo-Tibetan knowledge transfer, Tibetan 
intellectual history must not be perceived from the viewpoint of a pure continuation of Indian 
forms of knowledge, for neither was Tibet a tabula rasa prior to the beginning of the 
appropriation of Indian knowledge, nor was India the only source of knowledge for Tibetan 
learning and scholarship. Moreover, in the methodology of Tibetan scholarly argumentation, 
                                                          
1 For these two narratives, cf. infra 17f. and 19f. 
2 For this point and the Indo-Tibetan relation, cf. also Viehbeck, forthcoming. For a survey of the history of 
Buddhist Studies including Tibetan Buddhism, cf. De Jong 1997. 
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logical proof and factual evidence are on a par with scriptural authority, a fact that provided a 
most prolific matrix fostering the creativity of Tibetan intellectuals.3 Modern Tibetologists 
therefore also started engaging in more nuanced depictions of Tibetan knowledge production 
and the role of Indo-Tibetan relationships in this process through their investigations at the 
interface of such notions as scholasticism, tradition and innovation, Indian vs. Indic, amongst 
others.4  
A major question in the task to disentangle this relation that shaped Tibetan intellectual history 
at its very foundation therefore is how to understand the intricate dynamics of the 
transformation of adopted knowledge in a tradition that has so deeply sewn-in into its texture 
scriptural authority as a major principle of knowledge production. It is safe to assume that any 
production of knowledge involves processes of transformation in which continuities and 
discontinuities between traditions, authors, sources and theories operate alongside each other, 
and this is most certainly the case where this knowledge production is constituted by a transfer 
of knowledge across noteworthy cultural and linguistic boundaries. Specific forms of 
knowledge production or transfer and thus the intellectual relationship between India and Tibet 
are defined precisely through the interaction of these two forces, i.e. the individual continuities 
and discontinuities together with the mechanisms governing this interaction. 
While grammar certainly ranks among the minor fields in Tibetan Studies, compared to the 
much more prominent position of Buddhist philosophy and its related subfields, the question 
about the transformation of knowledge is an at least equally pressing challenge in the context 
of the relationship between Tibetan and Sanskritic grammaticography. In fact, the cross-cultural 
transfer of linguistic knowledge from India to Tibet offers a setting that may be of special 
interest. Since the study of language and particularly that of grammar is typically concerned 
with the structure of concrete languages, the substantial morphological and syntactic differences 
between Sanskrit and Tibetan – which in modern linguistics are classed into separate language 
families – presumably demand an equally substantial adaptation of adopted models of linguistic 
analysis. In contrast to Buddhist ontology or epistemology, which are commonly regarded as 
being concerned with universal questions, the very object of grammatical investigation itself, 
namely Tibetan language, requires grammarians to deviate from Sanskritic authority and apply 
modifications in line with the new target language. In this sense, the recontextualization of 
Sanskrit grammatical knowledge into the Tibetan linguistic environment challenges the Tibetan 
                                                          
3 For the methodology of Tibetan scholastic knowledge production in the context of grammar, cf. chapter 4. 
4 Cf. e.g. Cabezón 1994, Dreyfus 2003, Ruegg 2004. 
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scholastic methodology and the principle of scriptural authority very directly and concretely. 
To gain insight into the intricate dynamics governing the transformation of grammatical 
knowledge – in other words, the ways in which against the backdrop of Tibetan scholasticism 
grammatical theory formation was shaped in the course of de- and recontextualization of 
Sanskrit linguistic knowledge – can therefore only enhance our understanding of Tibetan 
intellectual history and its relation to Indian authority. Thus, this dissertation should be seen as 
a modest attempt to address this issue on the basis of one particularly controversial subject of 
Tibetan grammaticography.  
The present study investigates the classical eightfold Tibetan case model which has been 
developed by Tibetan scholars in close affinity to Sanskrit case grammar and which is attested 
already in the earliest period of linguistic studies in Tibet (approx. 7th - 9th century). It remained 
authoritative as one of the major theoretical models in Tibetan traditional grammar in the 
education of many monastic institutions up to the present day, despite the strong critique 
brought forth against it from academic linguistics. The present study sheds light on the major 
historical (chapters 2 and 3) and methodological factors (chapter 4) that have shaped the 
adoption and transformation of Sanskritic case grammar. Its main part (chapters 6-14) is then 
concerned with a close examination of the precise continuation and discontinuation of 
Sanskritic technical terminology, theories and discourses on case grammar in the conceptions 
of Tibetan grammarians to better understand the theoretical factors involved in this cross-
cultural knowledge transfer.  
The transformation of the original Sanskrit case model in Tibet was an ongoing process that 
involved selection as well as constant negotiation and re-negotiation of adopted concepts. Thus, 
our understanding of the Indo-Tibetan transcultural dynamics depends on questions related to 
the heterogeneity of the Sanskritic and Tibetan grammatical traditions, accessed sources and 
established knowledge as well as the concrete agency of certain historical figures, much of 
which hitherto has received little or no attention in academic research. Within its possibilities, 
the present study nonetheless attempts to remain historically sensitive regarding these different 
yet interacting aspects by paying utmost attention to the continuities and discontinuities in and 
between source materials against the backdrop of the historical information about them 
available to us today. In particular, its main part (chapters 7-14) has two focal points: the 
celebrated Tibetan grammarian and Sanskritist Si tu Paṇ chen Chos kyi ’byung gnas 
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(1699/1700-1774) 5  and his treatment of Tibetan case grammar in the so-called Great 
Commentary (GC)6 as a particularly famous and insightful specimen of Tibetan grammatical 
theory formation. This is a commentary on two seminal treatises, Sum cu pa (SCP) and Rtags 
kyi ’jug pa (TKJ),7 that in the tradition have attained the status of the very foundations of 
Tibetan grammar already centuries before Si tu’s work.8 In addition, Si tu’s conception of the 
classical eight Tibetan cases is accompanied by a historical survey for each of the cases that 
explores their conception in selected Sanskritic literature together with the most important 
developments of their transformation in Tibetan grammar previous to his times. This format 
will avoid inaccurate generalizations that obscure the heterogeneity of Tibetan and Sanskritic 
grammaticography and simultaneously provide a clear account of the tradition’s situation at Si 
tu’s time, which will also facilitate an understanding of his decision-making processes in the 
formation of grammatical theories. 
1.1 Current State of Research  
In modern Tibetology and Linguistics, the Tibetan grammatical tradition received notable 
attention, reaching back as far as to the end 19th century. Berthold Laufer’s study on Zha lu Lo 
tsā ba Chos skyong bzang po’s (Zha lu Lotsāwa; 1441-1527/28) lexicographical work Za ma 
tog in 1898 was one of the pioneering works in this field. Yet, only two years later in a review 
of Laufer’s work, the Leiden Sinologist Gustav Schlegel most blatantly attacked the value of 
Tibetan grammatical knowledge and of the entire Tibetan intellectual history: 
 “It has been rightly observed that the whole literature of Tibet does not afford us a single 
 positive result for our modern science, and that our knowledge of the tibetan language, 
 its structure and its life would not become enriched in the least by researches in this 
 field. Yet, Mr. Laufer remarks, the mere fact that this curious race of Central-Asia 
 possesses a rich literature of grammatical, lexicographical and philological works would 
 be sufficient to make it worth our study, although it may not enrich our knowledge of 
                                                          
5 Hereafter referred to as Si tu or Si tu Paṇchen. Regarding Si tu’s exact year of birth, either 1699 or 1700, there 
appears to be disagreement among Tibetologists. Taking as a reference JIATS 7 (cf. Germano et al. 2013), a 
volume which is dedicated to Si tu’s oeuvre, the contributions mention both dates 1699 and 1700. For details on 
Si tu Paṇchen’s life and works, cf. chapter 3. 
6 The full title of Si tu’s Tibetan grammar reads Yul gangs can pa’i brda yang dag par sbyor ba’i bstan bcos kyi 
bye brag sum cu pa dang rtags kyi ’jug pa’i gzhung gi rnam par bshad pa mkhas pa’i mkhul rgyan mu tig 
phreng mdzes, which may be translated as ‘Beautiful Pearl Necklace Adorning the Neck of Scholars: A 
Thorough Commentary on the Texts Sum cu pa and Rtags kyi ’jug pa, Quintessence of the Śāstra of Correct 
Grammar in the Land of Snow.’ The treatise is commonly known under its abbreviation Si tu’i ’grel chen or ‘Si 
tu’s Great Commentary.’ The text is contained in volume 6 of his collected works, published by Sherab Gyaltsen 
in 1990 (cf. also infra 10).  
7 For the edition of the two root texts used in this dissertation, cf. Appendix. 
8 On the commented root texts Sum cu pa and Rtags kyi ’jug pa, cf. infra 19f. as well as chapter 4.1. 
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 languages, it yet will  allow us to catch a deeper insight in the physiology and cultural 
 history of the tibetan people.  
 We do not quite agree with the author’s sympathy with a race which has not exercised 
 the slightest cultural influence upon the surrounding countries, whose literature is not 
 worth anything before the people was converted to Buddhism, and has been entirely 
 influenced by sanskrit literature, and, according to our conviction, is hardly worth the 
 immense labour bestowed upon its study. Like all races which only possess a religious 
 literature, the Tibetans, like the Arabs, have become enraged grammarians or rather 
 grammatists. As well in their religious as in their linguistic literature a barren 
 contemplative speculation is the only fruit we can gather from its study, and we should 
 like to throw at the head of the Tibetans Goethe’s word:  
  ‘Ich sage Dir: ‘Ein Kerl, der speculirt,  
  ‘Ist wie ein Thier, auf dürrer  
   Heide  
  ‘Von einem bösen Geist im Kreis  
   herumgeführt,  
  ‘Und rings umher liegt schöne,  
   grüne Weide’.”9 
The close adherence of the Tibetan tradition to Sanskritic authoritative knowledge was well-
observed by Schlegel’s review, yet it was also overemphasized to an extreme that does not do 
justice to Tibetan scholarly knowledge production and its relation to India. Fortunately, his 
polemical and precipitant assessment at the beginning of this emerging field of Tibetan Studies 
was not shared by several of the subsequent Tibetologists and linguists who continued to study 
the traditional grammatical literature. One of these was Johannes Schubert, who coined the 
notion of a ‘Nationalgrammatik’ especially for the two canonical root grammars SCP and TKJ 
together with their commentarial literature. He also produced translations of two well-known 
commentaries, namely that of Dbyangs can Grub pa’i rdo rje (1809-1887) in 1928-29 and that 
of Lcang skya Rol pa’i rdo rje (1717-1786) in 1937. About the same time of Schubert’s first 
translation, the French philologist and Tibetologist Jacques Bacot published another translation 
of a post-Si tu commentary on SCP and TKJ of unknown authorship in 1928, to which he also 
                                                          
9 Schlegel 1900, 357f. In a footnote, Schlegel translates Goethe’s words as follows: “I tell ye: a fellow who 
speculates is like an animal led about, by an evil spirit, in a circle, on a barren heath whilst all around ly 
beautiful, green meadows.” (Schlegel 1900, 358) On Schlegel’s review of Laufer’s study on the Zamatog, cf. 
also Miller 1993, 16.f. 
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added the first complete edition plus translation of the two root texts themselves. His numbering 
of the verses remains in use up to the present day, even though it has also evoked thus far 
unresolved controversies among modern scholars and is sometimes substituted with alternative 
counting systems.10 
Apart from these early works which have introduced Tibetan grammaticography to modern 
academia, there have also been noteworthy contributions to various selected topics. Among 
these, there are to mention for our purpose Simonsson’s studies on the use of the Buddhist 
Abhidharmic concept tshogs gsum (trikāya, ‘three collections’) in Tibetan traditional grammar 
(1982A, 1984) as well as on the theory of the sentence and case morphemes (1982B). The 
American linguist Roy Andrew Miller authored numerous essays on the history and constitution 
of the SCP and TKJ, and by means of these he advanced to the most important protagonist of 
the critique against the traditional narrative of Thon mi Saṃbhoṭa’s authorship.11 Remaining 
more on the linguistic side of modern academic research, different traditional grammatical 
concepts and theories have received attention for example in numerous works by Nicolas 
Tournadre, Bettina Zeisler or Ralf Vollmann, the latter having published – among other works 
– a historical survey on Tibetan ergativity in classical and modern academic accounts (2008). 
Zeisler’s extensive article on the classical Tibetan second case in 2006 as well as Tournadre’s 
more recent study (2010) on the case system of written Tibetan (WT) that includes an 
assessment of the traditional case model deserve special mention in the present study as they 
are directly dedicated to its core topic of case grammar. The same also applies to a more recent 
study of Nathan Hill (2011) on the use of the traditional Tibetan case marker ‘la don’ in the Old 
Tibetan Annals. 
While not directly connected to the present study, the topic perhaps most extensively explored 
in modern academia due to its arousal of a certain interest among linguists is Si tu’s action 
theory, namely tha dad min (‘differentiating [and] non-differentiating [actions]’), which is 
closely connected to the two technical terms bdag (‘self’) and gzhan (‘other’) in the TKJ. 
Among the various contributions are also some of the scholars mentioned above, however 
mention here will be made only to the main works of Tom Tillemans (1988, 2007, Tillemans 
and Herforth 1989). Especially the coauthored Agents and Actions in Classical Tibetan from 
1989 ranks among the most thorough introductions to this conception. 
                                                          
10 For a discussion of these controversies, as well as for the edition of both root texts used in this dissertation, cf. 
Appendix. 
11 For a collected edition of the main essays, cf. Miller 1993. 
 7 
 
Lastly, the work of Peter Verhagen on the Tibetan linguistic tradition in general and on Sanskrit 
studies in Tibet in particular deserves special mention as well. His two volumes on the History 
of Sanskrit Grammatical Literature in Tibet (1994 and 2001A)12 contain the most detailed 
account available on Sanskrit grammatical knowledge in Tibet and its relation to traditional 
Tibetan grammar. His meticulous historical-philological examination of Sanskrit and Tibetan 
source materials significantly increased and refined knowledge in the field by demonstrating 
“that much in Tibetan indigenous grammar has been derived from Indic grammar,”13 while he 
also pointed out concrete “elements that – at least at the present moment – cannot be traced to 
Sanskrit grammar or Buddhist literature dealing with language (in the broadest sense).”14 Apart 
from these two volumes, Peter Verhagen contributed numerous articles on linguistic 
scholarship in Tibet, covering selected issues in grammatical treatises from the earliest to the 
later periods. Also important for our current purposes is the fourfold series of essays on Si tu’s 
literary work (2004, 2008A, 2010, 2013) entitled Notes apropos to the Oeuvre of Si-tu Paṇ-
chen Chos-kyi-’byuṅ-gnas (1699?-1774). 
A considerable amount of relevant and insightful research has been carried out in the field of 
traditional Tibetan grammar and linguistics. These research findings have continued to improve 
and refine our knowledge over more than a century. Nonetheless, a critical tone prevails up to 
the present day. In her article on the Tibetan traditional second case, Zeisler epitomizes western 
academic standpoints in the following summary: 
 “For western scholars, who speak accusative languages, it has always been a matter of 
 fact that the Sanskrit term karman for the ‘second case’ has to be understood as the 
 ‘accusative’ case marker or as a case-relation corresponding to the syntactic category of
 Direct Object. The application of the term karman in its Tibetan translation as las, 
 byabaḥi yul, or lassu byaba to the directional case marker la (and its equivalents), used 
 for RECIPIENTS, GOALS, and LOCATIONS, thus seems to be a gross error on the 
 part of the Tibetan grammarians, due to their blind imitation of a prestigious model that 
 can by no means be applied to an ergative language (Tournadre 1990: 192, 195, 
 1996:347), except so as to create a new artificial language, which has not much to do 
 with the ‘primitive’ language spoken by ‘nomadic barbares’ (Bacot 1928: I-IV, 11, 
                                                          
12 Hereafter referred to as HSGLT 1 and HSGLT 2. 
13 HSGLT 2, 323. 
14 Ibid., 335. 
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 1946: 7), in any case a futile attempt ‘to make Tibetan fit the Procrustean bed of 
 Sanskrit’ (Tillemans 1991: 319).”15 
The critiques of scholars such as Tillemans or Tournadre have certainly been more well-
informed and based on more well-established historical and linguistic reasons compared to the 
statements of Schlegel, however the close adherence to Sanskritic authority remains a major 
topos. This critique commonly aims at the absent but required modifications of the original 
Sanskrit case grammar in view of the substantial differences between Sanskrit and Tibetan, a 
fact briefly alluded to by Peter Schwieger in the preface to his Handbuch zur Grammatik der 
klassischen Tibetischen Schriftsprache: 
 “Vorbild für die tibetischen Beschreibungen der eigenen Schriftsprache war das früh 
 hochentwickelte sprachwissenschaftliche Wissen der Inder, und so orientiert sich bis in 
 die Neuzeit die einheimische tibetische Grammatik insbesondere bei der Beschreibung 
 des Kasussystems an den in Tibet bekannten Grammatiken der Sanskrit-Sprache, wobei 
 dieses Modell letztendlich für eine Beschreibung einer agglutinierenden Sprache wie 
 des Schrifttibetischen schwerlich eine adäquate Grundlage bilden kann.”16 
As already indicated by this selection of quotations, the main target of this academic critique is 
the topic of case grammar and the eightfold Tibetan case model. However, awareness of this 
model’s shortcomings is not only observed among foreign scholars but also among native 
Tibetan grammarians of the recent decades. Dor zhi Gdong drug snyems blo, for example, is 
quoted by Tournadre, who translates his open criticism of the traditional model as follows: 
 “The analysis of Tibetan into eight cases is based on a Sanskrit model. But the model 
 does not work in many occasions. Every scholar who pays attention to grammar knows 
 that very well. Avoiding the bad habit of copying other languages, one should describe 
 the Tibetan language only on the basis of its own structure and specificities.”17 
A consensus has been reached in Tibetology and Linguistics that the classical Tibetan case 
model cannot provide a representative account of the structures of Tibetan language. Yet, apart 
from isolated studies such as Zeisler’s thorough article on the Tibetan second case, a 
                                                          
15 Zeisler 2006, 57. 
16 Schwieger 2006, 5. 
17 Tournadre 2010, 94. Tournadre translated and quoted from Dor zhi Gdong drug snyems blo 1987:  
 bod skad la rnam dbye brgyad du phyes pa de/     rgya gar gyi skad la dpe blangs pa yin kyang/     dpe de 
 don la mi ’byor mi nyung ba zhig yod pa ni/     sgra la gzigs rtogs gnang ba’i mkhas pa sus kyang shes/     
 skad rigs gzhan pa’i shan shor du ma bcug par/     bod skad rang gi grub lugs dang khyad chos mtshon 
 thub pa zhig gi steng nas gzhi rtsa ’dzin dgos so//. 
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comprehensive examination of single or multiple sources that traces the precise transformations 
of the original Sanskrit case model in Tibetan grammatical literature remain a desideratum. To 
date, Peter Verhagen’s pioneering translation and examination of the section on case grammar 
in the Gnas brgyad rtsa ’grel (NG(g); NG and NGg; 8th/9th century) is the only more inclusive 
contribution to Tibetan understandings of traditional cases.18  
The lack of a comprehensive study of the Tibetan case model is a major reason why previous 
academic research has paid insufficient attention to the reasons why Tibetan grammarians 
developed and, over the centuries, adhered to their eightfold case system. Modern enquiries 
paradigmatically root the Tibetan adoption of Sanskritic case grammar only very generally in 
the attempt to imitate Sanskrit and its grammar based on an open adherence or faithfulness to 
Indian civilization and its authority. In his more recent study on Tibetan case grammar, 
Tournadre puts it this way: 
 “For cultural and religious reasons, Tibetan grammarians of the past took as a model the 
 Sanskrit case system, which is radically different from the Tibetan case system. They 
 tried to match the cases of the two languages.”19 
In a similar vein, Dreyfus remarks that “although the Tibetan language is unrelated to Sanskrit, 
it was codified as part of an effort to adopt Indian civilization, particularly Buddhism,” and that 
“hence, its grammar emulates Sanskrit grammar, which is viewed as normative.”20 
However, such generalized and unspecified explanations through which modern academia 
repeatedly characterizes the seemingly obvious inadequacy of the traditional Tibetan cases give 
the impression that Tibetan grammarians preferred to remain in line with Sanskritic authority 
due to faithfulness or related reasons although they had known better. Other than a 
simplification of the situation at hand, such a premise bears the risk of imposing external 
linguistic principles of adequate grammatical theory formation onto the Tibetan grammatical 
tradition. Apart from the effectively central position of Sanskritic authority, it has not been 
investigated thus far what methodological and theoretical principles of grammatical theory 
formation were operative during the early, formative period of Tibetan grammaticography, nor 
is it by any means self-evident how any such principles have affected grammatical taxonomies 
or persisted or changed throughout the centuries. For example, academic research thus far has 
not brought forth any evidence that the traditional concept of case (rnam dbye) as a progeny of 
                                                          
18 Cf. HSGLT 2, 284ff. 
19 Tournadre 2010, 93. 
20 Dreyfus 2003, 102. 
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Sanskrit vibhakti introduced by the early grammarians equals either the traditional Sanskritic 
notion or the modern linguistic understandings of case grammar. Yet, without a detailed insight 
into the methodological and conceptual foundation of Tibetan case grammar, it is impossible to 
conclude in which ways any knowledge about the Tibetan language has been affected by this 
foundation, and consequently why Tibetan grammarians have adopted and adhered to the case 
model in this particular form. 
The Sanskritic origin of the Tibetan eight cases is well-established and commonly pointed out 
in critiques of the utility of the traditional case model, yet there is a lack of detailed, 
comprehensive studies of the history of the Tibetan case model and its intricate, transcultural 
relation to Sanskrit grammatical knowledge. Thus, this dissertation is a contribution to previous 
work done in this “slumbering field,”21 complementing it with a detailed study of the Tibetan 
case model in and before Si tu Paṇchen’s work. The focus lies on the continuities and 
discontinuities between Si tu’s case grammar, the preceding Tibetan tradition, and Sanskritic 
grammar. Hopefully, this approach will also refine our understanding of the mechanisms that 
have governed the formation of this model within the framework of Tibetan scholasticism and 
Sanskritic scriptural authority. 
1.2 Methodological Remarks 
The prospect of such a thorough and historically sensitive investigation of case grammar in Si 
tu’s work within the conceptual and methodological framework of the Tibetan scholastic 
tradition deserves a few general remarks regarding its methodology and limitations.  
The current dissertation is a historical study. It follows a hermeneutical-philological approach 
and thus primarily relies on textual material and its reception in- and outside the tradition. The 
main primary source is Si tu’s GC, which fortunately is available in several academic and non-
academic editions, although apart from a limited amount of passages on selected issues neither 
a critical edition nor a translation has thus far been produced. Among the editiones principes 
(Das 1915 and Sherab Gyaltsen 1990), this study relies on and quotes the latter, which was 
published in the form of a block print and as part of Si tu’s collected works in fourteen volumes, 
the GC being contained in volume six.  
Other primary sources include a variety of Sanskritic and Tibetan treatises from different fields 
of knowledge, mainly Sanskrit grammar, Buddhist philosophy, Tibetan linguistics and even 
sources related to the Nyāya tradition in the context of the Tibetan second and third case. 
                                                          
21 A personal comment of Peter Verhagen in an e-mail conversation (September 8th, 2015). 
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References are given to the established standard and critical editions wherever possible. This 
was easily possible for most of the Sanskritic sources, however, in the field of Tibetan grammar 
some sources are quoted from contemporary Tibetan publications either because there is no 
consensus regarding standard editions or because they were unavailable. 
Like any other work of academic research, the present work too has limitations which are 
important to keep in mind throughout. These may be summarized into two major points:  
First, there is to mention the sheer volume of Sanskrit and Tibetan grammatical and linguistic 
literature that must be taken into account for an accurate representation of the history of Tibetan 
case grammar and its relation to Sanskritic authority, be it with a focus on a historical survey 
across sources or a single source such as Si tu’s GC, the latter which is full of references to 
other authors and theories. Taking as a template our main author Si tu Paṇchen and confining 
ourselves only to Sanskrit grammar, Peter Verhagen lists a total of thirty titles which belong to 
four different Sanskritic grammatical schools that are mentioned by Si tu as part of his 
grammatical curriculum at the beginning of his massive commentary on the Cāndravyākaraṇa22 
– and we can suppose that this list is still incomplete. If we additionally consider the most 
important Sanskritic and Tibetan sources which are either directly dedicated to grammar or 
include relevant language-related material, this list easily adds up to fifty or more primary 
sources to be considered. Certainly, this is hardly manageable, particularly since much of the 
Tibetan grammatical material remains understudied in modern academia while many of the 
basic and most important Sanskritic and Buddhist sources have been extensively studied. In 
order to maintain a representative and historically sensitive picture of the Tibetan grammatical 
tradition’s heterogeneity as well as of the theoretical and conceptual situation which acted as Si 
tu’s starting point, the investigation of grammatical theories in this work has been divided into 
two parts: the first part will always explore the most important developments of the 
transformation of case grammar previous to Si tu in a more summarized fashion, whereas the 
second part will focus on Si tu’s conception against the background of these developments. 
Nonetheless, a selection of primary sources had to be made:23 
Regarding Sanskritic grammar, I have focused on the two most dominant grammatical schools 
on the Himalayan Plateau, i.e. Kātantra and Cāndra, as well as the most important Sanskrit 
grammatical school in India also known in Tibetan, i.e. the Pāṇinian24 – Si tu, for example, was 
                                                          
22 Cf. HSGLT 2, 172ff. 
23 For a complete list of Sanskrit and Tibetan primary sources, cf. the bibliography. 
24 Although Pāṇini is more accurately the author of the Sanskrit grammar entitled Aṣṭādhyāyī, his composition 
marks the beginning of the Pāṇinian school of Sanskrit grammar and the name Pāṇini also became a generic 
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well familiar with Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī and its commentarial literature, and without the latter 
the two former schools are hardly understandable from a historical point of view. In addition, 
the comparatively late Sārasvatavyākaraṇa also needs to be taken into account, since it dates 
back to after the beginning of linguistic studies in Tibet but enjoyed noteworthy popularity and 
“may still reflect older undercurrents that have not breached the elevated ceiling of scriptural 
documentation.”25 
In addition to Sanskritic grammatical literature, selected passages of language-related 
philosophical texts have also been taken into account: firstly, the Buddhist Abhidharmakośa 
(AK) together with its Bhāṣya (AKBh), Yaśomitra’s sub-commentary Spuṭārthā and the 
Tibetan sub-commentary Chos mngon mdzod kyi tshig le’ur byas pa’i ’grel pa mngon pa’i 
rgyan of Mchims ’jam pa’i dbyangs (~13th century) have been investigated in the context of 
the so-called tshogs gsum (trikāya; ‘three collections’) in AK 2.47, a hierarchical model to 
derive the different constituents of linguistic expression in three layers, namely letters, syllables 
or sounds (yi ge, vyañjana), free, lexical word forms (ming, nāma) as well as syntactically 
complete expressions or sentences (tshig, pada); secondly, the Nyāyasūtra verse 2.1.16 and the 
subsequent Sanskritic commentarial literature has been consulted with regard to the bivalency 
of actions into their active and resultative part in the context of the Tibetan second and third 
cases.  
As for the Tibetan grammatical tradition previous to Si tu, a main focus is placed on early 
sources in order to gain a better understanding of the early conceptions of grammatical theories 
and the thought processes that led to the initial adoption of case grammar in Tibet. These early 
sources include particularly NG and NGg, which are frequently quoted by Si tu, and the Sgra’i 
rnam par dbye ba bstan pa (GNT). A second focus consists in selected grammarians which are 
important either to the further developments of the tradition (e.g. Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga’ 
rgyal mtshan,26 Dpang Lotsāwa Blo gros brtan pa, etc.) or to Si tu (e.g. Smr̥tijñānakīrti, Zha lu 
Lotsāwa, Rnam gling Paṇchen, Pra ti Rin chen don grub, etc.), although the two converge in 
many if not most of the cases. It is not always easy to discern the authors important to Si tu 
himself, since despite his extensive discussions of the former tradition he often prefers not to 
mention details of the referenced authors or titles. 
                                                          
reference to the Aṣṭādhyāyī and the grammatical system therein. Wherever the name Pāṇini is written as such in 
this dissertation, it directly refers to the person, wherever it is written in italics, it refers to his grammatical 
composition (cf. also Abbreviations). 
25 A comment by Peter Verhagen in a personal e-mail conversation (September 1st, 2016 and September 5th, 
2016). 
26 Hereafter referred to as Sakya Paṇḍita. 
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Coming to the work of Si tu himself, the main focus of the entire dissertation remains on the 
GC as its major source, while parts on case grammar in his Cāndra commentary have also been 
included to a limited extent, as well as selected excerpts of various works in his collected works 
in chapter 3. 
The second limitation of this work is more of a linguistic nature: since the current topic is 
concerned with the study of language in Tibet, any hypothesis or conclusion about the 
transformation of grammatical knowledge includes and presumes our understanding of the 
language. We cannot adequately examine grammatical theories and the historical, conceptual 
or linguistic mechanisms that govern their development without accurate knowledge of the 
language structures under investigation in these theories. Although the analysis of Tibetan case 
markers in modern linguistics has brought forth important insights, there is lacking consensus 
regarding a standard case model and questions remain synchronically as well as 
diachronically.27 One might assume that the tradition offers important material to add to our 
knowledge and resolve these issues, however, from a historical perspective as proposed in the 
present work, the main questions concerning the transformation of case grammar and its related 
causes must prevail. Moreover, it has been stated that in many ways the Tibetan case model is 
not a representative account of the language, and apparently it followed principles different than 
those expected from a modern linguistic perspective, a fact which will be investigated in the 
present study. Thus, knowledge of language structures is more a prerequisite rather than the 
result of this research. In the context of actual analyses of grammatical theories, this tends to be 
more a question of emphasis since there usually occurs a synergy of both the analysis of theories 
and the analysis of language. Therefore, one of the shortcomings of this work is that its author 
is not a trained linguist, which impacts on the assessment of the traditional case model 
especially in the context of those case markers whose precise function and use continue to pose 
challenges to modern linguistics. To counteract such shortcoming, in such instances I have 
relied on more recent linguistic studies of Tibetan case grammar, especially those of Tournadre 
(2010) and Hill (2011). On the other hand, the chapter on case grammar is filled with linguistic 
considerations – often more likely speculations and possibilities – in order to point to different 
options of explaining why Tibetan grammarians did what they did.  
Due to these limitations both in the limited source materials as well as in unanswered linguistic 
questions regarding Tibetan language, the current study cannot claim to provide a complete or 
                                                          
27 Cf. chapters 7-14 on the respective cases, especially the second, fourth and seventh cases and the classical case 
marker la don. 
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final picture. The outlined limitations and open nature of this dissertation are manifest in the 
structure of chapters and in those instances where I abstained from any conclusive decision on 
a subject matter, but rather tried to explore and assess different possibilities or options based on 
the available material.28  
 
Following this introduction, the current study is divided into two parts: Part I will commence 
with a historical contextualization of Tibetan grammar in general (chapter 2) and Si tu’s 
grammatical work in particular (chapter 3). Chapter 2 allows the reader to learn more about the 
historical setting that led to the esteemed status of linguistic studies as an established discipline 
with autochthonous contributions to both Sanskrit and Tibetan language. In this context, the 
question will also be addressed how Sum rtags, i.e. the exegesis of the two treatises Sum cu pa 
(SCP) and Rtags kyi ’jug pa (TKJ), became the major means of grammatical theory formation 
in traditional Tibetan grammaticography. Chapter 3 will then turn to Si tu’s life and scholarship, 
particularly his occupation as a true philologist and linguist by heart, which sets the larger 
context of his composition of the GC.  
These two chapters are followed by an introduction to Tibetan grammatical theory formation 
and its mechanisms within the framework of Tibetan scholastic methodology in chapter 4, with 
a main focus on Si tu’s GC and the methodological constellation governing theory formation in 
Sum rtags in order to shed light on the principle of scriptural authority and the ways it affects 
GC’s case grammar.  
Turning to the main topic of case grammar itself, chapter 5 starts with a short overview of the 
Tibetan case model, its history and the related linguistic issues. This chapter introduces a 
selection of modern linguistic as well as traditional Sanskritic and Tibetan theories intended to 
provide the required theoretical and conceptual framework for the main investigation of the 
case model. First, an elaboration of the basic distinctions made in modern linguistic case 
grammar will help us understand better both classical Tibetan case grammar and its modern 
critique (chapter 5.2). The study then goes on to introduce two competing systems for the 
derivation of linguistic expressions that were both transmitted to Tibet, one from Sanskritic 
grammatical sources and one from the Buddhist Abhidharma. This subchapter demonstrates 
how such competing models were negotiated in Tibetan grammatical studies, how they are 
related to case grammar and how Si tu attempted to reconcile and bring them into a unified 
                                                          
28 Cf. also the general note in the Notes to the Reader. 
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version adapted to the morphosyntax of WT (chapter 5.3). This is followed by a brief and 
preliminary note on the notion of kāraka, a crucial category in Sanskrit case semantics which 
was also used widely in other fields of knowledge and played an important part in the formation 
of the Tibetan cases (chapter 5.4).  
After a short introduction (chapter 6), the main and by far most extensive part II consists in a 
detailed individual examination of each of the eight cases in two parts, i.e. a historical survey 
of the times before Si tu followed by his GC (chapters 7-14). Other than each case’s general 
definition and constitution in the different sources,  the investigation focuses on the relation to 
Sanskrit grammatical knowledge. The major historical, linguistic, philological and conceptual 
issues are identified for each case and discussed as far as the materials allow it.  
Finally, the last two chapters, a summary of findings in part II (chapter 15) and the overall 
concluding observations (chapter 16), extract and assemble the bigger picture of major 
arguments and hypotheses from all the small pieces dispersed over the preceding investigations. 
These final chapters are intended to add to our knowledge about the dynamics which 
characterize the transformation of case grammar in the course of its de- and recontextualization 
from the Sanskritic to the Tibetan environment.  
The dissertation also includes an appendix to discuss and clarify the issue of SCP and TKJ’s 
verse numbering in the existent research literature, and I also introduce a new numbering based 
on the edition of the texts contained in volume 6 of Si tu’s collected works (folios 439-446). 
This numbering is taken as the basis for quotations of SCP and TKJ in this dissertation.  
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2 Grammar in the History of Tibetan Scholarship 
2.1 Introduction 
Tibetan intellectual history as we know it is commonly said to begin with the appropriation of 
Buddhism from the Indian subcontinent. This evoked an extensive transfer of knowledge to the 
Land of Snow, its most intensive period lasting approximately from the 7th to the 13th century, 
including intermissions. The earliest phase of this cross-cultural contact lasted until the mid-
9th century and is known as the earlier dissemination of Buddhism (snga dar). It coincides with 
the Tibetan imperial epoch, in which larger areas of Central Asia were brought under the rule 
of a Tibetan central leadership.29 According to Tibetan historiography, in which much of this 
time has been mystified and thus requires our cautious reading, the Tibetan king Srong btsan 
sgam po (c. 617-650), whose conquests usually define the beginning of the Tibetan empire,30 
took two wives: the Nepalese princess Bhrikuti Devi and the Chinese princess Wencheng of 
the Tang dynasty.31 These two are credited for first having introduced Buddhism by each 
bringing along a Buddhist icon to Tibet. It is further said that the king ordered the construction 
of two temples as repositories for these gifts, which today are known as the famous monuments 
Ra mo che and Jo khang in Lhasa.32 However, Srong btsan sgam po’s interest in a larger 
propagation of Buddhism is difficult to trace. Although an inscription on the Skar cung rdo ring 
dating back to the 9th century attests the founding of temples during his reign,33 much of the 
promotion of Buddhism in Tibet attributed by Tibetan historiographers to princess Wencheng 
probably can be traced to the deeds of the Chinese princess Jincheng, who was married to Khri 
Lde gtsug brtsan in the first half of the 8th century.34  
About a hundred years after Srong btsan sgam po, it can be ascertained that Khri Lde gtsug 
brtsan’s son and successor Khri srong lde btsan (r. 755-797) officially converted to Buddhism 
(c. 779)35 and initiated its institutionalization through the construction and consecration of the 
                                                          
29 For a brief historical survey of the Tibetan empire, cf. Dotson 2009, 16ff.  
30 Based on his study of the Old Tibetan Annals, Dotson connects the beginning of the imperial epoch already to 
events two generations earlier (mid-6th century), followed by the expansion of the former Yar lung kingdom by 
Srong btsan sgam po’s father Slon mtshan (cf. Dotson 2009, 16f.). 
31 Srong btsan sgam po’s marriage with the Chinese princess Wencheng is verified by independent sources, 
namely the Tibetan Old Tibetan Annals and the Chinese Old Tang Annals, cf. Dotson 2009, 22. These early 
sources appear to remain silent regarding his Nepalese marriage, although there are indications that the Licchavi 
king Narendradeva spent several years in Tibetan exile during the 630s (cf. van Schaik 2011, 73). On issues 
regarding the fatherhood of Bhrikuti Devi (Khri btsun), cf. also Sørensen 1994, 199, ft. 560. 
32 For a classical account of this narrative in the Rgyal rab gsal ba’i me long of the 14th century and with critical 
annotation, cf. Sørensen 1994, chapters XII and XIII. 
33 Cf. Richardson 1985, 75. 
34 Cf. Dotson 2009, 19. 
35 Cf. ibid., 20f. 
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first monastery in Bsam yas and the foundation of a Tibetan saṅgha. Bsam yas then became 
known as the site of the famous, yet mystified debate which took place between two Buddhist 
monks during the reign of the same Khri srong lde btsan, Kamalaśīla from India and Moheyan 
from China. This debate would decide which form of Buddhism the Tibetan emperor should 
adopt and promote.36 The work of Matthew Kapstein and others has brought to our attention 
that before Buddhism started to dominate Tibetan civilization on so many of its layers, Tibetans 
had already been familiar with several ‘foreign’ cultural forms, including Chinese 
historiography, Greek medicine, Nestorian Christianity or Manichaeism. Thus, “to explain the 
success and thoroughness of Buddhism’s Tibetan conquest remains a central problem for the 
historical study and interpretation of Tibetan civilization.”37 Kapstein offers a selection of key 
aspects for why Buddhism did not simply provide a set of religious beliefs, but how it 
represented a full package of assets for the unification, protection and organization of the 
centralized Tibetan imperial state that might have motivated its promotion by Tibetan royalty 
during these early centuries.38 However, it should also be remarked that Buddhism did not 
succeed immediately and without resistance, since its royal promotion seems to have waned 
throughout the imperial epoch and due to ongoing rivalries between Buddhism and older forms 
of religion and ritual in Tibet, most notably during the empire’s own demise (c. mid-9th 
century).  
2.2 The Beginnings of Literacy and Grammar According to Tibetan Historiography 
The introduction of Buddhism concurs with the emergence of Tibetan literacy itself – a 
historical episode of utmost importance for the entire Tibetan intellectual history. Tibetan 
Buddhist historiographies after the 10th century, such as the Rgyal rab gsal ba’i me long, report 
first contacts with scripture as early as during the reign of the mythologized king Lha tho tho ri 
snyan shal, five generations before king Srong btsan sgam po. 39  The commonly accepted 
version of this narrative claims that a casket containing Buddhist texts fell from the sky, either 
at the feet of king Lha tho tho ri or on the roof of his palace.40 The texts supposedly contained 
in this casket differ in various historical sources, but usually the Karaṇḍavyūhasūtra and The 
Pangkong Homages are mentioned. However, Lha tho tho ri was illiterate and thus unable to 
                                                          
36 The winner of this two-year debate was Kamalaśīla and thus Indian Buddhism. 
37 Kapstein 2000, 3. 
38 Cf. ibid., chapter 4. 
39 For a more detailed account of the following narrative, cf. van Schaik 2011, 46ff.  
40 For Nelpa Paṇḍita’s (13th century) contestation of this version as well as the Fifth Dalai Lama’s counter-
critique against Nelpa Paṇḍita, cf. van Schaik 2011, 47. 
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read these texts, and so he resealed them under the label of gnyan po gsang ba (‘secret 
potency’).41  
According to Tibetan traditional accounts, it was only five generations later that the wise 
minister Thon mi Saṃbhoṭa with an entire delegation was dispatched to India at the command 
of king Srong btsan sgam po to study Indian systems of writing. The extant versions of this 
second narrative also differ in some of the provided details.42 At the latest from Bu ston Rin 
chen grub’s (1290-1364) Treasury of Priceless Scripture43  onwards, Tibetan sources hand 
down history in the form that it was Thon mi Saṃbhoṭa to whom the tradition is not only in 
debt for creating the Tibetan script and thus initiating Tibetan literacy as still in practice today 
but also for composing the first set of eight Tibetan grammatical texts.44 Moreover, since during 
his studies in India minister Thon mi also became proficient in different fields of learning, he 
is also credited with the first translations of Buddhist sources into the newly established written 
form of Tibetan.45 With the power of writing and grammar at free disposal, the heavenly casket 
could be reopened and the contained Buddhist texts finally translated. In this way, “it is said 
that the path of Shakyamuni’s teaching started to spread in the north, similar to a lamp raised 
in the darkness.”46 While not explicitly mentioned either in Bu ston’s History, the Rgyal rab 
gsal ba’i me long or the Blue Annals, it is commonly claimed that the seminal textbooks Sum 
cu pa (SCP) and Rtags kyi ’jug pa (TKJ), both of which are contained in the treatises section of 
the Tibetan Buddhist canon (bstan ’gyur), are the only two grammars of the eightfold set that 
are preserved. Consequently, these two texts have attained the status of the very foundation of 
Tibetan grammaticography to the extent that following the 13th/14th century, most of Tibetan 
                                                          
41 On the translation of this term, cf. also Dotson 2006. 
42 For a more detailed and historically sensitive summary of the legend of Thon mi Saṃbhoṭa, cf. van Schaik 
2011, 49ff. For the version contained in the Rgyal rab gsal ba’i me long, cf. Sørensen 1994, chapter X. 
43 This treatise, commonly referred to as Bu ston’s History (of Buddhism), was first translated by E. Obermiller 
(1931 and 1932) and more recently by L. Stein and Ngawang Zangpo (2013).  
44 Already the Old Tibetan Chronicle affirms that the writing system was introduced during the reign of king 
Srong btsan sgam po (cf. Kapstein 2000, 55 and van Schaik 2011, 52). In contrast, the narrative of Thon mi 
Saṃbhoṭa’s creation of a Tibetan writing system is traced back by van Schaik at least to the Pillar Testament 
(Bka’ chems ka khol ma) and the Testament of Ba (Dba’ bzhed) (cf. van Schaik 2011, 49). Regarding Thon mi’s 
authorship of grammatical literature, the Rgyal rab gsal ba’i me long of the 14th century lists four unknown titles 
of seemingly linguistic character that are attributed to him, but it makes no mention of Bu ston’s version of eight 
grammatical texts (cf. Sørensen 1994, chapter X). Bu ston, however, did not mention the titles of the eight texts. 
Thon mi’s composition of eight grammatical works seems to represent the most established account in the 
subsequent tradition and was adopted by grammarians such as Zha lu Lotsāwa or Si tu Paṇchen.  
45 For one list of titles allegedly translated by Thon mi himself, cf., e.g., Naga 2006, 13, where Naga refers to 
Mkhas pa lde’u and his Rgya bod kyi chos ’byung rgyas pa (13th century ?). 
46 […] smag la sgron me bteg pa bzhin du shākya’i bstan pa byang phyogs su rgyas pa’i lam gyi thog ma snang 
bar gyur to/     zhes grags so/ (GC 450.6).  
In this dissertation, I quote Si tu’s Great Commentary from Sherab Gyaltsen’s edition of Si tu’s collected works 
1990, vol. 6. The first number refers to the folio, the second number to the line (cf. also Abbreviations). 
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grammatical theory formation was conducted by means of commentaries on these two 
sources.47  
The account of the authorship of both preserved grammars SCP and TKJ in their established 
form together with the introduction of the writing system – all done by a single hand at the very 
dawn of Tibetan intellectual history – is historically doubtful and was subjected to severe 
critique in modern academia.48 However, the two narratives of Lha tho tho ri’s first encounter 
with scripture and Thon mi’s initiation of Tibetan literacy combine important motives in post-
10th century historiography that have become constitutive for Tibetan Buddhist civilization and 
its identity formation. First, one can observe a strong symbolic value retrospectively attributed 
by Tibetan historiographers to scripture in the narrative of Lha tho tho ri, who not only received 
the first exemplars of writing from heaven but also regarded them as a yet mysterious source of 
power. Thus, a certain mystification and symbolism is connected to scripture and writing, which 
was perhaps already involved during the early stages of Tibetan literacy and the shift from a 
non-literate to a literate culture. However, the details of such an early symbolic status are 
difficult to trace, and we should be cautious not to exaggerate it, since earlier sources like the 
Old Tibetan Chronicle and Old Tibetan Annals dwell only on the bureaucratic and 
administrative purposes of writing. 49  Moreover, Tibetans must have been familiar with 
scripture already before the invention of their own script through the contact with different 
literate neighbors, a fact confirmed by the legend of Lha tho tho ri. 
As van Schaik has sharp-wittedly noticed, another important motive that surfaces in both 
narratives is the connection of scripture with Buddhism.50 While the potency of Lha tho tho ri’s 
received scriptural exemplars certainly did not exclusively lie in their written form but also in 
the fact of their – yet unknown – Buddhist origin, the legend of Thon mi directly links the 
invention of writing with Buddhist motives such as the spread of Buddhism in Tibet and the 
translation of Buddhist sources. Yet, the Old Tibetan Chronicle and Old Tibetan Annals again 
lack any reference to the translation or composition of Buddhist texts as a major scriptural task 
                                                          
47 The earliest dedicated commentary known at present is Dbus pa blo gsal’s Rtags ’jug kyi ’grel pa (14th 
century), although some version of the root texts must have circulated earlier, at least most of their content 
occurs literally in Sakya Paṇḍita’s Yi ge’i sbyor ba yet in an entirely different order of the verses. Like SCP and 
TKJ, Sakya Paṇḍita’s text is a short grammar composed in verse form that are partially identical with those in 
the root texts and partially unknown from SCP or TKJ. The Yi ge’i sbyor ba makes reference to neither of the 
two. On the Yi ge’i sbyor ba and its relation to SCP and TKJ, cf. Miller 1993, 130ff. In addition, parts such as the 
old derivation of the traditional grammatical case marker la don in SCP hint into the direction of an early 
composition at least of some portions of the two texts (cf. infra 82). 
48 Cf. Miller 1993 and van Schaik 2011, 51. 
49 Cf. van Schaik 2011, 52ff. 
50 Cf. ibid. 
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during the reign of king Srong btsan sgam po, although the invention of a writing system was 
indubitably indispensable for a larger-scale introduction of Buddhism.51  It is evident and 
without need of elaboration that literacy must have been a powerful technology to organize the 
administration of the state in the form of record-writing, legislation, taxation and so on. 
However, Buddhist scholarly tasks such as the translation of Buddhist sources do not seem to 
have become a dominant force before the institutionalization of Buddhism by Khri srong lde 
btsan (r. 755-797 AD). 
Thon mi’s travel to India directly connects both the quest to spread Buddhism in Tibet as well 
as the invention of a Tibetan writing system with India. While the written form of Tibetan was 
certainly developed based on Indian abugida scripts the precise templates have been heavily 
debated among traditional and academic linguists. Usually, these are considered to have 
consisted in the Indian Brahmī script or one of its derivates which had previously circulated in 
South and Central Asia.52 In his recent investigation of the Tibetan writing system, van Schaik 
argues with strong paleographic and historical evidence that the most likely candidates for such 
templates are the late Gupta scripts (5th - early 7th century) in the regions of present-day 
Northern India and Nepal.53 This is not the place to consider the historical and linguistic reasons 
involved in the Tibetan adoption of the abugida form of writing widely spread in South Asian 
regions, as opposed to, for example, a logographic system with which they would have been 
familiar with based on their contacts to their Chinese neighbors. However, it is important to 
note that this basic orientation in systems of writing towards the Indian model does not apply 
in the same way to all other appropriated writing practices during imperial times. Kapstein lists 
a number of non-Indian forms of knowledge the Tibetans had acquired before the dominance 
of Buddhism,54 and Dotson, in his study and translation of the Old Tibetan Annals, points 
towards influential affiliations to Chinese bureaucracy during the time of Srong btsan sgam po 
by tracing these in the perhaps likewise exaggerated Chinese account found in the Old Tang 
Annals.55 In the same study, among those works translated into Tibetan already by the mid-8th 
century, Dotson also mentions Chinese classics, Chan Buddhist teachings and apocrypha, thus 
corroborating the influx of non-Indian knowledge during that time.56 
                                                          
51 Cf. ibid. On the issue of the beginning of translation in Tibet, cf. infra 24. 
52 For an introduction to the Tibetan script, cf. van der Kuijp 1996. 
53 Cf. van Schaik 2011. For his delineation of Northern India, cf. ibid., ft. 73. 
54 Cf. supra 18. 
55 Cf. Dotson 2009, 11. 
56 Cf. ibid., 20. 
22 
 
Along with the above motives of the symbolic power of scripture, the Buddhification of the 
foundation of Tibetan literacy and its connection to India features lastly the composition of the 
first Tibetan grammars in the legend of Thon mi.57 Despite the unresolved issues surrounding 
the composition of SCP and TKJ and the historicity of Thon mi Saṃbhoṭa as such, the basic 
orientation regarding the issue of grammar towards India and Sanskrit from the very beginning 
of Tibetan linguistic analysis remains largely uncontested. Not only does the Tibetan 
grammatical system indisputably exhibit such conceptual and terminological affinities, but also 
other possible role models such as Chinese grammatical studies only emerge much later than 
the Tibetan imperial epoch,58 and in this time linguistic studies are testified through several 
grammatical sources in addition to the historically problematic SCP and TKJ.59 
The legends of Lha tho tho ri and Thon mi present a picture of Tibetan history in which the 
adoption of scripture and grammar from the Indian subcontinent were important, even sacred 
vehicles for the Tibetan civilization, a civilization understood above all as the result of the 
appropriation of Buddhism, Buddhist scholarship and ultimately Buddhist salvation. This 
fundamental status of grammar for Buddhism is further supported by grammarians in a mostly 
pious fashion that depicts the purpose of grammatical endeavors in an intuitive causal chain: 
Buddhist salvation or enlightenment is nothing but a state of ultimate knowledge or 
omniscience, a type of knowledge for which language and scripture are ultimately insufficient 
yet indispensable in the process of learning, and mastery of language and scripture, in turn, 
means mastery of grammar.60 
The tradition’s own perception of the foundational character of grammatical studies in the 
Tibetan Buddhist scholarly enterprise and the propagated role of grammar in the civilization of 
Tibet and the Buddhist path to enlightenment – regardless of its historical accuracy – must have 
been an important force in the promotion of this discipline, and we have seen the most famous 
specimen of this perception in the present section. However, the emergence and flourishing of 
grammar and linguistics was most certainly the result of a complex of different theoretical, 
cultural, political, religious and other factors in the history of Tibetan scholarship that remain 
only vaguely perceptible with our current state of knowledge. Among the many efforts and 
                                                          
57 Note that the Tibetan Bon tradition does not accept this narrative and relates the writing system to different 
origins including Central Asia or even Iran (cf. van der Kuijp 1996, 431 and van Schaik 2011, 65ff.). This claim 
by followers of the non-Buddhist Bon has to be regarded not exclusively as an important historical matter but 
again in the context of a power struggle regarding the cultural identity of Tibet and Bon’s raison d’etre against 
the backdrop of a strongly domineering Buddhism on the Himalayan Plateau.  
58 Cf. infra 49f. 
59 Cf. HSGLT 2, chapter 1.1.1 and 1.1.2.  
60 On Lce Khyi ’brug’s parable of the boat and the ocean to emphasize the importance of grammar, cf. e.g. infra 
30f. 
 23 
 
practices in the Land of Snow which have in one way or another relied on scripture, the 
following section will take a closer look at the transmission of Buddhist knowledge from India 
and the translation of Buddhist sources. The translation enterprises of Buddhist literature are of 
particular interest in this context, since during the 8th/9th century they prompted an extensive 
standardization not only of translational practices but of the written form of Tibetan itself that 
stands in close relation to the emergence of grammatical studies, at least as far as we are able 
to trace it in the source materials other than the presented legendary accounts.  
2.3 Early Linguistic Studies in Tibet and the Translation of Buddhist Sources  
Amongst the most important means of the appropriation of Buddhism was the translation of a 
vast corpus of mostly – but not exclusively – Sanskrit sources into the newly established written 
Tibetan language. Any translation of more complex material requires various degrees of 
comparative analytical knowledge about the source and target language, and thus it is 
intelligible that the large-scale translation of Buddhist sources coincided also with the study of 
grammar. It is noteworthy in this context that many, if not most Tibetan grammarians also were 
active translators as well as Buddhist scholars. This holds true already during the imperial epoch 
and not only for the legendary account of Thon mi as an alleged grammarian and translator, but 
also for figures such as the Tibetan-Chinese translator Chos grub (Facheng; 9th century) or the 
venerated Lce Khyi ’brug (8th/9th century), both who composed grammatical texts that 
presently rank among the earliest dateable texts in the Tibetan tradition. The former composed 
a short exposé of case grammar in Tibetan (either for Tibetan, Sanskrit or both) entitled ’Jug 
pa’i sgra brgyad bstan pa tshig le’ur byas pa (‘Exposition of the Eight Joining 
Terms/Morphemes/Forms in Verse Form’), 61  whereas Lce Khyi ’brug authored the Gnas 
brgyad chen po’i rtsa ba (NG; ‘Root Text on the Eight Great Linguistic Topics’) and 
presumably also the Gnas brgyad ’grel pa (NGg; ‘Commentary on the Eight Linguistic 
Topics’)62 as well as perhaps even the Sgra’i rnam par dbye ba bstan pa (GNT; ‘Exposition of 
the Linguistic Cases’), all three of which are consecutively contained in the bstan ’gyur.63 Thus, 
the connection between translation and the study of grammar is not only intuitive, but in the 
Tibetan context it is also attested historically. Yet, the emergence of grammatical studies as an 
esteemed and separate field in which Tibetan scholars composed autochthonous works on both 
Sanskrit and Tibetan grammar was not per se the necessary consequence of Buddhist 
                                                          
61 Cf. HSGLT 2, 362ff. 
62 For a discussion of these eight topics, cf. HSGLT 2, 6ff. The Gnas brgyad ’grel pa is alternatively referred to 
as Sgra’i bstan bcos (‘Linguistic Śāstra’). Case grammar is covered in topic 6, the topic of grammatical cases. 
63 Cf. HSGLT 2, chapter 1.1.1.1-3. Note, however, that the third of these three texts, namely the Sgra’i rnam par 
dbye ba bstan pa (GNT), is missing in the Sde dge and Co ne editions of the bstan ’gyur. 
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translation. This is evident also from Buddhist translation practices in China, where the study 
of grammar as a dedicated and distinct field did not emerge in pre-modern times.64 What 
historical traces are therefore to be found in Tibet which would explain the emergence of a 
grammatical science and its close connection to translation?  
In contrast to Tibetan historiography, which traces the first (Buddhist) translations back to Thon 
mi and Srong btsan sgam po, the beginning of translational practices and related royal interest 
during imperial times is much more difficult to trace before Khri srong lde btsan (r. 755-797). 
Next to Dotson’s mention of the translation of Chinese literature by the mid-8th century,65 two 
imperial edicts of the 8th and 9th centuries also allude to possibly earlier translations of 
Buddhist texts such as the Ratnamegha or the Laṅkāvātarasūtra and even to the ratification of 
translational principles, yet the edicts in their preserved versions vary in the dating of these 
events.66 Accounts such as Thon mi’s translation of the first Buddhist texts into Tibetan during 
Srong btsan sgam po’s reign, though not impossible, lack verification. Whichever translations 
may have existed in whatever form previous to the mid-8th century, at the very latest from Khri 
srong lde btsan’s times onwards, large-scale translation efforts of (Sanskrit) Buddhist sources 
certainly were effected with an associated patronage by the royalty, which also included the 
institutionalization and standardization of translational practices.  
Much more far-reaching than mere guidelines for transferring knowledge from one language 
into another, Tibetan scholars and translators accomplished the creation of a highly 
standardized classical literary language, commonly known as chos skad (‘Dharma language’) 
and suitable for the translation of highly technical and sophisticated textual material in various 
fields of knowledge.67  The resultant accuracy and its proximity to the translated Sanskrit 
originals are esteemed within modern academia and even resulted in attempts to reconstruct 
sources where the Sanskrit original is lost.68 Among the testimonies preserved from this period, 
the Bye brag tu rtogs byed chen mo (Mahāvyutpatti, MVY) and Sgra sbyor bam po gnyis pa 
                                                          
64 On Chinese translation techniques, cf. HSGLT 1, 47f. and Zürcher 1982, 162-164. On Chinese grammatical 
studies, cf. infra 49f. 
65 Cf. supra 21. 
66 On the issue of dating the two mentioned translations, cf. Scherrer-Schaub 2002, 294ff. Scherrer-Schaub 
argues that “the idea they might have been translated into Tibetan at an early date should not 
be hastily rejected” (Scherrer-Schaub 2002, 298f.; cf. also ibid., 327). Regarding the first ratification of 
translational principles, the edicts leave open the possibility for a date before Khri srong lde btsan, although 
Scherrer-Schaub proposes the year 763 during his reign (cf. ibid., 314f.). On the two royal edicts and the 
different versions, cf. infra 25ff.  
67 Cf. Ruegg 2004, 322f. 
68 The Central University of Tibetan Studies in Sarnath, India, for example, has installed a separate Restoration 
Department that published several critical editions and restorations of Sanskrit Buddhist sources from Tibetan 
(http://www.cuts.ac.in/GuestSection/restoration.html, accessed March 6th, 2017).   
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(SSBP) bear the most impressive witness to the outstanding efforts to establish a literary form 
of Tibetan for scholarly purposes. The Mahāvyutpatti represents a Sanskrit-Tibetan glossary 
which consists of more than 9.500 entries arranged into 283 semantic categories coined by 
translators,69 ranging from various areas of Buddhist thought to more general topics such as 
‘names of diseases’ (no. 283) and others. A number of entries (4.705-4.736) of this treatise is 
already dedicated to Sanskrit grammatical terminology under the heading ‘vyākaraṇa’i skad kyi 
ming la’ (‘terms of the idiom of vyākaraṇa’),70 followed by the standard paradigm of the eight 
Sanskrit cases together with their reproduction in Tibetan language based on the noun 
vr̥kṣa/shing (‘tree, wood’). The second treatise, the SSBP, includes a commentary on 413 
lexical entries of the MVY.71 
Additionally, we are in the fortunate situation to have two royal edicts pertaining to these early 
translation activities. The later and better known edict is contained in the first part of the SSBP 
and thus incorporated in the treatises section of the Tibetan Buddhist canon (bstan ’gyur).72 It 
was decreed during the reign of Khri lde srong btsan Sad na legs (r. 799-815), probably in the 
year 814. The earlier edict, which is likewise accompanied by a lexical part of comparable 
volume,73 goes back to Khri lde srong btsan’s father and predecessor, the emperor Khri srong 
lde btsan (r. 755-797) mentioned above.74 
These two decrees testify the existence of a total of three ratifications of normative principles 
for the translation of Buddhist sources.75 The first ratification is mentioned in the two decrees 
only in a cursory and retrospective fashion, and therefore its date and involved authorities are 
more opaque. As for the second ratification, it is accepted that the earlier of the two edicts, i.e. 
the Tabo version, was issued on its occasion, whereas the third ratification of translational 
norms was the purpose of the edict of Khri lde srong btsan Sad na legs contained in the 
canonical Sgra sbyor (SSBP). In most general terms, the later edict accepts and confirms the 
principles already mentioned in the Tabo version, yet it also adds to them and provides further 
                                                          
69 According to Sakaki’s edition 1916-25; cf. HSGLT 1, 17. 
70 Transl. HSGLT 2, 19. 
71 Cf. HSGLT 1, 17f. 
72 In addition to this edition, there exists “a fragmentary Dunhuang manuscript of what appears to be a virtually 
identical state of the edict and the text of sGra sbyor bam po gnyis pa proper […] kept in the Bibliothéque 
Nationale (Paris)” (Verhagen 2015, 183), i.e. Pelliot tibétain 845. 
73 Cf. Scherrer-Schaub 2002, ft. 142. 
74 This earlier edict is usually referred to as the ‘Tabo version,’ since it was discovered and identified among the 
Tabo manuscripts by Panglung Rinpoche in 1991 (cf. Scherrer-Schaub 2002, 270 and Panglung 1994). Scherrer-
Schaub proposes the year 783 as the ratification of this earlier edict (cf. Scherrer-Schaub 2002, 314f.). 
75 For a detailed discussion of the edicts, cf. Scherrer-Schaub 2002. Following her study, the years of the three 
ratifications would be tentatively 763 or a little later (i.e. approximately the time of Śāntarakṣita’s arrival in 
Tibet), 783 or less possibly 795, and 814. 
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detail.76 Peter Verhagen discusses the details of how the translational tools promulgated in the 
two edicts advanced in the period between them, noting that “it seems the additional instructions 
(of the later edict) were not ‘new’ in the sense of being recent new insights per se, but perhaps 
rather formalizations of practices that had been current were here formally endorsed by the 
imperial edict.” 77  These two edicts and the three ratifications attested therein for the 
standardization of translation and the chos skad occur in an already initiated, ongoing process 
of translation in Tibet and are a reaction to perceived deficiencies that have surfaced in this 
process. Whatever translational practices may have already existed in and before the mid-8th 
century, these edicts represent important witnesses of a royally supported, institutionalized 
revision of these practices and the written Tibetan language as their most important means. 
According to the edict contained in the canonical SSBP, a central committee referred to as the 
Bcom ldan ʼdas kyi ring lugs kyi ʼdun sa, which was probably installed already during the reign 
of Khri srong lde btsan,78 was commissioned to supervise the translation of new terminology. 
Upon its approval, every newly adopted term was then added to a reference catalogue (dkar 
chag), presumably some version of the MVY. The edict emphasizes that any independent action 
in this regard by individual translation institutes (grwa) was strictly prohibited, which was a 
way of assuring that the translation techniques and guidelines also defined in the edict were 
followed to the greatest extent. These instructions also convey evidence for the importance 
attributed at that time to grammatical analysis in efforts to improve and standardize translational 
activities: 
 sngon lha sras yab kyi ring la/     ā cārya bo dhi satva dang/     ye shes dbang po dang/     
 zhang rgyal nyen nya bzang dang/     blon khri gzher sang shi dang/     lo tsā ba dznyā 
 na de ba ko ṣa dang/     lce khyi ’brug dang/     bram ze ā nanda la sogs pas chos kyi 
 skad bod la ma grags pa las ming du btags pa mang dag cig mchis pa’i nang nas kha 
 cig chos kyi gzhung dang/     byā ka ra ṇa’i lugs dang mi mthun te/     mi bcos su mi rung 
 ba rnams kyang bcos/     skad kyi ming gces so ’tshal gyis kyang bsnan nas theg pa che 
 chung gi gzhung las ji ltar ’byung ba dang/     gna’i mkhan po chen po nā gā rdzu na 
 dang/     ba su bandhu la sogs pas ji ltar bshad pa dang/     byā ka ra ṇa’i sgra’i lugs 
 las ji skad du ’dren pa dang yang bstun te/ 
“Earlier, during the time of the father (i.e. Khri srong lde btsan; r. 755-797) of the 
 divine son (i.e. Khri lde srong btsan), a great corpus of terms had been coined from the 
                                                          
76 For a direct comparison of the two edicts, cf. Scherrer-Schaub 2002, 317ff. 
77 Verhagen 2015, 185. 
78 Already the Tabo version mentions a bcom ldan ’das ring lugs (cf. Scherrer-Schaub 2002, 88).  
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 Dharma language [previously] unknown in Tibet by Ācāryabodhisattva, Ye shes dbang 
po, Zhang Rgyal nyen nya bzang, the minister Khri bzher sang shi, the translator 
Jñānadevakoṣa, Lce Khyi ’brug, the brahmin Ananda and others. Among these [terms], 
some had to be inevitably amended due to their discordance with the Dharma sources 
and the grammatical system (= vyākaraṇa). Furthermore, [this corpus of terms] was 
augmented by all the nomenclature that was deemed important. Then [these terms] were 
[coined] in accordance with the way they occur in the scriptures of the higher and lower 
vehicles, the way they were explained by earlier masters, such as Nāgārjuna, 
Vasubandhu and others, and the way they are derived from the linguistic system of 
vyākaraṇa.”79 
This passage describes the motives for issuing this third revision of translational practices, i.e. 
a discordance with authoritative knowledge during the time of Khri srong lde btsan.80 It refers 
twice to Indian vyākaraṇa (‘grammar’) as an authority which must be – and apparently has not 
been sufficiently – taken into account in the translation of terminology. Peter Verhagen presents 
the various types of Sanskrit grammatical analysis which were executed in the lexical part of 
the SSBP for translations of Sanskrit terminology into Tibetan and which required knowledge 
of traditional Sanskrit grammar. 81  Thus, the royally supported efforts to issue common 
principles included vyākaraṇa as one such criteria, and in this way linguistic sciences were 
promoted on the Himalayan Plateau during these early times. Although the earlier edict 
contained in the Tabo version lacks the above passage and therefore does not explicitly mention 
vyākaraṇa as an important authority,82 the lexical part attached to it proves the use of Sanskrit 
grammatical analysis – which indicates that the role of vyākaraṇa in the compilation and 
standardization of terminology was already established earlier than the third and final 
ratification present in the SSBP. 
The fact that Indian vyākaraṇa became an integral part of the translators’ efforts to revise 
existing translations and reform the practices that produced them is perhaps of little surprise in 
view of their close collaboration with Sanskrit paṇḍitas, a few of which were just named above 
in SSBP’s edict. In Indian scholarly education, there has been a strong and long-standing 
                                                          
79 CT 115 – 312f. For alternative translations of this passage, cf. Scherrer-Schaub 1999, 69; Kapstein 2003, 755f. 
80 This part is therefore missing in the earlier edict and represents an addition. 
81 Cf. HSGLT 1, 19ff. 
82 Cf. Scherrer-Schaub 2002, 318f. 
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emphasis on the study of grammar,83 as attested, for example, in the prelude (kathāmukha) to 
the world-famous Pañcatantra:  
 “’Gentlemen, it is known to you that these sons of mine, being hostile to education, are 
 lacking in discernment. So when I behold them, my kingdom brings me no happiness, 
 though all external thorns are drawn. For there is wisdom in the proverb: 
  Of sons unborn, or dead, or fools, 
  Unborn or dead will do: 
  They cause a little grief, no doubt; 
  But fools, a long life through. 
 And again: 
  To what good purpose can a cow 
  That brings no calf nor milk, be bent? 
  Or why beget a son who proves 
  A dunce and disobedient? 
 Some means must therefore be devised to awaken their intelligence.’  
 And they, one after another, replied: ‘O King, first one learns grammar, in twelve years. 
 If this subject has somehow been mastered, then one masters the books on religion and 
 practical life. Then the intelligence awakens.’”84  
In his study of education in ancient India, Hartmut Scharfe states that “what is almost totally 
absent is the concept of a science or an art for its own sake, since even the seemingly most 
theoretical science has a goal - not the detached search for truth as we would have it, but 
deliverance through assimilation of the truth that has been revealed.”85 This holds equally true 
for the science of grammar. Patañjali, for example, refers to grammar as the most important 
among the six ancillaries to the study of the Veda, for such purposes as to preserve the sacred 
Veda, assure correct understanding, correctly perform ritual and more generally to eradicate 
defective use of words among brahmins.86 When Patañjali’s emphasis on Sanskrit grammar is 
regarded in its socio-political context, what was most likely at stake was the Sanskritic and 
Brahmanical dominion which was threatened by the Prakrit languages spoken by the common 
                                                          
83 Cf. Scharfe 2002, 60f. In this context, cf. also Takakusu’s translation of the Chinese Buddhist monk I-tsing’s 
travel records (671-695) to India and the Malay Archipelago, where the latter devoted a section on education, 
including a grammatical curriculum in western (?) India (cf. I-tsing 1896, chapter XXXIV, 167ff.). 
84 Transl. Ryder 1925, 13f.  
85 Scharfe 2002, 59. 
86 Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen (1986, 26ff.) on Mahābhāṣya (MBh), Paspaśāhnika, Bhāṣya 16ff., particularly 
Bhāṣya 19. The six ancillary disciplines are śikṣā (‘phonetics’), kalpa (‘ritual’), vyākaraṇa (‘grammar’), nirukta 
(‘etymology’), chandas (‘prosody’) and jyotiṣa (‘astrology’). 
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people.87 Yet, the importance and prestige of Sanskrit grammatical studies remained throughout 
the course of time, even after different forms of Prakrit languages evolved in literary arts and 
philosophy.88 Sanskrit is the language that is ‘properly constructed’ (saṃskr̥ta) and the correct 
use of Sanskrit words continued to be highly esteemed, prestigious and even necessary to many 
of the scholarly and religious practices in India. 
Returning to the Himalayan plateau, the above passage from the SSBP ranks among the earliest 
dateable testimonies to the fact that grammatical studies had been practiced and esteemed, and 
it is perhaps the only one of that time which provides a concrete historical context and describes 
the promotion of this practice as a royally supported, centralized revision and standardization 
of translation. Apart from these fractured bits, it is difficult to trace whether grammatical 
analysis already existed before the royally supported revision enterprises. We can assume that 
grammatical studies must have been involved from the very time the first translations were 
made from Sanskrit, simply for the acquisition of necessary language skills. May these have 
been initiated already during the time of Srong btsan sgam po or only shortly before the first 
revision, it was most likely through the centralized revision of translational practices that the 
Tibetan tradition first gave increasing and lasting attention to grammar.  
The shape and form of possible grammatical studies previous to the revisions remains unknown 
– perhaps these were confined to translators who conducted a merely passive study of Sanskrit 
grammar, perhaps there were first compositions of study materials or perhaps even real 
linguistic treatises such as proto-versions of SCP and TKJ. As already noted above, with the 
8th/9th century we have evidence for the existence of Tibetan linguistic works in relation to the 
translation of Buddhist sources by figures such as Lce Khyi ’brug and Facheng (Chos grub), 
and thus in- and outside the context of royally supported translation revision. The following 
section will take a closer look at such traces and how the composition of linguistic texts emerged 
within the revision and standardization of Sanskrit Buddhist translations. 
2.3.1 On the Beginnings of Tibetan Autochthonous Grammatical Compositions 
The extent and depth of Sanskrit grammatical analysis in the lexical part of the SSBP and its 
Tabo version certainly required an extensive occupation with the Sanskritic grammatical system 
(vyākaraṇa’i lugs). Yet, the ways in which this focus on Indian vyākaraṇa led further to the 
composition of autochthonous grammars is an intricate issue with a general lack of more 
extensive evidence. One helpful point of reference may be the Tibetan translator and 
                                                          
87 Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1991, 8f. 
88 Cf. also Scharfe 2002, 61f. 
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grammarian Lce Khyi ’brug, who flourished already shortly before the issuing of the second 
edict quoted above and who presumably is the author of up to three grammatical works 
preserved in the bstan ’gyur. He is also listed among the active translators during the time of 
Khri srong lde btsan and was thus involved in the contemporaneous terminological 
standardization and compilation.89 As testified by the existence of sources such as Lce Khyi 
’brug’s NG, his efforts as a translator of Sanskrit sources in terminological standardization and 
compilation went hand in hand with the translation of and probably also the commentary on 
grammatical terminology in a dedicated work.90 At the end of his NG, Lce Khyi ’brug  mentions 
the following parable: 
 dbul ba ’joms byed rnyed dka’ rin po che/     bgrod dka’ rgya mtsho che la gnas pa dag     
 legs par gru btsugs dar phyar rlung gis bskyod/     rin chen thob byed gzhan du thabs 
 med bzhin/     sdug bsngal ’joms byed dam chos rin po che/     rtogs dka’ gsung rab rgya 
 mtsho dag la gnas/     yi ge ming dang tshig gi ’bru btsugs te/     sgra yi dar phyar shes 
 rab rlung gis bskyod/     dam chos thob byed gzhan du thabs med do/ 
 “The poverty’s conqueror, the jewels difficult to find dwell in the great ocean difficult 
 to traverse. Having built a proper boat [and] hoisted the sail, moved by the wind [one] 
 attains the jewel. Other than that, there is no way. Likewise, the jewel [which is] the 
 suffering’s conqueror, the noble Dharma, dwells in the ocean of Buddha’s word (gsung 
 rab) difficult to realize. Having built the boat of letters (yi ge), free, lexical word forms 
 (ming) and syntactic forms (tshig) and hoisted the sail of linguistics, moved by the wind 
 of wisdom [one] attains the noble Dharma. Other than that, there is no way.”91 
This commitment to scripture for the realization of the Buddhist doctrine tells us that the 
attainment of the Dharma can only be achieved by skillfully navigating through the vast ocean 
of the Buddha’s words (gsung rab) as presented in the authentic scriptures. The sole expedient 
                                                          
89 Cf. supra 26f. 
90 Of the three texts that could be attributed to him, only one bears his name in the colophon, namely the Gnas 
brgyad chen po’i rtsa ba (NG; ‘Root text on the eight great linguistic topics’): 
 “The translation/compiling (bsgyur ba ?) of some vyākaraṇa-terminology (byā ka ra ṇa’i skad mdo 
 tsam zhig) by Ce khyi ’brug, the Gnas brgyad (chen) po’i rtsa ba is finished.” 
 ce khyi ’brug gis byā ka ra ṇa’i skad mdo tsam zhig bsgyur ba gnas brgyad (chen) po’i rtsa ba rdzogs 
 so (CT 115 – 413) 
The Tibetan tradition usually mentions Lce/Ce khyi ’brug as the author and not translator of the NG, although 
the nominal form bsgyur ba (‘translation’) rather indicates that he did not compose the text himself. Both options 
cannot be ruled out, but it seems to be more plausible that he translated and commented vyākaraṇa-terminology. 
The unusual and in Sanskritic sources thus far unattested material contained in NG and its commentary (NGg) 
suggests that a straightforward translation of a Sanskritic source is rather unlikely in my view, although an 
ultimate decision would require a thorough philological scrutiny of the text. Related to this issue, the text also 
raises the question whether it deals with Sanskrit, Tibetan, both languages or languages in general (cf. infra 31f.). 
91 CT 115 – 413. 
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means thus is literacy – the boat of letters (yi ge), syntactically free, lexical word forms (ming) 
and syntactic forms (tshig) – guided by the wind of wisdom to progress into the right direction. 
Yet, it is only through the study of linguistics and grammar (sgra) that wisdom leads to the 
Dharma, for the boat does not travel when its sails are not hoisted, despite the strong breeze of 
wisdom. Although a direct comparison of Patañjali’s assessment of the importance of grammar 
and the views expressed by Lce Khyi ’brug is only partially reasonable and reveals more 
differences than similarities, the above quotation still strongly resonates with general ideas that 
widely permeated Indian scholarship with which he was most probably familiar through his 
Indian colleagues – first and foremost the mainly pious motive of grammatical knowledge as 
indispensable for the study of sacred texts and ultimately for the realization of soteriological 
goals. Besides any practical use of autochthonous grammars in the revision of translations, such 
motives together with the prestige that grammatical studies occupied in India must have 
certainly left a strong impression on figures such as Lce Khyi ’brug and perhaps even the royalty 
itself, situated in an emerging intellectual tradition that was only about to develop its own forms 
of knowledge production and literature in close collaboration with Indian scholars. Different 
scenarios may be envisaged as to the ways in which a translator such as Lce Khyi ’brug might 
have initiated such an endeavor: perhaps it was conceived as part of the formalization of 
translation, maybe it even carried an official status as some form of theoretical textbook in 
addition to SSBP and MVY, or perhaps it was composed based on personal interest. 
Another question that arises in this context is how and to which extent the focus on Sanskrit 
grammatical analysis expanded on the study of Tibetan grammar already at that time. Although 
SCP and TKJ are historically problematic in their present form, passages such as SCP 9.3-11.2 
attest that portions of them, and thus Tibetan-specific grammatical analysis as well, must go 
back to the early stages of Tibetan literacy.92 However, it remains open whether the origins of 
these portions are to be sought before, during or still after the revisions of translations. Apart 
from SCP and TKJ, the above-mentioned early sources NG and NGg as well as Chos grub’s 
’Jug pa’i sgra brgyad bstan pa tshig le’ur byas pa (‘Exposition of the Eight Joining 
Terms/Morphemes/Forms in Verse Form’) all share the feature that they are difficult to attribute 
to a specific language. Without doubt, in one way or another they all draw upon Sanskrit 
grammatical knowledge, and NG and NGg even contain portions specifically dedicated to 
Sanskrit morphology together with its Tibetan equivalents. However, the texts themselves do 
not explicate whether the promulgated theories and analytical models pertain to one, both or 
                                                          
92 SCP 9.3-11.2 provides an old derivation of the morphological category la don that is known from pillar 
inscriptions and Dunhuang manuscripts (cf. infra 82). 
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languages in general. Overall, these sources do not give the impression of being dedicated to 
Sanskrit per se, since their main contents appear to be focused on linguistic, grammatical and 
language-related topics in a broader sense, which are not dedicated to a specific language but 
to forms of linguistic analysis that are generally or perhaps even universally applicable.93 In the 
case of later grammarians such as Si tu, we will see in part II that he did regard the contents of 
NG(g) as applicable to Tibetan language. A more general and perhaps indeed universal 
approach to grammar in NG(g) is further corroborated by the GNT, possibly authored by the 
same Lce khyi ’brug but composed no later than during the early period of the second 
dissemination of Buddhism (10th/early 11th century).94 This text makes clear reference to the 
universality of its case model and contains several portions dedicated to the discussion of 
language-specific morphologies of both Sanskrit and Tibetan.95 Another noteworthy source in 
this regard is the historically problematic Smra ba kun la ’jug pa’i sgra’i bstan bcos 
(Sarvabhāṣāpravartanavyākaraṇaśāstra, ‘Linguistic Śāstra Pertaining to All Speech’) together 
with its autocommentary (-vr̥tti), both of which allegedly represent Sanskritic compositions and 
are contained in the bstan ’gyur.96 Although the colophons of both CG 16 and 17 mention 
Subhāṣākīrti as their author, the texts themselves are rather opaque regarding their Sanskritic 
origin, authorship and content. In any case, their titles and contents do suggest the universal 
applicability of their propounded theories. Interestingly, these texts do not only contain a 
section on the fundamentals of Sanskrit case functions, i.e. the kāraka theory, in close affinity 
to typical Tibetan conceptions of the case model, they also list many if not most of the non-case 
functions of SCP that have been hardly traceable in any Sanskritic sources so far.97  
Presuming that the hypothesis regarding a universal approach to grammar in these early sources 
proves consistent, the linguistic analysis of Tibetan language structures may have arisen as a 
natural byproduct of the presentation and exemplification of cross-linguistic theories in sources 
such as NG(g), GNT, and others. Part II will detail how this more ‘universal’ validity of 
linguistic models not only facilitated the expansion of Sanskrit grammatical studies on the 
                                                          
93 For a concrete instance of this issue on the language under investigation, cf. also infra 198ff. on NGg’s 
presentation of the first two kārakas of the eightfold kāraka-scheme. 
94 Cf. HSGLT 2, 15. 
95 Cf. e.g. infra 95f., 173 and 291. 
96 Cf. HSGLT 1, CG 16 and 17. The two texts together will be referred to as Smra ba kun. 
97 Leaving alone the historical problems and assuming their Indian origin, texts like CG 16 and 17 might have 
likely been direct sources of inspiration already in early Tibetan grammaticography. If not of Sanskritic origin, 
the fairly unusual grammatical taxonomies presented therein might have still been an important theoretical basis 
for Tibetan grammarians, somehow transmitted in their contact with Indian paṇḍitas and grammatical 
knowledge. As a personal remark, Peter Verhagen asked whether we can even look upon them as ‘class notes’ of 
a lecture (personal e-mail conversation dated September 1st, 2016). On kāraka, cf. infra 88f. and chapter 5.4. 
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Tibetan chos skad, but also how it was instrumental as a major mechanism in shaping the 
adaptation and non-adaptation of the Tibetan case model.  
Another question that begs to be raised at this point is the extent to which the purpose of early 
autochthonous works composed by translators that do apply to Tibetan-specific grammar – 
either exclusively or in the form of general or universal linguistics – lies in the practical use to 
either produce or refine concrete translations and resolve translational problems. In fact, they 
often appear to lack any practicable nature in this regard. Although this issue needs to be 
separately addressed for each individual grammatical source and topic, chapter 5.1 features a 
discussion of the shortcomings of the traditional Tibetan case model with regard to the 
morphosyntactic distribution of the chos skad.98 The substantial divergence between the case 
model and WT’s language structures alone suffice to conclude that Tibetan grammarians of that 
time did not develop the cases through monitoring and revising Sanskrit-Tibetan syntactic 
equivalents to produce concrete translational manuals or grammars, and even where this might 
have been the case they could have done so only on a very generalized and simplified basis that 
easily leads to significant errors in Tibetan if not accompanied by the language proficiency of 
a native-speaking translator.  
If any version of SCP and TKJ was composed during that time, we might nonetheless imagine 
that they served practical purposes such as teaching correct morphological derivations of 
Tibetan grammatical markers and word forms, a central topic in both texts. On the other hand, 
if works such as that of Lce Khyi ’brug did not simply serve the general scholarly purposes of 
introducing selected topics of Indian linguistic studies to the newly emerging Tibetan 
scholarship, the practical translational purpose of topics such as the case grammar in NG(g) 
may have been at most that of a metalinguistic-semantic analytical tool which clarifies basic 
problems of understanding on a rather gross level more hermeneutical than strictly grammatical 
in nature. Moreover, NG(g) comprises a selection of eight linguistic topics in the broadest sense, 
some of which come with a strong philosophical character that grants only limited utility in 
translational work. 99  We may therefore come to the conclusion that some of the earliest 
autochthonous compositions, despite the fact that they were produced within the context of 
                                                          
98 Cf. infra 92ff., as well as the respective investigations of the classical eight Tibetan cases in chapters 7-14. 
99 On the eight selected topics in NG and NGg, cf. HSGLT 2, 6ff. Cf. for example topic 5, i.e. the topic of the 
domains pertaining to letters/sounds/phonemes (yi ge ’jug pa’i gnas; lit ‘the topic of [where] 
letters/sounds/phonemes engage’), which defines the nature of eight linguistic technical terms such as sgra 
(‘sound’), skad (‘language’), brda (‘linguistic sign, signifier’), don (‘meaning, semantics’) and their relation. In 
comparison, topic 4 (drang ba’i gnas) seems to be related more to logical reasoning. 
34 
 
translation and its revision, were probably not primarily intended for the purpose of any 
translational practices.100 
In general, the elaboration, prestige and proclaimed importance of Sanskrit grammatical 
knowledge for soteriological goals provided favorable circumstances that apparently 
encouraged Tibetan scholars to compose the above-mentioned texts, which was even further 
supported by the context of translational revisions where grammar received special attention. 
Furthermore, the preserved source materials suggest that the cross-lingual validity of originally 
Sanskrit grammatical models have naturally facilitated Tibetan-specific grammatical analysis 
in early Tibetan compositions, yet with neither Tibetan nor Sanskrit as the actual topic, instead 
the languages perhaps served only as templates to introduce and illustrate general linguistic 
topics and theories.  Other than that, the actual causes for the expansion of grammatical analysis 
to Tibetan language are difficult to extract, and these may have varied in view of the different 
grammatical genres – those pertaining specifically to Tibetan (SCP and TKJ) and the more 
general grammars (NG, NGg, GNT, etc.) – as well as in- and outside the context of the revision 
of translation. 
Thus far, the current investigation has not only revealed some traces of how linguistic studies 
emerged in the course of translation, particularly that of a royally patronized revision of 
translation, and how Tibetan scholars have developed forms of linguistic studies that included 
autochthonous works applicable to Sanskrit and Tibetan language. It has also become clear that 
grammatical studies in Tibet were concerned with syntactic knowledge and more specifically 
with case grammar from the very beginning. Yet, what are the reasons of Tibetan translators 
and grammarians for devoting their attention to case grammar? And are there any traces that 
the centralized revision and standardization of translation helped to promote case grammar as 
a prominent Tibetan grammatical topic? 
2.3.2 Tracing the Role of Syntactic Knowledge in the Revision of Translation 
Any translation from a source into a target language naturally requires comparative knowledge 
of the syntactic features of both languages, including case grammar, so that linguistic 
expressions of a higher grammatical hierarchy than lexical words (i.e. phrases, clauses, and 
sentences) may be accurately rendered. Although Peter Verhagen lists the various types of 
Sanskrit grammatical analysis in the lexical part of the SSBP,101 unfortunately I have not been 
                                                          
100 It is to be kept in mind that Lce Khyi ’brug was explicitly mentioned as part of the revision efforts during 
Khri srong lde btsan. 
101 Cf. HSGLT 1, 19ff. 
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able to identify a particular occurrence of the utilization of grammatical knowledge other than 
for the purpose of the derivation of syntactically unbound, lexical terminology; that is to say, 
more ‘syntactic’ knowledge such as the derivation of case suffixes, case grammar in general 
and so on seems to have played no or only a minor role in the SSBP. This becomes apparent 
from the fact that the SSBP is a compilation of lexical entries rather than a grammar in the 
common modern sense. Yet, this does not mean that the ratified standardization of translation 
and explicitly related importance of Indian vyākaraṇa did not include the consideration of case 
grammar or other syntax. It is important to note at this point that Sanskritic grammatical schools 
usually do not strictly distinguish between syntactic and other aspects of grammar (vyākaraṇa), 
a discipline which is ultimately concerned exclusively with the single maxim to form complete 
and syntactically functioning word forms (pada, tshig) through the affixation, substitution or 
elision of inflectional morphemes.102 Consequently, if Tibetan translators were able to master 
the derivation of Sanskrit lexical entries in the SSBP, they certainly were also well acquainted 
with the elaborate and eminent Sanskritic system of case grammar.  
If we can assume that the entire revision was not exclusive to terminological conventions, it 
would be only natural, if the standardization of translation has been an impulse for translators 
also to seek a more standardized and accurate translation of syntactic structures that conforms 
with the standards of vyākaraṇa. Evidence for the consideration of linguistic expressions of a 
higher order than independent terminology as well as syntactic structures of such expressions 
in the standardization of translation is articulated in SSBP’s edict dated 814, although not 
without philological issues: 
 dam pa’i chos bsgyur ba’i lugs ni don dang yang mi ’khal la bod skad la yang gar bde 
 bar gyis shig    dharmma bsgyur ba la rgya gar gyi skad kyi go rims las mi bsnor ba bod 
 kyi skad du bsgyur na don dang tshig tu ’grel zhing bde na ma bsnor bar sgyur cig     
 bsnor na bde zhing go ba bskyed pa cig yod na/     tshigs bcad la ni rtsa ba bzhi pa’am/     
 drug pa’ang rung ste/     tshigs su bcad pa gcig gi nang na gang bde ba bsnor zhing 
 sgyur cig     rkyang pa la ni don gang snyegs pa yan chad kyi tshig dang don gnyis ka 
 la gar bde bar bsnor zhing sgyur cig 
“As for the manner of translating the sublime Dharma: It must not contradict the 
 meaning (don dang [...] mi ’khal ba), but it must also be done in a way that is accessible 
(~ easy [to read/understand]; bde ba) in Tibetan language. When translating Dharma, if 
                                                          
102 Cf. e.g. Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī, particularly P 1.4.14 suptiṅantaṃ padam “[A] pada [is that which either] ends 
[in a] nominal suffix (sup) [or a] verbal suffix (tiṅ).” 
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translated into the Tibetan language without deviating from the Sanskrit structure (go 
rims), then under the  condition that it is coherent and accessible in content as well as 
syntax (don dang tshig tu ’brel zhing bde). If [one] deviates [from the Sanskrit structure], 
then under the condition that it is accessible and comprehensible: As for verses, four or 
also six lines are suitable, and within one single verse line one may deviate and translate 
whatever is accessible/easy [for the reader]. As for prose, one may deviate and translate 
whatever is accessible in terms of both syntax and content (tshig dang don gnyis ka la 
gar bde), [as long as the syntax/phrasing (tshig) and content/meaning (don) remain] 
within the boundaries of the meaning pursued [by the translated text].”103 
In this passage, the edict offers basic principles for translating portions of Sanskrit language 
that surpass single, independent word forms. A translation is required to fulfill two main 
criteria: it must not contradict the meaning of the translated original (mi ’khal ba) and it must 
be accessible or easy to the readership (bde ba). I am not fully content with my translation of 
bde ba as ‘accessible’ or ‘easy’, yet the term usually refers to a state of mind or affection – 
happiness, felicity, content, pleasure – and in the current context it indicates that a translation 
should not be strenuous to the reader in terms of meaning/content (don) and phrasing/syntax 
(tshig). The accessibility is thus derived from the pleasant (bde ba) state of mind the reader 
maintains during reading, presumably as a result of effortlessness. This is readily 
comprehensible to every student or scholar who has studied difficult works that can cause a 
headache both metaphorically and literally.104 Moreover, the translation of the term tshig in the 
sense of ‘syntax’ is based on its two main technical uses familiar to Tibetan grammarians and 
translators as the Tibetan pendant of Sanskrit pada, one based in Sanskrit grammar and the 
other based on the Buddhist Abhidharma. The term pada (tshig) refers either to syntactically 
bound word forms (grammar) or to free, lexical word forms combined into connected phrases 
and sentences (Abhidharma), however, in both cases it refers to syntactic entities that express 
information in addition to a word’s unbound lexical value.105 Alternatively, a more general and 
less accentuated translation of tshig would be ‘phrasing,’ of which syntax is only one aspect. 
The two basic types of translation distinguished in the edict are those not deviating (mi bsnor 
ba) and those deviating (bsnor ba) from the original Sanskrit structure of the phrase, sentence 
or perhaps even paragraph. Obviously, both types need to fulfill the criteria of mi ’khal ba and 
                                                          
103 CT 115 – 313. For alternative translations, cf. Scherrer-Schaub 1999, 72; Kapstein 2003, 756. 
104 On the notion of bde ba in this context, cf. also Sakya Paṇḍita’s notes on how to write a synopsis (bsdus don) 
in the third chapter of his Mkhas ’jug, where he elaborates in more detail notions such as brjod bde ba (‘easy to 
express/pronounce/read’) and others (cf. KhJ 2009, 96f.). 
105 For more details, cf. chapter 5.3. 
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bde ba, but whenever the Sanskrit structure is transferred into Tibetan language without 
deviation, the translation also has to fulfill the criterion of syntactic and contentual or semantic 
coherency (’brel ba), which is missing for the deviating type and was apparently presupposed. 
It is important to note that the Tabo version only provides guidelines for the non-deviating type 
of translation and omits mention of the deviating type. Although both edicts remained silent as 
to which of the two strategies (non-deviating and deviating) is to be preferred or perhaps even 
used as the default method, it is safe to assume that the non-deviating type of translation was 
the preferred ideal in view of the larger context of the standardization of translation at greatest 
possible accuracy. Moreover, if the principles of coherence (’brel ba) and accessibility (bde ba) 
are fulfilled in a non-deviating translation, it does not according to this theory fall behind the 
deviating type and the proximity to the source language is but an additional improvement.  
Since the Tibetan text above poses certain difficulties and since there are alternative and 
deviating translations,106 this passage requires closer philological scrutiny especially of the two 
notions go rims (las bsnor ba) and don dang tshig tu ’brel zhing bde ba:  
The phrase go rims las bsnor ba (‘to deviate from the structure’) bears the ambiguity of either 
including syntactic modifications such as the change of case markers and so on or only referring 
in a narrower sense to a switch (bsnor ba) of the original order (go rims) of words or phrases in 
a translated sentence. In case of the latter, there arises the additional question as to whether the 
author(s) of the edict included the possibility of syntactic deviation from Sanskrit structures, or 
whether this statement prohibits deviation from the syntactic structure of a Sanskrit sentence. 
As for the latter, it is unlikely in my view that the edict would dictate such a restrictive 
methodology hardly ever to be executed in practice, since there is no direct one-to-one 
correspondence between Sanskrit and Tibetan vocabulary or syntax and thus no single way of 
rendering the syntactic structures from one language into the other. In contrast, the option that 
syntactic restructuring was not included in go rims but simply left open in the decree is more 
difficult to rule out at this point. Nonetheless, it is most likely that we are faced with a rather 
general statement which defines two strategies of translating Sanskrit phrases, etc. into Tibetan 
(deviating vs. non-deviating), pertaining to structural features of the languages in a very broad, 
unspecified way and thus including possible syntactic deviations as well. This is corroborated 
                                                          
106 Cf. Scherrer-Schaub 1999, 72; Kapstein 2003, 756. 
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also by Scherrer-Schaub’s translation of this passage as well as by Matthew Kapstein’s 
assessment of the same quotation.107  
The perhaps most intricate issue in the above quotation regards the phrase don dang tshig tu 
’brel zhing bde (ba). Scherrer-Schaub and Kapstein offer different renditions of the final 
passage while agreeing to read don dang tshig tu ’brel as one syntagma with the meaning of 
‘the relation/connection between meaning and word/phrase/expression.’108 As alluded to by  
Scherrer-Schaub in a footnote, such a relation between don and tshig refers to the relation 
between signifier (brjod byed, sgra) and signified (brjod bya, don),109 a topic that figures 
prominently in Indian and Tibetan philosophical literature as well as in topic five of NG and 
NGg. In that sense, don dang tshig tu ’brel clarifies that a non-deviating translation needs to 
remain meaningful in written Tibetan, and the item bde ba is treated as an additional attribute 
syntactically unrelated to don dang tshig tu. This understanding of don dang tshig tu ’brel zhing 
bde (ba) intuitively appears more correct especially against the background of the Tabo version, 
which only reads don dang tshig tu ’breld pa without the additional attribute bde ba.110  
In contrast, my translation offers the tentative and rather unusual alternative ‘coherent and 
accessible in content as well as syntax,’ in which the phrase don dang tshig tu does not indicate 
the connected entities but represents a verbal attribute to both ’brel ba and bde ba. One of the 
main reasons for this alternative translation is that the author(s) of the edict of SSBP repeat this 
attribute in the same quotation in the form of tshig dang don gnyis ka la gar bde bar bsnor zhing 
bsgyur cig (‘translate and deviate whatever is accessible/easy with regard to both syntax and 
content’), this time omitting ’brel ba.111 Despite the Tabo version that might be more supportive 
of the understanding of the first phrase don dang tshig tu ’brel zhing bde along the lines of 
Scherrer-Schaub and Kapstein, it may therefore be argued for the possibility that Tibetan 
authors of the second edict understood this first phrase in the sense of don dang tshig tu being 
                                                          
107 Cf. Scherrer-Schaub (1999, 72) who renders the phrase rgya gar gyi skad kyi go rims las mi bsnor ba as 
“without deviating from the arrangement of the Sanskrit [that is to say without deviating from the Sanskrit 
syntax].” Kapstein (2003, 756) also speaks of syntax and word order in this context. 
108 Scherrer-Schaub 1999, 72:  
 ‘[…] [making] the connexion between expression and meaning well-adapted [to Tibetan], […].’  
Kapstein 2003, 756:  
 ‘[…] the ease of relationships between meaning and word.’ 
109 Cf. Scherrer-Schaub 1999, 77. 
110 Cf. Scherrer-Schaub 2002, 319. 
111 Note that the phrase tshig dang don gnyis ka la gar bde bar bsnor zhing bsgyur cig (‘translate and deviate 
whatever is both, syntactically and contentwise accessible/easy’) is omitted in the Tabo version, since it belongs 
to the non-deviating type of translation that has not been mentioned in the earlier edict (cf. Scherrer-Schaub 
2002, 320). 
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a single syntagma equal to tshig dang don gnyis ka la in the second phrase. Consequently, don 
dang tshig tu then represents an attribute to both ’brel ba and bde (ba). 
The entire section on the translation of phrases, sentences and so on in the edict of SSBP would 
then amount to the following: Every translation is required to be in line with the original 
meaning of the translated text (mi ’khal ba) and accessible to the Tibetan readership (bde ba). 
Among the two types of deviating (bsnor ba) and non-deviating (mi bsnor ba) translation, it is 
to be assumed that both must fulfill the criteria of coherency/connectedness (’brel ba) and 
accessibility (bde ba), although coherency/connectedness only arises as an issue in non-
deviating translations to ensure the correctness of the sentence in Tibetan and thus has been 
omitted for the deviating type. Lastly, both criteria of ’brel ba and bde ba are measured by 
means of two additional parameters, namely tshig (‘phrasing, syntax’) and don (‘meaning, 
content, semantics’). Among the possible shortcomings of this reading, it has to be noted that 
while the proposed, tentative translation of ’brel ba in the sense of ‘coherency’ would certainly 
make sense and allow for a simpler and more straightforward rendition of the full Tibetan 
sentence, it also requires a more abstract, intransitive understanding of the term ’brel ba that 
perhaps did not exist in this form. 
Unfortunately, we cannot go deeper into the issues related to this passage without undertaking 
a separate study. The main tasks for such future research would be a detailed assessment of 
existing translations and their shortcomings as well as an examination of the four parameters 
tshig, don, ’brel ba and bde ba together with their precise relation. However, even without 
resolving these textual issues, it still holds true that linguistic expressions of a higher order than 
independent lexical terminology were considered in standardization and revision, and that a few 
simple principles for the translation of phrases, sentences and so on were already defined in the 
Tabo version and in more detail in the edict of SSBP. If syntax was indeed included as one 
feature in the deviation and non-deviation of Tibetan translations from Sanskrit structures (go 
rims) – either in the form of the phrasing (tshig), including syntax, that has to remain connected 
to meaning (don) (i.e. remaining meaningful), or in the form of syntactic coherency and 
accessibility (tshig tu ’brel zhing bde ba) – then the importance of syntax and case grammar in 
the standardization of translation is historically attested in the edict of SSBP. Although this may 
not explain the concrete decision making of an author like Lce Khyi ’brug and his reasons for 
featuring case grammar as a separate topic (topic number 6) in his Gnad brgyad, at least we 
have one important testimony for the ways in which syntactic topics such as case grammar 
received prominent status in Tibetan grammaticography from its very beginning.  
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The current section has shed light on the question how the study of grammar was initially 
promoted and perhaps even emerged for the first time during the early stages of Tibetan 
intellectual history in the course of the translation of Sanskrit sources and its royally supported 
revision, standardization and centralization in which Sanskrit and Tibetan scholars collaborated 
closely. Related questions were addressed, such as the ways in which Indian vyākaraṇa became 
an important focus in this revision due to the shortcomings of previous translations and the need 
for translational standards, as well as the ways in which the study of grammar started to involve 
the composition of autochthonous texts that dealt with both Sanskrit and Tibetan grammar, 
including case grammar, already in this earliest traceable period of Tibetan grammaticography. 
It was noted that prestige as well as the general and often soteriologically argued importance 
that Indian scholars attributed to the study of grammar must have strongly supported the role 
of vyākaraṇa in the revision and among Tibetan translators. Additionally, it was proposed that 
the ‘universal’ validity of certain grammatical topics was most likely an important factor that 
facilitated the expansion of grammatical analysis on the chos skad, a point which will be further 
developed in the investigation of the Tibetan case model as one particularly illuminating 
instance.112  
During the first dissemination of Buddhism, it is moreover too early to associate the preserved 
grammatical testimonies of that time with a full-fledged distinct discipline. The reference to 
Indian systems of vyākaraṇa in the edict of SSBP is evidence for the prevalence among Tibetan 
grammarians of an idea of grammar as a distinct field of knowledge in India, but the number, 
extent and form of the preserved Tibetan testimonies make it rather dubious that grammatical 
studies claimed the status of a full-fledged discipline north of the Himalaya at this early date. 
At the current state of research, there are preserved no more than six dedicated linguistic 
compositions which may in some version date back to this period: SCP (?), TKJ (?), NG, NGg 
(?), GNT (?) and ’Jug pa’i sgra brgyad bstan pa tshig le’ur byas pa. Furthermore, MVY lists a 
short selection of grammatical terms and SSBP refers to grammar in its edict. The composition 
of grammatical sources was likely restricted to a few scholars, some of which claim traceable 
authority in the subsequent tradition, and it remains open to which extent their compositions 
circulated in Tibet outside the authorities of the official translation committee at that time. 
Grammatical studies appear to have been more like an ancillary endeavor in the course of 
translation and its standardization that then transitioned into the composition of linguistic works 
on Sanskrit, Tibetan and linguistic expressions in general, yet without clearly defined status or 
                                                          
112 Cf. part II. 
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institutionalization. However, it may be certainly concluded that the commitment to linguistic 
studies as an integral part of the Tibetan Buddhist scholarly enterprise surfaced no later than 
the 8th/9th century and under the circumstances described above. The following section will 
demonstrate how this commitment will have intensified in the centuries ahead and, carried by 
one of the most illustrious figures in Tibetan intellectual history, led to the formalization and, 
to varying degrees, the institutionalization of linguistics and grammar. 
2.4 Linguistics and the Emergence of Tibetan Scholasticism 
After the demise of the Tibetan empire in the middle of the 9th century, followed by a period 
of political and religious instability until the end of the 10th or beginning of the 11th century 
about which still very little is known, the Indo-Tibetan knowledge transfer and the spread of 
Buddhism in Tibet was revitalized. This period up to roughly the end of the 13th century is 
commonly referred to as the later dissemination of Buddhism in Tibet (phyi dar) and was also 
accompanied by a new surge in translations (gsar ’gyur). Its beginning is usually associated in 
Tibetan historiography with the activities that took place in North-East and West Tibet. In the 
western kingdom of Gu ge, the activities of the translator Rin chen bzang po (958-1055) 
flourished under the sponsorship of king Ye shes ’od, who also invited the Indian scholar Atiśa 
(982-1054) to Tibet (arrived in 1042) and later founded the Kadampa order of Tibetan 
Buddhism. In Amdo in North-East Tibet, the transmission of  a codex of Buddhist monastic 
discipline (’dul ba, vinaya) in the form of the Mūlasarvāstivādavinaya as well as other parts of 
the royal dynastic curriculum supposedly survived,  and a handful of people subsequently 
reintroduced these to Central Tibet. 113  Davidson argues that the renewed flourishing of 
Buddhism and the integral changes of Tibetan civilization during this period are indeed closely 
connected to these events, but nonetheless the Tibetan Buddhist renaissance and reformation 
need to be seen in the larger context of Inner and East Asian developments which are more 
complex than the rather formulaic rendition outlined above.114 
Of special interest for our purposes is the fact that this second dissemination of Indian 
Buddhism in Tibet (phyi dar, ‘later dissemination’) was stimulated to a large extent by the 
decline of Buddhist spiritual and intellectual practices in temples and schools, both in number 
and quality, together with growing doubts about their authenticity. Davidson, for example, 
states that “according to the Tibetan documents, Lha lama Yéshé-Ö was aghast at the forms of 
Buddhism on display in the kingdom of Gugé.”115 This was not only a religious or theoretical 
                                                          
113 Cf. Davidson 2005, 85. 
114 Cf. ibid., chapter 3. 
115 Ibid., 108. 
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issue among intellectuals and practitioners, but it manifested as an institutional clash between 
old and new religious interests and thus must have also involved power struggles. 116  As 
indicated by the term gsar ’gyur (‘new translation’), one of the main protagonists of that time 
were again the translators, however the mode of translation had changed substantially compared 
to that of the imperial period. Without a central political or translational authority, those 
Tibetans who were ready to take on the hardships travelled to the South of the Himalaya in 
order to access Buddhist knowledge through Indian masters and sources as well as to acquire 
the skill of translation.117 At the same time, Indian scholars were also invited to teach and 
translate in Tibet. While this created an entirely new influx of knowledge and sources to Tibet 
which also included novel esoteric teachings, it could not resolve the issue of authenticity but 
rather intensified it. Davidson discusses how illustrious figures such as Mar pa (1012-1097) 
attained new supremacy in monastic as well as worldly affairs through their occupation as 
translators and their resulting authority.118 The translators of this time may be regarded from 
the perspective of powerful gatekeepers of the reinvigorated Buddhist doctrine, empowered 
through their skills and capable of consulting sources of knowledge (texts, masters, teachings 
and so on) inaccessible to the untrained. The lack of other, more transparent criteria apart from 
the authority of the translator to assess the reliability of teachings, translations, etc., naturally 
bears a certain arbitrariness, and thus it is “little wonder that the introduction of the great volume 
of esoteric materials during this period called for a response on many fronts.”119 In contrast to 
the contents of the imperial edicts of the earlier dissemination of Buddhism, the main concern 
in this period was not just the accuracy and standardization of translations, which likely 
remained an important issue even during the second dissemination,  but rather even the 
authenticity of sources and teachings as such. These times further featured the circulation of a 
vast amount of texts with uncertain or unattested Indian origin, including apocrypha of 
unknown authorship, and especially the authenticity of esoteric sources usually restricted to a 
small circle of initiates was discredited or doubted.  
Davidson has labelled the reaction to this uncontrolled spread of teachings of old and new 
translations under the banner of Buddhism together with the resulting disputes about the 
Sanskritic origins of teachings, transmission lineages, etc. as ‘neoconservative orthodoxy.’120 
Tibetan scholasticism in the form it became established and institutionalized during the second 
                                                          
116 Cf. Davidson 2005, 120. 
117 Even though some translators seem to never have left their home (cf. Davidson 2005, 119). 
118 Cf. ibid., chapter 4. 
119 Cf. ibid., 151. 
120 Cf. ibid., 151ff. 
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dissemination of Buddhism and the centuries thereafter is perhaps only the most formalized and 
technical manifestation of this movement to authenticate transmitted knowledge and to 
distinguish between the true and false Dharma.121 A main proponent of new scholarly principles 
during this new translation period was the venerated Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan 
(1182-1251).122 We can get a taste of Sakya Paṇḍita’s ‘neoconservativism’ at the beginning of 
his Mkhas pa la ’jug pa’i sgo (Mkhas ’jug, ‘Gateway to Scholarship’; KhJ):123 
 mkhas par khas ’che ba ’ga’ zhig sgra tsam gyi rnam gzhag dang/     ming sgrub pa la 
 rnams [sic!]124 par dbye ba’i rkyen ster ba dang/     khams sgrub pa la ti ngan ta’i rkyen 
 ster ba dang/     byed pa’i tshig la bzhi dang drug la sogs pa’i sbyor ba dang/     dpe la 
 dngos dang bzlog pa la sogs pa’i khyad par dang/     tshig gi rgyan la rang bzhin dang/     
 rdzas dang yon tan brjod pa la sogs pa’i dbye ba dang/     dbye ba sgo tha dad pa’i tshul 
 dang/     bsdu ba la spyi bye brag gis sgo nas ji ltar sdud pa dang/     grangs nges pa la 
 dngos ’gal rnam par gcod pa dang/     log rtog bzlog pa dang/     dgos pa’i sgo nas ji 
 ltar nges pa dang/      go rims la tshig dang don gyi rim pas brjod bde zhing rtogs sla 
 ba’i sbyor ba la gangs can gyi khrod ’di na legs par ma sbyangs pa’i skye bo phal cher 
 ’khrul par mthong nas/     de la phan pa’i don du mkhas pa ’jug pa’i sgo ’di bshad do/ 
 “Some here in the snowy mountain ranges [of Tibet] who claim to be learned are not 
 well trained in the analysis of sound itself, in providing the grammatical affixes for 
 nominal inflection of a formed word, in providing the grammatical affixes (ti ngan ta) 
 in verbal formation, in applying the four, six, etc. kārakas, in distinguishing such 
 things as the object (dngos, vastu) and the reversal (bzlog pa, viparyāsa) in an analogy, 
 in the nature of verbal ornamentation, in distinguishing among such things as 
 expressions of substance and quality, in the different methods for divisions and 
 headings, in how to summarize based on the general and subheadings in a summary, in 
 deciding among opposing [positions] in reckoning and ascertainment (grangs nges pa), 
 in eliminating  wrong views, in how to get a definitive ascertainment  by way of the 
 purpose, and in joining the order of words and meanings in a structure that is pleasant 
                                                          
121 In the current work, I see the major difference between the Tibetan scholastic tradition and non-scholastic 
knowledge traditions in the principle of scriptural authority and the preservation of authoritative knowledge that 
comes along with it. In most general terms, this includes the organization, canonization and exegesis of such 
knowledge as well as its defense that is strongly based on formalized argumentation practices. For more 
information on Tibetan scholastic methodology, cf. chapter 4. For a more detailed examination of the notion 
scholasticism in the (Indo-)Tibetan context, cf. Cabezón 1994, 11ff.; Dreyfus 2003, 10ff. 
122 Hereafter referred to as Sakya Paṇḍita. 
123 The text is also known under the title Mkhas pa rnams ’jug pa’i sgo (‘Gateway for Scholars’). 
124 I read rnam. 
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 to say and easy to understand, and so [they] are, for the most part, mistaken. This 
 Gateway of Learning is related for their benefit.”125 
Sakya Paṇḍita’s critique represents a frontal attack on many levels of scholarly practice, starting 
from a lack of linguistic competency to the ignorance about the application of commentarial 
techniques and the stylistic requirements for the composition of treatises. His response to these 
deficits is condensed in the same text in a quotation from the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra shortly 
after the above quotation: 
 rig pa’i gnas lnga dag la mkhas par ma byas par//      
 ’phags mchog gis kyang thams cad mkhyen nyid mi ’gyur te//      
 gzhan dag tshar gcad rjes su gzung bar bya phyir dang//   
 rang nyid kun shes bya phyir de la de brtson byed// 
 “Without becoming a scholar in the five sciences 
 Not even the supreme sage can become omniscient. 
 For the sake of refuting and supporting others, 
 And for the sake of knowing everything himself, he makes an effort in  
 these [five sciences].”126 
Among the many achievements attributed to Sakya Paṇḍita, he was credited with strengthening 
Indian models of learning in Tibet by introducing and propagating a classical Indian Buddhist 
curriculum that defines Sanskritic pāṇḍityam (‘scholarship’), formalized as the five sciences 
(rig gnas, vidyāsthāna): linguistics (sgra rig, śabdavidyā),127 logic or reasoning (gtan tshigs 
rigs pa, hetuvidyā), medical science (gso rig, cikitsāvidyā), craftsmanship (bzo rig, 
śilpakarmasthānavidyā) and spiritual or inner science (nang rig, adhyātmavidyā), i.e. the 
Buddhist Dharma. Together, these are referred to in Tibetan sources as the five major sciences, 
which are accompanied by another set of five minor sciences: poetry/poetics (kāvya, snyan 
ngag), lexicography/synonymy/metonymy (mngon brjod), metrics or compositional style (sdeb 
sbyor), opera (zlos gar) and astrology (skar rtsis).128 The five major and five minor sciences 
together do not form an exhaustive list of scientific branches, since areas such as politics or 
erotic arts are not even mentioned,129 however the minor sciences do complement the five major 
ones and within the latter mainly śabdavidyā, which reflects “the centrality of language in the 
                                                          
125 KhJ 2009, 2f.; transl. Gold 2008, 9. 
126 KhJ 2009, 5; transl. Gold 2008, 14. 
127 Which pertains to both Sanskrit and Tibetan linguistic studies. 
128 For an introduction to the five major and minor sciences, cf. Ruegg 1995. 
129 Cf. Dreyfus 2003, 102. 
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curriculum.”130 Among the five major sciences, Sakya Paṇḍita’s KhJ strongly focuses on the 
study of linguistics in a broader sense (śabdavidyā), including grammar (vyākaraṇa) and 
poetics (kāvya), as well as logical reasoning (hetuvidyā). His text represents one of the few 
Tibetan testimonies directly dedicated to scholarship, and it proposes a threefold model of 
inclusive learning based on Indian ideals: rtsom (‘composition’), which includes śabdavidyā 
(linguistics) as well as kāvya (‘poetry/poetics’),’chad (‘exposition’), which is concerned with 
interpretation and commentary and was developed in apparent relation to Vasubandhu’s 
Vyākhyāyukti (4th-5th century), as well as rtsod (‘debate’), much of which deals with logic and 
reasoning (hetuvidyā).131 
For Sakya Paṇḍita, the five major sciences did form a whole of complementary areas assisting 
the preservation and protection of the true Dharma as well as the attainment of the ultimate goal 
of omniscience.132 However, as authors like Gold and Dreyfus noted, the actual influence of 
Sakya Paṇḍita’s vision of the ideal scholar should not be overemphasized, since his “unified 
curriculum was never practiced as he articulates it in the Gateway, and never had exactly the 
effect he had hoped. Yet, Sa-paṇ is rightly credited with having consolidated the study of the 
‘five sciences’ across Tibet, and with having made the linguistic sciences – poetry (kāvya) in 
particular – the crown jewel in a great scholar’s intellectual repertoire.”133  
Since it is difficult to assess the real impact of the five major and minor sciences as an inclusive 
curriculum in Tibetan education and knowledge production, the same also holds true for 
grammar or linguistics (sgra rig) as one of them. Georges Dreyfus’ gives a general description 
of education and the monastic and secular curricula in pre-modern Tibet (= pre-1950) without 
distinguishing different historical periods but with many interesting details nevertheless.134 If 
we follow his account, which Dreyfus himself, being aware of the limitations of the source 
materials, characterizes as tentative,135 literacy – at least in the form of basic recognition and 
pronunciation of letters and combinations of letters – appears to have been surprisingly 
widespread among Tibetan people, although regional differences seem to have been 
considerable, for example between Central and Eastern Tibet as well as between more urban 
and more rural areas.136 Reading was utilized mainly for religious purposes such as ritual and 
                                                          
130 Ibid. 
131 On scholarship and hermeneutics in the KhJ as well as Vyākhyāyukti, cf. Verhagen’s series of articles Studies 
in Indo-Tibetan Buddhist Hermeneutics, more specifically article numbers 4-7, published in the years 2005A, 
2005B, 2008B, 2017. 
132 Cf. Gold 2008, 14ff. 
133 Ibid., 14. Cf. also Dreyfus 2003, 105. 
134 The following observations are based on Dreyfus 2003, chapters 4 and 5. 
135 Cf. ibid., 80. 
136 Cf. ibid., 81. 
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devotional practices, and by comparison writing skills were much more restricted. While the 
acquisition of such basic literacy was mostly an informal, private matter within the household 
or monastery, Dreyfus also reports of formal, state-supported schools in urban centers such as 
Lhasa or Shigatse (Gzhis ka rtse), in which branches such as administration, medicine, astrology 
or literature were taught,137 and there were also a small number of private schools that provided 
a solid education especially in literacy and linguistic skills such as writing, spelling, grammar 
and composition.  
As part of a closer look at the curricula in Tibetan education, Dreyfus outlines the significant 
differences between secular and monastic curricula as well as between the normative 
curriculum proposed in the five sciences and the actual curricula as they were practiced.138 Lay 
students were often trained predominantly in the literary sciences such as grammar and poetics 
in particular, and they focused less on the inner science of Buddhism or logic. In an article on 
monastic education in Tibet, Dungkar Lobzang Tinley mentions a government school during 
the times of the Seventh Dalai Lama (1708-1757), the Rtse rig gnas slob grwa, in which monks 
were trained in the secular sciences, including grammar, with the prospect of later joining the 
government administration. In contrast, the monastic curricula focused primarily on Buddhist 
philosophy and logic, sometimes to the full neglect of literary studies and other secular sciences, 
which also marginalized the role of grammar in monastic education.139 Tinley notes that “in 
some of the large monasteries, it was sufficient for the disciples to just understand how to read. 
[…] If the strength of the school was between forty to fifty, there were hardly more than two or 
three who could write. The number of students who knew grammar and had knowledge in 
lexicography was extremely few.”140 During the rule of the fifth Dalai Lama (1617-1682), the 
secular sciences were even officially banned from the three monastic seats (gdan sa gsum) of 
the Dge lugs school of Tibetan Buddhism, ’Bras spungs, Se ra and Dga’ ldan.141 Scholars of the 
three seats who upon graduation were interested in literary studies would therefore attend the 
Snying ma monastery Smin grol gling to study grammar or poetry. Another question that arises 
in this regard is to which extent the literary education related to śabdavidyā focused either on 
Sanskrit or Tibetan language, and Dreyfus’ study only remarks that the curriculum featured an 
                                                          
137 Cf. ibid., 82. 
138 Cf. ibid., 101ff. 
139 Cf. ibid., 102 and 105. 
140 Tinley 1993, 12. 
141 Cf. Dreyfus 2003, 121; Tinley 1993, 11. Note, however, that the ‘Great Fifth’, as he is commonly known, was 
a friend and promoter of the secular sciences and had composed Sanskrit verses, although his expertise in 
Sanskrit composition seems to have been only mediocre. According to Dreyfus (2003, 121), the prohibition of 
literary arts in the three seats was a means to protect students from any involvement in political matters, a danger 
that might come from the proximity of these powerful institutions to the political centre Lhasa. 
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emphasis on Sanskrit and that “the study of Tibetan grammar culminates in the study of Sanskrit 
grammar as analyzed in Tibetan sources.”142 
In total, the emerging picture reveals that secular and monastic education seemed to have had 
their respective focal points, but that they mostly did not implement the full scope of the formal 
curriculum proposed in the five major and minor sciences. Grammar and other literary arts were 
taught in a limited number of private and official schools as well as in a few monastic centers 
that offered sgra rig and related topics. Against the backdrop of these general observations, it 
is safe to assume that the mastery of Sakya Paṇḍita’s scholarly ideal probably remained reserved 
for a handful of illustrious figures in the history of Tibetan intellectual history, such as Bu ston 
Rin chen grub or Rje Tsong kha pa who studied at Sa skya monastery. The main value of Sakya 
Paṇḍita’s propagation of rig gnas for grammatical studies lies in the formalization of a 
normative curriculum that attributes great importance to linguistic and language-related studies. 
Sakya Paṇḍita’s efforts were pivotal in the sense that they have rendered linguistic studies 
including grammar a distinct discipline in Tibetan scholarship and consequently an integral and 
esteemed part of Tibetan intellectual history.  
2.5 Résumé on Grammar and Linguistics in the History of Tibetan Scholarship 
At this point, we may conclude this historical excursion and underline some of the central 
historical mechanisms that led to the high status of linguistics and grammar in the Tibetan 
tradition. As initially argued, the introduction of Buddhism and Tibetan literacy during the 
Tibetan empire mainly from Indian and Sanskritic role models involved the contact with the 
latter’s elaborate grammatical knowledge. This must have left a big impression on the Tibetans, 
particularly since grammar was a highly esteemed field of study at the beginning of any 
scholarly career in India, and Tibetan scholarly knowledge production which only started to 
begin followed the Sanskritic model. The vast extent of translation of Buddhist sources from 
Sanskrit into Tibetan naturally necessitated the study of Sanskrit grammar, and the preserved 
imperial decree in the SSBP attests that the supervision of translation by a royally supported 
central authority emphasized the importance of grammar in order to revise and standardize 
translational practices and their output.  
Around that time, authors like Lce Khyi ’brug or Facheng made important contributions to 
grammatical studies that seem to be primarily concerned with the introduction of grammatical 
terminology and concepts of cross-lingual validity, and only secondarily with an analysis of 
any specific language, but without any noticeable restriction to either Sanskrit or Tibetan. 
                                                          
142 Dreyfus 2003, 102. 
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Although we cannot say more about the concrete motivation and purpose of these early 
contributions, we have seen in the work of Lce Khyi ’brug that he drew on Indian soteriological 
motives that connect the study of language to the realization of the true Dharma. Regardless of 
the actual status of a work like Lce Khyi ’brug’s NG as a possible official document – perhaps 
requested by some authority and perhaps even in addition to SSBP and MVY – or merely as a 
private endeavor alone or in collaboration with Indian colleagues, it was argued that the 
usefulness of their contents in actual translational work appears to be higly limited, a fact that 
points more towards the direction that their main purpose was indeed more the introduction of 
linguistic studies to the establishing Tibetan scholarship. In any case, this focus on general 
rather than language-specific linguistics almost naturally facilitated the expansion from 
Sanskrit grammatical studies to that of the written Tibetan language, since the presentation of 
linguistic topics in NG or that of case grammar in Facheng’s exposition of the cases required 
exemplification either in Sanskrit, Tibetan or both. In addition to these sources, also some parts 
of SCP and TKJ were likely composed during or even before this period. Although part II will 
demonstrate that their terminological-conceptual framework clearly resonates with that of 
‘general’ linguistics, those parts that deal with old Tibetan morphology not only prove that they 
date back to early times of Tibetan grammaticography, but also suggest that Tibetan-specific 
grammatical analysis existed at that time as well. 
During post-imperial times and the second dissemination of Buddhism, the decline of Buddhist 
scholarly and religious practices and the quest to distinguish authentic from misguided 
teachings brought forth new standards of scholarship with a strong focus on commentary and 
argumentation. The study of language received an important role in this quest and became 
further formalized as one of the five classical sciences, thus attaining a fixed position in Tibetan 
scholarship. Sakya Paṇḍita as well as the earlier Indian scholar and translator Smr̥tijñānakīrti 
(10th/11th century)143 contributed important works as grammarians of that time, and some 
versions of the seminal treatises SCP and TKJ must have circulated as well.144 While direct 
cross-cultural contacts with India substantially decreased latest from the 14th century onwards, 
the narrative of Thon mi Saṃbhoṭa, his creation of the literary language as well as his 
composition of the first Tibetan grammatical treatises surfaced prominently in important and 
esteemed historiographical sources such as the Rgyal rab gsal ba’i me long or Bu ston’s chos 
’byung, thus uniting several motives such as the beginnings of literacy, the beginnings of 
Buddhism and grammar as well as a direct link to the Indian Buddhist tradition, and in effect 
                                                          
143 Hereafter also referred to as Smr̥ti. 
144 Cf. ft. 47. 
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connecting all these to the very beginnings of Tibetan (Buddhist) civilization. Along with the 
acceptance and promotion of this narrative, numerous important figures in Tibetan intellectual 
history produced a considerable corpus of commentarial literature on SCP and TKJ, 
consolidating the study of grammar in general and Tibetan grammar in particular, the latter now 
widely understood from the perspective of this narrative as Sum rtags (‘Tibetan grammar as 
correctly propounded in SCP and TKJ’)145 and not only as an integral discipline in Tibetan 
scholarship but also an important part of Tibetan Buddhist identity.  
At the current state of research, we are still far from any accurate assessment of the extent of 
linguistic studies in Tibet, either in terms of contributing authors or in terms of works associated 
with Tibetan-specific sgra rig. Different selections of mostly grammatical works or authors 
dealing with Tibetan grammar were provided by Tshe tan zhabs drung and Dmu dge bsam gtan, 
however without claiming to be exhaustive.146 After a preliminary and tentative assessment, it 
is safe to say that at least more than thirty identifiable authors contributed either one or several 
works to Tibetan-specific or general, Sanskrit-unspecific sgra rig in the period from the 8th/9th 
century up to the 1850s. These works are spread amongst genres such as bklag thabs (‘reading, 
pronunciation’), dag yig (‘orthography’), brda sprod (‘grammar’) or sum rtags (‘grammar,’ 
more specifically ‘Tibetan grammar as correctly propounded in SCP and TKJ’), and if areas 
such as snyan ngag (‘poetry’) or mngon brjod (‘lexicography/synonymy/metonymy’) and 
others were included, this number would certainly increase. The majority of these authors 
flourished subsequent to Sakya Paṇḍita, and previous to him there was only a handful of known 
authors during the Tibetan empire and the early period of the second dissemination. 
It is most interesting to note at this point that the situation differs significantly in the context of 
the growth and spread of Chinese Buddhism, in terms of the three factors (1) beginnings and 
early stages of literacy, (2) the prevailing translation policies and (3) a generally more scholastic 
approach to Buddhism with a strong emphasis on scripture and argumentation. Even before the 
appropriation of Buddhism, the Chinese tradition already looked back at a longstanding and 
esteemed intellectual history of their own literature as well as a logographic writing system. 
Furthermore, the translation of Buddhist sources into Chinese was initially a more private 
enterprise and centralized only during its later stages (c. 400). 147  The fact that Chinese 
translators apparently did not value Sanskrit grammatical expertise in their translational 
                                                          
145 The technical term Sum rtags that is frequently used in the meaning of grammar as a discipline or field of 
knowledge is derived from the respective first syllables of Sum cu pa (SCP) and Rtags kyi ’jug pa (TKJ). 
146 Cf. Tshe tan zhabs drung 2005, 190ff.; Dmu dge bsam gtan 2006B, 222ff. 
147 Cf. HSGLT 1, 47f.; Zürcher 1982. 
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practices as much as it is pronounced in the Tibetan imperial edicts has already been noted by 
the Chinese traveler and monk I-tsing in the records of his travels (671-695): 
 “But the old translators have seldom told us the rules of the Sanskrit language. Those 
 who lately introduced the Sūtras to our notice spoke only of the first seven cases. This 
 is not because of ignorance (of grammar), but they have kept silence thinking it is 
 useless (to teach the eighth), (i.e. the vocative). I trust that now a thorough study of 
 Sanskrit grammar may clear up many difficulties we encounter whilst engaged in 
 translation.”148  
Finally, although much of Chan Buddhism’s claim regarding its nonlinguistic transmission of 
realization from master to disciple should not be taken too literally,149 this rhetoric as such does 
stand opposed to the more intellectual and scholastic approach to Buddhism as promulgated in 
the Land of Snow as well as to literary curricula such as that of Sakya Paṇḍita. Interestingly – 
and we might be tempted to say consequently – grammatical studies have never been introduced 
to pre-modern China and without European influence.150 This may be seen as corroborating that 
these represent crucial factors for the flourishing of grammatical studies in Tibet, while the 
substantial linguistic and scriptural gap between the Chinese and Sanskrit languages in the 
Chinese context needs to be taken into account as well.151 
  
                                                          
148 Transl. by Takakusu in I-tsing 1896, 168. On the minor role of Sanskrit grammatical studies in Chinese 
translational practices compared to Tibet, cf. also HSGLT 1, 48. 
149 Cf. Gold (2008, 2) with reference to Faure 1991. Also note that in his travel records I-tsing complained about 
the lack of more extensive Sanskrit grammatical studies in China, proposing that it would clarify many 
difficulties encountered during translation (cf. I-tsing 1896, 168).  
150 Cf. Branner 2003, 192; Wang and Asher 1994, 524. Both point towards the 19th century for the beginning of 
systematic grammatical studies in a modern linguistic sense. 
151 Branner’s and Wang and Asher’s summary of Chinese grammaticography mention as reasons both language-
typology and the logographic writing system (cf. Branner 2003, 192; Wang and Asher 1994, 524). 
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3 Si tu Paṇ chen Chos kyi ʼbyung gnas – His Life and Scholarship 
3.1 Introduction 
Si tu Paṇchen (1699/1700-1774) was born into a family of old nobility near the city of Sde dge 
in East Tibet.152 At the age of three, he was recognized as the eighth incarnation in the lineage 
of Si tu sprul skus153 and received the name Chos kyi ʼ byung gnas. From his childhood onwards, 
he maintained close relationships with the House of Sde dge, at that time an independent 
kingdom which showed political interest in taking Bka’ brgyud lamas as court chaplains.154 
This relationship would turn out to be a strong influence on Si tu’s career, since his loyalty to 
the royal family not only enabled him to establish a new monastic seat in Dpal spungs but also 
made him the editor of the renowned Sde dge edition of the Bka’ ʼgyur (1731-1733).155 Even 
though many illustrious figures in Tibetan history had achieved mastery over multiple fields of 
knowledge, only few of these have reached a comparable level of proficiency and lasting 
influence in several of these. Based on the Journal of the International Association of Tibetan 
Studies 7156  and its contributions, we are in the fortunate position to have a full volume of 
articles dedicated to his work, the table of contents of which alone provides an impressive image 
of Si tu Paṇchen’s vita.  
As an abbot of Dpal spungs and a court chaplain, in the course of his life Si tu ordained more 
than four thousand monks. Next to his monastic obligations, Si tu also was a respected doctor 
and painter, and from his autobiography we learn about his appreciation for various Chinese, 
Newar and even Kashmiri painting styles he had encountered on his visits to Central Tibet and 
Nepal,157 and especially the former two impacted on the development of his own style. As a 
physician, Si tu incorporated a number of different medical sources and techniques, and he 
practiced not only classical Tibetan but also Chinese medicine.158 Si tu’s literary production 
becomes evident from a look at his collected works,159 which features a broad array of literary 
genres, such as the already mentioned field of medicine or historical works on Indian and 
Tibetan Buddhism (volume 9) as well as the Tibetan Karma bka’ brgyud lineage (volumes 11-
12). Especially the latter received attention in recent academic research as an important 
                                                          
152 Today’s Sde dge County is located in Garze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, China’s Sichuan province. 
153 The Si tu sprul skus are among the high-ranking incarnations in the Karma bka’ brgyud order of Tibetan 
Buddhism. The title ‘Si tu’ was originally granted by the Yuan dynasty in the 14th century (cf. Chaix 2013, 19). 
154 Cf. Chaix 2013, 22. 
155 Cf. Smith 2001, 91. 
156 Cf. Germano et al. 2013. 
157 Cf. Tashi Tsering 2013, 128f. 
158 Cf. Garrett 2013, 280. 
159 Published by Sherab Gyaltsen 1990 (cf. supra 10). For an overview of the volumes, cf. Schaeffer 2013, 304f. 
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complementary perspective to the more established Dge lugs pa tradition and its version of 
Tibetan monastic history.160 Si tu also composed a variety of poems which cover religious and 
worldly topics both in Tibetan and Sanskrit, and these bear witness to his mastery of and passion 
for the literary arts. Regarding the inner science of Buddhism, he translated, revised and 
commented upon numerous short tantric treatises and prayers most of which are rather short in 
volume. His major contribution to Buddhist philosophy is a word-by-word commentary (tshig 
’grel) on the first four books of the Abhidharmakośa which covers nearly 700 folios in his 
collected works (volume 13). As Schaeffer noticed, the classical topics of Madhyamaka, 
Yogācāra or Pramāṇa are, however, entirely missing.161 It is also noteworthy in this context 
that his oeuvre contains at least one contribution to non-Buddhist philosophy in the form of a 
translation of a treatise attributed to the non-dualist Vedāntika Śaṇkara.162  
The largest part of Si tu’s writing is related to linguistic science, and the first six volumes of his 
collected works are exclusively dedicated to Sanskrit and Tibetan grammar as well as 
linguistics, with some additional minor works in the remaining volumes. The most outstanding 
works of Sanskrit scholarship are certainly his revisions of the Tibetan translations of the 
Kātantra and Cāndravyākaraṇa (volume 1) as well as his extensive commentary on Cāndra 
(volumes 1-3), which Verhagen aptly characterized as “a survey of all major Indian indigenous 
traditions of Sanskrit linguistics.”163 Si tu also revised the Tibetan version of the Sanskrit-
lexicon Amarakośa along with a translation of the commentary Kāmadhenu by Subhūticandra 
(volumes 4-5). His collected works further feature a bilingual version of Daṇḍin’s Kāvyādarśa 
on poetical theory as well as minor works which include additional contributions to Sanskrit 
lexicography, pronunciation and grammatical voice. Regarding Tibetan language, his most 
important contribution certainly is his Great Commentary (GC; volume 6), an extensive Tibetan 
grammar which covers 170 folios and comments on the two seminal texts SCP and TKJ, a 
separate edition of which directly precede this commentary. Additionally, volume 10 includes 
two shorter grammatical works on Tibetan lexicography and orthography. 
Prevailing throughout Si tu’s entire literary production is the fact that conspicuously much of it 
is not his own composition, but it rather consists in either translated Sanskrit works – some in 
bilingual versions – or edited and revised translations. Schaeffer illustrates the scope of Si tu’s 
                                                          
160 Cf. Sperling 2013. 
161 Cf. Schaeffer 2013, 306. 
162 Cf. ibid. 
163 Verhagen 2013, 317. 
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meticulous detail and accuracy in which he conducted the edition and translation of sources.164 
Si tu’s translation of the Nag po chen po’i bstod pa brgyad pa (‘Eight Verses of Praise to 
Mahākāla’; volume 7) includes not only a bilingual version of the eight verses but is also replete 
with annotations. These range from comparisons of numerous textual witnesses of the prayer 
in Sanskrit and Tibetan for the sake of a reliable edition of the Sanskrit text to translational-
hermeneutical issues relevant for a reliable Tibetan translation, drawing the reader’s attention 
to alternative readings, homonymies of Sanskrit terminology and other issues. Si tu’s main 
concern in this context is a bilingual edition of the prayer that provides the reader with all the 
necessary text-critical and translational background for a refined understanding of the verses, 
thus regarding the prayer primarily as a textual item with the concerns of a true philologist. The 
direct involvement and importance of grammar in general and case grammar in particular as 
part of his philological scrutiny is directly revealed, for example, when he states that “after I 
had carefully considered the structure and appropriate meaning of the words and case endings 
in the verse, which expounds the benefits of the recitation of this hymn, I translated it thus [as 
above].”165 It is clear that an exegetical approach that focuses on translation and textual critique 
is not far from the study of grammar, for grammatical expertise in theory and practice is the 
most fundamental armament of the translator and philologist, especially in a Sanskritic-inspired 
environment in which this was highly esteemed. While the connection to translation and the 
importance of grammatical studies in India have already been highlighted as major factors for 
the successful proliferation of grammatical studies in Tibet from the earliest times onwards, Si 
tu’s radical execution of philology was certainly exceptional among earlier and later Tibetan 
scholars. Thus, what are the roots of this meticulous philological approach in the eighteenth 
century that apparently, in Schaeffer’s words, “for Si tu philology trumps philosophy”?166  
3.2 Tracing the Emphasis of Philology in Si tu’s Scholarship 
Si tu shares the same stance with Sakya Paṇḍita, Lce Khyi ’brug’s NG as well as the opening 
declaration of SCP,167 namely the Sanskritic-inspired ideal that expertise in linguistic studies is 
at the very root of (Buddhist) learning: 
 gang dag thar mchog bde chen dbyig thob phyir/      
 des don snying po’i rgya mtshor ’jug ’dod na/     
                                                          
164 Cf. Schaeffer 2013, 307f. For a more detailed account of Si tu’s text-critical methodology in the same text, cf. 
Verhagen 2001B, 77-82; Verhagen 2010, 474-476. 
165 bstod pa bklag pa’i phan yon bstan pa’i tshigs bcad ’di rnam dbye dang tshig gi ’gros dang don thob la legs 
par brtags nas ’di ltar bsgyur ba yin […] (Si tu 7.437.6, transl. Verhagen 2010, 476). 
166 Schaeffer 2013, 306. 
167 For the importance of grammar in SCP’s opening declaration, cf. infra 111f. 
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 ming tshig brjod gzhi yi ge’i sbyor ba’i gru/      
 blo ldan ded dbon tshogs kyis bsten bya yin/ 
 “For attaining the treasure of liberation and highest joy, 
 if one wishes to enter the seas of quintessence and definitive meaning, 
 the basis of free, lexical words (ming), syntactic forms (tshig) and sentences (brjod pa), 
 the boat of applying letters, 
 is to be relied on by those helmsmen gifted with acumen.”168 
Even though this quotation marks the end of the GC, the application of letters (yi ge’i sbyor ba) 
draws upon the opening declaration of SCP and needs to be understood as that very operation 
which defines all of linguistic studies and grammar, including topics such as lexicography, 
orthography, syntax, etc.169 Along with this approach which sees the purpose of grammar in the 
Buddhist path to realization, we have seen that philology and grammar have had a long history 
in Tibet already before Si tu, since they were instrumental to the transfer, revision and 
authentication of authoritative knowledge, first and foremost the Buddhist doctrine. Si tu was 
certainly not unaffected by these issues, since the preservation and validation of knowledge are 
at the very core of Tibetan scholastic knowledge production with its strong focus on exegesis 
and commentary. Si tu does not stint polemics throughout his writings against misguided 
scholarly practices during his time, and illustrative examples of these are beautifully rendered 
by Schaeffer in the following: 
 dbul po’i rigs skyes mu to ba rnams kyis//      
 nor bu ’ching bu’i170 bye brag mi shes shing//      
 brgya lam dbyig mchog rin chen thob gyur kyang//      
 don ldan byi dor cho ga shes mi srid//      
 de bzhin sgra rig mi shes mkhas rloms kyis//      
 legs bshad nyes bshad dbye ba mi shes shing//      
 dam pa’i gzhung bzang ’chad par rloms pa yang//      
 phal cher tshig don log par ’phyan pa mang// 
 “Beggars, people destitute and poor, 
 Do not know the arts of formal dress. 
 And if they chance to gain a precious jewel, 
                                                          
168 GC 615.6. For an alternative translation, cf. Schaeffer 2013, 303. 
169 Cf. also infra 111f. 
170 Schaeffer (2013, 10) reads ’ching bya’i. 
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 They know not how to don it to impress. 
 Just so fake scholars know not language arts, 
 And don’t distinguish eloquence from chatter. 
 They vainly teach the good and holy scriptures, 
 Yet mostly stray from words that actually matter.”171 
 ci phyir deng dus skye bo phal mo che//     
  blun po ’khor mang stobs ’byor ldan pa’am//     
  rmongs pa mkhas snyems zol zob gyon can la//      
 mkhas par bstod cing ri bong cal rjes ’jug// 
 “Why do the masses around today, 
 Chase fools like rabbits, chattering praise? 
 These fools with power, wealth, and command, 
 Are idiots posing as scholars – a scam!”172 
The danger of fraudulence and the lack of linguistic skills reflect motives encountered also 
during the later dissemination of Buddhism, when scholars like Sakya Paṇḍita promoted new, 
higher standards for Buddhist scholarly practices, and thus it seems that Si tu’s scholarship 
resounded this position hundreds of years later in a time when the vast translation enterprises 
of the two disseminations of Buddhism and the most intensive period of the Indo-Tibetan 
knowledge transfer had already passed.  
3.2.1 The Intellectual Environment of Si tu’s Era 
It seems that the decrease of political turmoil in India that had been caused by the Muslim 
invasions and stimulated the emigration of Indian scholars to Tibet as well as the vast 
accumulation of Sanskritic knowledge by Tibetans up to the 13th century was followed by a 
period in which the Tibetan tradition engaged more in an internal processing of the collected 
knowledge rather than the pursuit of additional Sanskritic materials.173 At the latest by the 14th 
century, the  accumulation of new Sanskritic materials decreased substantially and the Tibetans 
increasingly attended to the study of Tibetan or bilingual translations. Despite the long history 
of philology in the form of translated Sanskritic knowledge and the established position of 
Sanskrit-Tibetan linguistics (sgra rig pa, śabdavidyā) in the scholastic curriculum, the primary 
practical purpose of these two disciplines, i.e. translation, had naturally lost importance. An 
                                                          
171 Si tu 3.678.5; transl. Schaeffer 2013, 309f. 
172 Si tu 3.679.1; transl. Schaeffer 2013, 309. 
173 Cf. Smith 2001, 87f. 
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emerging and increasing state centralization, such as the establishment of the Central Tibetan 
government, the foundation of the Qing empire and the kingdom of Bhutan, took place from 
the mid-17th century onwards, with the effect of again invigorating Buddhist patronage and 
scholarly learning on the Himalayan plateau. The Fifth Dalai Lama (1617-1682) together with 
his regent Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho (1653-1705) played important roles in this flourishing of 
intellectual practices after a period of conflict between rivaling political and religious parties, 
as the former had established a central leadership over Central Tibet with the help of the Mongol 
ruler Gushri Khan. In the words of Kurtis R. Schaeffer, the Great Fifth and his regent “embarked 
on a massive literary, architectural, and institutional campaign to create a cultural hegemony 
for Gelukpa influence over the entire Tibetan Plateau, reforming religious and secular practices 
and especially the Lhasa landscape in the process. Aside from their literary output and the 
building of the Potala Palace, they made Lhasa a lively center of international exchange, with 
resident Armenians, Mongols, Newars, and Indians, not to mention Tibetans from all over the 
plateau who brought elements of this cultural renaissance back to their own home regions, 
helping shape the current vision of Tibetan nationalism.”174 Between 1654 and 1681, nearly 
forty Indian scholars resided at the Fifth’s court according to his own autobiographical account, 
the majority of which were renowned for their knowledge of medicine and languages. About 
ten of these reportedly came from Varanasi, such as a Brahmin named Gokula, who remained 
in Lhasa for an entire decade (1654-1664).175 Si tu’s lifetimes and the decades before him 
witnessed a sprawling development of new monastic institutions throughout the Himalayan 
plateau due to the recent political changes.176 In Amdo province, for example, the patronage of 
Buddhism by the newly established Qing dynasty evoked a significant growth of the monastic 
population. Lastly, Si tu’s role as the chief editor of Sde dge’s royally sponsored bka’ ’gyur 
print certainly is of special relevance to philological scholarship, together with the fact that by 
the early eighteenth century printing had become a major means to textual reproduction and a 
technological advance that substantially increased the output of published texts.  
These developments resulted in “a vibrant period of Tibetan intellectual life,” referred to by 
Schaeffer as “the long eighteenth century”,177 in which Si tu was part of “a new generation of 
eastern Tibetan ‘renaissance scholars’.” 178  Among Si tu’s contemporaries with which he 
maintained close personal relationships were also such figures as Mdo mkhar ba Tshe ring 
                                                          
174 Cf. Schaeffer 2014, 348. 
175 Cf. ibid., 352f. 
176 Cf. Schaeffer 2013, 303f. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Schaeffer 2009, 94. 
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dbang rgyal, the author of the celebrated novel Gzhon nu zla med kyi gtam rgyud (‘Tale of the 
Unrivaled Youngling’), as well as the editor of the Sde dge bstan ’gyur, Zhu chen Tshul khrims 
rin chen. Even without detailed knowledge of the latter’s linguistic expertise, Zhu chen’s 
editorial standards certainly equaled those of Si tu.179 Such was the prolific environment across 
the Himalyan plateau which was caused by the invigorated promotion of Buddhism and literary 
as well as other arts and in which Si tu developed his ideal of scholarship while simultaneously 
causing awareness and voicing criticism of the deficiencies of that tradition. 
3.2.2 Tracing Si tu’s Critique against the Lack of Linguistic Skills 
It was stated above that particularly pre-modern Tibetan monastic education neglected literary 
arts to the extent that many students were incapable of proper writing, since the studies were 
predominantly centered around the development of expertise in Buddhism and logical 
reasoning.180 Judging from events such as the ban of secular sciences from the Dge lugs’s 
monastic seats during the Fifth Dalai Lama, Si tu probably faced a similar situation in his own 
times. In the scholastic view of Si tu, it must have seemed contradictory if not ironic to see so-
called experts in Buddhist philosophy and logical debate without a proper literary education, 
for in his views this was the very foundation of becoming an expert in the true Dharma. We 
might therefore speculate whether Si tu’s critique quoted above may have also aimed at this 
lack of literary skills he observed in the prevalent forms of monastic scholarly training during 
his times.  
Si tu’s polemics against those unskilled in linguistics was certainly not simply an eloquent 
exercise for the amusements of readers, but he probably considered the lack of literary skills in 
both Sanskrit and Tibetan as a real danger to the exegesis of authoritative Buddhist knowledge, 
and throughout his career he had plenty opportunity to witness that a correct and accurate 
(textual) understanding requires linguistic, philological and translational expertise. To give one 
particularly illuminating example, Si tu travelled to the Kathmandu valley twice to visit 
dignitaries from the three kingdoms Kathmandu, Bhaktapur and Patan. On his first visit, at the 
age of 23 (1723-24), he was in the company of the Black and Red Hat hierarchs of the Karmapa 
branch, and for his second visit, in the year 1748, he travelled with his own entourage.181 During 
both visits, he was eager to meet local paṇḍitas and access or collect Sanskrit manuscripts 
wherever possible, and Si tu’s autobiography notes that he was able to study numerous texts in 
different areas of knowledge. Verhagen remarks that Si tu was well aware of the different 
                                                          
179 Cf. Schaeffer 2009, chapter 5. 
180 Cf. supra 46. 
181 Cf. Verhagen 2013, 1. 
58 
 
qualities of manuscripts obtained from Nepal,182 for example for his Tibetan translation of the 
Svayaṃbhūpurāṇa (volume 7 of his collected works), he was able to acquire two editions in 
1723 and in 1748 and observed that the first one was corrupt and thus inferior compared to the 
second one. We can assume that such comparisons of Sanskrit manuscripts and likewise of 
Tibetan translations, such as the Eight Verses of Praise to Mahākāla mentioned by Schaeffer,183 
clearly called Si tu’s attention to the dangers of misinterpretation due to textual corruption or 
translational errors. 
Si tu encountered this lack of language proficiency also during his stays abroad, and Verhagen 
gives a vivid account of Si tu’s first travel to Nepal and his struggles in communicating with 
local scholars in his quest for knowledge, two episodes of which seem especially noteworthy. 
First, even though much of the communication with locals was facilitated by interpreters, Si tu 
learned to speak Sanskrit in order to directly converse with the paṇḍita Bacchur Ojā, an 
acknowledged Sanskrit grammarian. While the details of the earlier stages of Si tu’s education 
are yet to be investigated in more detail, he must have already achieved a certain proficiency in 
Sanskrit grammar from a young age and before travelling to Nepal, which is evident from a list 
of tutors (yongs ’dzin) at the end of his autobiography (volume 14), where at least three names 
are associated with Sanskrit studies.184 In his autobiography, Si tu’s recount of his first trip 
shows that his Sanskrit expertise was recognized by local scholars,185 however, Si tu also had 
to realize that his mostly theoretical and passive reading competency of Sanskrit acquired in 
Tibet was insufficient to speak the language and, to his embarrassment, his mistakes were 
corrected by the Brahmin paṇḍita.  
As for the second episode, the Tibetan delegation had relied on interpreters for discussing the 
Buddhist doctrine with local scholars and dignitaries, and during one such occasion Si tu 
complained that the interpreters’ translational skills severely impeded the exchange: 
 gang ci’i gsung ’phros smar [sic!]186 bar byung song yang lo tsā ba mi mkhas pa dag 
 bar du bcug dgos pa’i stabs kyis chos phyogs kyi gsung ’phros ’dra ni cher byung ma 
 song/ 
                                                          
182 Cf. ibid., 4f. 
183 Cf. supra 52f. 
184 Slob dpon Mkhas pa dpal grub apparently introduced him to the Kalāpa system of Sanskrit grammar (cf. Si tu 
14.736.4), a scholar named Viṣṇupati taught him Pāṇini as well as Sārasvata, and the name Pradhumna is 
mentioned as Si tu’s tutor of the Amarakośa (cf. Si tu 14.736.7f.). I owe this important piece of information to 
Peter Verhagen in an e-mail conversation dated January 6th, 2017. 
185 Cf. Verhagen 2013, 318f. 
186 I read smra. 
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 “Whatever conversation came up, it was necessary to bring in the unlearned translators, 
 for which reason a real conversation on Dharma could not take place for the bigger 
 part.”187 
Such frustration caused by language barriers during his first visit in Nepal must have left an 
impression on him, formative for his position on scholarship and the related role of linguistic 
competency. On the other hand, direct contact with local paṇḍitas must have also provided him 
with firsthand experience of Indian scholarly ideals in theory and practice. 
Yet, Si tu’s philological career was only about to begin. Considering perhaps the most important 
event for the purpose of this study, it is unsurprising that his position as the court chaplain of 
the House of Sde dge together with his philological-linguistic expertise led to being 
commissioned by the royal family as the editor of the bka’ ’gyur section of the Tibetan Buddhist 
Canon, which work he commenced in 1729 at the age of thirty.188 As part of the catalogue that 
he compiled following completion of the canonical project in 1733 (volume 9), Si tu also 
attached not only the above-mentioned history of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism but also 
detailed information on the materials, workforce, methodology etc. for the production of the 
bka’ ’gyur.189 As editor-in-chief, Si tu was responsible for the edition of more than 1.000 works 
considered as the word of the Buddha, compiled into more than 100 volumes, and he oversaw 
more than 500 men or 6 types of workers, i.e. more than 60 calligraphers and scribes, a group 
of 10 proofreaders and several hundred block carvers, woodworkers as well as paper and ink 
workers.190 These numbers already reveal the enormous size of this royally sponsored project 
and the prestigious and – from a Buddhist perspective – auspicious task of the chief editor only 
rendered the need for philological accuracy all the more urgent. According to his own accounts, 
Si tu himself made the decisions regarding the compilation and editing methodologies for the 
bka’ ’gyur and he had the final word on difficult passages. His editorial work was mainly based 
on two earlier versions of the bka’ ’gyur, the ’Jang sa tham block-print (1609-11) and the Lho 
dzong manuscript.191 Apart from these two sources he also had access to earlier editions, and 
he also used several Sanskrit manuscripts for the edition of tantras. Schaeffer mentions the 
recension, examination and emendation of the canonical sources as the three main tasks in the 
editorial practice of both the editors of the Sde dge Canon, Si tu and Zhu chen Tshul khrims rin 
                                                          
187 Si tu 14.119.4. Cf. also Verhagen 2013, 322. 
188 On the history of the Sde dge canon, Si tu’s editing of the bka ’gyur section as well as the general “explosion” 
of printing the Tibetan Buddhist Canon on the Himalayan Plateau during the 18th century, cf. Schaeffer 2009, 
chapter 5. 
189 Cf. Schaeffer 2009, 94; Verhagen 2010, 471f.; Chaix 2010, 91f. 
190 Cf. Schaeffer 2009, 104f. 
191 Cf. ibid., 95. 
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chen, the latter being responsible for the bstan ’gyur section of the Canon from 1737 until 
1744.192 While recension is concerned with the appraisal and arrangement of sources, their 
examination has to distinguish between authentic and corrupt readings, the latter then being 
possibly emended as the third of the three branches. Schaeffer further notes that “the 
foundations for such reasoned examination and impartiality,” as they were practiced by the two 
editors, “were definitely laid down in the grammatical treatises of the early translators.”193 
Editors working in the project groups were required to be familiar with works such as the SCP 
and TKJ, the SSBP and MVY or even Smr̥tijñānakīrti’s Tibetan grammar Smra sgo.194 Indeed, 
Schaeffer’s detailed and informative account of the production of the Sde dge Canon reminds 
us to some extent of the centralized translation enterprises during the imperial period, at that 
time also a massive, royally patronized project with a high degree of standardization based on 
decreed principles. The honorific duty assigned to Si tu further fostered his philological-
linguistic vocation and required him to further practice, cultivate and promote these disciplines 
among his editors. Latest at this stage of his career Si tu must have had detailed insights into 
the philological, editorial and further constitution of translated Buddhist Sanskritic sources on 
the Himalayan plateau, thus empowering him to critically assess the observed shortcomings 
among the scholars of his time. 
Si tu’s direct access to new textual material already during his first visit to Nepal, his contacts 
with Sanskrit paṇḍitas, the editorship of the Sde dge bka’ ’gyur as well as some of his personal 
experiences all point towards the importance of linguistic competency and philology and only 
confirm what SCP, Lce Khyi ’brug or Sakya Paṇḍita already had pronounced long before him: 
recourse to the Sanskritic tradition and its sources as well as linguistic, translational, text-critical 
and philological practices are indispensable for an accurate understanding of authoritative 
(Buddhist) teachings.195 However, to this point, the question as to how the composition of the 
Great Commentary is situated within Si tu’s philological and linguistic work has remained 
unaddressed in our investigations. 
3.3 Si tu’s Project of Tibetan Grammar, the Great Commentary 
Si tu’s philological work as an editor and translator was closely intertwined with his 
grammatical work, a fact which is most directly testified by his revision of Tibetan translations 
                                                          
192 Cf. ibid. 
193 Schaeffer 2009, 101. 
194 Smr̥tijñānakīrti’s composition on Tibetan grammar referred to here as Smra sgo more accurately consists of a 
root text entitled Smra ba’i sgo mtshon cha lta bu (‘Weapon-like Speech door (= mouth)’ or ‘Weapon-like 
Entrance to Speech’) and an autocommentary (cf. also Smra sgo in the Abbreviations). 
195 On reasons for Si tu’s emphatic revision of already translated textual materials, cf. also Schaeffer 2013, 305. 
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of the Sanskrit grammars Kātantra and Cāndra196 as well as his editorial work on the bka’ ’gyur 
in which he demanded grammatical knowledge from his editors.  
It was mentioned above that many of the well-known Tibetan translators also made 
contributions to the field of Sanskrit or Tibetan linguistics. During the imperial epoch, a few 
autochthonous linguistic texts on Sanskrit language and the chos skad emerged in- and outside 
the context of the revision and standardization of translation that directly emphasized Indian 
vyākaraṇa, however it remains challenging to evaluate whether these compositions arose out 
of mere personal efforts by figures like Lce Khyi ’brug or whether they had an official status 
or purpose in the royally supported commission.  
Si tu makes available more detailed material on the background of his grammatical 
composition, for example at the end of the Great Commentary he states that several interested, 
yet unnamed persons had repeatedly encouraged  him before he commenced the composition 
of the part on the Sum cu pa at the age of thirty, the same year he was assigned to the editor-in-
chief for the bka’ ’gyur and several years after his first trip to Nepal.197 It is difficult to discern 
the true value of this statement, since it is a typical rhetoric of Tibetan scholarly modesty to 
deny the composition of an important work merely on one’s own behalf. On the other hand, this 
claim may further corroborate the fact that his expertise in linguistics and grammar was already 
widely acknowledged at that time, which is confirmed also by his assignment to the editor of 
the bka’ ’gyur. SCP and TKJ had already achieved their status as the unquestionable authorities 
of Tibetan grammar some centuries before Si tu and the related narrative about their origin was 
widely accepted by the tradition. The composition of a commentary on these two texts thus was 
an established practice among grammarians and even the most important means of grammatical 
theory formation for WT, therefore also an esteemed endeavor for an expert like Si tu.  
Si tu further explains that he put down the work and postponed its completion several times, 
distracted by different “duties related to the Dharma as well as mostly not declinable obligations 
outside of [his] control,”198 until he finished the work only at the age of forty-five in his 
monastic seat in Dpal spungs. In this context, he mentions the venerated Mdo mkhar ba Tshe 
ring dbang rgyal as a high-ranking literate who kindly and repeatedly beseeched him to finish 
his work after having deferred it the first time, which also demonstrates the value ascribed to 
Si tu’s composition of the Great Commentary amongst Tibetan intellectuals. Even though Si tu 
had already started composing the treatise slightly before or at the beginning of his editorial 
                                                          
196 Cf. volume 1 in his collected works, Sherab Gyaltsen 1990. 
197 Cf. GC 617.1. 
198 […] chos ldan gyi bya ba dang phal cher bzlog tu med pa’i gzhan dbang gi khol po […] (GC 617.4). 
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work on the Sde dge Canon – probably one of those duties which distracted him – the fifteen 
years required to complete it also assured that his experience and expertise gathered during this 
time found its way into his grammar.  
Si tu comments upon his own motivation to compose the Great Commentary at its very 
beginning: 
 de las sum cu pa dang rtags kyi ’jug pa gnyis kho na deng sang gi bar du yod cing/     
 mkhas blun mang pos ’grel bshad kyi khur blangs pas don gzhan dang gzhan du ’don 
 pa’i glegs bam gyi phreng bar gyur mod/     ’on tang rnam dpyod dang ldan pa kha cig 
 gis rigs pa’i mda’ rnon gyis phug pas gzhung don mang po zhig dpyis pyin par gyur 
 cing/     phal cher ni byang pyhogs ’dir gtsug lag gnyis ka bar du nyams pa’i dbang las 
 bshad rgyun dang bstan bcos kyi yan lag gzhan ma tshang ba’i phyir mi gsal ba rnams 
 kha khral ’jal ba tsam las don du gnas par ma mngon pas/     bdag lta bus mtha’ gcig tu 
 bshad par sla ba ma yin kyang blo gros kyi nor dang ldan pa gzhan dag gis kyang ched 
 du bskul ba dang/     rang nyid gzhung khyad par du ’phags pa ’di dag la ’jug par ’dod 
 pa’i spro ba brtas pas rjes dpag gsum gyis ji ltar dpag pa dgrol bar bya’o/ 
 “Of these [eight treatises originally composed by master Thon mi Saṃbhoṭa], only the 
 two, Sum cu pa and Rtags kyi ’jug pa, are preserved up to the present day. Since many 
 learned ones as well as fools have taken on the burden of a commentary, a series of 
 works expounding this and that interpretation (~ don) has emerged. Yet, while some 
 with the gift of thorough analysis have pierced the treatises’ meaning with the sharp 
 arrow of reasoning, thus clarifying much of it, the majority [of explanations] lacks 
 clarity, because the transmission as well as the remaining branches of the [eight] 
 treatises are incomplete due to their downfall between the two disseminations (gtsug lag 
 gnyis ka bar du ?) here in the north (i.e. Tibet). Apart from paying tribute [to master 
 Thon mi], they appear to miss the [texts’] meaning (don du gnas par mi mngon). 
 Consequently, even though a definitive explanation (mtha’ gcig tu bshad pa) is not easy 
 for someone like me (bdag lta bus), after others gifted with the jewel of intellect also 
 requested it and, as for myself, being full of enthusiasm, wishing to engage in these two 
 sublime treatises, [I] will elaborate how to measure [them] by means of the three 
 inferences (rjes dpag gsum).”199 
                                                          
199 GC 451.1. 
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Here, Si tu expresses a strong and direct critique against most of the existing commentarial 
literature on the Sum cu pa and Rtags kyi ’jug pa and reveals his main opponents. The notion 
of kha khral ’jal ba (‘to pay tribute/respect [to the master]’) is not merely directed against 
previous commentators in general, it is a subtle but unmistakable attack against Zha lu Lo tsā 
ba Chos skyong bzang po (Zha lu Lotsāwa; 1441-1527/28) together with Rnam gling Paṇ chen 
Dgon mchog chos grags (Rnam gling Paṇchen; 1646-1718) as well as Pra ti Dge bshes Rin 
chen don grub (Pra ti; 17/18th century).200 All of them mention drin du gzo ba (‘to show 
gratitude’) as one of the reasons why “writing on [the two root texts], reading and explaining 
[them], listening to [teachings on them] as well as [their] full clarification is nothing but 
appropriate for scholars.”201 Si tu therefore acknowledges that their respective compositions 
fulfill the purpose of paying respect to the root texts and their author, but he also shares his 
devastating judgement of their actual understanding of SCP and TKJ. However, his polemical 
assessment of the tradition is not restricted to these three since his knowledge of Sum rtags 
commentaries and Tibetan grammatical literature in general went far beyond these works. 
Si tu observes the diversity of existing interpretations of the two root texts, both by true scholars 
as well as fools, and consequently he sees the primary purpose of his commentary to arrive at 
a definitive explanation (mtha’ gcig tu bshad pa). Thus, it was the exegetical state of the art of 
Sum rtags that prompted Si tu to add abundant assessments – for the larger part refutations – of 
the former grammatical tradition throughout the entire Great Commentary. This common 
Tibetan scholastic-commentarial practice bears the name mtha’ dpyad (‘final analysis’) and is 
usually contained at the end of a textual section in order to clarify uncertainties, possible 
inconsistencies and to refute or reconcile competing interpretations and theories. Since Si tu 
attributed such great importance to the language arts in which he had become an acknowledged 
expert and since he already had direct contact with Sanskritic scholarship during his first trip to 
Nepal, it seems natural if not necessary in view of his assessment of the exegetical state of the 
art to turn to the most important Tibetan grammatical texts – either by himself or upon request 
– and take upon him the duty of correcting misleading faults of former commentators as well 
as to elaborate on the ‘definitive’ meaning of SCP and TKJ. According to Si tu’s own account, 
standing out against commentators that only achieve to show their gratitude, he intends to 
pursue the courageous project of mtha’ gcig tu bshad pa by means of rjes dpag gsum (‘threefold 
                                                          
200 Note that Zha lu Lotsāwa represents a frequent target of Si tu’s critique also in the context of other works, e.g. 
the translation of the Eight Verses of Praise to Mahākāla (cf. Verhagen 2010, 476) or the commentary on 
Cāndravyākaraṇa (cf. HSGLT 2, 177f.). 
201 […] mkhas pa rnams kyi ’bri zhing klog pa dang ’chad pa dang nyan pa dang rab tu gsal bar byed rigs pa 
nyid do/ (Zha lu 2013A, 2). 
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inference’), that is to say, reasoning. This well-established triad in Tibetan scholastic 
knowledge production sets out the methodological framework within which Si tu’s grammatical 
theory formation operated.  
The present chapter had demonstrated that Si tu was a philologist by heart who was fully 
committed to the prominent view that grammar should be studied as part of the Buddhist path, 
and thus his Great Commentary was not only an exegetical exercise but also serves an important 
soteriological purpose. The foundations of Si tu’s project in the Great Commentary were the 
diversity of competing commentarial literature, the need for a definitive explanation of SCP 
and TKJ as well as the open commitment to a critical approach based on reasoning. 
After having discussed at some length the historical background of Tibetan grammar as well as 
that of Si tu and his Great Commentary, the following chapter will turn to the methodological 
framework of Si tu’s grammatical theory formation in order to provide insights into why and 
how a definitive explanation of SCP and TKJ may improve the understanding of WT, an 
investigation that will further reveal some important methodological mechanisms governing his 
conception of case grammar. 
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4 Tibetan Scholastic Methodology and the Formation of Grammatical Theories 
in the Great Commentary 
The perhaps most important characteristic of grammatical theory formation in the Great 
Commentary is the fact that it is a commentary on SCP and TKJ, ultimately the exclusive 
scriptural authorities regarding the grammar of the written Tibetan language in Si tu’s time. 
This further implies that any analysis of the structures of WT, including any attempt to further 
develop the understanding of these structures, takes place within the framework of interpreting 
the word of SCP and TKJ – and the same holds true for the entire Sum rtags tradition, i.e. the 
commentarial literature on SCP and TKJ that understands the grammar of WT through the 
exegesis of these two seminal texts. In order to gain insight into Si tu’s methodology and his 
quest towards a definitive explanation, this chapter will commence with a closer look at his 
understanding of the authority of SCP and TKJ against the background of the general Tibetan 
scholastic principal of scriptural authority.  
4.1 On the authority of Sum cu pa and Rtags kyi ’jug pa 
In his study of Indo-Tibetan scholasticism, Cabezón notes that “when it comes to the actual 
practice of philosophical discourse, we find that scripture plays an extremely important role.”202 
This importance of scriptural authority in Tibetan scholarship is rooted in the Indian tradition 
and is theoretically founded in the field of pramāṇa (tshad ma, ‘means of valid cognition’) that 
is primarily concerned with logic, epistemology and the question of valid cognition. In Indian 
philosophical schools such as Nyāya, for example, authoritative speech (śabda) is considered 
one such pramāṇa, next to pratyakṣa (‘direct perception’), anumāna (‘inference’) and upamāna 
(‘comparison, analogy’), through which one arrives at correct and reliable knowledge.203 The 
epistemological school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti commonly referred to as the tradition of 
Buddhist epistemology accepts only the two pramāṇas of pratyakṣa (‘direct perception’) and 
anumāna (‘inference’), śabda being included as a form of the latter.204 In the context of the 
validation of authoritative speech or scripture, exegetical analysis and argumentation are further 
formalized in the Tibetan scholastic tradition by means of the dbyad pa gsum (‘threefold 
analysis’), comprising direct perception (mngon gsum), logical inference (rjes dpag) and 
scriptural authority (~ yid ches rjes dpag; lit. ‘inference [based on] trust or belief’).205 Any 
                                                          
202 Cabezón 1994, 91. On scriptural authority in so-called “Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism”, cf. ibid., chapter 5. 
203 Cf. Nyāya Sūtra 1.1.3. 
204 Cf. Tillemans 1986. For a reprint of this article, cf. Tillemans 1999, chapter 1.  
205 As already evident from the term yid ches rjes dpag, Buddhist epistemology has subsumed authoritative 
speech under the category of logical reasoning. On the dpyad pa gsum as well as the question of authority and 
truth in (Tibetan) Buddhist scripture, cf. also Cabezón 1981. Note that Tillemans (1993, 9ff.) speaks of a 
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authoritative source and its content must not contradict factual evidence, must be logically 
consistent and conform with other authoritative knowledge in and outside itself. These are the 
three pillars that support the authority and authenticity of a source and its content.  
In most general terms, the authority of a source that occupies the status of a dpyad pa gsum gyis 
dag pa’i lung (‘scripture/teaching that is pure by means of the threefold analysis’) in the Tibetan 
scholastic tradition is tied to the idea of its completeness and inerrancy.206 That is to say, such 
authoritative texts and corpora of texts contain at least all necessary knowledge with regard to 
their topic and without fault. This also comes with the task for the exegetical tradition to defend 
these against any violation in terms of the three types of analysis brought forth by either real or 
anticipated opponents. Despite the tradition’s rhetoric that emphasizes the dpyad pa gsum as 
the method of authentication, it must be noted that the actual authentication of scriptures can be 
a more intricate dynamic than a mere theoretical validation through the threefold analysis, a 
fact confirmed by the authority of SCP and TKJ that has been largely promoted by Tibetan 
traditional historiography and the narrative of Thon mi. Nonetheless, this triad makes clear that 
Tibetan scholastic knowledge production is based not simply on blind adherence to any 
scriptural authority but on a critical encounter with it, revealing that factual evidence and logical 
reasoning represent important parameters next to to authoritative knowledge in the validation 
of scriptural authority. 
The fact that Si tu directly confirms this authority of SCP and TKJ based on the threefold 
analysis (dpyad pa gsum) is of utmost importance for an understanding of Si tu’s grammatical 
theory formation within a Tibetan scholastic methodology: 
 […] zhes smos te bstan bcos ’da [sic!]207 dpyad pa gsum gyis rnam par dag pas rjes ’jug 
 rnams kyis ’phags yul nas bsgyur pa’i bstan bcos khyad par ’phags pa rnams dang 
 mtshungs par lta zhing don du gnyer rigs so zhes ’doms pa’i don du thu mi nyid kyis 
 bsgyur pa’i mdo rgyud rnams kyi ’gyur phyag dang mthun par ’phags pa ’jam dpal la 
 phyag mdzad pa’o/ 
 “[The root text SCP] says the following [through the translator’s homage]: For the sake 
 of expounding that, due to [its] full purity (rnam par dag pa) by means of the threefold 
 analysis, it is reasonable to aspire towards this śāstra (= SCP and TKJ) and regard it as 
 equivalent to those noble śāstras translated from the Noble Land by [his] successors, 
                                                          
seemingly “Tibetan contribution” with regard to the dpyad pa gsum, whereas Verhagen (2008B, 244ff.) notes a 
possible connection to Vasubandhu’s Vyākhyāyukti.  
206 On the characteristics of completeness and inerrancy, cf. also Cabezón 1994, 91.  
207 I read ’di. 
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 Thu mi payed homage to Mañjughoṣa in accordance with the translator’s homage of the 
 sūtras and tantras he himself translated.”208 
Si tu’s exposition of the initial homage of SCP is concerned with the issue of why master Thu 
mi (= Thon mi Saṃbhoṭa) had included a translator’s homage (’gyur phyag) at the very 
beginning of the text, if it is a Tibetan source and thus not a translation. Si tu’s solution to this 
issue is that the master added it in the same fashion as he added it to his actual translations and 
as to indicate that SCP and TKJ are to be treated in the same way as translated Sanskritic texts, 
since they are all equally pure/authenticated/correct (rnam par dag pa) by means of the 
threefold analysis.  
Their purity involves that the texts contain a correct representation of WT’s grammar, and 
consequently a correct understanding of the language amounts to the correct interpretation of 
the root texts. For an accurate understanding of Si tu’s intricate grammatical theory formation 
which involves the reconciliation of several authorities,209 it would be far too narrow to reduce 
the topic of his commentary to a mere exposition of the root texts that tries to overcome 
misinterpretations of the former tradition and to defend its authority, since he has equally 
attempted to further develop and refine the representation of the language.  
Due to their inerrancy, a correct interpretation of SCP and TKJ falls together with the correct 
understanding of the language, which is assumed to be the intention or intended meaning 
(dgongs pa) of the author of the commented texts, i.e. master Thon mi Saṃbhoṭa. When Si tu 
thus aims at a definitive explanation of the SCP and TKJ, he simultaneously aims at the master’s 
intended meaning (mkhan po’i dgongs pa) as well as the correct understanding of WT: 
mtha’ gcig tu bshad pa = mkhan po’i dgongs pa = correct understanding of language  
   structures 
This very relationship is always presupposed and represents the starting point of Si tu’s 
grammatical theory formation in the GC. It amounts to the simple point that every single part 
of the root texts’ content is treated as a significant and adequate representation of Tibetan 
grammar.  
In the GC, the unquestioned authority is mostly based on the constellation that any taxonomy, 
any inquiry and reply as well as the entire scope of grammatical theory formation takes place 
within the conceptual framework of the root texts and that they are de facto never refuted, not 
even in part. To a large extent, their unrefuted character is simply due to the reason that the two 
                                                          
208 GC 453.1. 
209 Cf. chapter 4.4. 
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texts are highly condensed and leave much space for interpretation, but is their authority really 
such that Si tu was not allowed to violate it and needed to preserve the infallible status? Firstly 
and independent of any concrete answer, it should be kept in mind that the commentarial task 
is not simply to defend the root texts but to describe and explain Tibetan language. Since the 
two coincide, a commentary such as the GC is more about describing the language through 
explaining and defending the root texts, and their strong authority is already implied by this fact 
alone. However, the question remains whether they are simply unquestioned or really 
unquestionable? This is a matter of why they are unquestioned, because they have proven to 
remain consistent or because the status they occupy in the tradition does not allow for any 
serious questioning?  
Most cases of Tibetan scholastic reasoning and argumentation are far too intricate for either of 
these two dimensions to surface straightforwardly and on their own. Any defense of the root 
texts’ content is typically based on reasoning, thus giving at least the impression that the author 
followed them not due to their status but because examination demonstrated that they are 
consistent. Moreover, many if not most of such defenses do not simply defend the root texts 
themselves, but they equally and often primarily defend a commentator’s own interpretation of 
the root texts. Presuming that no scriptural source is fully consistent and without problems, 
ultimately it is the overall attitude of a commentator to constantly take side with the root texts 
in and throughout argumentation that renders them not only unquestioned but through this 
attitude also unquestionable. In a text like the GC, only very few instances of this 
unquestionability surface more directly. In his argument against the literal reading of SCP 9.4-
11.1 that would prescribe the morphemes su, ru and du to the final letter of the marked syllable 
itself (nyamsu vs. nyams su), Si tu launches a multilayered attack that evokes empirical reasons 
and others, including the following:210 
 de la ’dod pa snga ma de ni shin tu ’khrul te/     rjes ’jug sa ra da gsum gyi mthar su ru 
 du rnams ’jug zer ba nyi tshe zhig gzhung ’dis bstan par song bas ru dang du gnyis kyi 
 ’jug yul da dung gzhan yang yod na gzhung ’dis mi ston pa’i rgyu mtshan ’thad ldan 
 smra dgos shing/     rgyu mtshan med na ni gzhung gi bstan bya ma tshang ba’i skyon 
 du ’gyur ba […] 
 “As regards that first assumption, it is strongly deluded for the following reason: if this 
 text (SCP) should have taught such a half-finished statement (zer ba nyi tshe zhig) that 
                                                          
210 On the issue of how to read SCP 9.4-11.1 and how Si tu’s reading was based on his limited knowledge, cf. 
infra 81f.  
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 su, ru [and] du join at the end of the three postscript letters sa, ra [and] du, one has to 
 give a plausible reason (rgyu mtshan ’thad ldan), [why], given there are still also other 
 letters (~ yul) which the two ru and du join to, this text did not teach [these]. If there is 
 no reason, the error follows that the content of the text is incomplete. […]”211 
Si tu argues that in a literal reading of the root texts, it would follow that su, ru and du were 
only mentioned to mark postscript letters sa, ra and du. However, since the Tibetan language 
uses at least also ru and du after other postscript letters, SCP would have missed to provide the 
full morphological derivation of the three morphemes. If that was the case, there must be a 
plausible reason, otherwise SCP would be incomplete. This consequence, however, was not 
accepted by Si tu, who took it as a reason for dismissing a literal reading. Such passages reveal 
that Si tu’s understanding was indeed based on the inerrancy and completeness of the root texts 
as an adequate representation of Tibetan language. 
However, despite the proclaimed purity of SCP and TKJ, there are different factors that obscure 
or complicate their definitive interpretation and the relation between mkhan po’i dgongs pa and 
the correct understanding of the language, for example terse and cryptic passages, conflicts 
between the texts’ content and the language, diachronic variations of the language, conflicts 
with other authoritative knowledge and others. Thus, the project of Si tu or any other 
commentator is anything but an easy task. As we have seen, to Si tu it is the rjes dpag gsum 
that meet the methodological standards to achieve the commentator’s task, and he explicitly 
declares them as the major means of his GC.212 
4.2 The rjes dpag gsum in the Great Commentary 
The rjes dpag gsum (‘three inferences, threefold inference’) represent a common typology of 
logical inferences in formal Tibetan scholastic reasoning. It distinguishes inferences into 
inferences based on facts (dngos stobs rjes dpag), inferences based on renown or convention 
(grags pa’i rjes dpag) and the inference based on faith or authority (yid ches rjed dpag).213 Each 
of these three inferences has its own type of inferential proof or reason (rtags; lit. ‘sign, mark’) 
for the validity of a certain proposition. In most simple terms, a dngos stobs rjes dpag is an 
inference based on a dngos stobs kyi rtags (‘factual reason’), the typical example being the 
proposition that sound is impermanent, where the fact that sound is produced and disintegrates 
is an inherent feature of sound that directly and factually evidences its impermanence. In 
                                                          
211 GC 478.3. 
212 Cf. supra 62. 
213 For a general introduction to these three inferences, cf. Lati Rinbochay 1986, 77ff.; Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö 
Tayé 2012, 153. 
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contrast, an inference based on renown or convention (grags pa’i rjes dpag) has renown or 
convention as its reason (grags pa’i rtags). The proposition ‘the rabbit-bearer is properly called 
‘moon’’ (ri bong can zla ba zhes pa’i sgras brjod du rung) is only based on the (inherent ?) fact 
that the signified object is an object of thought (rtog yul) that can be designated at free will. 
Yet, there is no inherent fact that directly connects the sound sequence ‘moon’ with the 
designated object, for which reason the name’s appropriateness is established through renown 
or convention in English. If that were not the case, the same object would not be properly called 
candra in Sanskrit. Lastly, the yid ches rjed dpag (‘inference based on faith or authority’) is 
based on the authority of an authenticated, typically textual source by the power of which 
certain propositions become valid.214 As evident from the above examples, the application of 
each type of inference is dependent on the nature of the topic or proposition under 
investigation.215  
Si tu’s general organization of his GC quotes SCP and TKJ part by part according to his topical 
division (sa bcad) of the root texts. Following (1) a gloss that either concisely or more 
elaborately paraphrases the quoted passages to elucidate their direct meaning as understood by 
him, he optionally supplements (2) a more detailed discussion of his understanding of the topic 
at hand, (3) and a final analysis (mtha’ dpyad) to discuss positions of earlier commentators and 
possible objections to his interpretation. A closer look at Si tu’s execution of his abundant final 
analyses (mtha’ dpyad) reveals that in the majority of cases he indeed strictly follows the basic 
structure of formal reasoning:216  
 […] ’grel byed kha cig gis/     lhag bcas kyi sgra ste kho nar ’dod pa ni mi ’thad de/     
 gong smos ltar rjes ’jug ’ga’ zhig la ste sbyar ba klog dka’ ba’i skyon dang/     de yig 
 lhag bcas kyi don can ’jug pa’i skabs mi ’byung ba’i skyon dang/     sngon gyi glegs 
 bam dag pa rnams la yongs su grags pa dang ’gal ba’i skyon yang yod pa’i phyir ro/ 
“[…] Regarding some commentators’ assumption that ste is the only morpheme  [in 
the function] of lhag bcas, it is not apt, because there is the fault, as stated above, that 
 the application of ste with some postscript letters is difficult to read, and the fault that 
 there would be no possibility for letter de to join in the meaning of lhag bcas as well as 
                                                          
214 The classical example for this third type of inference is that the proposition ‘generosity brings 
pleasure/possessions/resources and moral conduct happiness’ (sbyin pas longs spyod khrims kyis bde) is 
confirmed through the authority of a scripture authenticated by the three types of analysis (dpyad pa gsum gyis 
dag pa’i lung). 
215 Cf. Horváth 1989, 393 and 396f. 
216 For a comparison with common examples in Tibetan Buddhist formal reasoning, cf. e.g. Tillemans 1999, 
121ff. 
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 the fault that it contradicts the common convention in the pure books of earlier 
[times].”217 
This argument consists of the topic under investigation – frequently an opponent’s view marked 
by the topical marker ni – in combination with a proposition that frequently expresses the 
unacceptability of this view ending with the grammatical marker lhag bcas, followed by Si tu’s 
statement of the reason or a sequence of reasons. Throughout the GC, there are minor variants 
of this basic structure as well as expanded forms with subordinate reasons, since many of the 
arguments are considerably more extensive and intricate than the one quoted above. Although 
Si tu’s argumentation does not consistently follow this or similar structures, it remains a 
frequently recurring pattern and Si tu generally does follow Tibetan scholastic formal 
reasoning. Yet, a full categorization of each argument in his GC according to the typology of 
three inferences would be to overextend this point, since the multifaceted reasons provided by 
Si tu would certainly evade a fully coherent categorization of them, considering also that single 
arguments often contain several reasons of different kinds. In general, to support and confirm 
his interpretation of the root texts SCP and TKJ and consequently of WT, Si tu mentions, among 
others, linguistic conventions (grags pa) used among speakers of the language, textual 
testimonies, the quotation of authoritative sources, factual arguments that are directly perceived 
and thus independent of further reasoning (mngon gsum gyis grub pa), reasons that aim at the 
logical consistency of an argument or the root texts, as well as others.  
Si tu’s mention of the rjes dpag gsum in the opening passages of his Great Commentary should 
thus not be taken too literally, since he simply refers to this typology in the form quoted above 
and without providing a detailed theoretical account of them. In this sense, their mentioning 
should be understood first and foremost as a strong commitment to the generally critical 
approach which investigates and explores the correct interpretation of SCP/TKJ based on 
reasoning as understood in Tibetan scholastic methodology. Thus, although Si tu takes for 
granted the authority of SCP/TKJ and their content, a critical encounter with them was a major 
objective that defined his own project. The following two subchapters will now investigate in 
more detail the ways in which he executed this approach in practice. 
4.3 Authorities in Si tu’s Grammatical Theory Formation 
As pointed out in chapter 4.1, the root texts as authoritative textual sources that correctly 
represent the structures of WT together with these structures themselves are the very pivot of 
                                                          
217 GC 491.2; my emphasis. 
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Tibetan scholastic grammatical theory formation in the context of GC and we can safely assume 
in a number of earlier and later Sum rtags commentaries as well. The two constitute the double 
value of a commentary and represent the two principal authorities which provide input to the 
grammarian or commentator, a relationship that from the perspective of a commentary like the 
GC may be represented as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While the unidirectional arrows in this figure represent the aspect of input in the GC, they take 
into account neither the ways in which Si tu negotiated this input,218 nor the possible relations 
between the structures of WT and the root texts or any possible normative dimension of 
grammatical texts that may have affected the language. For the GC, it may also be noted that 
Si tu himself considers the relation between SCP, TKJ and WT such that the root texts represent 
WT during the time of their author Thon mi (dashed arrow), as evident in comments such as 
the following: 
 gzhan yang bod yig gi sdeb ji ltar sbyor ba’i tshul ni sngon gyi bod skad dag pa nyid la 
 brjod pa’i sgra ji ltar ’byung ba de ltar mkhan po ’dis sbyar ba yin […] 
 “Furthermore, regarding the mode of how to combine Tibetan letters (bod yig gi sdeb ji 
 ltar sbyor ba’i tshul), this master [Thon mi] applied the sounds/morphemes (sgra) as 
 [they] occurred [in] the pronunciation of the pure Tibetan language itself of the past 
 (sngon gyi bod skad dag pa nyid la brjod pa).”219 
The principality of the two authorities, the root texts of Sum rtags and WT, is mainly constituted 
by the fact that both are simultaneously the actual topic of classical Sum rtags commentarial 
literature. In addition, the root texts are unquestionable insofar as any direct or open and 
unresolved contradiction even with their parts is unacceptable and regarded as a commentarial 
                                                          
218 Cf. chapter 4.4. 
219 GC 520.4. Preceeding this quotation, we read that the undefiled pronunciation (klog tshul ma nyams pa) is 
commonly known as the one from ancient Central Tibet (bod yul dbus) (cf. GC 520.2). 
SCP & TKJ 
Tibetan 
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theory in 
the GC 
Structures 
of written 
Tibetan 
Figure 1: Principal authorities in the Great Commentary 
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lapse in the form of either a lack of understanding or commentarial skill. While Si tu did not 
explicitly declare the unquestionability of WT in the same way as he did for the root texts, the 
fact that the written Tibetan language in use represents a principal authority for grammatical 
analysis and the assessment of grammatical theories in the GC surfaces when, in the context of 
the syntactic link (tshig phrad) slar bsdu,220 he argues that ultimately the application of any 
dependent grammatical marker at the end of a marked entity has to follow the criteria of easy 
pronunciation and worldly convention: 
 da drag can gyi mthar to la sogs pa ’thob pa’i don ni/ […] spyir btang rjes ’jug la ltos 
 pa’i rnam dbye dang phrad rnams la/     sbyor yul ming tshig gi mtha’ de dang sbyar 
 bas brjod pa bde zhing sgra mthun pa yod na rtags mthsungs nyid sbyar bar bya zhing/     
 de lta bu med na’am yod kyang brjod mi bde na brjod bde ba gang yin sbyar bar bya 
 ba yin pa dang/     de dag kyang ’jig rten gyi grags pa’i rjes su ’brang dgos pas rjes ’jug 
 gzhan rnams rang rang la rna ru sogs sbyar bar rtags mthsungs min ci rigs yod  kyang 
 brjod bde ba dang drags zhing grub pa’i phyir ’od pa yin […] 
 “As for the point that the ending of [a word] with da drag (= secondary postscript 
 da) takes to, etc.: […] In general, regarding the cases and [syntactic] links that are 
 dependent on the postscript letter (rjes ’jug la ltos pa’i rnam dbye dang phrad rnams), 
 if there is an easy pronunciation and morphological/phonological agreement (brjod bde 
 zhing sgra mthun pa), [then] the concordant sign (rtags mthsungs) is to be applied 
 directly (~ nyid). Yet, regardless of whether or not there is such a [concordant sign that 
 is easy  pronounceable and morphological/phonological agreeing], if not easy to 
 pronounce, whatever is easier to pronounce is to be applied. And since the [other 
 postscript letters] also must follow worldly convention (’jig rten gyi grags pa), it is apt 
 to apply rna ru (= vowel ‘o’) at the end of the other postscript letters as such, no matter 
 if it is the concordant sign or not, because it is easier to pronounce (brjod bde), 
 commonly known/used (grags pa) and established (grub pa) [in that way]. […]”221 
Although this passage discusses the syntactic link slar bsdu in SCP 8.3-9.2, it also refers to the 
idea of morphological/phonological agreement of letters (sgra mthun pa, lit. ‘agreeing 
phonemes/morphemes’), a term mentioned in TKJ 22.2.222 The major topic of TKJ (rtags kyi 
                                                          
220 The syntactic link slar bsdu is used to mark the end of a Tibetan sentence. On the technical term tshig phrad 
(‘syntactic link’), cf. infra 90f. 
221 GC 468.5. 
222 TKJ 22.1-23.1: 
 “By these very word endings (ming mtha’),   ming mtha’ de dag nyid kyis ni// 
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’jug pa, ‘joining of [gender] signs’) is concerned with the classification of letters (yi ge), 
prescripts (sngon ’jug) and postscripts (rjes ’jug) based on predefined genders (male, female, 
neutral, very female, etc.) in order to establish rules that govern the morphophonological 
derivation of word forms. Depending on the position in the word (prescript, root letter, 
postscript), each letter represents a specific gender sign (rtags) that is in concordance with the 
sign of the neighboring letter, if they agree with one another according to the defined gender 
rules in TKJ. In Si tu’s terminology, such gender signs are concordant signs (rtags mthsungs). 
A simple example would be the word form dpyid ka (‘spring’), where the ending letter ka is the 
concordant sign (rtags mthsungs) of the postscript letter da, since in their respective position 
both are defined as male gender (pho) and TKJ 21.2 defines that male postscript letters trigger 
male word endings. On the basis of this gender model, TKJ presents some fundamental 
principles for the correct morphophonological derivation of word forms.  
Si tu’s main argument in this passage is that if these concordant signs (rtags mtshungs) which 
are defined by the rules of TKJ interfere with the criteria of easy pronunciation and common 
usage/convention, then in the derivation of any grammatical marker preference is to be given 
to those forms of the markers that fulfill these last criteria. In this way, Si tu clearly states that 
grammatical analysis must follow the common conventions of the users of a language, even if 
this overrules the gender rules as defined in TKJ.223 Such passages bear direct witness to the 
                                                          
  in morphological agreement with themselves,  de nyid rang gi sgra mthun pa’i// 
 [the syntactic links] chos dngos, las, byed pa   chos dngos las dang byed pa dang// 
 sbyin,’byung khungs, ’brel ba, gnas   sbyin dang ’byung khungs ’brel pa dang// 
 and also the morpheme for bod pa are triggered.”  gnas dang bod pa’i sgra yang drang//  
This passage states that the word endings discussed previously to this quotation trigger the grammatical markers 
in morphophonological agreement with these very word endings. The eight listed syntactic links are the eight 
case markers. This passage is directly followed by a list of non-case syntactic links in TKJ 23.2-23.4, a section 
which is equally governed by TKJ 22.1-2.  
223 From the perspective of the root texts, this would be an obvious violation of their authority, since the existing 
language conventions prove that important parts of TKJ’s content are not always applicable, and if they are, then 
only as long as the other criteria (easy pronunciation, worldly convention) apply. Si tu resolves the problem by 
defining mainly two criteria for the term sgra mthun in TKJ 22.2. Although SCP/TKJ mention no other term 
than sgra mthun pa once in TKJ 22.2, Si tu labels any agreement in terms of the gender scheme with the term 
rtags mtshungs (‘concordant sign’) during his exposition of TKJ 22.2. He goes on to argue that this is only one 
criterion of morphophonological agreement (sgra mthun) along with the even more important criterion easy 
pronunciation (brjod bde) (cf. GC 591.2). When Si tu therefore argues in the last quotation that not rtags 
mtshungs alone but even more importantly brjod bde (and in this passage also grags pa, i.e. convention, and 
grub pa, i.e. being established) govern the derivation of grammatical markers, this is also his proposed 
interpretation of the term sgra mthun pa in TKJ 22.2. Thus, even if TKJ’s gender rules are overruled by brjod 
bde, this is still in line with TKJ, since brjod bde is included in sgra mthun pa in TKJ 22.2 according to Si tu’s 
understanding. 
Whether Si tu’s strategy to explain the term sgra mthun in TKJ and reconcile it with existing language use is 
indeed in line with the root texts or rather an intentional attempt to avoid a violation of their purity is difficult to 
assess. On the one hand, the single, not further explicated use of the term sgra mthun pa in TKJ 22.2 within the 
overarching topic of gender rules suggests that sgra mthun pa refers precisely and exclusively to these rules but 
not to any other criteria such as brjod bde that are entirely missing in both texts.  
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importance he attributed to the language as a principal authority in arguing for or against 
linguistic taxonomies, and they also reveal his efforts at improving the understanding of the 
language and not simply the root texts. However, another question altogether is whether or not 
the indubitable and categorical significance presupposed for the commented root texts and their 
entire content also in the same way applies to the language and all its parts, or if there are cases 
in which Si tu openly diminished the significance of the language in favor of the root texts’ 
content.224  
In addition to the two principal authorities that represent the actual topic of the GC, Si tu also 
consulted and quoted from Sanskritic grammatical texts, Buddhist philosophy and several 
Tibetan linguistic sources that are either commentaries on SCP and TKJ or not directly 
associated with Sum rtags. The main schools of Sanskrit grammar studied in Tibet, i.e. Kātantra 
and Cāndra, both figure occasionally in the GC225 and they claim full authority when it comes 
to Sanskrit grammar, and from what may be estimated from the numerous references in his 
voluminous Cāndra commentary, he presumably also in the same way acknowledged the 
highest recognized system in India, i.e. the Pāṇinian. However, when it comes to the highest 
authority regarding the true state of reality, including linguistic matters such as the nature of 
language in the context of the so-called tshogs gsum model, authenticated Buddhist 
philosophical sources such as the Abhidharmakośa occupy center stage.226 In Sum rtags, neither 
Sanskritic grammatical nor Buddhist philosophical sources are the actual commentarial topic, 
which to a limited extent allows for a diminishing of their significance with regard to Tibetan 
grammar, although we can assume that any critique undermining their validity within their own 
province has to be seen as a commentarial lapse rather than an actual inconsistency of the 
authoritative source.227 Lastly, there are a number of Tibetan grammatical texts of different 
                                                          
On the other hand, the gender rules are strictly speaking only defined in the context of word-internal formation, 
i.e. the derivation of prescripts (sngon ’jug), postscripts (rjes ’jug) and word endings (ming mtha’) of a single 
word form. In contrast, the once occurring term sgra mthun (‘agreeing phoneme/morpheme’) in TKJ 22.2 refers 
in very general and unspecified terms to the agreement of word endings with the syntactic links, and thus it 
might be possible that TKJ indeed understood it as a general reference to morphological agreement and not 
specifically to the defined gender rules. As Si tu correctly noted, this is corroborated by the fact that not all the 
morphological forms of the syntactic links presented in SCP follow the gender rules of TKJ (cf. GC 592.1). 
224 On Si tu’s rejection of the Tibetan interjections ka ye and kwa, two proper forms to express or emphasize 
vocative meaning, cf. e.g. GC 498.3 and infra 80. 
225 For an exemplary list of quotations from Sanskritic grammars, cf. Verhagen 1996, 431. 
226 On the tshogs gsum (trīkāya; ‘three groups/collections’) in Sanskrit and Tibetan scholarship, cf. chapter 5.3. 
227 I am unaware of any passage in the GC where Si tu would openly refute the mentioned Sanskritic 
grammatical or Buddhist philosophical sources with regard to their own respective fields. The instance that 
comes closest to an open critique is in the context of the Abhidharmic tshogs gsum model, where Si tu states that 
it is “merely general and rough, therefore not applicable from the perspective of a more detailed investigation 
here” (spyir btang rags pa tsam yin pas ’dir phra ba’i dbang du byas na mi ’byor ba) (GC 608.5). However, this 
statement does not declare that the Abhidharmic model is wrong by any means, it is only too general for a 
detailed examination as required in GC’s context concerned with Tibetan-specific grammatical analysis, rather 
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kinds that have found their way into the GC. These include texts like the NG(g) that presumably 
deals with linguistic theories of multilingual validity such as the Tibetan eightfold case model, 
Tibetan-specific grammars such as the Smra sgo which remain outside the context of Sum rtags 
as well as numerous Sum rtags commentaries. These sources did not attain the same status of 
authority in the Tibetan tradition that sources like SCP, TKJ, Cāndra, Kātantra, Pāṇini or the 
Abhidharmakośa occupy in their respective fields. Consequently, their general authority as well 
as their significance for a certain topic were openly contested by Si tu who subjected this last 
type of sources to his full critique. This is clearly evident from statements about NG(g), for 
example, in which he notes that “there is some content (don) of the Eight Linguistic Topics’ 
root and commentary which cannot be reasoned/proven (bsgrub bya las sgrub byed du mi ’gro 
ba).”228 However, regardless of their incompletely authenticated status, in Si tu’s view such 
sources claim significance in the context of grammar and linguistics, but they need to be 
investigated more critically: 
 smra sgo rtsa ’grel dang smra ba kun la ’jug pa’i sgra’i bstan bcos rtsa ’grel ’di rnams 
 la’ang mi ’thad pa shin tu mang zhing mkhas pa gzhan gyis gnad [sic!]229 byed brjod pa 
 gnad du song ba’ang mang bar snang bas ’phags yul mkhas pa’i legs bshad ni min par 
 nges mod/     ’on kyang sum cu pa’i skabs su ’ga’ zhig drangs pa sogs gzhung ’di’i don 
 dang skabs ’gar mthun pa’i legs bshad mang dag kyang ’dug pas rnam pa kun tu ’dor 
 bya ni ma yin no/ 
“Root text and commentary of the Speech Door (Smra sgo) as well as root text and 
commentary of the Linguistic Śāstra Pertaining to all Speech (Smra ba kun la ’jug 
 pa’i sgra’i bstan bcos) not only convey plenty of inadequacies (mi ’thad  pa), but there 
also seem to [be] many trenchant refutations expressed by other scholars  (mkhas pa 
gzhan gyi gnod byed brjod pa gnas du song ba). Therefore, [these texts] are not the lucid 
exposition of scholars [of] the Noble Land. However, since [they] also contain numerous 
lucid explanations which on several occasions agree with the content of these texts (= 
SCP and TKJ), e.g. some derivations (’ga’ zhig drangs pa ?) in the SCP, they are not to 
be rejected in all respect.”230 
                                                          
than with the nature of language and linguistic expressions in general. On the tshogs gsum in the GC, cf. chapter 
5.3.3. 
228 gnas brgyad rtsa ’grel gyi don ’ga’ zhig bsgrub bya las sgrub byed du mi ’gro ba yod […] (GC 455.2). On 
the context of this statement, cf. infra 312f. 
229 I read gnod. 
230 GC 607.5. 
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In total, the different authorities consulted by Si tu as important input sources in the formation 
of grammatical theories may be summarized as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure is not intended as a comprehensive and exhaustive presentation of authorities, and 
each of the mentioned authorities may be further divided to arrive at a more accurate picture. 
However, the main point of this figure is to illustrate that a variety of different sources 
prominent in the Tibetan scholastic tradition, each with a variety of different theories, occupied 
a certain authoritative status which was ascribed by Si tu based on his knowledge of grammar 
and the tradition, either as fully authenticated and thus indubitable within their own province 
or generally acknowledged by Si tu or others as significant yet not un-erroneous contributions 
– all of which provided important input to the GC and thus contributed to the formation of 
grammatical theories.  
The precise status and use of any of these authorities varies across grammarians due to 
differences in the importance attached to them. For example, a more or less direct adherence to 
both Sanskrit grammatical and Buddhist derivational models is encountered – despite their 
limited compatibility with each other – in sources such as Dpang Lotsāwa’s Tshogs gsum gsal 
Figure 2: Overview and hierarchy of sources of input in the Great Commentary 
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ba (TshSS), an important grammar outside of the Sum rtags genre, without any noteworthy 
efforts towards reconciliation. By contrast, Si tu Paṇchen emancipated himself from these two 
authorities to develop a model more fit to the peculiarities of the written Tibetan language.231 
On different occasions, he makes the point clear that what works in the context of Sanskrit 
language does not necessarily apply to Tibetan language in the same way, and thus Sanskrit 
models of description may not always be directly applied.232 In the GC, regarding the Buddhist 
doctrine he even openly criticizes that “without explaining the mode of application of the 
syntactic link [called de sgra (‘morpheme de’) as it would have been] important in the current 
context, the extensive verbiage [of previous commentators] on Madhyamaka or the Pāramitās 
ends nowhere.”233 Although Si tu does not directly refute any Buddhist theory, this comment 
clearly restricts the authority of Buddhism in the domain of (Tibetan) grammar.  
4.4 The Disequilibrium of Authorities and their Reconciliation 
Even those authorities which are pure by means of the threefold analysis and thus inerrant and 
complete according to the tradition do exhibit inconsistencies, either within themselves or 
compared to other authorities. The partial overlap of authorities in figure 2 attempts to illustrate 
schematically that any two of these may converge or diverge regarding theories, concepts and 
terminology. Naturally, any inconsistencies within and between authorities can result in a 
variety of theoretical conflicts that cause a ‘disequilibrium’ in the constitution of a grammatical 
theory. This term has been introduced by Seyfort Ruegg to specify Tibetan knowledge 
production and its relation to Indian scholarship:   
 “A challenging and very significant task before us is to attempt to clarify the ways in 
 which Tibetans have absorbed and integrated into their civilization the various 
 component parts of the originally Indian culture that they imported starting at the latest 
 in the seventh/eighth century. In the study of such a transcultural relation, and of the 
 enculturation of Indo-Buddhist civilization in Tibet, the identification and analysis of 
 continuities and discontinuities – of homeostasis (dynamic stability) and internal, 
 systemic disequilibrium leading to restoration/renewal/innovation – will naturally play 
 a major part. This should then assist us in overcoming the familiar opposition of stagnant 
                                                          
231 Cf. chapter 5.3.3. 
232 E.g. in the context of case marking in connection with verbs of prostration (cf. infra 310ff.) or in the context 
of the morphology of the first case (cf. infra 132f.). Note that such a stance towards Sanskrit grammar is not 
restricted to Si tu. Sakya Paṇḍita, for example, elaborates in some detail in his KhJ how Sanskrit models of 
nominal inflexion do not apply to Tibetan language, and therefore he restricts their validity for WT mainly to the 
eight prototypical case functions in the form they were adopted already long before him (cf. KhJ 2009, 24). 
233 […] ’di skabs su gal che ba’i phrad kyi ’jug tshul ’chad du med par dbu phar sogs kyi bshad yam rgyas pas ni 
gang du’ang mi ’gyur ro/ (GC 505.5) 
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 stasis vs. dynamic change, a somewhat superficial and jejune dichotomy which has so 
 frequently, and unproductively, been invoked in such matters.”234  
In the current study, the term disequilibrium is applied to the theoretical imbalance within or 
between established authorities or sources that take part in the formation of – in this context – 
grammatical theories. It is manifested in the form of a partial or full disregard, underestimation 
or neglect of an authority. From the perspective of such a theoretical disequilibrium, the main 
task of Si tu and other traditional grammarians of Sum rtags in order to arrive at a valid 
grammatical theory involves neither simply finding forms of conceptualization appropriate to 
the language nor a straightforward reading of the commented root texts, but more an estimation 
in each and every single case of the precise significance and validity of each authority and an 
identification of possible contradictions, incompatibilities, etc. within and between these 
authorities. Finally, the grammarian’s use of reasoning and argumentation has the task of 
resolving conflicts and reconciling the different authorities while avoiding any violation of their 
respective authoritative status.235  
In order to resolve conflicts or inconsistencies and reconcile authorities, each authority offers a 
variety of hermeneutical techniques for the argumentation of Si tu and other commentators. 
SCP and TKJ give much freedom for different readings but also allow for supplementation of 
missing information or even textual interventions. 236  In case of supplementation, a 
commentator like Si tu tends to provide a reason for why the root texts lack the supplemented 
information.237 Sanskrit grammatical concepts, in contrast, can be adopted, adapted or rejected 
in the context of the Tibetan language for the reason that they do not always directly apply due 
to significant language differences. Already the grammarians before Si tu have acknowledged, 
for example, that the Tibetan first case is more a stem form and does not fit into the Sanskritic 
derivational scheme of stem plus suffix.238 Likewise, Si tu repeatedly distinguishes between 
generic and exceptional case marking patterns in Sanskrit grammar to decide which of them are 
in line with Tibetan case marking patterns and which of them are not.239 The language and its 
                                                          
234 Ruegg 2004, 321. 
235 On the resolution of scriptural inconsistencies in the context of Buddhist philosophy, cf. Cabezón 1994, 62ff. 
236 One such textual intervention in SCP 10.3 by former commentators is attested and refuted in the GC (cf. GC 
479.4). 
237 Such a completeness can be argued, for example, through stylistic requirements to be fulfilled by the root 
texts, e.g. conciseness that necessitated the selection of noteworthy information, or through the requirement of 
text-internal consistency. For example, the missing derivation of syntactic links such as to, tu, etc., in SCP, all 
which take the root letter ta, has been explained by Si tu – correctly or not – insofar as that the derivation of 
syntactic links is based on the ten so-called postscript letters (rjes ’jug) in the SCP. Letter ta, however, is none of 
these ten (cf. GC 468.1). 
238 Cf. infra 141f. 
239 Cf. e.g. infra 310f. and 354ff., as well as chapter 16. 
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structures, in turn, allow for the manipulation of their representation in a grammatical source, 
for example, through the selection of examples that might approve or disapprove taxonomies.240 
Another possibility are decisions as to a certain standard of the language, e.g. the exclusion of  
local and colloquial peculiarities as well as the distinguishing between pure and impure or 
exquisite and ordinary language. On different occasions, Si tu mentions a pure language (skad 
dag pa) not further specified by him or purified corpora of texts (glegs bam dag pa)241 as 
reference points of his argumentation. He also argued, for example, that the missing forms ka 
ye and kwa, both which express the function of address (bod pa) similarly to the form kye 
mentioned in SCP 17.3, appear to be a little vulgar (cung zhig mi mdzes pa).242 All of the above 
and beyond are important techniques for the commentator which allow him to modify the 
authorities or stretch and narrow their boundaries in order to maintain their respective 
authoritative status in the reconciliation attempts and to arrive at valid grammatical theories. 
It is important for an understanding of the scholastic methodology in GC to keep in mind that 
the authoritative statuses of input sources outlined in the previous section connects to the 
significance Si tu attributed to a source and its content with regard to a certain grammatical 
topic (e.g. case grammar), since this has a strong impact on the strategies how to reconcile 
conflicts within and between authorities. A conflict between a source like NG(g) and WT may 
but not necessarily must be directly designated as an error of the linguistic text, since it is not a 
fully authenticated source and thus the significance of its content may be freely questioned. 
Yet, a conflict between language and SCP or TKJ does not offer this possibility due to the root 
texts’ authority which is fully accepted by Si tu. In the latter case, Si tu needed to find other 
strategies and apply hermeneutical techniques that maintained the significance of the root texts 
despite a conflict with language. There is, for example, at least one interpretation of the root 
texts’ content in the GC that matches Si tu’s understanding of the language yet also goes against 
a straightforward reading and might even result in a misrepresentation of the root texts.243 
Additionally, it was mentioned above that he had, on the basis of text-internal reasons, i.e. the 
root text’s focus on the postscript letters, correctly or incorrectly argued for SCP’s completeness 
despite the missing forms to, tu, etc.244 Perhaps even more problematic from a modern linguistic 
perspective is the fact that the root texts’ authority has also allowed for the strategy of leaving 
                                                          
240 In part II, this will be a major point during the investigation of the cases and their exemplification by different 
grammarians. 
241 Cf. supra 70f. and 72. 
242 Cf. GC 498.3. 
243 For an instance, where Si tu deviated from a direct reading of the root texts and reinterpreted their content to 
accommodate it for a more accurate understanding of WT, cf. infra 82. 
244 Cf. ft. 237. 
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the conflict unresolved by their reinterpretation while at the same time accepting their content 
and adapting the understanding of WT’s structures. This seemingly happened frequently in Sum 
rtags commentaries when case examples are selected that are more in line with the root texts’ 
taxonomy than the actual distribution of case markers in the language.245 However, it remains 
difficult to assess to which extent a commentator has intentionally adjusted his understanding 
of the language to preserve the root texts’ authority, since the commentaries feature only limited 
material about their authors’ precise knowledge of the distribution of grammatical markers in 
the language, and part II will demonstrate that strong theoretical reasons impeded such 
knowledge and consequently supported this strategy. 
On a theoretical level, the quality and success of a commentary in terms of an agreement or 
disagreement by the subsequent tradition depends on the grammarian’s ability as a commentator 
to account for not just one but all the authorities (language, etc.) and to estimate their relative 
significance with regard to a certain grammatical subject matter. This results in most interesting 
reconciliation strategies that differ from author to author and can range from a simple 
negligence of one authority to the formation of a consensus, yet significant divergences 
frequently do not allow more than uneasy compromises. These may manifest as a cumbersome 
and unlikely explanation of a passage in the root texts or other textual sources or as an inaccurate 
or even inadequate representation of the language. It is about the extent to which a commentator 
was able to reach a consensus and how few compromises were necessary or how few conflicts 
have remained unresolved in the process. The prevailing compromises, the various evaluations 
of authorities and the fact that different authors have a different perception of their convergence 
or divergences constantly requires additional reconciliation strategies in the tradition, thus 
resulting in a continuous process of renegotiation, restoral, renewal or reformation of 
established theories, including the introduction of new theories or postulates. This entire 
dynamic constitutes the lifeline which over the centuries has nurtured grammatical theory 
formation in the Sum rtags tradition as well as in Si tu’s Great Commentary.  
It is important to note at this point that the reconciliation of authorities and resolution of 
conflicts through the application of techniques in the argumentation of a Sum rtags 
commentator is not simply governed by free and active decision-making. Any agency of the 
commentator in his formation of grammatical theories depends on his knowledge and 
                                                          
245 Cf. chapters 7-14 on the respective cases, where several lists of examples are provided from sources previous 
to Si tu as well as the GC. A particularly illustrative example would be Rnam gling’s ’tshang rgya ’dod na chos 
gyis (‘If [you] want to become enlightened, practice Dharma!’) as an instance of na expressing the meaning of 
the fourth case (cf. infra 271). 
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experience which are naturally limited by factors such as the accessibility of and interaction 
with sources, teachers, colleagues, etc. It may therefore be argued that in the resolution of 
conflicts the limits of a commentator’s knowledge and expertise are as determining as his 
knowledge itself. A simple example is Si tu’s interpretation of SCP 9.4-11.1 and the morpheme 
du with its allomorphs su and ru: in contrast to other authors, Si tu goes against a literal reading 
of the root text and claims that the passage needs to be interpreted so that these morphemes are 
added after the last syllable (~ tsheg bar) of a lexical word form rather than being attached 
within that syllable. The difference would be, for example, nyams su (Si tu’s reading of SCP) 
vs. nyamsu (literal reading of SCP).  The obvious reason is that Si tu’s version is the one that 
has been long used in WT. However, old Tibetan inscriptions and Dunhuang manuscripts also 
bear witness to the fact that the alternative version was in use during the early period of the 
current writing system. It required quite some effort on behalf of Si tu to demonstrate how the 
phrasing of SCP should be understood despite the much more straightforward literal reading, 
and one of his arguments was that such morphological forms are unattested in the ancient 
textual testimonies listed by him which also included ancient inscriptions.246 This is somehow 
surprising in so far as at least Lhasa’s Zhol rdo rings inscription dating back to the reign of 
King Khri Srong lde btsan features such forms.247 Without knowledge of Si tu’s reasons for 
denying their existence – he might not have come across this particular instance or perhaps 
these forms featured too infrequently in the available material to be accepted as proper – access 
to additional material as contained in the Dunhuang manuscripts would have probably lead Si 
tu to another conclusion altogether. Consequently, we might speculate, whether he would have 
changed his reconciliation strategy from matching the root texts’ meaning with the current use 
of the language to arguing that there are diachronic variations in the latter, something he indeed 
acknowledged in other contexts. 
4.5 Résumé on Grammatical Theory Formation in the Great Commentary 
This chapter has demonstrated that Si tu introduces his commentary on Sum cu pa and Rtags 
kyi ’jug pa with basic methodological principles common to Tibetan scholastic knowledge 
production. He presupposes the unquestioned authority and thus significance of the commented 
texts regarding the topic at hand, i.e. Tibetan grammar, and attempts their definitive explanation 
by means of argumentation and formal reasoning, more precisely the rjes dpag gsum (‘three 
inferences’). In practice, this involved the consideration and negotiation of a variety of different 
                                                          
246 Cf. GC 478.4. 
247 Cf. Richardson 1985, 4. 
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input sources such as Sanskritic grammatical sources, Buddhist philosophy, Tibetan linguistic 
sources and of course the written Tibetan language as the root texts’ object under investigation. 
The pivotal point in this constellation is the relation between the root texts and language, which 
forms the major topic of the commentary. Thus, a further refinement of existing interpretations 
of the root texts goes hand in hand with a further refining of existing grammatical models and 
vice versa. The remaining sources mainly serve to support this project. They represent 
important authorities that offer Si tu additional material to improve and defend his 
understanding of SCP, TKJ and WT through either adherence or refutation. Each authority 
occupies a certain status accepted by Si tu, (1) fully authenticated and thus unquestionable 
within its province, (2) only generally accepted as an important source, (3) or in case of WT the 
topic under investigation. Inconsistencies between and within authorities result in a 
disequilibrium that requires renegotiation and reconciliation, therefore the major task of Si tu 
and any other Sum rtags grammarian is to detect possible conflicts and to resolve them in order 
to arrive at sound grammatical theories. This results in various creative strategies of 
grammatical theory formation that often are unable to achieve more than a compromise between 
authorities. 
What may be learned from this methodological constellation about the mechanisms that have 
shaped Tibetan case grammar? And what does this mean for the role of Sanskritic authority in 
scholastic Tibetan linguistic knowledge production? 
The principle of scriptural authority is a major mechanism how Si tu features the cases in his 
GC, and the investigation in this chapter has revealed that the unquestionable authority of the 
commented sources SCP and TKJ sets the framework for Si tu’s grammatical theory formation. 
This implies that the unquestioned authority of adopted forms of originally Sanskritic case 
grammar relies primarily on SCP and TKJ and the fact that the eight case functions of the 
classical Tibetan case model are listed in connection with their respective morphological 
realization.248 Additionally, the case model has been an all-pervasive and widely acknowledged 
concept that figures in many of the renowned and accepted Tibetan grammatical sources and is 
also closely connected – historically and conceptually – to Sanskrit case grammar. This entire 
constellation establishes and strengthens the undoubted authority of the Tibetan eightfold case 
scheme, and Si tu drew information from all these sources and the language. The presentation 
of these eight cases in SCP and TKJ also sets the framework for Si tu to acknowledge different 
                                                          
248 Yet, it should be noted that neither SCP nor TKJ make use of the category ‘case’ (vibhakti, rnam dbye) and 
list these eight functions on a par with the remaining syntactic links and their meanings (cf. infra 138f.). 
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parts of case grammar as well possibilities for adaptation. The basic scheme of the eight 
functions together with their respective morphology as presented in SCP and TKJ sets the 
minimum framework Si tu needs to adhere to, and therefore it also governs the possibilities for 
adaptation. This methodology undeniably constrained the possibilities of transforming the 
existing case model into a more accurate description of the written Tibetan language because it 
needed to account for scriptural authorities especially of the root texts.  
However, the investigation has made it equally clear that in the concrete practice of grammatical 
theory formation the adherence to scriptural authority is neither primarily based on Sanskritic 
authority nor is it uncritical, but instead it is far more intricate, creative and versatile than is 
typically acknowledged by the topos of faithfulness to or imitation of Sanskritic grammatical 
authority. Part II will occasionally give evidence for the fact that Sanskritic grammatical 
knowledge remained a strong and authoritative argument and that references to the notion of 
Indian civilization in general (’phags yul, etc.) had noticeable power in a grammarian’s 
reasoning, however, this chapter has also provided noteworthy methodological restrictions to 
the ‘normativity’249  of Sanskritic knowledge. In Sum rtags that is specific to the Tibetan 
language, the main scriptural authorities are SCP and TKJ but not Sanskritic grammatical 
sources. Consequently, the adherence to the case model is based on the cases’ appearance and 
form in SCP and TKJ, and thus not directly but only indirectly on Sanskritic grammatical 
knowledge. Moreover, although Si tu never directly refuted the validity of any Sanskritic 
theory, he openly restricted their applicability to Tibetan language. We have also seen that Si 
tu’s use of Tibetan scholastic formal argumentation that combines principles such as factual 
evidence, linguistic conventions, logical consistency and scriptural authority, together with the 
application of a variety of hermeneutical-argumentative techniques, allowed him a critical 
encounter with the root texts in which there was space for negotiation, adaptation and 
refinement of the existing understandings of the case model. 
A natural question remains, which will occasionally be reencountered also in the examination 
of Si tu’s case model, namely the extent to which Sum rtags commentators were aware of 
producing compromises that not always adequately represented either the language or an 
authoritative source. In other words, did commentators intentionally argue for a certain 
taxonomy in spite of knowing that it leads to a misconstruction of sources or language, with the 
principle of scriptural authority not allowing them otherwise? Although this will have to be 
decided separately for each instance, strongly cumbersome and seemingly artificial solutions 
                                                          
249 Cf. supra 9. 
 85 
 
by commentators including Si tu sometimes cannot but give the impression that they did know 
better than admitted in their commentaries, even more so in view of the fact that most of them 
were native speakers. However, the issue at hand is more difficult. It was noted above that the 
formation of theories through the reconciliation of authorities is not a simple act of a 
commentator’s free will but strongly limited by his own knowledge. This also includes the fact 
that any language proficiency of Tibetan grammarians does not directly translate into an 
awareness of the gap between language and linguistic models, no matter how immense this gap 
might be. Linguists will agree that language is an utterly complex phenomenon which offers 
innumerable strategies as to how to describe it. How to distinguish, therefore, between an 
adequate and an inadequate description of language, a valid or invalid grammatical theory? The 
answer to this question depends on the specific state of the art in a tradition, of approved modes 
to conceptualize language, available knowledge about linguistic theories and methods to 
describe the language and form theories. Lastly, it is also a matter of awareness of the strengths 
and weaknesses of these methods and theories. Such knowledge of adequacies or inadequacies 
is not given simply with language competency, but it is limited by the peculiar approach 
followed by a grammarian and it needs to be developed by detecting and, in the process, 
focusing on shortcomings or inconsistencies in prevailing forms of grammatical analysis 
through a constant rubbing of concepts against each other and the language in use. 
Methodology, perceptions of adequacy, awareness of strengths and weaknesses and 
consequently the refinement of theories are all intertwined and develop alongside in time and 
space. As a word of caution rather than an answer to the above question, it is utterly difficult to 
discern and therefore will remain open in this thesis, whether a grammarian such as Si tu had 
all the prerequisites at his disposal to becoming aware of the linguistic shortcomings in some 
of his conceptions of the case model. The next chapter will detail, for example, how any possible 
awareness was severely impeded by the theoretical foundation of case grammar with its roots 
already in the Sanskritic tradition. In any case, it is safe to conclude that Si tu’s case grammar 
in the GC is the thorough and honest attempt to develop an adequate representation of WT, not 
just to defend the scriptural authority of SCP and TKJ or any other source.  
Before going on to the main topic of this dissertation, i.e. the close examination of the classical 
Tibetan eightfold case model in and before Si tu, it is necessary to repeat that the grammatical 
methodology investigated in this chapter focused only on Sum rtags and thus on a literary genre 
and tradition that cannot be traced back further than the 14th century at the current state of 
research. The numerous linguistic sources in the Tibetan tradition outside of the Sum rtags 
genre and before and after this time have a different constellation of their respective input 
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sources and their authorities. This might be of special interest for early conceptions of the case 
model in sources like NG(g), GNT or the ’Jug pa’i sgra brgyad bstan pa tshig le’ur byas pa, 
in which Sanskritic authority presumably played a more direct role. Yet, it is a different question 
whether Sanskritic sources occupied any similar status like SCP and TKJ. It may also be 
assumed that especially for the earliest period it was only natural and even reasonable to rely 
on the accumulated linguistic knowledge and experience of the Indian tradition in the cross-
cultural knowledge transfer, and it would be counterintuitive for grammarians of that early time 
to have been fully aware of the intricacies of grammar and the weaknesses of their approach to 
the analysis of the Tibetan language.  
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5 Introduction to Tibetan Case Grammar  
5.1 Introduction to the Tibetan Case Model 
Since there is no morphological structure in written Tibetan that directly corresponds to the 
Sanskrit nominal inflexion, the introduction of case grammar must have posed a great challenge 
to Tibetan grammarians. In Sanskrit as a fusional language, suffixes join to base forms (verbal 
roots and nominal stems) in order to form complete, syntactically functioning and bound word 
forms (pada).250 These suffixes are clearly defined by Sanskrit grammarians in terms of two 
unmistakably separated sets of suffixes for nominal and verbal inflexion.251 Written Tibetan, in 
contrast, allows the application of one and the same grammatical marker following nouns and 
verb forms, indicating either identical, related or occasionally even unrelated syntactic, 
semantic or pragmatic information. Next to this morphological difference, there is also a 
significant morphosyntactic disagreement between Sanskrit and WT, regarding both the 
number of distinguishable morphological case forms as well as the different syntactic, semantic 
and pragmatic categories (= case functions) distributed onto them. Despite multiple serious 
obstacles, the Tibetan tradition has nonetheless adopted nonetheless Sanskrit case grammar and 
eventually made it an integral part of its grammatical system.  
A specific procedure for the derivation of syntactically bound word forms (pada) was 
developed in Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī and continued in a simplified manner by grammars such as 
Cāndra and Kātantra, enabling grammarians to execute a distinction between morphological 
forms and their functions in the context of case grammar very consistently.252 The grammatical 
term vibhakti (‘case suffix’), of which the Tibetan term rnam dbye is a direct translation, is 
restricted to a fixed set of 21 suffixes listed in grammatical treatises, which are triggered by 
clearly defined semantic and syntactic conditions to indicate the respective semantic or 
syntactic information conveyed in these conditions. 
 P 2.3.2 karmaṇi dvitīyā “If there is a karman, a second [vibhakti occurs].” 
 P 2.3.4 antarāntareṇa yukte “In connection with antarā (‘in between’) and 
 antareṇa (‘without’), [a second vibhakti occurs].” 
While both these rules establish specific conditions which require an affixation of a second case 
suffix, they constitute different types. The grammatical tradition usually distinguishes these two 
                                                          
250 The notion of syntactically bound word forms to render pada is derived from the idea of “bound syntactic 
word forms” in HSGLT 2, 220 and 240. 
251 Cf. infra 114. 
252 On the distinction between case forms and case functions in case grammar, cf. also chapter 5.2. 
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in terms of kārakavibhakti (‘case suffix [triggered by] a kāraka’) and upapadavibhakti (‘case 
suffix [triggered by] another word [in the sentence]’). In simple terms, the first type of condition 
(P 2.3.2) expresses a direct participation of the marked argument in the accomplishment of the 
action expressed by the verb of the sentence, whereas the second type establishes merely an 
intrasentential relation between two arguments, for example the marked argument and the two 
word forms antarā and antareṇa according to P 2.3.4. Therefore, these two types may be 
distinguished in terms of semantic vs. syntactic conditions, where the first condition is directly 
related to the semantic structure of the sentence, whereas the latter is not.253 These two main 
conditions are supplemented by a set of additional ones that address specific situations, for 
example Vedic conventions, and others. 254  The precise and distinct separation of the 
morphological and functional level in the derivation of cases provides an economical way of 
representing the highly complex morphosyntax of Sanskrit nominal inflexion, and it also allows 
the grammarian to account for features of Sanskrit language such as the different morphological 
manifestations of each vibhakti255 or the fact that each vibhakti can have several distinct uses. 
The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini list a total number of 32 kāraka-definitions (1.4.24-55) and 72 
conditions that can trigger the Sanskrit case suffixes (2.3.2-73). Kātantra has 8 kāraka-
definitions (2.4.8-15) and 22 triggers of the suffixes and Cāndra provides 56 triggers without 
separate definitions for the kārakas (2.1.43-98). 256  Furthermore, the Sanskritic linguistic 
literature across the centuries includes extensive investigations of the semantic-syntactic 
constitution of the defined case functions, especially of the kārakas.257  
The Tibetan grammarians have basically retained the number of eight cases by simplifying the 
Sanskritic model and focusing on a selection of prototypical case functions of each Sanskrit 
case suffix.258 These functions consist of the six eminent kārakas (‘doers, causes’), of which 
karaṇa (‘instrument’) and kartr̥ (‘agent’) prototypically belong both to the Sanskrit third case 
                                                          
253 However, the kārakas have been an all-pervasive analytical tool in Indian scientific knowledge production 
that has been used in different ways in various fields of knowledge and moreover, there exist also significant 
divergences in academic research, how to classify them in terms of syntactic, semantic, or other categories. On 
the term kāraka, cf. chapter 5.4. On the distinction between syntactic and semantic case marking in academic 
approaches to case grammar, cf. also infra 102f. 
254 For one such example of Vedic grammatical operations, cf. e.g. P 2.3.3. 
255 I.e. the different paradigms of nominal inflexion. 
256 Cāndra did not provide any definition of the kārakas, since the text does not supply saṃjñā-sūtras for the 
definition of technical terms and relies more on self-explanatory terminology (cf. HSGLT 2, 292). 
257 Cf. chapter 5.4 and the historical surveys of the respective cases. 
258 Sanskritic grammatical schools such as Pāṇini, Kātantra or Cāndra usually distinguish only seven cases 
based on seven distinct case forms, while the eighth case form that expresses vocative meaning is not 
distinguished due to its morphological proximity to the first case form. For a more details, cf. chapter 14. 
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suffix, plus the prototypical first (prātipadikārtha) and sixth case function (sambandha), as well 
as  sambodhana as another typical first, or alternatively eighth case function: 
# Pāṇini Kātantra Cāndra 
1.1/ 
1 
prātipadikārtha (‘meaning 
of the nominal stem’) 
(2.3.46) 
liṅgārtha (‘meaning of the 
nominal stem’) (2.4.17) 
arthamātra (‘the mere 
meaning’) (2.1.93) 
2. 
karman (~ direct object) 
(1.4.49-53, 2.3.2) 
karman (~ direct object) 
(2.4.13, 2.4.19) 
kriyāpya (‘to be reached 
through the action’) 
(2.1.43) 
3.1 
kartr ̥ (‘agent’) (1.4.54-55, 
2.3.18) 
kartr̥ (‘agent’) (2.4.14, 
2.4.33) 
kartr̥ (‘agent’) (2.1.62) 
3.2 
karaṇa (‘instrument’) 
(1.4.42, 2.3.18) 
karaṇa (‘instrument’) 
(2.4.12, 2.1.19) 
karaṇa (‘instrument’) 
(2.1.63) 
4. 
sampradāna (~ recipient, 
goal) (1.4.32-41, 2.3.13) 
sampradāna (~ recipient, 
goal) (2.4.10, 2.4.19) 
sampradāna (~ recipient, 
goal) (2.1.73) 
5. 
apādāna (‘fixed point of 
departure’) (1.4.24-31, 
2.3.28) 
apādāna (‘fixed point of 
departure’) (2.4.8-9, 
2.4.19) 
avadhi (‘limit’ ?) (2.1.81) 
6. śeṣa (‘remainder’) (2.3.50) 
svāmyādi (‘owner, etc.’) 
(2.4.19) 
sambandha (‘connection’) 
(2.1.95) 
7. 
adhikaraṇa (‘location’) 
(1.4.45, 2.3.36) 
adhikaraṇa (‘location’) 
(2.4.11, 2.4.19) 
ādhāra (‘support’) 
(2.1.88) 
1.2/ 
8. 
sambodhana (‘address’) 
(2.3.47), āmantrita 
(‘address’) (2.3.48) 
āmantraṇa (‘address’) 
(2.4.18) 
sambodhana (‘address’) 
(2.1.94) 
Figure 3: Overview of the Sanskritic conceptual framework adopted in the Tibetan case model 
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After a fusion of agent and instrument under a single agentive function, each of these functions 
was directly associated with a single morphological category in WT as its respective 
morphological realization, resulting in the following standard Tibetan model:  
# Case name (rnam dbye’i ming) Morphology + example 
1st  
ngo bo tsam, ming tsam (‘the mere essence [of a word 
meaning],’ ‘the mere nominal stem’) 
unmarked form: 
shing (‘wood’) 
2nd 
las, las su bya ba  
(~ direct object, ‘to be done as the karman’ ?) 
base form + la don 
shing la (‘upon the wood’) 
3rd byed pa po (‘agent’) 
base form + byed sgra 
shing gis (‘by the wood’) 
4th ched du bya ba, dgos ched (‘beneficiary, purpose’) 
base form+ la don 
shing la (‘for the wood’) 
5th ’byung khungs (‘origin’) 
base form + las/nas 
shing las (‘from the wood’) 
6th ’brel ba (‘connection’) 
base form + ʼbrel sgra 
shing gi (‘of the wood’) 
7th gnas gzhi, rten gnas (‘base, support’) 
base form + la don 
shing la (‘on/in the wood’) 
8th bod pa (‘address’) 
kye + base form: 
kye shing (‘oh wood!’) 
Figure 4: Overview of the Tibetan case model 
The Tibetan case model may be described in most general terms as a bivalent system of case 
forms and their meanings or functions. While the total number of cases follows from their 
meaning, namely from the eight functional categories also represented by the cases’ names, the 
model distinguishes only six different case forms, since the second, fourth and seventh cases 
have identical markers. In Tibetan grammatical nomenclature, the case morphemes which are 
added to indicate cases two to eight are referred to as ‘syntactic link’ (tshig phrad). ‘Syntactic 
link’ (tshig phrad) is also the technical term for all other grammatical markers that modify the 
meaning of lexical word forms to govern – mainly but not exclusively – the relations between 
arguments, subclauses, and other parts of a sentence. The autocommentary of Smr̥tijñānakīrti’s 
Smra sgo gives the following definition of tshig phrad:  
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 tshig gang zhig rang la bstan par bya ba’i don med cing gzhan la phan ’dogs shing gsal 
 bar byed pa de ni tshig gi phrad ces bya ste/     dper na lcags gnyis sbyor bar byed pa’i 
 tsha la lta bu’o/ 
 “Any word form (tshig gang zhig) that has no meaning on its own to be indicated and 
 benefits as well as clarifies [the meaning of] another [word form] is called syntactic link 
 (tshig gi phrad, lit. ‘connection of syntactically functioning word forms, phrases, 
 subclauses, or other syntactic forms’), for example like the solder that attaches two iron 
 pieces.”259 
Si tu’s definition of the term resonates with that of Smr̥tijñānakīrti: 
 […] tshig gi phrad ces bya ba ni spyir ming tsam gnyis sam du ma sbrel ba’i tshe bar 
 du mtshams sbyor ba’am don gsal ba la phan ’dogs par byed […] 
 “[…] Regarding ‘syntactic link’ (tshig gi phrad), in general, whenever two or more 
 mere lexical word forms (ming tsam) are combined together (sbrel ba), [a syntactic link] 
 connects between [them] (bar du mtshams sbyor ba) and benefits the clarification of the 
 meaning (don gsal ba la phan ’dogs par byed) […].”260 
However, not all grammarians have accepted the subsumption of case markers under tshig 
phrad. Dpang Lotsāwa, for example, in his Tshogs gsum gsal ba (TshSS) explicitly separates 
the two notions of rnam dbye and tshig phrad on the basis of Sanskrit grammar, where the 
translational equivalent of phrad (i.e. nipāta) refers to indeclinable particles that are separate 
from the case suffixes.261 
While the Tibetan case model follows the most basic and general interpretation of Sanskritic 
case grammar, it is certainly not a direct reproduction of any Sanskritic grammatical school. 
The Tibetan model exhibits noteworthy modifications and reinterpretations of the Sanskritic 
conceptions contained in Pāṇini, Cāndra and Kātantra, although a strong emphasis remained 
on Sanskritic authority in general.262 In addition to these three classical schools of the Sanskritic 
grammatical tradition, there are indications that the transmission of grammatical knowledge 
                                                          
259 Smr̥ti 2002, 74. 
260 GC 603.5. It is to be noted, however, that Si tu deviates from Smr̥ti when he following to this quotation 
distinguishes between those syntactic links that cannot indicate clear meaning on their own and those that can 
(cf. GC 603.5 and 604.5). 
261  Cf. Dpang Blo gros brtan pa 2004, 260. One reason might be that his TshSS is dedicated to general 
linguistics that considers both, Sanskrit and Tibetan language, and thus he attempted a more universally 
applicable taxonomy in which he adhered closer to Sanskritic models. In contrast, Smr̥ti’s and Si tu’s works are 
Tibetan-specific grammars. 
262 For more information, please refer to the respective chapters of the cases. 
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was also mediated through other scriptural or oral sources, although historical challenges 
remain to be resolved as to the exact details.263   
Due to the Tibetan grammarians’ strategy to retain selected basics of the Sanskritic scheme and 
its prototypical functions, a variety of morphosyntactic differences between Sanskrit and 
Tibetan language remained for the most part unreflected in the adaptation processes. In fact, 
neither the classification of Tibetan case morphology into six categories nor the list of eight 
case labels as the actual case functions distributed onto these morphological categories is able 
to provide an exhaustive and representative template of the grammar of WT. The following 
discrepancies, among others, arise in research literature:  
1. An unmarked word form as a mere expression of a word’s lexical meaning (ngo bo tsam, 
ming tsam; = first case) in Tibetan is not incorrect as such, but it has no syntactic significance 
whatsoever, since Tibetan does not follow any agreement patterns of noun phrases with verbs 
that are comparable to Sanskrit.264 Consequently, usual exemplifications of the first case in 
Tibetan grammatical treatises do not exceed mere lists of words without any implementation in 
phrases or sentences.  
Within a Tibetan sentence, however, the unmarked argument represents the most affected 
participant of the action, being either the PATIENT of a verb where AGENT and PATIENT 
are differentiated (tha dad pa) or the single participant of verbs where AGENT and PATIENT 
are instantiated within the same entity (tha mi da pa, ‘non-differentiated’). 265  In modern 
linguistics, the unmarked participant in a Tibetan sentence is normally identified with the 
ABSOLUTIVE. This much more important use of an unmarked word form – at least in the 
context of grammar and syntax – has never been considered by Tibetan grammarians in the 
context of the first case.266 
                                                          
263 One possible candidate is the Smra ba kun (root text and autocommentary; cf. supra 32). Additionally, we 
know only little about the oral transmission of grammatical knowledge to Tibet, but we know that the close 
collaboration between Tibetan and Indian scholars for the translation of Buddhist sources also involved 
grammatical studies and therefore some of the adaptations in the Tibetan model might have been mediated 
through oral transmission. 
264 For an early Tibetan theory that may be against such a view, cf. infra 198ff. 
265 Cf. e.g.:  
 (a) shing mkhan gyis shing gcod ‘the carpenter is cutting the tree/wood’ (tha dad pa) 
 (b) ’khor lo ’khor ‘the wheel turns’ (tha mi dad) 
There are numerous debates about the conceptual affinity of the traditional classification of verbs into tha dad pa 
and tha mi dad pa (‘differentiated’ and ‘non-differentiated’) which was originally introduced by Si tu in the 
Tibetan context, and the academic notion of transitivity (cf. Tournadre 1992, Tillemans 2007, Müller-Witte 
2009). I will not engage in these debates in this chapter and use the Tibetan nomenclature, as this is mainly a 
historical work. 
266 Cf. also point 3 in the current list of discrepancies. Equations of the traditional first case ngo bo tsam with the 
ABSOLUTIVE of WT as an ergative language, which appear in research literature (cf. Tournadre 2010, 94f.; 
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2. The morphological category la don (‘[having] the meaning of la’ or ‘[having the same] 
meaning [as] la’) consists not only of the morpheme la but includes the seven morphemes tu, 
du, ru, -r, su, la and na, all of which may equally take on the meaning of a second (las), fourth 
(dgos ched) or seventh case (gnas gzhi) according to the tradition. This is contrary to various 
academic studies of the Tibetan case morphemes,267 which demonstrate that la don consists at 
least of three different morphological categories (la, na, du). The latter three differ significantly 
in their usage in Tibetan sentences and in the syntactic-semantic information they can express, 
even though their precise constitution remains a subject of debate both synchronically and 
diachronically. 
3. Closely related to both above points is the specific morphosyntactic distinction in WT 
between the grammatical categories PATIENT and DIRECTION/INDIRECT OBJECT, which 
would have required an adaptation of the second case called las as a direct translation of the 
Sanskrit prototypical second case function karman.  
Both Sanskrit clauses are morphosyntactically identical and treat the arguments marked by the 
second case suffix as the same type of category, which traditional Sanskrit grammarians have 
rendered as karman. WT, in contrast, clearly distinguishes these two instances in the form of 
different grammatical constructions: the ’bras chan (‘rice’) represents the PATIENT role as the 
unmarked argument in phrase 1, whereas grong (‘village’) of phrase 2 is marked by the 
morpheme la expressing the information of DIRECTION, INDIRECT OBJECT or more 
                                                          
Müller-Witte 2009, 28), are therefore misleading from a historical perspective. I am not aware of any classical 
Tibetan grammar, which identifies the ABSOLUTIVE-argument in a Tibetan sentence with the first case ngo bo 
tsam. The only exception might be NGg in its presentation of an eightfold kāraka-scheme (cf. infra 198ff.), 
however, the passage in question is open to interpretation and assuming that my reading of it is correct, this 
theory has not been adopted by any other Tibetan grammarian to my knowledge. 
267 Cf. e.g. Hill 2011; DeLancey 2003; Tournadre 2010. 
 Phrase 1 Phrase 2 
Syntax of 
phrase 1 and 2 
Sanskrit: odanaṃ pacati 
rice-ACC cook-3SG.PRS 
grāmaṃ gacchati 
village-ACC go-3SG.PRS 
1: karman 
2: karman 
Tibetan: ’bras chan ’tshed  
rice-Ø cook.PRS  
grong la ’gro 
village-ALL go.PRS 
1: PATIENT 
2: DIRECTION 
(English:) ‘(s/he) cooks rice’ ‘(s/he) walks to the village’  
Figure 5: Comparison between Sanskrit and Tibetan case marking patterns in the context of the second case function karman 
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generally perhaps SECONDARY OBJECT.268 In other words, Tibetan language distinguishes 
on its morphosyntactic level between two grammatical categories that are not separated in the 
same way in Sanskrit. This most significant, language-specific feature of WT, especially the 
zero-marking of the PATIENT, has never been openly problematized in a systematic 
theorization in the Tibetan tradition, which has rather simply adopted the Sanskrit second case 
as a single category representing the meaning of karman and marked by la don. 269 
Consequently, the question arises whether the traditional conceptions of the Tibetan second 
case qua karman are only restricted to the directional/indirect objective function of morpheme 
la as the second case’s prototypical marker (cf. e.g. phrase 2 above)? Or does the Tibetan second 
case perhaps cover any other function of the three morphemes la, na and du subsumed under la 
don? How does any such function of one of the la don-morphemes connect to Sanskritic karman 
that typically – yet not exclusively – refers to that PATIENT role which is prototypically 
indicated by the unmarked argument in Tibetan? And lastly, how does the PATIENT role and 
its zero-marking in written Tibetan fit into this model?  
4. The fifth case in the standard model (’byung khungs, ‘origin’) once again comprises two 
different morphemes (las and nas). These, however, may be distinguished more accurately, and 
recent studies render their difference in terms of an ABLATIVE function for las and an 
ELATIVE function for nas:270 
 (1) rta las/nas babs ‘[Someone] has fallen off/dismounted the horse.’ 
 (2) ba las ’o ma byung ‘The milk originated from the cow.’ 
According to Tournadre, the first sample phrase indicates a mere spatiotemporal origin in which 
the morphemes las and nas may be applied interchangeably. The second phrase, however, 
expresses not only a mere spatiotemporal relation but an “origin of a transformation” in 
                                                          
268 I use the term SECONDARY OBJECT as a more neutral, thus far less loaded category in modern linguistics 
compared to INDIRECT OBJECT. In the current thesis, SECONDARY OBJECT only emphasizes the aspect of 
less affection relatively to the ‘primary’ DIRECT OBJECT. 
Although there is a clear consensus in modern Tibetan linguistics that there is a linguistically significant 
difference between the unmarked PATIENT and arguments marked by la, the question about the grammatical 
information encoded by the morpheme la in terms of how many distinct functions it expresses, as well as what 
these functions precisely express, has not been conclusively resolved thus far. On this issue, cf. the la don-cases 
in chapters 8, 10 and 13, especially 8.1.1 and 8.1.2.7. 
269 Some awareness of the difference between the traditional second case marker la don and the unmarked 
morphology in Tibetan language, yet not any open problematization, is traceable already before Si tu, who 
himself seems to be the first addressing it directly, yet without acknowledging any significant difference that 
would result in separate case functions. Only during the 20th century we can find more systematic approaches in 
Tibetan grammatical treatises to investigate the difference of la don and unmarked morphology in the context of 
the traditional second case, although a distinction between the different la don-morphemes is entirely missing to 
my knowledge. For more details, cf. chapter 8.2.4. 
270 C.f. e.g. DeLancey 2003; Tournadre 2010; Hill 2012. 
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Tournadre’s nomenclature, i.e. “the object (or the being) from which, [sic!] something is 
extracted, generated or produced.”271 In such cases, only las must be used. Additionally, only 
the morpheme nas may be used to indicate the agent: 
 (5) bod dmag nas rgya nag gi yul mang po bcoms ‘The Tibetan army conquered many 
 Chinese territories.’272  
In this clause, the morpheme nas may be substituted by the agentive marker gis, but I am 
unaware of any study which would specify semantic, syntactic or pragmatic nuances between 
these two types of agentive marking. In any case, the morpheme las may certainly not be applied 
in such instances. 
5. Finally, in addition to the morphological categories provided in the classical eightfold case 
model, there is at least also the morpheme dang (‘and,’ ‘with’) with its usage as a morphological 
marker to indicate intrasentential relations either between nouns or between nouns and verbs: 
 (6) ri dang chu ‘mountains and water’ 
 (7) bla ma dang mjal ‘to meet with the Lama’273  
These two uses of dang have been rendered in Tournadre’s study as coordinative (6) and 
associative case functions (7) respectively, while traditional grammarians have not categorized 
these as case functions but instead commonly classify dang as a non-case syntactic link.274 
As demonstrated in this exemplary list, the close adherence of Tibetan grammarians to the 
Sanskritic fundamentals of case grammar has created a substantial gap between the structures 
of WT and their conceptualization, giving rise to the question why Tibetan grammarians 
unequivocally followed the Indian tradition in this particular way – a question which has startled 
modern academia for a long time.275 The answer provided by Tibetan grammarians is most 
striking in view of the outlined inconsistencies: 
 de ltar na ’khor ’das kyi dngos po’i don brjod par bya ba rnams brjod par byed pa’i tha 
 snyad thams cad ni brgyad po ’di las ma ’das shing/     ’dir ma ’dus pa’ang gcig kyang 
 med pa kho na’o/ 
                                                          
271 Tournadre 2010, 111. 
272 Example and translation from Tournadre 2010, 112. 
273 Examples and translation from Tournadre 2010, 113. 
274 Note that Tournadre proposes a tenfold case system in total, which I did not fully discuss in this presentation. 
Hill (2011, 5) proposes 9 case morphemes for Old Tibetan, whereas Schwieger (2006) does not seem to 
distinguish between case and non-case morphemes or functions.  
275 Cf. chapter 1.1. 
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 “Accordingly, regarding all terms (tha snyad thams cad) which express the meanings 
 to be expressed of a real phenomenon in saṃsāra or nirvāṇa (ʼkhor ʼdas kyi dngos po), 
 they do not exceed these eight [cases], nor are there any [such terms] which are not 
 included in them.”276  
Even hundreds of years later and despite his demonstration of a considerably increased 
awareness of the language-specific structures of WT, Si tu Paṇchen will still argue for the 
validity of these cases along similar lines, although perhaps in a more careful voice: 
 rnam dbye zhes pa ni legs sbyar gyi skad la ming gi mthar sbyar bas tshig tu ’grub par 
 byed pa’i rkyen si sogs bdun gsum nyi shu rtsa gcig po rnams te/  don thob kyi dbang 
 gis don rjod par byed pa’i skad rigs thams cad la rnam dbye de rnams med pa mi srid 
 pas mkhan po ’dis bod kyi skad la’ang legs sbyar dang bstun nas rnam dbye de rnams 
 kyi ’jug pa gsal bar mdzad pa yin no/ 
“’Case’ [refers] to 21 – seven times three – suffixes in Sanskrit, such as si, etc., which 
 complete/accomplish (’grub par byed pa) a word through their application at the end of 
a nominal stem. However, actually for all languages that express meaning it is 
impossible that these cases do not exist, and therefore this teacher here has elucidated 
the application of these cases in accordance with Sanskrit also for the Tibetan 
language.”277 
Taking the proclaimed and recurrent idea of the cross-lingual validity of the cases as its starting 
point, this chapter examines how Si tu received and – in the process – transformed an analytical 
inventory from both the Sanskritic and Tibetan tradition, how he conceptualized and 
categorized the morphosyntactic surface structure of WT within the theoretical framework of 
case grammar, and how he modified, reconfirmed and illustrated the case categories, with the 
aim to gain further insight into the underlying, explicit and implicit rationales that have led him 
to his assertion of the cross-lingual explanatory value of the cases.  
The remaining chapter will start with a brief sketch of some of the key elements of case 
grammar from a modern linguistic perspective in order to develop the necessary analytical-
hermeneutical equipment for a refined awareness of the issues regarding Tibetan case grammar 
and a more precise assessment of the mechanisms involved in Tibetan grammatical theory 
formation (chapter 5.2). This is followed by a short introduction to Sanskritic as well as Tibetan 
                                                          
276 GNT CT 115 – 444. 
277 GC 597.2. 
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derivational systems for the formation of lexical words, syntactic entities, etc., that constitute 
the theoretical framework in which case grammar has been embedded (chapter 5.3). A brief, 
yet important preliminary consideration of the notion of kāraka in Sanskritic scholarly literature 
will be given in chapter 5.4, which is required for a more accurate understanding of the adoption 
of case grammar by Tibetan scholars.  
5.2 Introduction to Modern Case Grammar 
Without a proper background in linguistic training, the study of modern case grammar to me 
often seemed like the opening of Pandora’s box, exposing myself to an unsurmountable and 
continuously growing amount of highly technical and difficult theories as well as competing 
nomenclatures and taxonomies, all aimed at explaining the utterly complex phenomenon called 
language. More than once, all I was left with was the hope to understand it one day. This 
introduction will therefore only provide a rough template of a basic conceptual framework 
useful to our current purposes, and the reader should bear in mind that any of the presented 
terms and models can and probably have been contested or even criticized by alternative 
accounts of case grammar. 
In its most basic sense, case grammar is part of syntactic theory and thus aims at a representative 
explanation and description of the morphosyntactic surface structure of languages. 278 
Moreover, syntax and its adjective ‘syntactic’ generally take the sentence and thus 
intrasentential structures as their reference. As will become evident in this chapter, case 
relations on the surface may be more syntactic, more semantic or even pragmatic in nature, yet 
as intrasentential entities they remain part of syntax. Speaking of languages in this context 
implies a whole variety of different languages, each with their own specific structures. One 
central characteristic of languages is that they offer a relatively fixed inventory of grammatical 
categories to express a relatively unfixed amount of content intimately related to our world of 
experience.279 The ways in which this is achieved by the speakers of a certain language – or 
more technically speaking how this content becomes represented and encoded in linguistic 
expressions – is at the very core of syntactic theory including case grammar. In his well-known 
introduction to grammatical cases, Blake gives the definition that “case is a system of marking 
dependent nouns for the type of relationship they bear to their heads.”280 Grammatical cases are 
typically regarded as a property of nominal forms and traditionally refer to a system of 
                                                          
278 On the term syntax, cf. e.g. Wackernagel 2009, 1f. On the history of Anglo-European syntactic analysis, cf.  
Graffi 2001. 
279 Cf. DeLancey 1991, 338. 
280 Blake 2004, 1. For another important introduction to case grammar and the issues related to it, cf. Fillmore 
1968. 
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inflectional marking in a specific language. Grammatical treatises usually organize these 
systems into the different paradigms, which constitute the set of case forms in which lexical 
items may appear.281 Latin and Turkish, for example, distinguish six cases, whereas Ancient 
Greek distinguishes only five and Sanskrit even eight. In sum, grammatical cases are a linguistic 
device that governs and indicates intrasentential relations of a nominal form to other arguments 
in the sentence, and thus the sentence and its meaning are its major reference levels. 
Cases and their various morphological manifestations need to be separated from the relations 
they may express,282 and thus one of the most fundamental distinctions in case grammar is that 
between the morphological case forms and the case functions,283 i.e. the specific information 
communicated in the use of a certain case form. This distinction has not always been 
consistently pursued in academic linguistics, as noted by Anderson: 
 “The grammatical terminology of most languages which incorporate the European 
 tradition in such matters displays a systematic ambiguity in the use of the term ‘case’. 
 Usually, it is employed to refer both to a certain inflexional category (and the forms that 
 manifest it) and to the set of semantic distinctions carried by the forms of that category. 
 We can differentiate these as case-forms and case-relations or case-functions 
 respectively. Thus in Lutetiam veni, 284  it might be said that the noun is in 
 ACCUSATIVE form and that in this instance it indicates, or functions as, the ‘goal’. 
 Much controversy has depended simply on the confusion of the two senses.”285 
As we have seen above, Sanskritic grammatical sources avoid this issue through the derivational 
procedure of padas (syntactically bound word forms), which consistently distinguishes these 
two levels so that vibhakti is unambiguously restricted to the morphological case suffixes 
only.286 The Tibetan tradition, however, did not follow the Sanskritic terminological framework 
as strictly, and thus the ambiguity described by Anderson above is once more encountered. The 
Tibetan notion of rnam dbye, which is translated as ‘case’ in this work, was modelled along the 
lines of the eight prototypical functions rather than morphology, and therefore it often focuses 
                                                          
281 Cf. Blake, 1f. 
282 Cf. ibid., 3. 
283 Note that Blake (2004) uses both terms in a slightly more specific way, which is, however, not further 
relevant for our current discussion and the questions followed in the investigation of the Tibetan case model. 
284 ‘I came to Lutetia (a pre-Roman and Roman town at the place of present day’s Paris).’ (transl. Graf) 
285 Anderson 1977, 9. It is rather confusing that the case forms as morphological entities are often referred to in 
terms of ACCUSATIVE etc., which are clearly semantic notions originally introduced to indicate the 
prototypical function of a specific case form. In modern linguistic treatises, however, these labels often do not 
imply any indication about the use of the case form. 
286 Cf. supra 87f. and infra 113f. 
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on the functional side of the cases. However, in the context of the morphological derivation of 
case forms, the Tibetan term may still also refer to the morphological categories outlined in 
figure 4. Thus, depending on the context, the term allows for both meanings of case form as 
well case function, an imprecision that may strongly impede our understanding of a 
grammarian’s argumentation for or against certain taxonomies.   
On the morphological side, there are different types of manifestations of cases. The most 
familiar way to indicate case forms in the European grammatical tradition would be that of case 
suffixes of fusional languages like Latin, Ancient Greek, etc., where one case form encodes not 
only the information of an intrasentential relation but also number and gender, such as in the 
following Sanskrit paradigm for masculine a-stems: 
 Singular Dual Plural 
1st case vr̥kṣaḥ vr̥kṣau vr̥kṣāḥ 
2nd case vr̥kṣam vr̥kṣau vr̥kṣān 
3rd case vr̥kṣeṇa vr̥kṣābhyām vr̥kṣaiḥ 
4th case vr̥kṣāya vr̥kṣābhyām vr̥kṣebhyaḥ 
5th case vr̥kṣāt vr̥kṣābhyām vr̥kṣebhyaḥ 
6th case vr̥kṣasya vr̥kṣayoḥ vr̥kṣāṇām 
7th case vr̥kṣe vr̥kṣayoḥ vr̥kṣeṣu 
8th case vr̥kṣa vr̥kṣau vr̥kṣāḥ 
Figure 6: Example of case suffixes in fusional languages 
The eightfold case model of Sanskrit has a number of case forms which are morphologically 
identical. For masculine a-stems, the dual is identical in the 1st, 2nd and 8th case and in the 3rd, 
4th and 5th as well as in the 6th and 7th case. Accordingly, the plural is identical in the 4th and 
5th case. This phenomenon is termed syncretism,287 a common feature of case systems across 
languages. Next to synthetic case suffixes as a mechanism for expressing grammatical relations, 
there are also ‘analytic’ means such as adpositions. The Sanskrit case system clearly belongs to 
the synthetic type, but Tibetan is a more problematic case. Even though Tibetan is in principle 
an agglutinative language which encodes grammatical information in the form of analytic 
                                                          
287 Cf. Blake 2004, 19. 
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morphemes,288 there are grammatical markers (byed sgra, ’brel sgra, du sgra) that exhibit 
morpho-phonetic agreement patterns with the final sound of the marked base form. These 
variants are usually termed allomorphs, and the grammatical morphemes in general are thus 
often referred to as enclitics rather than mere adpositions or particles. Many, if not most, 
synthetic languages have the two means of inflexional affixes as well as adpositions to indicate 
relations to other arguments in a sentence. To which extent these different means of expressing 
grammatical information are accepted as forms of case marking is a matter of the theoretical 
foundation of the cases and thus varies from theory to theory.289 
On the functional side, it is a common feature across languages that case markers have several 
functions. This feature is observed in WT as well and may be referred to as the 
multifunctionality of cases.290 However, as already demonstrated above, one and the same 
function may also be shared by several case markers, as in the case of la (bod la ’gro ‘to go to 
Tibet’) and du (bod du ’gro ‘id.’), both of which in WT may mark the destination of verbs of 
motion.291 The same feature also applies to Sanskrit, where sentences like grāmaṃ gacchati 
(‘s/he goes to the village’) and grāmāya gacchati (‘id.’) are equivalent in the sense that they 
both encode the karman-function according to P 2.3.12.  
It was stated at the beginning of this subchapter that the morphosyntactic surface structure of a 
language and the content expressed by it is at the very core of case grammar. This does not, 
however, necessarily require a direct correspondence between the two. Modern case grammar 
commonly follows a more multilayered approach of understanding the meaning or content of 
sentences and its relation to the surface structure as directly present in the sentence. First, we 
observe various kinds of case functions, i.e. the information directly encoded by the case forms. 
If we compare two simple German phrases like Ich liebe dich (‘I love you’) and Ich töte dich 
(‘I kill you’), the morphosyntactic surface structure is identical insofar as both verbs are 
bivalent, governing one argument in the NOMINATIVE form and one in the ACCUSATIVE. 
On the semantic level, however, we are faced with two quite different types of events in which 
the actants’ participation varies significantly: while the argument marked by the 
                                                          
288 Analytic in the sense that one morpheme only encodes one type of information (grammatical relation, 
number, gender) at a time, as well as that these morphemes are morphologically independent from the word stem 
and are thus no suffixes in the strict sense.  
289 Cf. Heine 2009, 458: “Where this boundary [between affixes and adpositions] is to be located is an issue that 
is notoriously controversial in both typological works and grammatical description; what is described by one 
author as an affix is described by another author as a clitic or an adposition, and what is expressed by case 
suffixes may correspond to adpositions in another language or dialect of the same language.” 
290 Cf. Tournadre 2010, 99. 
291 At least in classical Tibetan. Nathan Hill (2011, 35) observes that in the Old Tibetan Annals, only du and its 
allomorphs mark the DIRECTION of motion verbs. 
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ACCUSATIVE in the action of killing may be interpreted as a genuine PATIENT, which is 
directly affected by the action done by a genuine AGENT characterized by intentionality, 
volitionality and other parameters, the loved one in the first phrase cannot be said to be directly 
affected by the action of loving, nor is the argument in the NOMINATIVE a genuine agent in 
the sense that s/he is doing something. In a semantic analysis, the NOMINATIVE form 
governed by the verb lieben (‘to love’) may be more likely termed the EXPERIENCER of the 
action.292 If we change the grammatical voice to a passive construction (Du wirst von mir 
geliebt; Du wirst von mir getötet), then the arguments marked by the NOMINATIVE even 
correspond to those marked by the accusative of the active clause. These case forms therefore 
do not directly encode information about the semantic structure at hand, but only syntactic 
information that governs their relation to other arguments in the sentence. In our two examples, 
these syntactic relations would be called SUBJECT and DIRECT OBJECT for the 
NOMINATIVE and ACCUSATIVE respectively. Other common syntactic categories in 
modern linguistics are the INDIRECT OBJECT as well as the ABSOLUTIVE and ERGATIVE 
in ergative languages. AGENT, PATIENT and EXPERIENCER are normally labelled 
semantic roles, sometimes also thematic roles or theta roles, depending on the linguistic theory.  
As for the syntactic information conveyed in the SUBJECT relation in languages like Latin or 
Sanskrit, this is the agreement with the verb. Another type of an exclusively syntactic 
information would be that of the Tibetan syntactic link slar bsdu,293 which is used to mark the 
end of a Tibetan sentence in the literary language, although this link is not classified as a case 
either in the Tibetan tradition or in modern linguistics. Yet, both categories, grammatical subject 
and slar bsdu, add only structural information for the organization of the sentence and no 
information about the semantic structure of the sentence. Other than such mere information 
about the organization of the sentence, the German examples have demonstrated that syntactic 
relations such as the DIRECT OBJECT, for example, are more syntactic in nature rather than 
semantic, because they often cover a heterogeneous array of different semantic roles. Another 
important parameter to measure the ‘syntacticity’ of a case relation is thus also its degree of 
standardization or abstraction, that is to say to which extent intrasentential case marking 
patterns follow prototypes and persist across different semantic contexts. In case of semantic 
relations, we may measure their ‘semanticity’ in terms of the sensitivity of case marking 
regarding semantic variations of the verbs or in the extent to which case marking forms patterns 
                                                          
292 Cf. e.g. Blake 2004, 32 and 68. 
293 nga bod la phyin no ‘I went to Tibet.’ This link consists of eleven allomorphs, which correspond to the ten 
postscript letters in WT plus the form to. 
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of homogeneous semantic categories (= semantic roles) that directly convey information about 
the sentence’s construal of the actual phenomenal scenario it refers to. In this sense, we may 
distinguish between more syntactic and more semantic case relations which are directly 
manifest in the sentence’s surface. 
In his study on linguistic ergativity, Dixon introduces a distinction between syntactically based 
and semantically based patterns of grammatical marking along similar lines: 
 “Before venturing into a detailed examination of kinds of ergative and accusative 
 grammatical patterning, we must distinguish between two different kinds of strategy 
 that languages employ for marking ‘who is doing what to who’. These can be called (1) 
 the syntactically based (or prototypical’) alternative, and (2) the semantically based (or 
 ‘direct’) alternative. We shall see that labels such as nominative, accusative, absolutive 
 and ergative are only properly applicable to languages of the first type. 
 For languages of the first type, each verb has a prototypical meaning, and grammatical 
 marking is applied to the verb’s arguments on the basis of their function in the 
 prototypical instance. English basically follows this approach. The prototypical meaning 
 of hit is that in He hit me (implied: with his hand) or He hit me with a stick. The agent 
 (who propels the implement) is marked as transitive subject (A), being placed before 
 the verb (and being in nominative case if a pronoun). The target, which the implement 
 comes into contact with, is marked as transitive object (O), and placed after the verb 
 (being in oblique form if a pronoun). 
 When the verb is used with a non-prototypical meaning the same grammatical marking 
 of arguments applies. Hit is categorized as a transitive verb and so there must be a 
 transitive subject stated. In The falling branch hit me, the noun phrase the falling branch 
 is treated as being in A function, although it is not an agent propelling an implement 
 (nor an implement propelled by an agent). […] 
 Turning now to languages of the second type, we find that in any instance of use of a 
 verb its arguments are marked not by a syntactic rule relating to any prototypical 
 scheme, but so as to directly describe its meaning in that instance. […] In ‘John hit Bill 
 accidentally’ and ‘The falling branch hit Bill’ ‘Bill’ would again be marked as patient 
 but ‘John’ and ‘the falling branch’ would not be marked as agent, since they do not exert 
 volitional control over the activity.”294 
                                                          
294 Dixon 1998, 23f. 
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Since languages are highly complex systems, case marking systems usually exploit both types 
of relations, more syntactic and more semantic ones, sometimes even within one and the same 
case form. The Latin ablative case form, for example, is often categorized as encoding the 
information of a semantic case relation, since its prototypical function is to directly encode the 
distinctive semantic information of SOURCE in a sentence. At the same time, it can also mark 
the ‘agent’ of a passive clause, but this agent indifferently subsumes a variety of distinguishable 
semantic roles in clauses like occisus a consule (‘killed by the consul’) vs. amata a consule 
(‘loved by the consul’), since it corresponds to the SUBJECT of the active clause.295  
A third type of information apart from the syntactic and semantic that may be encoded by case 
markers is of pragmatic or discursive character. Tournadre gives the examples of emphasis, 
topicalization or contrastive function as possible information expressed by such morphemes as 
gyis (together with its allomorphs) or la.296 Compare the following example from a Tibetan 
translation of the sixth chapter of Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra (verse 54): 
 gzhan dag bdag la mi dga’ ba/     des ni tshe ’di ’am tshe gzhan la/      
 bdag la za bar mi byed na/     bdag ni ci phyir de mi ’dod/ 
 “If the repugnance/disfavour [of] others towards me does not consume me in this life or 
 another, why do I dislike it?”297 
The bdag (‘I’) in the third line of the verse is marked by la to indicate the information that ‘I’ 
is PATIENT/DIRECT OBJECT of the action of eating.298 The verb za ba (‘to eat’), however, 
usually governs two arguments, one in the ergative representing the eater and an absolutive 
form (zero-marking) rather than a la-form to mark that which is eaten. We might interpret the 
addition of la, a marker of the INDIRECT/SECONDARY (i.e. less affected) OBJECT and 
DIRECTION, to have a semantic function in terms of a partitive meaning (‘to eat into me’ > 
‘to consume me partially’ > ‘gnaw upon me’), but this is not suggested by the Sanskrit original, 
which remains indifferent regarding the degree of the consumption.299 It seems more likely to 
                                                          
295 Cf. Blake 2004, 32. 
296 Tournadre 2010, 99. 
297 mayy aprasādo yo ’nyeṣāṃ sa māṃ kiṃ bhakṣayiṣyati | iha janmāntare vāpi yenāsau me ’nabhīpsitaḥ || 6.54 || 
(Tibetan and Sanskrit quoted from Zeisler 2006, 76f.)  
Cf. alternative translations either from Sanskrit (Steinkellner 1997, 69), or from Tibetan (Hangartner 2005, 125). 
The English translation above focuses on the Tibetan version. The varying interpretations in the quoted sources 
is of rather minor importance for the current grammatical analysis, which only focuses on the unproblematic 
morpheme la in verse line 3. 
298 In the current analysis of this example it is not important, whether la is typically a syntactic or semantic case 
marker, since it focuses on the pragmatic value. I cannot answer the question in this dissertation, whether la is a 
syntactic or semantic case marker. 
299 For this type of interpretation and the resulting translation of la in verse line 3, cf. Zeisler 2006, 75ff. 
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me that the translator first of all felt the need to specify or emphasize the PATIENT role of ‘I’ 
due to the semantic constitution of the verb ‘to eat.’ The semantics of the action of eating highly 
suggests that the agent is a sentient being that eats something else. From a lexical-semantic 
perspective, the ‘I’ (bdag) in the third line of the verse therefore qualifies as a prototypical agent 
for the verb za ba (‘to eat’). In Bodhicaryāvatāra 54, we are faced with a very abstract use of 
the verb with a somewhat reverse situation in which a sentient being as the PATIENT is eaten 
by an abstract affection as the AGENT marked by the ergative (mi dga’ ba ‘repugnance, 
disfavour’). If la had been omitted, bdag as a sentient being could have been easily 
misunderstood as an agent without ergative marking, a common practice in poetry if the agent-
patient distribution is self-evident. In this sentence, the agency of bdag would have been further 
corroborated by the fact that the analytic verb form za bar (mi) byed emphasizes the active part 
of the action. The resulting and incorrect understanding of pādas 1-3 would then be that ‘I am 
eating due to the repugnance of others towards me.’ This would make little sense and raise the 
question what the ‘I’ is eating. In a poetic context, the translator probably wanted to clarify the 
precise participation of the two actants (‘repugnance’ and ‘I’) in the action, in order to maintain 
the reading flow. Secondly, the meter of the verse counts seven syllables, and the first, third, 
fifth and seventh (i.e. the uneven ones) are stressed. Usually the primary items of a sentence, 
i.e. the lexical items, tend to be distributed onto the stressed syllables, whereas additional 
information such as case relations, etc. often takes on the remaining slots. By way of the 
addition of la between bdag and the verb za, the translator found a convenient solution to 
complete the verse meter and simultaneously allocate za to a stressed position in the verse line. 
Thus, we are faced with the pragmatic function of a verse filler. Thirdly, the word bdag is 
repeated immediately at the beginning of the following line of verse, marked here with the 
topical marker ni, indicating that bdag switches from the patient role of za ba to the subject of 
’dod pa (‘to want, desire’). The bdag la/bdag ni contrast therefore also adds a contrastive 
function of la to bdag la. In sum, the morphosyntactic surface structure of the Tibetan sentence 
may be explained as the result of a combination of three pragmatic functions of the morpheme 
la. Of course, all three mentioned functions – emphasis, verse filler and contrastive function – 
must not interfere with the syntactic and semantic structures of the sentence, and thus the 
grammatical marker which comes closest to the role of a PATIENT or DIRECT OBJECT has 
been utilized. Yet, the pragmatic functioning is based on the fact that, even though the 
morpheme la encodes syntactic or semantic information in this sentence, the marking of bdag 
was not triggered by any syntactic or semantic condition but due to the pragmatic reasons 
outlined above.  
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Thus far, we discussed a small selection of basic distinctions in academic case grammar, i.e. 
the difference of case forms vs. case functions as well as the three different types of grammatical 
functions, namely the encoding of syntactic, semantic or pragmatic information. Although these 
types of functions are connected to different types of information in a sentence structure, all 
three are interrelated and their boundaries are not always easily determined.  
From what was said so far on the differences between syntactic and semantic case relations, it 
is clear that semantic roles such as AGENT or PATIENT are not always directly encoded in 
the morphosyntactic surface structure of the sentence and only directly surface if a grammatical 
case relation coincides with such a role. Nonetheless, it may be assumed that any kind of surface 
structure consisting of different types of grammatical relations between arguments of a sentence 
connects to an underlying semantic structure. To speak with Blake, “all modern theories allow 
for some kind of semantic relations that are not always reflected directly in the 
morphosyntax.”300 As already mentioned in the case of the German examples (1) ‘Ich liebe 
dich’ and (2) ‘Ich töte dich,’ while both share the same morphosyntactic surface, their semantic 
structures differ and they prescribe the semantic role of EXPERIENCER to the ‘Ich’ in (1) and 
that of the AGENT to the ‘Ich’ in (2). Such semantic roles are frequently also called deep-
cases.301 Naturally, it is the semantics of the verb that governs much of the underlying semantic 
structure of a sentence. 
Another crucial distinction in this context comes from the fact that neither the surface structure 
of a sentence nor any underlying semantic structure cover the entire range of semantic 
information that can be said about the actual phenomenon referred to by that sentence. In fact, 
any one phenomenon may be semantically structured into several events. For example, in the 
incident of throwing a ball through the window, the window may be conceived in one semantic 
representation as the LOCATION (pathway of the ball) or as the PATIENT (smashed window) 
in another. However, one sentence only encodes one such semantic representation or event at a 
time. In the phrase ‘to throw the ball through the window,’ the situation at hand is semantically 
structured with the window as the location no matter whether or not it was smashed, whereas 
‘to smash the window with the ball’ would be an event construal of the same phenomenal 
incident in which the window is the PATIENT. Not keeping these two levels apart from each 
other, the specific event expressed in a sentence and the underlying, semantically open 
                                                          
300 Blake 2004, 62. 
301 Cf. ibid., 63. 
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phenomenon,302 easily leads to the imposition of wrong event construals onto the sentence  
based on the wrong assumption that “to say that case roles are semantic means that it should be 
possible to read them algorithmically off of an objective description of an incident.” 303 
DeLancey calls such wrong imposition the “objectivist error,” for example to classify the 
window as the PATIENT and the ball as the INSTRUMENT in ‘to throw a ball through the 
window,’ because the window was conceived as being closed and thus smashed in the situation 
as such.304 
In sum, what was said thus far about the different types and layers of case functions amounts to 
the fact that the grammatical information directly encoded by grammatical case markers in a 
sentence does not necessarily correspond directly to the underlying semantic structure of the 
same sentence, nor does this sentence’s semantic structure directly correspond to the 
phenomenal scenario referred to in the sentence. 
Based on the distinction of case forms vs. case functions and what was said about them so far, 
two fundamental and intertwined problems of linguistic analysis regarding case grammar may 
be formulated that also permeate linguistic methodology. How to distinguish the case forms? 
And how to describe their meaning and use?305  
Without having space in this introduction to even scratch the surface of the methodology of 
case analysis and its related issues, modern as well as traditional linguistics have known 
multiple strategies for the derivation of the different forms and functions of the cases in their 
                                                          
302 One may argue that phenomena as such are not semantically open, but determined to various degrees. This 
would bring us deep into questions about the existence of semantic universals, the ontological status of 
phenomena and universals, etc. Some aspects of Si tu’s stance and that of other Tibetan grammarians regarding 
these questions are touched upon in part II and are summarized in chapters 15 and 16. However, these issues are 
related to entire sets of philosophical discourses in Western as much as (Tibetan) Buddhist thinking which have 
to remain outside the scope of the present work. It will also become clear that apart from general references to 
notions such as phenomenon or the actual meaning of actions, Tibetan grammarians remained largely 
unconcerned with any deeper linguistic-philosophical foundation of them. In the current context, the focus 
should therefore remain on the fact that phenomena as such allow for several semantic construals and can be 
semantically structured in different ways within and across languages. 
It should be also noted that the use of the term phenomenon has been chosen in this work for two reasons: (1) it 
is a common translation of the Tibetan terms chos as well as dngos po (2) and in contrast to notions such as 
reality, object, etc., it remains more neutral with regard to the ontological status of phenomena. In most general 
and simplistic terms, ‘phenomenon’, ‘real phenomenon’, ‘scenario’ as well as the attribute ‘phenomenal’ all refer 
to the bottom basis of linguistic expressions in this dissertation, regardless how this basis may be interpreted in 
terms of an extra-linguistic, sensory, cognitive, ‘real’, or other nature by different scholars. They are used 
interchangeably in the present study, if not expressed otherwise.  
303 DeLancey 1991, 339. 
304 Cf. ibid. Note that DeLancey introduces more technical terms in his article to work out the presented 
difference and I am also not fully sure, whether my use of the term ‘event’ fully corresponds to his. However, for 
our investigation of the history of Tibetan case grammar, I would argue that these nuances are not further 
required. 
305 Cf. Blake 2004, 19. 
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specific languages – often with competing results. While traditional approaches were 
sometimes based on more intuitive grounds, 306  a rigorous analysis of the distribution of 
linguistic elements throughout a language has become an integral part of methodological 
inventories at least in the context of modern descriptive grammars, with the major advantage 
of a comparatively high verifiability.307  
In theory, distributional analysis may be described as dealing with the “distribution of features 
of speech relatively to the other features within the utterance.”308 Historically, this approach 
belongs to the heritage of structuralist linguistics. In more detail, it means that “in both the 
phonologic and the morphologic analyses the linguist first faces the problem of setting up 
relevant elements. To be relevant, these elements must be set up on a distributional basis: x and 
y are included in the same element A if the distribution of x relative to the other elements B, C, 
etc., is in some sense the same as the distribution of y. Since this assumes that the other elements 
B, C, etc., are recognized at the time when the definition of A is being determined, this operation 
can be carried out without some arbitrary point of departure only if it is carried out for all the 
elements simultaneously. The elements are thus determined relatively to each other, and on the 
basis of the distributional relations among them.”309  
In practice, the distribution of case forms and functions may be tracked by monitoring and 
comparing the behavior of morphemes on the surface structure throughout different syntactic 
and semantic environments within a language. This involves different tests, such as the 
replacement of one element with another within the same clause or the application of one and 
the same element to different clauses, etc. For example, if we were to assess whether or not the 
seven morphemes subsumed under la don in traditional Tibetan grammar indeed form a single 
category, we might trace their distribution through a comparison of different sets of clauses: 
 1) lcags gser du sgyur (‘to transform iron into gold’), *lcags gser ru sgyur (‘id.’), *lcags 
 gserr sgyur (‘id.’), *lcags gser tu sgyur (‘id.’), *lcags gser su sgyur (‘id.’), *lcags gser 
 na sgyur (‘id.’), *lcags gser la sgyur (‘id.’)  
                                                          
306 Cf. ibid., 48. 
307 In the Tibetan context, Hill (2011, 4) notes in his study of la don in the Old Tibetan Annals that 
“distributional considerations are the correct criteria on which to describe linguistic phenomena.” Note, however, 
that especially case semantics and semantic roles can require different forms of semantic and syntactic testings, 
as they are not always directly manifest in the morphosyntax. In the following, I will, however, focus on the 
distributional methodology. 
308 Harris 1963, 6. 
309 Ibid. 1963, 7. 
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 2) lcags ’bras su sgyur (‘to transform iron into rice’), *lcags ’bras ru sgyur (‘id.’), 
 *lcags ’brasr sgyur (‘id.’), *lcags ’bras tu sgyur (‘id.’), *lcags ’bras du sgyur (‘id.’), 
 *lcags ’bras na sgyur (‘id.’), *lcags gser la sgyur (‘id.’) 
 3) nga la dpe cha gcig dgos (‘I need a pecha’), ngar dpe cha gcig dgos (‘id.’) ?nga ru 
 dpe cha gcig dgos (‘id.’), *nga na dpe cha gcig dgos (‘id.’), ngar dpe cha gcig dgos 
 (‘id.’), *nga du dpe cha gcig dgos (‘id.’), etc. 
 4) bod na ’dug (‘to reside in Tibet’), bod la ’dug (‘id.’), bod du ’dug (‘id.’), *bod ru 
 ’dug (‘id’), *bodr ’dug etc. 
Based on this very limited amount of data and assuming it is correct, we are able to infer certain 
statements about the distribution of the seven la don morphemes.310 First, only one of the three 
morphemes du, su and tu may be applied at a time, never two of them. Secondly, one of the 
same three morphemes is applicable in sets one, two and four, yet not in three. Thirdly, the 
morpheme na is only applicable in the fourth set, whereas its application in the first three sets 
is ungrammatical. Fourthly, la may be applied in sets three and four, but it appears to be 
ungrammatical in the first two. Fifthly, if la may be applied, then also -r may be applied in set 
three but not in set four. The amount of data above is simply too small to arrive at large-scaled 
generalizations and to abstract reliable regularities. However, if the corpus of phrases attested 
in texts would be continuously extended, we would sooner or later arrive at a distributional map 
demonstrating that du, su, tu and ru are allomorphs, la and na are separate categories, -r is an 
allomorph of la as well as a free variant of ru in vocalic environment311 and that the use of the 
resulting three morphological categories (la, na, du) overlaps only with a restricted number of 
verbs. 
Another, more technical example of distributional analysis is presented by Blake in the extinct 
(?) Australian ergative language Kalkatungu.312 By way of “paradigmatic oppositions,”313 he 
demonstrates that the language distinguishes between transitive subjects (‘A’) and the 
instrumental function, although both are identically marked with the ergative marker: 
                                                          
310 The data presented here is not the result of a real distributional analysis of any Tibetan text corpora, but only 
based on my – perhaps insufficient – language proficiency. Moreover, also the very limited volume of the data 
might lead to wrong or at least only temporary conclusions regarding the ultimate distribution of the morphemes 
and should therefore not be mistreated as a representative picture of Tibetan morphosyntax. These sets of phrases 
are only a hypothetical example to illustrate linguistic methodology, for which such shortcomings even improve 
our understanding of this approach’s mechanisms and the related problems. 
311 Cf. Tournadre 2010, 97. 
312 Cf. Blake 2004, 48f. 
313 Ibid. 
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 a. Marapai-thu  rumpa-mi   ithirr   matyamirla-thu 
      woman-ERG  grind-FUT   seed.NOM  grindstone-ERG 
     ‘The woman will grind the seed with the grindstone.’ 
 b. Marapai   rumpa-yi-mi   ithirr-ku  matyamirla-thu 
     woman-NOM  grind-AP-FUT  seed-DAT  grindstone-ERG 
     ‘The woman will grind seed with the grindstone.’ 
The difference of the two sentences lies in their grammatical construction, with a. being a 
typical ergative construction with two tokens of the ergative, whereas b. represents the 
corresponding antipassive. In most simple (though inaccurate terms), the antipassive-
construction of ergative languages is the equivalent to the passive voice of accusative 
languages. Consequently, the case marking of the woman as the agent changes from 
ERGATIVE to NOMINATIVE. However, the grindstone as the instrument remains unaffected 
by the derivation of either a. or b. Through monitoring the distribution of the ergative-marker 
throughout different syntactic environments, INSTRUMENT can be demarcated as a distinct 
and relevant grammatical category in Kalkatungu. 
Of course, distributional analysis is often easier said than done. What may be fruitful in one 
context may not be so in another, or perhaps it will even lead to wrong conclusions. Since 
languages vary significantly, there is no universal set of testings which can produce an adequate 
description of the morphosyntactic surface structure of all languages, and thus what Harris 
articulates at the beginning of his Structural Linguistics is a most important insight: 
 “The only preliminary step that is essential to this science is the restriction to distribution 
 as determining the relevance of inquiry. The particular methods described in this book 
 are not essential. They are offered as general procedures of distributional analysis 
 applicable to linguistic material. The specific choice of procedures selected for detailed 
 treatment here is, however, in part determined by the particular languages from which 
 the examples are drawn. The analysis of other languages would undoubtedly lead to the 
 discussion and elaboration of additional techniques. Even the methods discussed in 
 detail here could be made to yield many additional results over and above those brought 
 out in this survey. Furthermore, the whole framework of basic procedures presented 
 below could be supplanted by some other schedule of operations without loss of 
 descriptive linguistic relevance. This would be true as long as the new operations dealt 
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 essentially with the distribution of features of speech relatively to the other features 
 within the utterance, and as long as they did so explicitly and rigorously. Any such 
 alternative operations could always be compared with the procedures presented here, 
 and the results of one could always be put into correspondence with the results of the 
 other.”314 
Since there is no perfectly consistent model to explain the distribution of case forms and case 
functions without producing incoherencies, there is neither a single taxonomy defined by 
academic linguistics for specific languages, nor are distributional considerations the only 
technique in linguistic analysis. The high distributional complexity of languages, which reflects 
the speakers’ or writers’ usage of the language’s lexical, grammatical, stylistic, etc. inventory, 
naturally provokes competing results in linguistic analysis. There is often dissent about the 
types of use of a certain grammatical case morpheme, whether to capture them in terms of 
syntactic or semantic relations and whether to accept a case’s multifunctionality or to abstract 
a Gesamtbedeutung, etc. Also the boundaries of the different case functions are often difficult 
to define, which allows for competing taxonomies. What in one theory is classified as a 
syntactic relation due to its high standardization across semantically heterogeneous 
environments might perhaps be traced back to a homogeneous semantic category in another 
model through the abstraction of different semantic parameters. Also the language in use itself 
impedes a fully conclusive distributional mapping of syntactic elements, since their distribution 
in a language is not always consistent, as is evident in WT, where la and du may be identified 
as two separate morphemes, but the allomorph -r still belongs to both of them.315 Moroever, 
local variations and peculiar uses by certain authors or speakers increase the difficulties to arrive 
at a definitive representation of a language’s syntax – and attempts at tracing regularities across 
languages makes the whole story even more shambolic.  
It was stated above that case grammar, especially in the context of descriptive grammar, is 
concerned with a representative explanation or description of a language’s morphosyntactic 
surface structure. This excursus has demonstrated a few important distinctions, such as the 
distinction of case forms and case functions as well as different types of case functions 
dependent on the behavior of the morphemes and the information expressed by them. This 
reasoning has also touched upon the intricate yet crucial difference between morphosyntactic 
surface structure, underlying semantic structure and the actual situation or phenomenon referred 
                                                          
314 Harris 1963, 6. 
315 Cf. Tournadre 2010, 97. 
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to. Finally, it has also engaged in the issue of distributional methodology and the task of arriving 
at an accurate representation of a language’s morphosyntax. There exists a variety of competing 
models that offer different ways of distinguishing between surface and underlying deep 
structure, as much as there are different theories on the relation of case forms, case functions 
and semantic roles. Consequently, also the boundaries of syntax, semantics, etc. may differ 
significantly in grammatical analysis. Without going into their respective details, the terms and 
techniques outlined above are intended here for a refined awareness of the general problems 
involved in linguistic analysis against the backdrop of its general purpose in modern research 
and the resulting methodologies. What has been revealed in the process is that any adequate 
and accurate representation of a language’s syntax cannot contradict or go against the language-
specific morphosyntactic structures on the surface level as it is directly manifest in the sentence; 
and even if other methodologies are applied which focus more on the underlying structures, the 
outcome must not contradict the morphosyntactic surface structure of the language. 
5.3 The Derivation of Linguistic Expressions in Tibetan Grammar 
“The fundament of all [Buddhist] teachings, 
the cause of the proclamation of the Vedas, 
the basis for expressing all lexical word forms and syntactic forms, 
the application of letters will be taught.”316 
This opening declaration (dam bca’) of the Sum cu pa articulates in most basic terms the very 
essence of linguistic studies (sgra rig, śabdavidyā), including grammar (sum rtags, brda sprod, 
lung du ston pa, vyākaraṇa), as it was widely understood in the Tibetan tradition: the mastery 
of language amounts to the knowledge of the single operation of applying letters or phonemes 
(yi ge, vyañjana) to each other. This highly analytical approach to grammar and linguistics is 
rooted in the trikāya model (‘three groups/collections’) of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa, 
                                                          
316 bslab pa kun gyi gzhi ’dzin cing//     rig byed smra ba rnams kyi rgyu//     ming tshig brjod pa kun gyi gzhi//     
yi ge’i sbyor ba bshad par bya// (SCP 3.1-4)  
The term brjod pa, which I translated as a nominalized verb attributed to ming and tshig in the meaning of 
‘expressing’, could be alternatively interpreted as ‘sentence’ as a reference to Sanskrit vākya. The application of 
letters would then be “the basis of all lexical word forms (ming), syntactic forms (tshig) and sentences (brjod 
pa).” Although this second version would make totally sense from a linguistic perspective, it is, in my view, 
historically problematic. This verse makes reference to the Abhidharmic tshogs gsum model that only consists of 
the three constituents yi ge, ming and tshig. While authors such as Si tu modified this triad and added brjod pa as 
another layer of syntactic expression that represents a combination of tshig (cf. chapter 5.3.3), in the more 
common Tibetan interpretation of the tshogs gsum model that is already attested in the NG tshig is defined as 
ming ’dus pa (‘collection of ming’) and thus covers sentences as well (cf. infra 125f.). Under the condition that 
presentations of tshig like that in NG are representative, brjod pa cannot refer to sentences and thus must express 
its normal lexical value ‘to express’, in which way it also fits well with the term smra ba in the preceding verse 
line. 
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which was adopted and absorbed by the Tibetan linguistic tradition far beyond the quoted Sum 
cu pa to an extent that one cannot but think of it as almost all-pervasive. The analysis of 
linguistic expressions into letters or phonemes (yi ge, vyañjana), names – or more precisely 
denotative-lexical words (ming, nāma) – and syntactic forms (tshig, pada) constitutes the most 
basic framework in Tibetan grammatical analysis and also served as an important organizational 
principle in grammatical works such as Dpang Lotsāwa’s Tshogs gsum gsal ba (TshSS; 
‘Elucidation of the Three Collections’). 
The above opening declaration of the SCP already alludes to a very specific understanding of 
the three collections and their relation, namely that ultimately any kind of linguistic expression 
may be split into its component parts until we arrive at the level of letters or phonemes which 
cannot be further subdivided. From this perspective, all linguistic expressions, either 
syntactically free and unbound word forms (ming) of merely lexical-denotative value or any 
syntactic form (tshig) that expresses information in addition to a word’s lexical meaning (e.g. 
marked word forms other than a first case, phrases, subclauses or entire sentences), are nothing 
but the combination of letters. Their alteration, for example through addition, elision or 
substitution, is what governs the meaning and the structure of linguistic utterances. While this 
hierarchical taxonomy for the derivation of linguistic expressions presents itself in a rather 
straightforward and intuitive fashion, a closer look at its details nevertheless raises a few 
pertinent questions of historical and linguistic character that will be addressed in this 
subchapter. First, it will be shown that Sanskritic grammar includes a competing derivational 
system that can be traced back as early as to Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī. The most pressing issue seems 
to be the terminological overlap of the term pada (tshig) that has been used in both models, the 
Abhidharmic and the Sanskrit grammatical. Although both versions of pada in one way or 
another refer to ‘syntactic forms’ of linguistic expression, they also represent almost entirely 
different interpretations of the term. This fact is of particular interest for the current chapter, 
since case grammar in the Sanskritic tradition was originally based in the Pāṇinian mode of 
grammatical analysis rather than the Abhidharmic theories of language.  
The following questions therefore arise from the above: how did Sanskritic and Tibetan scholars 
negotiate these two models in view of the substantial discrepancies between them? To which 
extent were the Tibetan grammarians aware of the differences between the two models? What 
are the ramifications of the Tibetan grammatical conversion from Sanskrit grammatical to 
Abhidharmic derivational models for Tibetan case grammar? And how should references to 
pada (tshig) in quotations such as SCP 3.1-4 be understood? Finally, the presentation of 
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derivational models in Sanskritic and Tibetan grammaticography will also serve as a 
prerequisite for an investigation of the first case, where it will be proposed that some of the 
terminological framework prevalent in the Tibetan interpretation of the tshogs gsum entered the 
conceptualization of the first case. 
5.3.1 Two Competing Sanskritic Systems for the Derivation of Linguistic Expressions  
In Indian vyākaraṇa, case grammar is intimately related to the derivation of word forms or, 
more accurately, of complete, syntactically functioning and bound word forms that are known 
under the term pada. Technically, case grammar is one half of the derivation of padas in 
Sanskrit grammar, and if this is explained based on Pāṇini’s system, the following three rules 
of his Aṣṭādhyāyī are of particular interest: 
 P 1.4.14 suptiṅantaṃ padam “[A] pada [is that which either] ends [in a] nominal suffix 
 (sup) [or a] verbal suffix (tiṅ).” 
 P 1.2.45 arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ prātipadikam “[A] prātipadika [is that which is] 
 meaningful, neither a verbal root (dhātu) nor a suffix (pratyaya).” 
 P 1.3.1 bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ “[A] dhātu [is] bhū (‘to be’) etc.” 
This set of rules dispersed in the first book defines three key terms that govern the derivation 
of padas in Pāṇini’s derivational system. Confining this examination to the very basics required 
for the current context, the most important rule is P 1.4.14, which defines pada as that which 
either ends in nominal (sup) or verbal suffixes (tiṅ). In other words, only those word forms that 
are marked by either of these two mutually exclusive sets of suffixes qualify as a pada. The 
class of sup-suffixes consist of 21 prototypical case suffixes which are listed in P 4.1.2. 
Although P 1.4.104 assigns the term vibhakti to both sets of suffixes, nominal (sup) and verbal 
(tiṅ) suffixes, it has become the generic term for the set of sup-suffixes in the subsequent Indian 
grammatical tradition and throughout the different schools, and thus vibhakti is usually rendered 
with the term ‘case’ or ‘case suffix’ as its closest English equivalent. Without ending in either 
a sup- or a tiṅ-suffix, a word form is incomplete and unable to participate in a sentence. 
According to the Pāṇinian system, even indeclinables and particles that do not take any 
separable suffix are considered padas, since Pāṇini treated them as suffixed and thus complete 
padas that subsequently undergo the grammatical operation of suffix elision.317  
                                                          
317 Cf. Abhyankar 1986, 233. For an example of such an elision, cf. P 2.4.82. 
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An important feature of this definition of pada is that it distinguishes two basic types of word 
classes, namely nominal forms and verbal forms which may be distinguished through the two 
sets of suffixes. Accordingly, there are two separate types of word forms to which these two 
sets may be joined, i.e. prātipadika and dhātu. While prātipadika is defined in negative terms 
as a meaningful entity (arthavat) that is neither a dhātu nor a suffix (pratyaya) (P 1.2.45),318 
dhātu is defined through reference to a list of base forms that starts with bhū (‘to be,’ ‘become’) 
and is entitled Dhātupāṭha.319 In simple terms, both refer to incomplete, free or syntactically 
unbound base forms that convey a word’s lexical value, with prātipadika referring to nominal 
stems that may be affixed with the case suffixes (sup or vibhakti) and dhātu referring to verbal 
roots that take tiṅ-endings. The distinction into nominal and verbal forms as well as the 
distinction into base forms and suffixes for each of the two word classes constitutes the very 
foundation of the Sanskrit derivational model in the field of grammar and thus of the entire 
grammatical system. Regarding case grammar, the basic derivation is as follows: 
prātipadika + sup = pada 
Example: 
brāhmaṇa + as = brāhmaṇāḥ ‘the brahmins’ (NOM.PL) 
The exact Pāṇinian derivation of the form brāhmaṇāḥ is more complex than presented above 
and involves additional morphological as well as text-internal technical operations,320 yet the 
basic procedure to apply a case suffix to a stem form remains the foundation. The precise 
nomenclature as well as the precise derivational procedure may vary throughout the 
grammatical schools,321 but the basic scheme above has been retained within the entire field of 
Sanskrit grammar. 
Turning now to Buddhist philosophy, the prominent Abhidharmakośa (AK) and its Bhāṣya 
(AKBh), both attributed to Vasubandhu (4th-5th century), have proposed a threefold 
                                                          
318 Note that pratyaya (‘suffix’) includes more than sup and tiṅ, since there exist a variety of other morphemes 
that are subsumed under the category of suffixes in classical Sanskrit grammar (cf. Abhyankar 1986, 265). This 
does not change the fact, however, that any intra-sentential word form requires to end in either an actual or 
elided sup or tiṅ-suffix in Pāṇini’s grammar. 
319 Note that grammatical schools such Pāṇini or Cāndra usually have their own Dhātupāṭhas. On the definition 
of dhātu in P 1.3.1, its discussion in Sanskritic commentarial literature, as well as issues related to it, cf. Ogawa 
2005. 
320 Cf. Sharma 1990, 512f. 
321 Cf. e.g. Kātantra 2.1.1, which substituted the term prātipadika with liṅga. 
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classification of linguistic expressions that stands in contrast to the grammarians’ understanding 
of the technical term pada:322 
AK 2.47 a-b:  
 nāmakāyādayaḥ saṃjñāvākyākṣarasamuktayaḥ 
 “nāmakāya, etc., are the groups of saṃjñā, vākya, and akṣara.”323 
AKBh on AK 2.47 a-b: 
 ādigrahaṇena padavyañjanakāyagrahaṇam/ tatra saṃjñākaraṇaṃ nāma, tad yathā 
 rūpaṃ śabda ity evam ādi/ ‘vākyaṃ padam’, yāvatā ’rthaparisamāptiḥ/ tad yathā anityā 
 bata saṃskārā ity evam ādi/ yena kriyā-guṇa-kāla-sambandha-viśeṣā gamyante/  
 “The word ‘etc.’ denotes padakāya and vyañjanakāya. Among these [groups which are 
 mentioned in the kārikā], nāman is the same as saṃjñākaraṇa, as when we say ‘colour’, 
 ‘sound’, etc. [By] ‘vākya’ [mentioned in the kārikā,] [we mean] pada [by which term 
 we do not mean a ‘word’, but a set of words, used] in so far as a meaning (idea?) is 
 brought to complete expression. For instance: ‘impermanent are the saṃskāras’, etc. [A 
 pada is defined as that] by which the specific relations of action, quality, and time are 
 known.”324 
In most simple terms, Vasubandhu distinguishes three groups or collections (kāya) fundamental 
to human linguistic utterances, namely vyañjana (‘letter,’ ‘phoneme’), nāma (‘name’) and pada 
(lit. ‘word;’ i.e. ‘linguistic expression higher than single, unspecified word forms’). In order to 
clarify their meaning, AK and AKBh provide alternative and less technical terms for each of 
these three groups: the group of vyañjana is also referred to as akṣara (‘alphabetical letter’), 
nāma is identified with saṃjñā (‘term,’ ‘definition,’ ‘name,’ ‘idea’) and pada with vākya (lit. 
‘speech;’ i.e. ‘sentence’).  
Of particular interest for the current topic of Tibetan case grammar are nāma and pada. AKBh 
defines nāma as saṃjñākaraṇa, which, following Yaśomitra’s Sphuṭārthā commentary on 
                                                          
322 The following quotations of the AK and AKBh have been already discussed by Simonsson (1982A) in his 
investigation into the Tibetan grammatical tradition and its use of the Abhidharmic tshogs gsum (trīkāya) model. 
Although his argumentation follows a different direction than the present dissertation, I draw from his approach 
to contrast Abhidharmic and Sanskrit grammatical derivational models as well as theories of the sentence (vākya, 
ngag/brjod pa). Therefore, the following quotations are for the bigger part quoted from and transl. by Simonsson 
(1982A). For a comparison of Sanskrit grammatical and Abhidharmic derivational models in the context of 
Tibetan grammaticography, cf. also HSGLT 2, 240ff. 
323 AK 2.47 a-b, quoted from and transl. by Simonsson 1982A, 538. 
324 AKBh on AK 2.47 a-b, quoted from and transl. by Simonsson 1982A, 538 and 540. 
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AKBh, should be understood as everyday language and thus a synonym (paryāya) for 
nāmadheya (‘name,’ ‘appellation,’ ‘designation’), just like a person may be called Devadatta.325 
Consequently, designations such as ‘colour,’ ‘sound,’ etc. constitute the group of nāma. We 
can assume that Vasubandhu’s concise definition aimed at the rather direct, intuitively 
comprehensible idea that words such as ‘colour’ or ‘sound’ as such have a denotative power 
through which phenomena can be referred to. In this sense, they stand in proximity to the 
expression of lexical information similar to Sanskrit grammatical stem forms. However, 
AK(Bh) does not add further considerations about the precise morphosyntactic nature of nāma, 
and the two examples (rupam and śabdaḥ) are fully inflected nouns in the first case singular. 
From the perspective of the mere denotative-semantic value of nāma, these examples 
nonetheless fall together with the Sanskrit grammatical prātipadika (‘nominal stem’), since 
grammars like that of Pāṇini, Cāndra or Kātantra define the first case as that which expresses 
the mere meaning of the nominal stem.326 Vasubandhu’s choice to use fully inflected word 
forms (= grammatical pada) rather than stem forms may be due to the fact that the latter are 
incomplete word forms, i.e. theoretical abstractions in grammatical analysis that do not exist in 
the actual language.327 Against the backdrop of Sanskrit grammatical definitions of the first 
case function, it seems most likely that nāma is indeed restricted to nominal word forms (noun 
substantives, nominalizations, etc.) in the nominative case form, since in Sanskrit syntax only 
this word form is confined to the denotative function assigned by Vasubandhu to nāma as 
saṃjñākaraṇa. However, the following questions should still be kept in mind for the subsequent 
investigation: Do base forms qualify as nāma? And do only nominal word forms in the 
nominative qualify as nāma, or also other word forms such as verbs? 
In contrast, a pada is defined as a sentence (vākya), more particularly a linguistic expression 
with complete meaning (arthaparisamāpti) and through which relations of action, qualities and 
time are specified (kriyāguṇakālasambandhaviśeṣā). The single example ‘impermanent are the 
saṃskāras’ (anityā bata saṃskārāḥ) is apparently a specification of the type guṇa (‘quality’), 
assuming that saṃskārāḥ as a nominative plural form is that which is specified. Although 
Vasubandhu remains silent on this point, the implication seems to be that this nominative plural 
                                                          
325 Cf. ibid., 539. 
326 The difference between nominal stem and word form in the nominative is thus not the expressed semantic 
information, but their respective syntactic value. While stem forms are incomplete, syntactically non-functioning 
word forms, first case forms are in congruence with the finite verb. This latter value was presumably not in the 
focus of Vasubandhu’s definition. For more information on the syntactic value of the Sanskrit first case suffix as 
well as Sanskritic conceptions of the first case function, cf. infra 142f. and 150f. 
327 In contrast, c.f. e.g. infra 145 on the examples of the Tibetan scholar Dpang Lotsāwa for nāma that include 
Sanskrit nominal stem forms. 
 117 
 
is a nāma that may then take certain additional word forms (nominal, verbal, etc. with different 
nominal and verbal inflections) as specifiers to form a pada (= vākya). Already the Indian 
commentator Yaśomitra, in his commentary on AK 2.47 a-b and AKBh, has sharply observed 
that this definition of pada is substantially different from pada as understood by Sanskrit 
grammarians: 
 padaṃ tu suptiṅantaṃ padaṃ gr̥hyate/ tenātha ‘yāvatārthaparisamāptis tad yathā 
 anityā bata saṃskārāḥ ity evam ādi’ iti/ ādiśabdena utpādavyayadharmiṇaḥ, utpadya 
 hi nirudhyante, teṣāṃ vyupaśamaḥ sukham ity evam ādi/ 
 “Pada is [usually, by the grammarians,] taken [in the meaning of] that which has a 
 nominal or verbal ending. Therefore [i.e. in order to preclude this interpretation] the 
 author says: ‘in so far as a meaning (idea?) is brought to complete expression. For 
 instance: impermanent are the saṃskāras, etc.’ By ‘etc.’ [the rest of Śakra’s words are 
 meant]: having as attributes birth and decay, for having been born they die; their 
 cessation is happiness. And so on.”328 
A pada here is no longer a stem form that ends in sup or tiṅ and represents a syntactically 
functioning word form, but that which brings about complete meaning through specifying 
relationships of action, etc. in sentences such as ‘impermanent are the saṃskāras, etc.’ (anityā 
bata saṃskārā ity evam ādi). Yaśomitra was well aware that Vasubandhu’s illustration of pada 
was a partial quotation of the first verse (following two verses of homage) from the 
Udānavarga, which he did not hesitate to complete: 
anityā bata saṃskārā utpādavyayadharmiṇaḥ, 
utpadya hi nirudhyante, teṣāṃ vyupaśamaḥ sukham. 
We can thus assume that this is one example for a pada in its fullest sense of vākya as defined 
in AK(Bh), and there is no need to spend more time on the question what is involved in the 
condition of arthaparisamāpti (‘completeness of meaning’),329 an intricate issue that may be 
discussed elsewhere. Of more interest in our case is that Yaśomitra not only contrasts the two 
different notions of pada in Sanskritic grammar and AK(Bh), but he also goes on to compare 
the AKBh’s definition of pada as vākya (‘sentence’) with the definition of a sentence in the 
grammarian Kātyāyana’s Vārttika 9 on P 2.1.1: 
                                                          
328 Quoted from and transl. by Simonsson 1982A, 541. 
329 Cf. ibid., 540. 
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 sāvyayakārakaviśeṣaṇaṃ vākyam iti vākyavido vadanti/ tad yathā pacati paṭhati 
 gacchatīti, kr̥ṣṇo gauro raktaḥ iti, pacati pakṣyaty apākṣīd iti kriyā-guṇa-kālānāṃ 
 sambandhaviśeṣā gamyante tat padam/ 
 “The [Pāṇinian] experts on vākya say that vākya [sentence] is what has indeclinable 
 words  and kāraka as qualifiers. [But according to Vasubandhu,] that is pada, whereby 
 are known specific relations connected with action: e.g., is cooking, is reading, is going 
 – with  quality: e.g., black, white, red – and with time: e.g. is cooking, will be cooking, 
 has cooked.”330 
As we can read in Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya, the explicit definition of a sentence appears to be a 
novelty of Kātyāyana’s work, since Pāṇini did not include any such definition.331 Yaśomitra 
does not quote Kātyāyana’s full definition, and he omitted perhaps its most important part, 
namely the term ākhyāta (‘verbal form,’ ‘finite verb’): 
 ākhyātaṃ sāvyayakārakaviśeṣaṇaṃ vākyam “A sentence is a finite verb qualified by 
 avyayas (indeclinables) and kārakas.”332 
Due to this omission, Yaśomitra’s quotation of Kātyāyana’s definition may not be wrong, but 
it is certainly somewhat misleading. A sentence is indeed that which has qualifiers (Yaśomitra), 
namely indeclinables and kārakas, yet it is the verb which is qualified in Kātyāyana’s definition. 
In Vārttika 10 on P 2.1.1, Kātyāyana also gives a well-known second definition of a sentence 
that emphasizes the importance of the verb: 
 ekatiṅ “[A sentence is that which has] one [word form ending in] tiṅ.” 
In other words, a sentence is that which has a finite verb; and according to the first definition 
not only a finite verb, but one that is or may be further qualified by kārakas. In contrast, AKBh 
states that a sentence is that through which specifications such as action or qualities are to be 
understood, and it seems to be a central nāma in the nominative case form that is specified. 
Therefore, there is a discrepancy between the grammarians and Vasubandhu concerning the 
point whether a verb, i.e. that argument of the sentence that typically expresses the action, is 
                                                          
330 Quoted from and transl. by Simonsson 1982A, 541f. 
331 Cf. Deshpande 2009, 113. This is reasonable due to the fact that Pāṇini’s grammar is entirely confined to a 
perspective that focuses on the individual derivation of padas. Although it seems to be surprising, how syntactic 
topics such as case grammar can be adequately treated without any clear notion of a sentence, it has been argued 
in modern academia that he could dispense with any explicit concept of the sentence due to the requirement of 
sāmarthya (‘semantic-syntactic fitness’) that governs the derivation of word forms (cf. Roodbergen 1974, iv). On 
the notion of sāmarthya, cf. also Deshpande 1991, esp. 32f.; Deshpande 2009, 111ff.; Cardona 2004, 194. 
332 Cf. Deshpande 2009, 113. 
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viśeṣya (‘qualificand,’ for the grammarians) or viśeṣa (‘qualification,’ for Vasubandhu) in a 
sentence.333  
Yet, Yaśomitra does not stop here and continues with his comparison of AK(Bh) and 
grammatical theories of the sentence, next quoting Patañjali on Kātyāyana’s Vārttika 4 in the 
context of P 1.2.45: 
 tathā hi sāmānye vartamānānāṃ padānāṃ yad viśeṣe ’vasthānam sa vākyārtha ity āhuḥ/ 
 tad evaṃ svalakṣaṇābhidyotakaṃ nāma kriyādisambandhaviśeṣābhiyotakaṃ padam ity 
 uktaṃ bhavati/ 
 “Thus, it is said [by Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya on P 1.2.45 that] ‘the sentence meaning 
 represents the particularization (= contextualization) of [the meanings of] these words 
 which otherwise have generic [= uncontextualized, lexical] meanings.’ Likewise, it is 
 said [by Vasubandhu] that that which indicates a svalakṣaṇa is nāma [and] that which 
 indicates a specification of relations of action, etc. is pada.”334  
Patañjali’s statement on the particularization of word forms with otherwise generic meaning is 
part of his exposition of P 1.2.45 and its definition of prātipadika (‘nominal stem’), more 
particularly its feature of being arthavat (‘meaningful’).335 If arthavat specifies prātipadika, 
there is the definitory problem that also linguistic expressions of a higher hierarchy, such as the 
collection of words into meaningful sentences, would likewise qualify as prātipadika. This 
issue sets the starting point for a more voluminous and excessive discussion of the attribute 
arthavat in different contexts such as stem forms, other word forms, sentences and even letters, 
in order to clarify their respective meaningfulness or meaninglessness and consequently to 
distinguish them from prātipadika and its arthavat. This discussion has also included the 
question, whether the meaning of sentences as collections of words (samudāya) is exhaustively 
constituted through the meaning of the individual words in a sentence, or whether its meaning 
goes beyond that of the individual words. As hinted at in the part quoted by Yaśomitra, Patañjali 
                                                          
333 Cf. also Simonsson 1982A, 542, although his argument goes into a different direction. If I understand 
Simonsson correctly, this difference of the verb’s status in the sentence amounts for him to the difference 
between a verb-centered theory of the sentence vs. a noun-centered system – the latter which he also attributes to 
Tibetan Sum rtags (cf. ibid., 531): 
 grammarians:  viśeṣya = ākhyāta  viśeṣa = kārakas, etc.  
 AK(Bh): viśeṣya = nāma    viśeṣa = kriyā, etc.  
334 Sanskrit quoted from Simonsson 1982A, 542; transl. of Patañjali’s portion by Deshpande 2009, 115. 
335 For P 1.2.45, cf. supra 113. For Patañjali’s exposition of P 1.2.45, cf. the translation of MBh in Subrahmanya 
1956, 80ff. 
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accepts that a sentence’s meaning not only includes the meaning of its individual parts but also 
the interrelation between them covered by their particularization.  
Yaśomitra apparently used this quotation for the attempt to at least partially reconcile the two 
competing models of the grammarians and Vasubandhu. He seems to mediate between 
Vasubandhu’s nāma and Patañjali’s sāmānye vartamāna pada through the 
svalakṣaṇābhidyotaka (‘clarification/indication of the self-characteristic [of a real 
phenomenon]’) as well as between Vasubandhu’s pada and Patañjali’s viśeṣe ’vasthāni padāni 
through kriyādisambandhaviśeṣābhiyotaka (‘clarification/indication of a specification of 
relations of action etc.’): 
nāma (Vasubandhu) = svalakṣaṇābhidyotaka (Yaśomitra) ~ sāmānye vartamāna pada  
           (Patañjali) 
pada (Vasubandhu) = kriyādisambandhaviśeṣābhiyotaka (Vasubandhu and Yaśomitra) ~ 
        viśeṣe ’vasthāni padāni (Patañjali) 
Nāma as that which denotes a self-characteristic (‘svalakṣaṇa’) does not figure in the AK or 
AKBh and is thus an addition, possibly by Yaśomitra himself. The idea of an unspecified self-
characteristic indicated by nāma comes close to Patañjali’s idea of an unspecified, generic 
meaning of a pada (sāmānye vartamāna pada). Furthermore, it is clear from the basic 
grammatical derivational maxim – namely nominal/verbal stem + sup/tiṅ = pada – that 
Patañjali’s word forms that express generic, lexical meanings (sāmānye vartamāna pada) must 
refer to prātipadika and dhātu, whereas their particularized form (viśeṣe ’vasthāni padāni) 
represents grammatical pada, i.e. suffixed, completed, syntactically fitting and functioning 
word forms. Yaśomitra’s comparison thus brings grammatical base forms (prātipadika and 
dhātu) in close proximity to Vasubandhu’s nāma, a strategy which is indeed reasonable from 
the point of view that both represent word forms with pure denotative-lexical value from a 
semantic perspective. However, a direct association of nāma and base forms is not necessarily 
suggested by AK(Bh), which illustrates nāma by means of fully inflected word forms.336 The 
congruence of nāma and base forms therefore remains on a semantic level, yet not with regard 
to intrasentential morphosyntactic operations of any kind. Moreover, the inconsistency remains 
that Patañjali’s sāmānye vartamāna pada must refer to both base forms, nominal (prātipadika) 
and verbal (dhātu), whereas Vasubandhu did not explicate the inclusion of verbs in nāma, the 
latter being more likely confined to nominative nominal forms.  
                                                          
336 Cf. supra 115. 
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In contrast, the connection between Vasubandhu’s and Patañjali’s notions of a sentence is even 
less intuitive. While the idea of a sentence as that which contains specifications (viśeṣa) 
resonates with both conceptions, the respective natures of these specifications diverge 
significantly. In the context of grammar, Patañjali’s specification/particularization must refer 
to suptiṅantaṃ padam (P 1.4.14), in the sense that nominal and verbal base forms with generic 
meanings are specified in a sentence through the application of suffixes that particularize this 
very meaning. In the Abhidharmic context, only one nāma in the sentence is specified through 
quality, action and time. This specification does not refer to any grammatical markers but to the 
remaining parts of the sentence apart from the central nāma. Moreover, the term pada in MBh 
only refers separately to each particularized word which then form a sentence (vākya) together 
consisting of these several padas, whereas Vasubandhu refers to the entirety of the sentence 
(vākya) as one pada.  
The Abhidharmic notion of pada as a sentence that specifies a central argument by means of 
action, etc. raises the question of the relationship of case grammar to the trīkāya model. 
Obviously, the cases cannot be part of either vyañjana or nāma, since they require linguistic 
expressions of a higher order than either meaningless letters or single, free and unbound 
designations (= lexical word forms). Although the case model must therefore belong to the 
domain of Abhidharmic pada, the presentations of pada in AK(Bh) and the Sphuṭārthā focus 
on the criteria arthaparisamāpti and kriyāguṇakālasambandhaviśeṣā that have only limited 
explanatory power with regard to the grammatical operation of the affixation of case suffixes 
in Sanskrit. It may be expected that the completeness of meaning (arthaparisamāpti) as well as 
the reference to connections (sambandha) somehow relates to the idea of intrasentential syntax, 
but nowhere was this further elaborated and put into a more systematic and consistent model 
for the derivation of word forms and grammatical structures as it was done in grammatical 
sources. In the form it was formulated in the Sanskrit Abhidharmic sources quoted above, it 
should therefore be concluded that the trīkāya-model has only limited utility in the context of a 
more thorough analysis of case grammar. In that sense, the two competing notions of pada are 
both syntactic entities or forms, yet of very different natures. 
Although much more could be said about the definition of pada and the theory of the sentence 
in the works of Kātyāyana, Patañjali and Vasubandhu as well as about the possible implications, 
problems and ramifications of Yaśomitra’s comparison, we have now already arrived at a basic 
terminological-conceptual framework which includes a certain tension between grammatical 
and Abhidharmic models of linguistic derivation. This background is sufficient for our current 
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purpose of investigating derivational models in Tibetan grammaticography and their relation to 
the eight classical Tibetan cases. Therefore, we may now turn directly to the question how 
Tibetan scholars north of the Himalaya revisited and renegotiated this framework in the context 
of the fields of Buddhist philosophy and linguistics, and where in this process the Tibetan 
grammarians have located case grammar.  
5.3.2 Renditions of the two Models in Tibetan Scholarship  
In the Tibetan tradition in general, the trīkāya model proposed in AK 2.47 is known as the 
notion of tshogs gsum (‘three collections,’ ‘three groups’), a direct translation of the Sanskrit 
term. The respective groups of vyañjana, nāma and pada have also been adopted and rendered 
through the Tibetan terms yi ge (‘letter’), ming (‘name,’ ‘designation’) and tshig (‘word,’ 
‘phrase’). Although the triad yi ge, ming and tshig is certainly the most well-known version, 
vākya (‘sentence’) as AK’s interpretation of pada is typically translated with ngag (‘speech,’ 
‘sentence’) in Tibetan Buddhist as well as linguistic literature. 
The Tibetan commentarial literature on Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa is very elaborate, and 
thus we should not assume full consensus in the presentation of AK 2.47. One relatively early 
commentary that has attained general authority across the different branches of Tibetan 
Buddhism is Mchims ’Jam pa’i dbyangs’s (~ 13th century) famous work Chos mngon mdzod 
kyi tshig le’ur byas pa’i ’grel pa mngon pa’i rgyan, also known under the epithet Mchims chen. 
On the two collections ming (‘name, designation’) and ngag or tshig we can read the following: 
 de la ming ni don gyi ngo bo brjod par byed pa ste gzugs zhes pa lta bu’o/     ngag ni 
 tshig ste don gyi khyad par ston pa kye ma ’dus byas rnams mi rtag ces bya ba la sogs 
 ba’am/     bstan du med la thogs pa dang bcas pa’i gzugs zhes bya ba lta bu ji tsam gyis 
 don yongs su rdzogs pa (ra ston pa bstan bcos la sogs pa) ste/     tshig gang gis lhas 
 byin (dkar sham) ’gro zhes ba la sogs pa’i bya ba dang/     kha dog dkar sham la sogs 
 pa’i yon tan dang/     btsos so ’tshed do ’tshed par ’gyur ro zhes pa la sogs pa (ngo bo 
 dang yon tan dang bya ba dang) dus kyi ’brel ba’i khyad par rtogs par ’gyur ro/ 
 “As regards ming, it expresses the essence of a meaning (don gyi ngo bo) as in ‘form’ 
 (gzugs). As regards a  sentence (ngag) it is tshig. [This] is the indication of a 
 qualification/specification of [that] meaning (don gyi khyad par), a full completion of 
 the meaning to the extent [of that qualification] as in ‘Oh, impermanent are the 
 saṃskāras (’dus byas)’ or ‘the form which cannot be indicated and is endowed with 
 resistance’ [A sentence is] any tshig, by which [the meaning’s] qualification [in terms] 
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 of connections of action, such as ‘Devadatta goes’ (lhas byin ’gro), qualities, such as 
 ‘pure colour’ (kha dog bkar sham), or time, such as ‘having cooked,’ ‘cooking,’ ‘will 
 be cooking’ (btsos so, ’tsed do,’tsed par ’gyur ro), is comprehended.”337 
The basic definition of ming is don gyi ngo bo brjod par byed pa (‘expressing the essence of a 
meaning’, ‘expressing the essential meaning,’ or ‘expressing the semantic essence’ ?) and that 
of ngag or tshig is don gyi khyad par ston pa (‘indicating the qualification/specification of a 
meaning’ or ‘indicating a semantic specification’ ?): 
 ming = don gyi ngo bo brjod par byed pa 
 tshig = don gyi khyad par ston pa 
This directly resonates with Yaśomitra’s terminology of svalakṣaṇābhidyotaka and 
viśeṣābhiyotaka that he used to characterize nāma and pada respectively, although at least the 
notion of viśeṣa equally figures in AKBh and Yaśomitra’s quotation of Patañjali.338 Mchims 
’Jam pa’i dbyangs provides one example for ming, namely gzugs (‘form’), to illustrate the form 
of such an expression of a meaning’s essence. A ming and thus expression of the essence of a 
meaning (don gyi ngo bo) appears to be a direct reference to the designated object or 
phenomenon without any indication of further information (e.g. syntactic). Judging from 
Sanskrit svalakṣaṇābhidyotaka, this reference is intimately related to the designated object’s 
self-characteristc. In the definition of tshig as the qualification of a meaning (don gyi khyad 
par), the Mchims chen also adopts the feature of arthaparisamāpti (‘completeness of meaning,’ 
don yongs su rdzogs pa) and interprets the notion of a qualification (viśeṣa, khyad par) – 
naturally following from AKBh – in terms of action, quality and time. The original quotation 
of AKBh from the Udānavarga to illustrate pada qua vākya, i.e. ‘impermanent are the 
saṃskāras, etc.’ (kye ma ’dus byas rnams mi rtag ces bya ba la sogs ba), was retained in the 
Tibetan commentary and accompanied by the second example ‘that form which cannot be 
indicated and is endowed with resistance’ (bstan du med la thogs pa dang bcas pa’i gzugs). 
This second example emphasizes that gzugs, Mchims chen’s example for ming, is that which is 
further qualified through qualities, etc. The Mchims chen therefore fully adheres to the 
                                                          
337 Mchims ’Jam pa’i dbyangs 2004, 156. 
Note that the three brackets in the Tibetan text are annotations inserted by the author (or scribe/editor?) into the 
main commentary. This practice was followed throughout the entire commentary. In the quoted passage, I 
omitted them in the translation. For a digital block print version, cf. “chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi rnam par bshad 
pa'i mngon pa'i rgyan zhes bya ba stod cha'i dkar chag.” In bka' gdams gsung 'bum phyogs bsgrigs thengs gsum 
pa/. TBRC W1PD153536. 23: 7 - 8. khreng tu'u/: si khron dpe skrun tshogs pa/ si khron mi rigs dpe skrun 
khang/, 2009. http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O1PD153536|O1PD153536C2O0217$W1PD153536 (accessed March 
21st, 2017) 
338 Cf. supra 115 and 119. 
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Abhidharmic version of a syntactic form (tshig) that is a synthetic expression consisting of more 
than one word form. 
Mchims ’Jam pa’i dbyangs does not seem to have added substantial new aspects to the materials 
in the Sanskritic sources discussed above, and he adhered mostly to Yaśomitra’s rendition of 
nāma and pada without further comparison to grammatical theories as found in the Sphuṭārthā. 
Related questions have not been further addressed, such as whether nāma is restricted only to 
genuine nouns as indicated by the examples in the Sanskritic and Tibetan sources, or whether 
vākya’s parameter of completeness refers to some notion of complete sentences – e.g. the 
requirement of an explicit or implicit verb – or more generally only to complete meaningful 
syntactic entities such as in Mchims chen’s second example. 
Although in the field of grammar and linguistics we might expect that Sanskrit grammatical 
models of word formation and derivation as well as notions of the sentence should have become 
more important than the very general conception of linguistic expressions in terms of individual 
phonemes/letters, denotative lexical words and sentences of Buddhist Abhidharmic literature, 
quite the opposite is true: it is the latter that figures much more prominently in Tibetan 
autochthonous grammatical literature. 339  One reason for this must have been the general 
importance of Buddhist Abhidharma in Tibetan Buddhist scholarship, some of which may be 
assumed also to have permeated into the field of grammar, since the tshogs gsum model 
represents a linguistic theory that applies to linguistic expressions in general and thus also in 
the case of Tibetan. In addition, in his Mkhas ’jug, Sakya Pāṇdita alludes to the possibility that 
there may have also been linguistic reasons for the Tibetan grammarians to abstain from any 
direct application of the Sanskrit grammatical pada model: 
 su banta’i rkyen gyis sgra sgrub pa’i tshul ’di saṃ skrīta la shin tu dgos mod/     bod kyi 
 skad la mi dgos pa’i phyir re zhig gzhag go 
 “This system of accomplishing a word form (~ sgra sgrub pa) by means of the subanta-
 suffixes is very much required for Sanskrit, yet [I] ignore [it] for the time being, since 
 it has no need in Tibetan language.”340 
Sakya Pāṇdita makes this comment in the context of case grammar in general and the Sanskrit 
case suffixes in particular. If we are to speculate why he concludes that the subanta system, i.e. 
the system of nominal padas which end in one of the sup-suffixes, is not required in Tibetan, a 
                                                          
339 Without having looked deeper into it, one exception might be Tibetan contributions to Sanskrit-specific 
grammar, in which derivational models of the Sanskrit grammarians are usually adopted and applied.  
340 KhJ 2009, 24. 
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major reason is the fact that complete word forms in Tibetan do not require the application of 
case suffixes to stem forms. Unmarked words such as gzugs (‘form’) already represent complete 
and meaningful word forms that are not theoretical abstractions but can be either used on their 
own, in sentences as DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT/ABSOLUTIVE or also in sentences with 
copula.341 In the context of case grammar, the demarcation line between nominal stem forms 
and padas is therefore shifted in the Tibetan context. Apart from this, the fact that Tibetan 
language also does not contain a system of verbal suffixes comparable either to Sanskrit verbal 
inflection or the Tibetan system of case markers marks another major gap between the uniform 
and straightforward maxim suptiṅantaṃ padam (P 1.4.14) and Tibetan morphosyntax that 
would have required a more substantial adaption of Sanskritic grammatical models. 
It was therefore maybe not completely without linguistic reasons that Tibetan grammarians 
have rather followed the threefold distinction of linguistic expressions proposed in Abhidharmic 
literature. The perhaps earliest definition of the tshogs gsum preserved in Tibetan linguistic 
literature is contained in NG as part of its fifth topic number five (yi ge ’jug pa’i gnas, lit. ‘the 
topic of [where] letters/sounds/phonemes engage,’ i.e. ‘the topic of the domains pertaining to 
letters/sounds/phonemes’). Under the premise that letters or sounds form the smallest analytical 
component of any form of linguistic expression, this topic defines eight linguistic key terms for 
which the notion of yi ge is constitutive in one way or another.342 Although yi ge, ming and 
tshig have not been presented in topic five as the unified concept they represent in the 
Abhidharmic tshogs gsum (trīkāya) model, Lce Khyi ’brug had a clear idea of their unity, which 
is evident from his reference to the triad at the end of NG.343 In topic five, he defines ming and 
tshig in very brief terms: 
 ming ni chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid kyi tshig bla dwags te yi ge ’dus pa’i bdag nyid do/ 
 “Regarding ming, it is a designation (tshig bla dwags) of the essence of phenomena 
 (chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid), an entity of collected letters (yi ge ’dus pa’i bdag nyid).”344  
 tshig ni chos rnams kyi khyad par gyi tshig bla dwags yin te ming ’dus pa’i bdag nyid 
 can no/ 
                                                          
341 Although Tibetan grammarians did not associate unmarked word forms with any kind of intrasentential 
argument. The unmarked argument has been identified with the first case of the Tibetan case model, its syntactic 
value remaining mostly open in grammatical treatises (cf. chapter 7). 
342 These eight are as sgra (‘sound’), skad (‘language’), ming (‘name, free lexical word form’), mtshan ma 
(‘characteristic’), brda (‘linguistic sign, signifier’), tha snyad (‘term, definition’), tshig (‘phrase’, ‘sentence’ ?) 
and don (‘meaning, semantics’) 
343 Cf. supra 30. 
344 CT 115 – 410. 
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 “Regarding tshig, it is a designation (tshig bla dwags) of the specification/qualification 
 of phenomena (chos rnams kyi khyad par), an entity of collected ming (ming ’dus pa’i 
 bdag nyid can).”345 
Lce Khyi ’brug adhered to the basic Abhidharmic distinction of ming (nāma) and tshig (pada) 
as presented in Yaśomitra’s commentary based on svalakṣaṇa and viśeṣa. Comparing the 
account of Lce Khyi ’brug with the later Mchims chen, the former explicitly speaks of the 
‘essence of phenomena’ (chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid) and ‘specification of phenomena’ while 
the latter refers to don gyi ngo bo  (‘essence of a meaning’) and don gyi khyad par 
(‘specification/qualification of a meaning’).346 Lce Khyi ’brug is therefore unmistakably clear 
on the point that the term ‘essence’ (ngo bo) refers to the essence of the designated object and 
that any designation in terms of ming is a reference to the essence of the designated 
phenomenon; and likewise it is the phenomena that are specified in tshig. In his definition of 
tshig (pada), he mentions neither arthaparisamāpti (don yongs su rdzogs pa ‘completeness of 
meaning’) nor kriyāguṇakālasambandha (bya ba dang yon tan dang dus kyi ’brel ba 
‘connections of action, quality and time’). Instead, he adds another characterization of ming and 
tshig that is found neither in the quoted sections of AK(Bh) and Yaśomitra, nor in the Mchims 
chen, namely yi ge ’dus pa (‘collection/combination of letters/phonemes/sounds’) and ming 
’dus pa (‘collection/combination of names/designations’). 347  This allows him to directly 
interrelate the three, yi ge, ming and tshig: 
yi ge  → yi ge ’dus pa = ming = chos kyi ngo bo → ming ’dus pa = tshig = chos kyi khyad par 
A collection or combination of letters forms a ming that expresses the essence of a phenomenon, 
whereas a collection or combination of ming results in tshig that expresses a specification of a 
phenomenon. This is the basic derivational scheme found in Tibetan grammatical sources such 
as the Smra sgo, Tshogs gsum gsal ba and others, with the already mentioned variation of don 
                                                          
345 Ibid., 410f. 
346 Cf. supra 122f. 
347 Note that also some Tibetan commentaries on AK(Bh) adopted this addition, e.g. Rgyal dbang ’phrin las rnam 
rgyal’s Chos mngon pa’i mdzod kyi dgongs don gsal bar byed pa’i legs bshad nyin byed dbang po’i snang ba 
from the 19th century.  
I cannot answer, whether this or any similar idea can be found in the remaining parts of Yaśomitra’s Sphuṭārthā 
on AK 2.47. Interestingly, the idea of a single word that is the collection of letters, as well as of a single sentence 
that is the collection of words can be found in the same section of Patañjali’s MBh on P 1.2.45, from where 
Yaśomitra quoted his theory of the sentence. Perhaps less systematically, but still in the same terms, Patañjali 
refers to the sentence during Vārttika 2 on P 1.2.45 as a collection of words (samudāya) (cf. Deshpande 2009, 
114; Subrahmanya 1956, 82), and later on he asks about the meaning of letters, either on their own or as a 
collection of letters (varṇānāṃ samudāya) (cf. Subrahmanya 1956, 92f.). 
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gyi ngo bo/khyad par vs. chos kyi ngo bo/khyad par. In the Smra sgo, which adopts the triad’s 
interrelation in terms of ’dus pa, this is also rendered in terms of a causal chain: 
 de la rgyu ni dper na rdul ’dus pa las gong bu grub pa na de nyid dang gzhan du brjod 
 du med pa bzhin yi ge ’dus pa las ming ’grub ste/ 
 “Regarding the cause for this [ming], for example like a lump that results from a 
 gathering (= collection) of dust particles cannot be said to be separate from these very 
 [dust particles], a ming results from a gathering (= collection) of letters/phonemes.”348 
 de la rgyu ni ming ngo/     rang gi ngo bo ni de ’dus pas don gyi khyad par brjod pa’o/ 
 “Regarding the cause for this [tshig], it is ming. [Tshig’s] essential characteristic (~ rang 
gi ngo bo) is that it expresses the specification of a meaning through the collection of 
that [ming].”349 
This relation of ming and tshig in terms of ming ’dus pa reveals a different understanding of 
nāma (ming) compared to Vasubhandu. It was argued above that common illustrations by 
means of word forms such as śabdaḥ or rupam suggest that the concept of nāma (ming) aims 
at genuine nominative nominal forms which are then to be specified by the remaining part of 
the sentence to form a pada (tshig). By means of the notion of ming ’dus pa, it becomes clear 
that any word form that is a specifier on the level of tshig is itself also ming, and this point has 
been expressed clearly in Smr̥tijñānakīrti’s Smra sgo: 
 […] tshig ces bya ba ni ming ’dus pa la bya ste/     ji ltar don gyi khyad par ston na ming 
 gnyis sam/     ming mang po ’dus kyang rung ste tshig ces bya’o/     ’di ltar ka ba ring 
 po zhes brjod na ka ba’i khyad par rjod par byed do/     de bzhin du ka ba ring po ’di ni 
 dkar po’o zhes bya ba la sogs pa’ang tshig ces bya’o/ 
 “[…] So-called ‘tshig’ is to be regarded as a collection/combination of ming. If [it is 
 asked] how a specification of meaning (don gyi khyad par) is indicated, either two ming 
 or multiple ming are suitable and are called tshig. Likewise, if one says ‘long pillar’ (ka 
 ba ring po), a specification of the pillar is being expressed. Similarly, also ‘Regarding 
 this long pillar, [it is] white.’ (ka ba ring po ’di ni dkar po’o) and the like are called 
 tshig.”350 
                                                          
348 Smr̥ti 2002, 49. 
349 Ibid., 58. 
350 Ibid., 58f. 
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Smr̥tijñānakīrti asserts that two or more ming may form a tshig. His two examples, namely ka 
ba ring po and ka ba ring po ’di ni dkar po’o, make clear that the terms ring po (‘long’) as well 
as dkar po (‘white’) are equally considered ming. ‘Essence’ (ngo bo) thus refers to the essential 
nature of any kind of phenomenon, and consequently ngo bo must refer to the essence of a 
phenomenon regardless of the type of word (nouns, adjectives, verbs) or lexical information 
(things, qualities, action). However, it is important to note that the typical illustrations of ming 
nonetheless abstain from mentioning other word forms than genuine nouns, a fact we might 
interpret as a remnant of the Abhidharmic commentarial literature in which this type of 
illustration prevails.  
In any case, already in the NG(g) we can observe a shift of focus in Tibetan linguistic sources 
away from pada as arthaparisamāpti (‘completeness of meaning’, don yongs su rdzogs pa) and 
kriyāguṇakālasambandhaviśeṣā towards pada as a collection of ming that specifies either a 
meaning or a phenomenon (don or chos). This does not necessarily mean that the criteria of 
AKBh were regarded as obsolete or even mistaken, rather they have receded into the 
background and sometimes were even fully omitted in the presentation of the tshogs gsum.351 
This shift possibly reflects a more analytical approach typical to (Sanskrit) grammatical 
analysis, namely to divide a linguistic utterance into its parts and focus on each of them 
individually and in relation to each other, a perspective towards which the Abhidharmic model 
with its focus on a central nāma remains fairly insensitive. However, also the Tibetan renditions 
of tshig in terms of ming ’dus pa have remained far from Sanskrit grammatical pada, since the 
specification of a meaning or phenomenon (chos/don gyi khyad par) is that of adding more 
lexical items and connecting them into sentences and phrases, yet not the particularization of 
an otherwise lexical word form through the affixation of suffixes. 
Before we will next turn to the views of Si tu, it should also be mentioned that despite the 
dominance of the Abhidharmic tshogs gsum in Tibetan grammatical treatises, Tibetan 
grammarians were not only well aware of the Sanskrit grammatical understanding of pada, but 
they in fact even fully acknowledged the difference between pada in Sanskrit grammar and 
Abhidharma:352 
                                                          
351 However, it is interesting to note that common presentations of the Tibetan syntactic link slar bsdu that marks 
the end of a Tibetan sentence resonate with the idea of arthaparisamāpti, not the least in the link’s alternative 
label rdzogs tshig (cf. e.g. GC 467.6; Zha lu 2013A, 6). Yet, even if this connection proofs to be consistent, at 
least Smra ba kun la ’jug pa’i sgra’i bstan bcos and its autocommentary should be equally taken into account 
with its category of zla sdud that became another established label for slar bsdu, cf. CT 109 – 1714f. 
352 Cf. also HSGLT 2, 245. 
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 ming gnyis ’dus pas don gyi khyad par brjod pa sangs rgyas ni skyabs so zhes pa lta bu 
 dang/     ming mang po ’dus pas don gyi khyad par brjod pa chos thams cad bdag med 
 pa’o zhes pa lta bu’o/     de bzhin du ’du byas mi rtag pa’o zhes ming gnyis pa dang/     
 mya ngan las ’das pa sdug bsngal thams cad zhi ba’o/     zhes pa ming mang po ’dus pa 
 yin te/     de ni chos mngon par gsungs pa’i tshig yin no/     brda sprod pa po la grags 
 pa’i tshig ni/      
  ming la rnam dbye brgyad phye ba/      
  nyi shu rtsa bzhi sbyar ba dang/     
  byings la ti sogs sbyar ba yis/     
  rang rang don rnams ’byed pa’i tshig/ 
 “[Tshig is] the expression of a meaning’s specification through the combination of two 
 ming, such as ‘The Buddha is the refuge.’ (sangs rgyas ni skyabs so), and the expression 
 of a meaning’s specification through multiple ming, as in ‘All phenomena are selfless.’ 
 (chos thams cad bdag med pa’o). Likewise, ‘The saṃskāras are impermanent.’ (’du 
 byas mi rtag pa’o) [is the] combination of two ming and ‘Nirvāṇa [is the] pacification 
 of all suffering’ (mya ngan las ’das pa sdug bsngal thams cad zhi ba’o) is the 
 combination of multiple ming. This is pada [as] propounded in the Abhidharma. Pada 
 [as] it is known to the grammarian (brda sprod pa po) is as follows:  
  To a nominal stem (ming), eight cases distinguished  
  [into] 24 suffixes are to be applied, and  
  to the verbal roots (byings) ti, etc. are to be applied by which  
  the individual meanings are distinguished. [That is the grammarian’s] pada.”353 
Dpang Lotsāwa in his Tshogs gsum gsal ba repeats the foundations of pada in Abhidharma and 
Sanskrit grammar as they are commonly known in the Tibetan tradition: pada is either the 
specification of a meaning (don gyi khyad par) through the collection of otherwise unbound 
lexical word forms (ming ’dus pa), or it is a stem form to be affixed with nominal or verbal 
suffixes.  
The two following points in the above passage are important to note. First, the terminological 
issue of ming: Dpang Lotsāwa not only uses ming as a translation of Abhidharmic nāma in the 
notion of ming ’dus pa, it is also the Tibetan translation of Sanskrit grammatical prātipadika 
(‘nominal stem’). Despite the clear separation of the two derivational models in the TshSS, 
                                                          
353 Dpang Blo gros brtan pa 2004, 249. 
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Abhidharmic nāma and grammatical prātipadika were equated, at least implicitly. Also his list 
of examples for ming qua nāma contain among Tibetan unmarked word forms also two Sanskrit 
nominal stem forms (ku and sugata), which suggest a direct relation between nāma and 
prātipadika in Dpang Lotsāwa’s conception.354 Neither this association nor any other form of 
relation between the two was elaborated by Dpang Lotsāwa, yet the terminological congruence 
was not at all regarded as problematic. Thus, should we read this as the silent acceptance of a 
direct relation between nāma and prātipadika? But then how does this fit with his clear 
separation of Abhidharmic and grammatical tshig? Does this mean that ming in tshig qua ming 
’dus pa (Abhidharma) and tshig qua ming plus case suffix (grammar) both refers to stem forms 
that either form tshig through a collection of several such stem forms (Abhidharma) or through 
the affixation of a case suffix to a single stem form (grammar)? And what about Sanskrit first 
case forms that are the prototypical examples for nāma in AK(Bh)?  Do they equally qualify as 
nāma in his model? These questions are only speculative attempts to reflect further upon issues 
which Dpang Lotsāwa has never clearly explicated in his work, and a similar situation is given 
in many if not most Tibetan grammatical sources previous to Si tu – at least as part of my 
research, I have not encountered a source that actively attempts to reconcile or problematize 
ming qua nāma and ming qua prātipadika.  
As stated above, these two notions are only semantically identical, and a comparison of 
Vasubandhu’s derivational model with that of the grammarians has demonstrated that they are 
not necessarily the same morphologically or syntactically and that they have their roots in 
different Indian fields of knowledge. After the investigation into Yaśomitra’s exposition of AK 
2.47 and its notion of pada,355 I tentatively propose that it may have been his mediation between 
Patañjali’s sāmānye vartamāna pada (a reference to the stem forms) and Vasubandhu’s nāma 
that has facilitated the Tibetan strategy to translate both Sanskrit terms with ming. In addition, 
the fact that the morphosyntactic difference between nāma in the nominative case and 
prātipadika as an unmarked stem form is blurred in WT perhaps has also suggested a Tibetan 
translation of the two with the same term ming. Although the implicit equation of nāma and 
prātipadika by means of their common translation as ming is thus a rather comprehensible 
choice, it should be noted that the category dhātu (verbal root) that must also belong to sāmānye 
                                                          
354 Cf. infra 145. 
355 Cf. supra 117ff. 
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vartamāna pada in Patañjali’s theory has been translated in Tibetan with byings and thus is not 
translationally equated with nāma.356   
The second important point in Dpang Lotsāwa’s confrontation of Abhidharmic and Sanskrit 
grammatical pada is that there has been no attempt to further compare and reconcile the two. 
Both versions of pada, the Abhidharmic and the Sanskrit grammatical, refer to syntactic forms 
or entities in general, yet of very different natures. Nonetheless, Dpang Lotsāwa did not reflect 
upon whether these two authoritative models agree with or complement each other, and his 
presentation does not go beyond an acceptance of their coexistence. It is difficult to assess 
whether this silence was a scholastically-driven strategy to avoid possible conflicts of two 
important authoritative models which are difficult to attack, or whether Dpang Lotsāwa simply 
did not see any need to specify their relation. In any case, this lack again leaves unaddressed 
the the question how to relate the cases to the Abhidharmic tshogs gsum model. As will be 
shown in the following discussion of the first case, Dpang Lotsāwa’s strategy to resolve this 
issue was to switch from the Abhidharmic notion of pada to Sanskrit grammatical pada and to 
remain silent on questions of their relation or the location of the case model within the tshogs 
gsum. His silence is representative for the Tibetan grammatical tradition in general, since most 
of its authors refrained from clarifying this issue in their use of either notion of pada. 
This strategy of leaving unclarified the interpretation of pada and its two related derivational 
models may severely impede our understanding of tshig in grammatical sources. Quotations 
such as SCP 3.1-4 that lack any further elaboration not only leave open whether tshig (‘syntactic 
form’) is a marked and thus syntactically functioning stem form or a collection of nāma. If it is 
suitable to apply the early linguistic interpretation of ming and tshig in NG to SCP’s opening 
declaration, an Abhidharmic interpretation of tshig in terms of a collection of several word 
forms is more likely, independently of whether or not they are nāma on their own. Moreover, 
the missing attempt to reconcile the Abhidharmic and Sanskrit grammatical versions of pada 
limits the explanatory value of the tshogs gsum, particularly that of Abhidharmic pada as ming 
’dus pa, for the case model, to the extent that it may even become irrelevant. This was certainly 
not the intention of Dpang Lotsāwa or other Tibetan grammarians, but it is a direct ramification 
                                                          
356 One rationale for the Tibetan translation strategy might be that early translators understood nāma in the sense 
of genuine nouns as suggested by Vasubandhu’s examples. However, this would be against tshig as that which is 
ming ’dus pa, a definition already attested in NG (cf. supra 125f.). 
To complicate things even further, also note that Dpang Lotsāwa gives Sanskrit namaḥ (‘to bow, pay homage’) 
as a further example of nāma, defining it as “being an identical verbal root like phyag ’tshal ba” (phyag ’tshal ba 
dang byings gcig pa; Dpang Blo gros brtan pa 2004, 246). Does this suggest that he regarded the form namaḥ 
that is an indeclinable (avyaya) in Sanskritic grammar (cf. Sharma 1995, 124) as a verbal form and consequently 
also allowed for verbal forms being included under Abhidharmic nāma (ming)? 
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of their silence. Therefore, we will turn next to Si tu and investigate the strategy in his GC for 
treating the derivation of linguistic expressions and its relation to case grammar. 
5.3.3 Si tu’s Approach to the Derivation of Word Forms in a Tibetan-specific Context 
Si tu’s discussion of the tshogs gsum as well as of the Sanskritic grammatical model for the 
derivation of case suffixes is contained in the last parts of his GC and in the context of an 
exposition of TKJ 28.4-29.3 which featured the tshogs gsum:357 
 bya [sic!]358  ka ra ṇa’i lugs la rnamd dbye’i mtha’ can ni tshig go     rnam dbye med pa 
 ni ming ngo/     zhes ’byung yang/     bod skad la rnam dbye dang po’i gcig tshig ming 
 tsam las logs su dbyer med cing/     dag dang rnams kyi phrad kyis gnyis tshig dang 
 mang tshig mtshon yang da dung de dag gi mthar rnam dbye gzhan ’jug pa sogs kyis 
 rnam gzhag de lta bu sbyar du mi rung ba dang/     chos mngon pa’i lugs kyi yi ge du 
 ma ’dus pa las ming/     ming du ma ’dus pa las tshig ces gsungs pa’ang spyir btang 
 rags pa tsam yin pas ’dir phra ba’i dbang du byas na mi ’byor […] 
 “It occurs in the system of vyākaraṇa that a syntactic form (pada, tshig) is that which 
 has a case ending (rnam dbye’i mtha’ can), and a nominal stem (prātipadika, ming) is 
 that without a case (rnam dbye med pa). However, in Tibetan language the mere nominal 
 stem (ming tsam) is not distinguishable from the singular of the first case, and although 
 the dual and plural is indicated (mtshon) by the [syntactic] links dag and rnams, there is 
 still another case joining (’jug) at their end. Due to this and other [reasons], this [Sanskrit 
 grammatical] model (rnam gzhag de lta bu) is inapplicable. Furthermore, the 
 teaching of the Abhidharmic system that from many letters [results] a lexical word form 
 (ming) [and] from many lexical word forms [results] a syntactic form (pada) is merely 
 general and rough, therefore not applicable from the perspective of a more detailed 
 investigation here […].”359 
                                                          
357 TKJ 28.4-29.3: 
 ci phyir ’jug par byed ce na/ 
 yi ge’i khongs nas ming dbyung ste/ 
 ming gi khongs nas tshig phyung nas/ 
 tshig gis don rnams ston par byed/  
 “Why are [letters] joined?  
 Out of letters, lexical word forms are to be brought forth, 
 Out of lexical word forms, syntactic forms are brought forth and 
 Through syntactic forms, meanings are indicated.” 
358 I read byā. 
359 GC 608.4. 
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Si tu is not only aware of the different models proposed in Abhidharma and Sanskrit grammar, 
but he even openly rejects them. For his rejection of the grammatical derivation stem plus 
suffix, he takes recourse to Tibetan-specific linguistic reasons, one of which he illustrates. As 
mentioned above, Tibetan unmarked stem forms already are complete word forms that do not 
require any further application of case suffixes, and such word forms are the first case in Tibetan 
grammatical taxonomy. This holds equally true for dual and plural forms, since the syntactic 
links for dual and plural are no case markers and yet their application alone results equally in 
complete word forms that consequently represent the first case.  That is proven by the fact that 
like singular forms, dual and plural forms can take a case marker to form one of the remaining 
cases. In contrast, the Abhidharmic model is briefly rejected by Si tu with the reason that 
although it is not per se inapplicable to the Tibetan context, it remains too general for the 
detailed grammatical analysis attempted by him. Following this assessment, Si tu goes on to 
propose his own derivational model specified for the Tibetan context:  
 […] skabs ’dir ni bod skad gzhir gzhag gis gang zhig yi ge gnyis sam mang po ’dus 
 pa’ang rung don gyi ngo bo tsam ston pa’i sgra ni ming yin zhing/     ming de nyid rnam 
 dbye’am phrad gang rung dang ldan pas don gyi khyad par ston par byed pa rnams ni 
 tshig dang/     tshig mang po sprel nas don dang ldan pa’i ngag gi phreng bar grub pa 
 ni brjod pa zhes bya’o/ 
 “[…] For our current context, therefore, taking Tibetan language as the basis, any 
 indication of a mere essence of a meaning, regardless of whether two or more letters are 
 combined, is a lexical word form/word stem (ming). And the indication of a 
 specification of the meaning by that very lexical word form/word stem endowed with 
 any case or [syntactic] link is a syntactic form (tshig). And after connecting many 
 syntactic forms, the resulting speech sequence (ngag gi phreng bar grub pa) 
 endowed with meaning is called ‘a sentence’ (brjod pa ?).”360 
Put in simple terms, Si tu combines the basic conceptual blocks of the Abhidharmic and Sanskrit 
grammatical models. He adopts the basic distinction of Abhidharmic ming and tshig in terms 
of don gyi ngo bo and khyad par that were already encountered in Yaśomitra’s exposition of 
AK 2.47, and he directly applies it to the derivational scheme of stem form + syntactic link/case, 
the latter which was most likely Si tu’s adaptation of Sanskrit grammatical subanta as one half 
of pada. Si tu clearly states what the former grammarians have not further specified: ming is 
                                                          
360 GC 608.5. 
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both prātipadika as a stem form to be affixed as well as nāma as a mere denotative, lexical 
word form. However, only in his exposition of the first case it will be understood that his version 
of ming not only refers to nominal stem forms (prātipadika) in opposition to verbal roots (dhātu, 
byings), but it comprises unmarked nominal and verbal forms, thus referring to word stems or 
base forms in general that may be affixed with case markers or other syntactic links.361 In sum, 
Si tu proposes a single derivational procedure for any kind of morphosyntactic operation in 
WT: 
yi ge ’dus pa = ming → ming + rnam dbye/tshig phrad = tshig → tshig sprel = brjod pa 
One can see that Si tu completely discards the notion of ming ’dus pa in the context of tshig, 
probably because it was incompatible with the derivational model of stem + syntactic link. 
Instead, he substitutes it with the notion of tshig mang po sprel (‘connecting many syntactic 
forms’) that results in the next level of linguistic expression, presumably sentences (brjod pa), 
although he did not provide an example to clarify this point. 
Since Si tu takes a clear stance and forms a single, homogeneous and straightforward Tibetan-
specific derivational model from the former two competing systems, its relation to case 
grammar is specified without ambiguity. Any application of the cases (rnam dbye) to a ming 
results in tshig that specifies this very ming by means of the grammatical information contained 
in the case.362 What remains to be investigated in chapter 7.2, is the question how the first case 
as ming tsam (‘mere word stem,’ ‘mere lexical and syntactically free word form’) fits into Si 
tu’s model. 
5.4 A Preliminary Note on the Notion of kāraka 
The introduction of this chapter has already mentioned that the kārakas represent a group of six 
fundamental case functions in Sanskrit grammar. Although case grammar in either Sanskrit or 
Tibetan linguistic studies cannot be reduced to this group, it is no exaggeration that they are at 
the very center of the case functions. The kārakas have been extensively studied in modern 
academia and thus a detailed study is unwarranted in this dissertation.363 Moreover, part II will 
feature a detailed discussion of each of the six categories of kāraka in the context of the 
respective cases they belong to. However, as the perhaps most central part of Tibetan case 
                                                          
361 Cf. chapter 7.2.2. 
362 Note that in this quotation, Si tu clearly uses rnam dbye in the sense of case suffixes and thus morphological 
categories. However, during the examination of the cases we will frequently encounter this term as a reference to 
the case functions rather than their forms. On the ambiguity between case forms and case functions in modern 
linguistics, cf. supra 98. 
363 Cf. e.g. Kiparsky and Staal 1969; Cardona 1974; Cardona 1997, 215ff. 
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grammar, one important observation about the nature of this category is required, which will 
allow for a more accurate understanding of the historical developments of Tibetan case 
grammar from Sanskritic grammatical knowledge.  
In Pāṇini’s grammar, which is one of the earliest and perhaps the most prominent Sanskritic 
account, the six kārakas are defined in the section P 1.4.23-54 that starts with the so-called 
adhikāra-rule “kārake” (‘in [the domain of] kāraka’; P 1.4.23). In Patañjaliʼs Mahābhāṣya 5 ad 
P 1.4.23, the term kāraka is explained in terms of sādhaka (‘accomplisher’) and nirvartaka 
(‘producer’) as respective glosses.364 Jayāditya and Vāmanaʼs Kāśikāvr̥tti (KV) ad P 1.4.23 also 
gives a similar explanation, providing the terms nimitta and hetu (‘cause’) as synonyms, adding 
that the kārakas are the cause of the action.365 The kārakas as participants in an action contribute 
to the accomplishment of that very action based on the specific functions they perform. As such, 
agent, object, instrument, etc. all represent constitutive parts for bringing about the phenomenal 
action denoted by a verb.  
Mahābhāṣya 15ff. on P 1.4.23 explains this accomplishment in more detail. Based on the literal 
meaning of kāraka as ‘that which does’ and ‘that which brings about’ (karotīti kārakam), each 
of the kārakas somehow works as an agent which contributes a specific type of action to the 
accomplishment of the action denoted by the verb. In a sentence like ‘Devadatta cooks rice in 
a pot with fire wood’ (devadattaḥ sthālyām odanaṃ kāṣṭhaiḥ pacati), each of the participants 
performs its respective action that then results in the main action of cooking: Devadatta needs 
to put the pot on the fire and the rice into the pot, etc., the pot needs to hold the rice and the fire 
wood has to burn. Patañjali himself as well as the later tradition have painstakingly discussed 
the details and various ramifications of this theory. What we can see is that this theorization 
and use of kāraka goes beyond mere linguistic-syntactic considerations about relationships 
between arguments in a Sanskrit sentence, such investigations into the nature of actions 
additionally involves a strong semantic and even metalinguistic-philosophical component. 
However, this does not mean that these metalinguistic conceptualizations automatically go 
against Sanskritic morphosyntax. In fact, imbedded in and developed out of the semantic-
syntactic environment of Sanskrit, these grammarians have nonetheless achieved a highly 
accurate description of Sanskrit language. 
Moreover, the six categories of kāraka were not only utilized in the context of case grammar 
or grammatical analysis in general, they also figure, for example, in the literature of the Nyāya 
                                                          
364 Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1975, 13. 
365 Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1995, 79. 
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school, where the categories of ‘agent’ and ‘instrument’ serve as analytical tools for 
conceptualizing the process of cognition.366 Likewise, modern characterizations of the kārakas 
in Pāṇini’s grammar range from purely “semantic categories” 367  and “extra-linguistic or 
psychological, rather than linguistic and formal in nature”368 to Cardona’s “semantico-syntactic 
categories”369 and even to Houben’s “ontological-logical classifications.”370  
While the precise nature of the kārakas as well as their location somewhere at the intersection 
of logic, semantics, syntax and perhaps even psychology and ontology is not of further concern 
for our topic, all these different competing notions do bring to light that the kārakas in Sanskritic 
scholarly literature reached far beyond mere grammatical categories in a modern linguistic 
sense. This status of the kārakas should be kept in mind when in the following we will have a 
close look at how it has affected the conception of the classical Tibetan case model. 
 
Following part I on the history of Tibetan grammaticography and Si tu’s work, the methodology 
of his theory formation, and the theoretical background of Tibetan case grammar, part II will 
now scrutinize in detail the continuities and discontinuities between Sanskrit and Tibetan case 
grammar, including those between Si tu and former Sanskrit and Tibetan grammarians in 
particular. This part will bring several reconciliation strategies to the surface and reveal the 
extensive processes of transformation and negotiation in Tibetan conceptions of the cases. 
Furthermore, it will point out how theoretical-linguistic reasons have shaped the Tibetan case 
model as fundamentally as the methodological framework discussed in part I. 
  
                                                          
366 Cf. e.g. infra 250f. 
367 Sinha 1973, 35. 
368 M.D. Pandit 1963, 22. 
369 Cardona 1975, 138. 
370 Houben 1999, 28. On some more information about the discourse on the precise status of the kārakas that can 
be traced back to the later parts of the 19th century, cf. Cardona 1997, 216ff. 
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Part II: The rnam dbye brgyad – Historical Survey and 
their Conception in the Great Commentary   
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6 Introduction 
Si tu received the eight Tibetan cases as an integral part of Tibetan grammar that had already 
been established and reconfirmed in the entire grammatical tradition over many centuries, thus 
claiming unquestionable authority. In the Sum rtags commentarial literature, presentations of 
the case model follow a rigid standardization that is often confined to the very essentials to 
comprehend SCP and TKJ. Specifications of the cases’ morphology and semantics (sgra and 
don) are usually confined to a sometimes more, sometimes less elaborate glossing of the 
information contained in the root texts, accompanied by varying amounts of minimalistic 
sample phrases in the form of verb plus the argument marked by the case form. Any further 
examination of the case model, such as detailed conceptions of the case functions, syntactic, 
semantic, pragmatic or any other parameters to characterize the use of the cases, problematic 
instances which allow for more than one classification or the comparison with competing 
conceptions are more the exception and were often completely omitted. The condensed 
presentation of the cases with a restriction to a few illustrations in most of the Sum rtags 
commentaries reflects the cases’ self-evident status assumed by commentators, at least for 
native speakers who are proficient in the use of the language. Although this status may hold 
true for some of the cases, this restraint is rather surprising, especially in the context of the three 
la don-cases in which the morphosyntactic variety of the examples in and between grammatical 
sources is not readily comprehensible to infer the precise meaning of the case category intended 
by the grammarian or commentator.  
It is crucial to note that neither SCP nor TKJ make use of the term rnam dbye in its technical 
sense. TKJ 22.3-23.1 lists the eight case functions in their usual order, which suggests that the 
author or editor(s) of the treatise must have been familiar with the concept. However, the fact 
that the concept of case plays no systematic role in the root texts is obvious not only from the 
fact that SCP omits the first case and does not follow the cases’ order for the remaining case 
functions, but also since the only verse line which refers to rnam par dbye ba (TKJ 28.3) alludes 
to its lexical meaning of ‘dividing’ or ‘distinguishing’ and pertains equally to all functions of 
the syntactic links listed in TKJ 24.4-28.2, not just the cases. The omission of the technical term 
rnam dbye could be due to different reasons, and one likely was that the economical character 
of texts was highly valued in Indian and Tibetan scholarship. The authors or redactors of SCP 
and TKJ may have also followed role models such as Cāndra, whose works feature a strong 
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tendency to avoid technical terminology and its definition.371 In any case, Si tu acknowledges 
that the use of the technical term rnam dbye in the context of Sum rtags is actually an imposition 
by commentators: 
 […] byed pa pos bya ba la sbyor ba ston pas na gzhung gzhan du rnam dbye gsum pa 
 zhes ’byung ba byed pa po’i sa re shes par bya’o/ 
 “[…] [The morphemes gis, kyis, ’is, yis and gyis], since they indicate the engagement of 
 an agent in an action, are known as the semantic domain of the agent, which in other 
 texts occurs as third case.”372 
The same observation is made in the contexts of the sixth case ’brel sgra in SCP 12.3-13.3 and 
the fifth case ’byung khungs in 16.2-4. Nonetheless, Si tu does not hesitate to follow the 
common convention in Sum rtags’s commentarial literature to identify the classical Tibetan 
case functions given in SCP with their respective case numbers of the Tibetan model.  
The GC discusses Tibetan case grammar mainly in two sections, first in SCP’s presentation of 
syntactic links in SCP 8.3-23.2, the cases being covered in 9.3-14.1 and 16.2-17.3, as well as at 
the end of TKJ in the context of the root text’s own recapitulation of the main functions of 
syntactic links in 24.4-28.2.373 In many ways, Si tu’s exposition resonates with his predecessors: 
definitions are kept short and concise, often leaving space for interpretation, while the main 
focus is on the selection of sample phrases to determine the precise interpretation of the case 
function. The established and self-evident character of the cases strongly figures in his work as 
well. Nonetheless, he has also developed an astute awareness of the peculiarities of WT as well 
as its differences to Sanskrit, which has frequently animated him to address those pressing 
questions less self-evident in the context of Tibetan language in order to refine the cases and 
revalidate them also for the Tibetan context. This most important material in the GC, which is 
                                                          
371 In addition, we might also speculate, whether the omission of rnam dbye reflects a shifted understanding of 
the categories case and non-case due to the agglutinative character of WT that has no fully distinct nominal 
inflexion compared to Sanskrit. The notion of rnam par dbye ba in TKJ 28.3 might have even been a technical 
use as a generic category applicable to all functions listed in TKJ 24.4-28.2, similarly to Pāṇini’s use of vibhakti 
that is used for both, nominal and verbal endings (cf. P 1.4.104). Also a linguistic philosophical influx cannot be 
ruled out at this point, e.g. the common distinction of linguistic signs (brda) into sound and meaning (sgra and 
don) Tibetan scholars have been well familiar with from Buddhist epistemology might have become the general 
model in grammatical analysis, for which reason any further classification into case/non-case forms and 
functions might have become obsolete. 
372 GC 485.5. 
373 More accurately, Si tu’s sa bcad distinguishes between TKJ 24.4-25.3 (case functions) and TKJ 25.4-28.3 
(remaining functions until 28.2), but he provides his discussion of case grammar in form of a summary of cases 
1-7 only after the discussion of both passages, so technically under 25.4-28.3.  
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mainly contained in the part of TKJ on case grammar, includes a number of ideas new to 
classical Tibetan case grammar. 
After this brief introduction, each of the cases will be treated separately in their traditional order 
from one to eight. Every case will be treated twofold, starting with a historical survey of the 
developments up to Si tu, followed by Si tu’s strategies for developing his case model and 
tackling perceived problems of previous conceptions. 
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7 Rnam dbye dang po ngo bo tsam 
7.1 Historical Survey 
The first case, best known in the tradition under its name of ngo ba tsam (‘the mere essence’), 
is an unmarked word form. 374  Even though there are significant differences between the 
sources, the most dominant basic conception became that the first case only expresses a word’s 
lexical information, which is closely connected to the essence (ngo bo) of a real phenomenon 
(chos, dngos po) as its reference point. Sakya Paṇḍita succinctly demonstrates this idea by the 
help of the time-honored example ‘tree’ or ‘wood’ (shing): 
 [...] shing zhes bya ba yal ga lo ’dab dang ldan pa tsam go bar byed pa lta bu ngo bo’i 
 tshig [...] 
 “[…] [A word form such as] ’wood,’ which merely causes the comprehension (go bar 
 byed pa) of a branch endowed with leaves, is the syntactic form of essence (ngo bo’i 
 tshig). […]”375 
Illustrations of the first case often do not exceed mere listings of syntactically unbound single 
nouns, such as in Zha lu Lotsāwa’s TKJ-commentary:  
 [...] rnam dbye dang po chos dngos te ngo bo tsam brjod pa/     sangs rgyas/    sems can/     
 ka ba/     bum pa/     snam bu/     re lde zhes pa la sogs pa ming rkyang pa rnams [...] 
 “The first case is an actual phenomenon (chos dngos), i.e. the expression of a mere 
 essence. These are bare nouns, as in ‘Buddha’ (sangs rgyas), ‘sentient being’ (sems can), 
 ‘pillar’ (ka ba), ‘pot’ (bum pa), ‘woolen cloth’ (snam bu), ‘bast’ (re lde).”376  
At least since Dpang Lotsāwa Blo gros brtan pa’s Tshogs gsum gsal ba (TshSS) onwards, there 
has been the awareness that the morphological word form which encodes this type of 
                                                          
374 The precise nomenclature varies significantly: chos dngos (TKJ 22.3), spyi(r) ’jug (TKJ 24.4), don tsam gyi 
tshig (NGg kāraka-topic CT 115 – 417), ngo bo tsam ston pa’i tshig (NGg kāraka-topic CT 115 – 419), (don 
gyi) dngos po gang yang rung ba (NGg vibhakti-topic CT 115 – 432), rang gi ngo bo tsam ston pa (GNT CT 115 
– 444), (dngos po) gang yang rung ba’i sa (GNT CT 115 – 444), khyab pa (?) spyi’i don (GNT 115 – 444), ngo 
bo’i tshig (KhJ 2009, 24f.), ngo bo tsam  ston pa/brjod pa (Dpang Blo gros brtan pa 2004, 250; Zha lu 2013B, 34 
on TKJ 22.3), gang yang rung ba  (Dbus pa Blo gsal 20.1), chos kyi dngos po (Dbus pa Blo gsal, 20.1) dngos po 
tsam brjod pa (Zha lu 2013A, 7 on SCP 8.3-9.2), ming don gyi ngo bo tsam zhig ston pa (GC 598.2), etc. Many 
of the terms are obviously related, some of them being specifications of others, some only mere paraphrases. To 
which extend the terminological variations reflect conceptual differences, is a question which cannot be pursued 
any further here. However, it can be affirmed that there are noteworthy dissimilarities between the sources. 
375 KhJ 2009, 24f. For a translation of the entire section on the cases in Sakya Paṇḍita’s Mkhas pa rnams ’jug 
pa’i sgo (KhJ), cf. also Gold 2008, 168. 
376 Zha lu 2013B, 34. The first case’s designation/characterization as chos dngos (‘actual/real phenomenon’) is a 
quotation from TKJ 22.3, of which Zha lu’s passage is a gloss. Dbus pa blo gsal in his TKJ-commentary 
paraphrases the term as chos kyi dngos po (~ ‘dharmic phenomenon’). 
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information does not follow the Sanskrit morphology of the first case and thus cannot be 
analyzed into stem and suffix like its Sanskrit counterpart: 
 de la rnam dbye dang po ngo bo tsam ston pa/     shing/     me/     bum pa zhes pa lta bu 
 ste/     saṃskrīta’i phal che ba la rkyen gyi rdzas377 yod pas/     ’di dang po gcig tshig 
 sbyar ba’o/     zhes bshad mod kyang/     bod skad la dang po’i gcig tshig la de med pas/     
 de dang ming la khyad med do/ 
 “The first case, the indication of a mere essence, is for example ‘wood’ (shing), ‘fire’ 
 (me), ‘pot’ (bum pa). Since the majority of Sanskrit [word forms] have suffix-
 endings (rkyen gyi rjes), it is explained that ‘this is the application of the first [case 
 suffix] singular.’378 Yet, since in Tibetan the singular of the first [case] does not have 
 such a [suffix], there is no difference to the nominal stem (ming).”379 
Dpang Lotsāwa explained the zero-marking of the Tibetan first case form in Sanskrit 
grammatical terms as a nominal stem (ming, prātipadika). This explanation was well received 
by later grammarians like Rnam gling Paṇchen and also Si tu. However, to my knowledge, none 
of these classical authors have taken into account also the morphological identity with the 
ABSOLUTIVE argument in Tibetan sentences.  
Despite a clear connection to the prototypical function of the Sanskritic first case, the 
terminological variations of the Tibetan version380 immediately reveal that, with the exception 
of the very general don tsam (‘the mere meaning’),381 none of them was a direct translation of 
the corresponding Sanskritic grammatical nomenclature. In the grammars of Pāṇini, Kātantra 
and Cāndra, the first case form is a suffix applied to nominal stems, and its prototypical function 
has been rendered along the following lines: 
 P 2.3.46 prātipadikārthaliṅgaparimāṇavacanamātre prathamā “A prathamā ‘first 
 triplet of sUP’ occurs when only prātipadikārtha ‘meaning of the stem, stem notion’; 
 liṅga ‘gender’; parimāṇa ‘measure’; or vacana ‘number’ is to be expressed.”382  
                                                          
377 I read rkyen gyi rdzas as rkyen gyi rjes in accordance with Rnam gling (2013, 66), who quotes this passage in 
his Sum rtags commentary. 
378 or “this [suffix] is to be applied as the first [case] singular”? Even though this appears to be a quotation, I 
have not been able to identify the origin. 
379 Dpang Blo gros brtan pa 2004, 250.  
380 Cf. ft. 374. 
381 NGg kāraka-topic, CT 115 – 417. 
382 Transl. Sharma 1995, 149. 
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 K 2.4.17 prathamā vibhaktir liṅgārthavacane “The first case suffix [occurs] if the 
 meaning of the nominal stem [is to be expressed].” 
 C 2.1.93 arthamātre prathamā “The first [case suffix occurs] if the mere meaning [is 
 to be expressed].” 
The precise meaning of the nominal stem (prātipadikārtha) and the semantic features it includes 
in P 2.3.46 was subject to extensive contentions in the Sanskritic tradition.383 This study will 
not address to which extent these discussions have influenced especially the early 
interpretations of the Tibetan first case and perhaps even the dominating label ngo bo (tsam) 
itself. Nonetheless, it may be assumed that the terminological divergence between the quoted 
Sanskritic grammars and the Tibetan tradition reflects modifications regarding the conception 
of the case, which raise questions of historical and linguistic character. Since their adequate 
assessment requires preliminary investigations far beyond the scope of this introduction, they 
will be outlined in the following only regarding Si tu’s grammar, and the answers will remain 
to the largest extent tentative and deserve further research in the future.  
First, there is the simple matter of the historical origin of the different Tibetan terminologies 
for the first case function, especially that of ngo bo tsam. While this is a simple question, its 
answer appears to be more intricate. According to our current knowledge concerning the 
timeline of Tibetan grammatical sources, the early tradition seems to have centered its 
interpretation of the first case’s meaning more on the notions of a real thing or phenomenon 
(dngos po, chos dngos) and a word’s generic meaning (spyi’i don, spyir ’jug).384 In addition, 
NGg and GNT have already mentioned the concept of ngo bo (‘essence’). While NGg only uses 
it as an alternative label for don tsam (arthamātra, ‘mere meaning’) in the section on kāraka 
and not as a case label, the GNT mentions it in its conception of the first case:  
 de la dang po gang zhes pa ni dngos po gang yang rung ba’i sa ste/     khyab pa spyi’i 
 don yin la las ni gang la yang mi sbyor ba kho na te/     mdor na rang gi ngo bo tsam 
 ston pa de’i khyad par dang bcas te ston pa dang/     khyad par gyi bye brag du ma ston 
 pa’ang ste/     dngos po’i don gang yang rung ba zhig ni go […] de yang phyogs gcig la 
 mtshon na/     ka ba nyid brjod par ’dod pa’i bsam pas ka ba zhes brjod pas bdag nyid 
 dang/     gzhan rnams kyis ka ba’i shes pa nges par ’dren par ’dren nus de nyid dang 
                                                          
383 For a comprised summary, cf. Sharma 1995, 150f. According to Sharma, Patañjali, for example, lists five 
meanings: dravya (‘concrete thing’), svārtha (‘stem-notion’), liṅga (‘gender’), saṃkhyā (‘number’) and kāraka. 
Cf. also the entry on prātipadikārtha in Abhyankar 1986, 276.  
384 For the precise references, cf. ft. 374. 
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 po’i sgra yin la/     byed pa’i tshig gzhan ni gang yang ma sbyar ba’o/     de yang ka ba 
 zhes brjod par ka ba’i ngo bo tsam go ba dang/     ka ba ring po zhes brjod na ngo bo 
 de nyid khyad par dang bcas nas go ba dang/     ka ba sbom zhing ring ba mang po ’dug 
 ces brjod na ngo bo’i khyad par de nyid khyad par du ma dang bcas nas go nus pa ste/ 
 “The first [case], ‘what’ (gang), is the semantic domain of whatever real thing (dngos 
 po) is at hand. It is a generic meaning (khyab pa spyi’i don) and an action is never 
 applied. In short, [the first case] is the indication of the mere self-essence (rang gi ngo 
 bo tsam), [its] indication including a quality (khyad par) and also the indication of many 
 specific qualities. The comprehension of whatever meaning is at hand of a real 
 phenomenon [...] [is a first case]. If we illustrate [these] together, that which is capable 
 (nus pa) of inducing a cognition (shes pa) of a pillar in oneself and others, because one 
 says ‘pillar’ due to the wish of expressing pillarhood (ka ba nyid), is the first case form 
 (dang po’i sgra). The kāraka forms (~ byed pa’i tshig) are not to be applied at all. 
 Furthermore, in expressing ‘pillar,’ only the mere essence of the pillar is understood, 
 and if one expresses ‘long pillar’ (ka ba ring po), then this very essence is understood 
 after including a qualification, and if one expresses ‘there are many thick and long 
 pillars’ (ka ba sbom zhing ring ba mong po ’dug), one can understand that very 
 qualification [of the essence] after including many qualifications.”385 
According to GNT, the first case as an indication of any real thing or phenomenon (dngos po 
gang yang rung ba) is confined to generic meanings (spyi’i don) without the application of an 
action (las sbyor ba), which is reserved for the kāraka-relations. Such generic indications of 
real phenomena then include any type of linguistic expression (single word forms, phrases, 
sentences), as long as this remains restricted to information about a real thing’s self-essence 
(rang gi ngo bo) and its specification through attributes or qualities (khyad par). The remaining 
tradition did not follow the same strategy, since the specification of additional qualities has not 
been considered a first case anymore. In contrast to GNT’s understanding of tsam (‘mere,’ 
‘only’) in ngo bo tsam, which excludes las sbyor ba (‘application of action’) together with the 
kārakas from the first case that is ngo bo plus optionally khyad par, in most Tibetan 
grammatical sources tsam excludes also any other kind of information indicated by a linguistic 
expression other than ngo bo.386  
                                                          
385 GNT CT 115 – 444. 
386 However, I do not know to which extent the tradition before Si tu was merely focused on any other semantic 
information regarding tsam in the first case’s definition as ngo bo tsam ston pa (‘indicating the mere essence’), 
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It is most likely that the Tibetan reinterpretation of prātipadikārthamātra (‘mere meaning of 
the nominal stem’) in terms of ngo bo tsam was developed in connection with the Abhidharmic 
tshogs gsum. As shown in chapter 5.3.2, the Tibetan commentarial literature on the 
Abhidharmakośa defines ming (‘syntactically unbound, lexical word form’) as don gyi ngo bo 
brjod pa/ston pa (‘expressing/indicating the essence of a meaning’) and distinguishes it from 
tshig (‘syntactic form’) as don gyi khyad par brjod pa/ston pa (‘expressing/indicating a 
specification of [that] meaning’), the terminology of which directly corresponds to that of the 
Tibetan first case. In both notions, Abhidharmic ming and the Tibetan first case, ngo bo 
functions as the denotatum and is intimately connected to the essential nature or own-being of 
a phenomenon.387 Also morphology and the selection of the examples corroborate a relation: 
syntactically unbound nominal forms without grammatical marker are the expression of ngo bo 
in both models, tshogs gsum and case grammar, and GNT’s example for the first case as either 
ka ba (‘pillar’) or ka ba ring po (‘long pillar’) is the example for Abhidharmic ming and tshig 
respectively in such Tibetan grammatical sources as the Smra sgo, KhJ or TshSS. Lastly, 
Yaśomitra’s comparison of Abhidharmic nāma (ming) as svalakṣaṇa with Patañjali’s sāmānya 
(‘generic [meaning]’)388 resonates with the Tibetan first case’s meaning as (rang gi) ngo bo and 
spyi’i don/spyir ’jug respectively, suggesting that perhaps both notions have been adopted from 
the same Abhidharmic context. 
Although the historical connection between the terminology of the first case as ngo bo tsam and 
Abhidharmic ming is highly conspicuous, the Tibetan tradition normally avoided an open 
reflection of this relation. In the Tshogs gsum gsal ba (TshSS) of Dpang Lotsāwa (14th century), 
for example, the connection between Abhidharmic ming qua don gyi ngo bo ston pa and the 
Tibetan first case qua ngo bo tsam ston pa becomes clearly visible: he lists two unmarked 
Sanskrit nominal stem forms (ku ‘earth,’ ‘ground’ and sugata ‘Sugata’) and a few unmarked 
Tibetan proper nouns as examples for Abhidharmic ming and its definition don gyi ngo bo brjod 
pa.389 Since Tibetan translators have rendered nāma and prātipadika with the single term 
                                                          
or whether this also excluded syntactic information. It will become evident below, at least for Zha lu Lotsāwa 
and his followers, that tsam apparently mainly referred to additional semantic information (cf. chapter 5.5.1.2.1). 
387 Compare Sakya Paṇḍita’s and GNT’s definition of the first case as ngo bo (tsam) with Smra sgo’s definition 
of Abhidharmic ming: 
 mdor na chos kyi ngo bo nyid tsam ston nus la khyad par mi ston pa’i yi ge ’dus pa’i gnas skabs la ming 
 zhes bya’o/ 
 “In short, a spatio-temporal entity (gnas skabs), which is the combination of letters and is capable of 
 indicating the mere essential nature of a phenomenon (chos kyi ngo bo nyid tsam) without indicating a 
 specification (khyad par), is termed ming.” (Smr̥ti 2002, 50) 
388 Cf. supra 119f. 
389 yi ge gnyis ’dus nas brjod bya’i don gyi ngo bo rjod par byed pa/     saṃskr̥ta la ku zhes pa ka dang u ’dus 
pas sa gzhi’i ming dang/     bod la’ang kha dang a ’dus pas kha’i bu ga’i ming dang/ nya zhes pa nya yig dang a 
’dus pas sems can gyi bye brag gi ming yin pa lta bu’o/     yi ge mang po ’dus pas don gyi ngo bo brjod pa su ga 
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ming,390 which is further supported by Dpang Lotsāwa’s classification of Sanskrit nominal stem 
forms as nāma, and also since the Tibetan first case as ngo bo tsam was defined as nothing but 
a nominal stem (prātipadika),391 both the Abhidharmic ming and the first case are constituted 
by prātipadika and express the meaning of ngo bo. Likewise, the morphology of the Tibetan 
examples, i.e. unmarked noun forms, remains identical in both concepts. Thus, it may be 
inferred that Abhidharmic ming and the Tibetan first case meaning are equivalent in Dpang 
Lotsāwa’s work and that ngo bo must refer to the same idea. However, no matter how 
convincing this inference strikes us, Dpang Lotsāwa did not articulate a direct relation between 
the two. Instead, in his topical outline (sa bcad), he subsumes the discussion of the first as well 
as the other cases under Abhidharmic tshig, and then he also switches from the Abhidharmic to 
the Sanskrit grammatical understanding of ming and tshig: 
 ming gnyis ’dus pas don gyi khyad par brjod pa sangs rgyas ni skyabs so zhes pa lta bu 
 dang/     ming mang po ’dus pas don gyi khyad par brjod pa chos thams cad bdag med 
 pa’o zhes pa lta bu’o/     de bzhin du ’du byas mi rtag pa’o zhes ming gnyis pa dang/     
 mya ngan las ’das pa sdug bsngal thams cad zhi ba’o/     zhes pa ming mang po ’dus pa 
 yin te/     de ni chos mngon par gsungs pa’i tshig yin no/     brda sprod pa po la grags 
 pa’i tshig ni/      
  ming la rnam dbye brgyad phye ba/      
  nyi shu rtsa bzhi sbyar ba dang/     
  byings la ti sogs sbyar ba yis/     
  rang rang don rnams ’byed pa’i tshig 
 […] ’dir bod la nyer mkho ba’i ming la sbyar ba’i rnam dbye’i rnam pa tsam bshad par 
 bya ste/     ngo bo las dang byed pa ched/     ’byung khungs ’brel ba gnas gzhi dang/     
 bod (’bod) pa’i don la rnam dbye brgyad/    re re’ang gcig gnyis mang tshig can/     de 
 la rnam dbye dang po […] 
 “[Tshig is] the expression of a meaning’s specification through the combination of two 
 ming such as ‘The Buddha is the refuge.’ (sangs rgyas ni skyabs so) and the expression 
 of a meaning’s specification through multiple ming as in ‘All phenomena are selfless.’ 
                                                          
ta dang/ de bzhin gshegs pa zhes pa la sogs pa shin tu mang ngo/ (Dpang Blo gros brtan pa 2004, 246; my 
emphasis). 
390 Cf. e.g. supra 129ff. 
391 Cf. supra 142. 
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 (chos thams cad bdag med pa’o). Likewise, ‘The saṃskāras are impermanent.’ (’du 
 byas mi rtag pa’o) [is the] combination of two ming and ‘Nirvāṇa [is the] pacification 
 of all suffering’ (mya ngan las ’das pa sdug bsngal thams cad zhi ba’o) is the 
 combination of multiple ming. This is pada [as] propounded in the Abhidharma. Pada 
 [as] it is known to the grammarian (brda sprod pa po) is as follows:  
  To a nominal stem (ming) eight cases distinguished  
  [into] 24 suffixes are to be applied, and  
  to the verbal roots (byings), ti, etc. are to be applied, whereby  
  the individual meanings are distinguished. [That is the grammarian’s] pada.  
 […] Here, only those aspects of the cases applied to nominal stems which are required
 in Tibet will be explained: the meanings of essence, karman, agency, benefit, origin, 
 connection, locus and address [are termed] the eight cases, each of which has a singular, 
 dual and plural form. As for the first case, […]”392 
By applying to case grammar the grammatical derivational model stem plus suffix, instead of 
the Abhidharmic essential meaning and its specification, the question remains open whether the 
Tibetan first case belongs to the domain of ming in the Abhidharmic sense according to Dpang 
Lotsāwa. We are left with interpreting the reasons for this, but a direct identification would 
have gone beyond the morphological (nominal stem) as well as semantic (essence) congruence 
between the two, since it would have also attributed the syntactic status of Abhidharmic ming 
to the first case.  
This status has not been fully clarified in the Tibetan grammatical reception of the tshogs gsum 
to my understanding, since ming may either refer to the main argument of the sentence to be 
specified by quality, etc., or to the basic building blocks of a sentence in the sense of ming ’dus 
pa (‘combination of ming’).393 As for the first option, the first case would attain a syntactic 
status close to the topical subject of a Sanskrit sentence marked by the first case suffix. As for 
the second option, the first case would not only share morphology and meaning with the 
nominal stem (prātipadika), but it would actually have become nothing but that very nominal 
stem itself as a syntactically non-functioning building block for sentences, without representing 
                                                          
392 Dpang Blo gros brtan pa 2004, 249f. The first part of this passage up until the end of the verse has already 
been quoted and discussed supra 129f. 
393 These two options correspond to the two different definitions of the sentence which belong to Vasubandhu 
and Patañjali and which are brought together by Yaśomitra in his Spuṭārthā on AK 2.47. For more details, cf. 
also Simonsson 1982A, 542; chapter 5.3.1. 
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any syntactic, i.e. intrasentential, item whatsoever. Dpang Lotsāwa does not follow any of these 
directions, but confines himself to a separate presentation of the two concepts Abhidharmic 
ming and first case within the Abhidharmic and grammatical derivational models respectively 
without relating them further:   
 Abhidharmic ming (nāma)  rnam dbye dang po 
Morphology: 
ming qua prātipadika 
(indicated by Sanskrit and unmarked 
Tibetan examples) 
= 
ming tsam qua prātipadika 
(only in Tibetan) 
Semantics: don gyi ngo bo ston pa = ngo bo tsam ston pa 
Syntax: 
ming qua nāma 
(main argument of the sentence to be 
specified or syntactically unbound 
building block, i.e. prātipadika) 
≠ ? 
Figure 7: Comparison between Abhidharmic ming and the Tibetan first case 
The resulting model successfully avoids any possible ramifications of the complete fusion of 
Abhidharmic ming and first case, but it does so at the price of systematicity, since the author 
does not further explicate why according to his model the first case in Tibetan semantically and 
morphologically equals Abhidharmic ming but is still treated under the section of tshig or pada. 
Since the author does not specify any syntactic equivalence between the first case and ming, 
does this imply that the first case still belongs to the domain of syntactically bound and 
functioning word forms? This would be most certainly correct in the Sanskritic context, where 
the first case suffix establishes a syntactically bound word form despite its semantic identity 
with the nominal stem. However, its explanatory value for Tibetan is very limited, since the 
semantic value of the first case does not figure in most Tibetan sentences. Alternatively, did his 
silence imply that the morpho-semantic congruence between Abhidharmic ming and first case 
results in their syntactic equivalence as well? Depending on the precise understanding of 
Abhidharmic ming, this would either assign a rather insignificant status to the first case in 
Tibetan (main argument of the sentence), or it would result in a substantial divergence 
compared to the Sanskrit first case (syntactically unbound building blocks). Moreover, despite 
Dpang Lotsāwa’s clear switch to grammatical tshig (pada) (stem plus suffix) in his treatment 
not only of the first case but of the entire case model, the precise interrelation of the two 
derivational models has not been specified by Dpang Lotsāwa.  
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In my opinion, it is most likely that in his conception of the cases he deliberately remained close 
to the Sanskrit grammatical model, and that apart from morphological observations he did not 
go into further detail about the differences between the incongruent models or the syntactic 
status of the first case in Tibetan – the latter which remains of course the biggest question mark 
in our current context – because his work deals with a presentation of the tshogs gsum as a 
general, cross-lingual concept that he applies to Sanskrit and Tibetan language in his 
exemplifications. The strategy to remain within the established and authoritative conceptual 
framework of the Sanskritic grammatical and Abhidharmic derivation of linguistic expressions 
without clarifying their mutual relation or adapting them to Tibetan was an easy solution in this 
regard.  
In summary, the understanding of Tibetan conceptions of the first case lies in the interrelation 
of the triad nāma (ming), prātipadika (ming) and prathamā vibhakti (rnam dbye dang po). The 
three demonstrate clear conceptual affinities and even borrowings with regard to terminology, 
morphology and semantics, but they also pose questions regarding their relation on the syntactic 
and derivational level. As for the historical relation of the first case as ngo bo (tsam) to 
Abhidharmic ming qua ngo bo tsam ston pa, presentations like that of Dpang Lotsāwa are a 
strong indication that the adoption of the latter for the former was apparently mainly based on 
the close semantic value of the first case and nāma without deeper syntactical considerations or 
comparisons of the two competing derivational models.   
The precise usage of the first case as an intrasentential and syntactic category in Tibetan 
language remains a major lacuna. In fact, whether an argument in the first case is or even can 
be part of any sentence is a most salient question in the Tibetan context – a question which was 
completely outside the grammarians’ attention. The standard definition of a first case as the 
indication of a mere essence, together with its illustration as syntactically unbound noun lists, 
emphasizes that the first case is restricted to the expression (brjod pa) or indication (ston pa) of 
mere lexical information, just like its Sanskrit counterpart prātipadikārtha. Any additional 
information about the sentence or its content is no longer covered by the meaning of the first 
case. If at all, then the first case’s use was only indirectly decided by Tibetan authors through 
varying scopes of linguistic expressions that were deemed to be confined to the semantic 
information of dngos po, spyi’i don or ngo bo, etc.  
For example, GNT classifies a clause with the existential copula ’dug as an instance of a first 
case, namely ka ba sbom zhing ring ba mang po ’dug (‘There are many thick and long 
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pillars’).394 Based on the treatise’s examples, any linguistic expression about the mere essence 
of a real phenomenon (dngos po) including its attributes or qualifications (khyad par dang bcas) 
qualifies as a first case. Zha lu Lotsāwa was the first in a succession of grammarians, who in 
contrast argued that also the syntactic link slar bsdu, which marks the end of a Tibetan sentence, 
is closely related to the first case.395 The precise rationale of his argument is not made explicit 
in his grammatical work, but according to Pra ti’s interpretation, this refers to elliptical 
expressions like bum pa’o (‘pot.’), etc., which do not go beyond the semantic information of 
lexical word meanings and thus qualify as first cases. Thus, Pra ti’s theory allows for at least 
one type of intrasentential use of the first case.  
In sum, the mere lexical-semantic definition of the first case did not establish sufficient 
parameters regarding its precise usage in Tibetan language. Since the focus of this definition 
lies only on the reference between a word and its lexical meaning, issues like the case’s function 
in a sentence and its relation to other intrasentential arguments apparently were secondary for 
most grammarians and thus frequently omitted.  
The roots of the unresolved intrasentential status of the Tibetan first may be traced back not 
only to the Abhidharma and possible conflicts with the grammatical derivational models, but 
go back even further to the first case’s origin in Sanskritic grammar. Like its Tibetan progeny, 
the Sanskrit first case form is introduced by the three quoted grammatical schools in purely 
semantic terms as the indication of a mere lexical function without any syntactic value.396 The 
syntactic information of the first case suffix, i.e. its congruency with the finite verb, is only 
indirectly contained in the derivational procedure of the treatises, and in the Pāṇinian system 
first of all in the famous rule of anabhihite in P 2.3.1.397 Compare the two interpretations of the 
following Sanskrit clause: 
 Devadattaḥ odanaṃ pacati 
 Devadatta cooks rice. 
 *Devadatta; someone cooks rice. 
                                                          
394 GNT CT 115 – 444f.; cf. supra 143f. 
395 Cf. infra 156ff. 
396 Cf. Raster 2015, 93; Deshpande 1991, 36. 
397 P 2.3.1: 
 anabhihite  
 “[A case suffix is only to be applied] if [the information contained in the condition which 
 triggers the case suffix is] not [already] expressed otherwise.”  
For the exact scope of this rule and related issues, cf. the rules P 2.3.1 and 2.3.46 in Joshi and Roodbergen 1998. 
Cāndra explicates this syntactic condition for triggering a first case suffix only in its Vr̥tti ad C 2.1.43. 
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Obviously, only the first interpretation represents the correct understanding of the Sanskrit 
clause. Devadatta is the agent of the action, even though his agency is not expressed by the first 
case suffix, since this type of information is already encoded by the verbal ending -ti. 
Nonetheless, there must be a relation in the sentence between noun phrase and verb phrase, 
otherwise Devadatta cannot be understood as the agent but remains an unrelated, mere 
articulation of a word as in the second interpretation. It is precisely the addition of the syntactic 
condition of anabhihite which covers this relation by triggering the first case suffix in the 
meaning of prātipadikārtha only if Devadatta’s agency is already expressed through the verb. 
In other words, Sanskritic grammars ascertain the use and status of the first case suffix as an 
intrasentential, syntactically connected category not in direct terms in their definitions of the 
first case function, but only indirectly through a condition that must be fulfilled by other 
arguments in the sentence for the assignment of a first case suffix. Of course, this syntactic 
condition that triggers a first case suffix covers a language-specific feature of Sanskrit 
sentences. Conversely, the quoted semantic definitions of the prototypical first case function in 
Pāṇini, Kātantra or Cāndra do not account for the relation between first case and verb-
ending.398  
The Tibetan tradition designed its case model along the lines of the Sanskritic prototypical case 
functions and adopted the lexical-semantic character of the first case directly from the 
Sanskritic tradition. It stands to reason, however, that grammarians north of the Himalaya did 
not pay much attention to its syntactic function as the default case form for already expressed 
agents or karmans, for WT does not follow any consistent agreement patterns between noun 
arguments and the verb, nor does the verb in the same way already encode the information of 
agent or karman. Once the Tibetan tradition dispensed with the outlined implementation of the 
first case’s prototypical function into the Sanskrit-specific derivation, the language-specific 
syntactic value of the Sanskrit first case suffix was lost and the lexical definition stood on its 
own, leaving open the question of the case’s usage in Tibetan language. From this perspective, 
it may even be speculated whether the Sanskritic strategy to explain the meaning and usage of 
the first case suffix evoked the impression in Tibetan grammarians that its semantic value 
constitutes the main function and that the grammatically more important syntactic value is only 
secondary; and even more so in a linguistic comparative approach with WT, since at least the 
                                                          
398 It is only the Sanskritic commentarial literature which explicates this. Kātyāyana, for example, adds the 
following definition for the first case ending: 
tiṅ samānādhikaraṇe prathamā 
“The nominative case is used after a word if it is coreferential with the finite verb ending” (transl. by 
Deshpande 1991, 38). 
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expression of unconnected single words carries comparable semantic information in WT so that 
the prototypical definition of the first case function might have been regarded as having 
linguistic validity across languages, whereas the precise usage of mere denotative lexical word 
forms (= first case) varies from language to language. 
In sum, the standard interpretation of the Tibetan first case (ngo bo tsam ‘mere essence’) in pre-
Si tu times is most likely a combination of Sanskritic grammatical definitions and Abhidharmic 
definitions of ming. Its morphology as an unmarked word form was explained by the tradition 
in Sanskritic terminology as a mere nominal stem (prātipadika, ming) without the affixation of 
separate suffixes (pratyaya, rkyen) for its completion. Among the different conceptions and 
terminological variations, the most dominant first case function agrees with Sanskritic 
grammatical theories inasmuch as it expresses only a word’s lexical meaning, which has been 
rendered in terms of ngo bo (‘essence’) and is closely related to the own-being of phenomena. 
It has been argued in this historical survey that this particular interpretation of a nominal stem’s 
meaning (prātipadikārtha) is an influx of Abhidharmic conceptions of ming (nāma) as don gyi 
ngo bo ston pa (‘indicating the essence of a meaning’), which however requires further approval 
in separate studies due to the grammarians’ reservation to articulate this connection. As we have 
seen, Dpang Lotsāwa and his influential TshSS separate between Abhidharmic ming and the 
first case insofar as the latter is treated as part of case grammar that belongs to the different 
derivational model of Sanskritic grammar, the latter in which it is tshig. Additionally, the status 
of the first case as an intrasentential argument in Tibetan sentences lies almost completely 
outside the focus of classical treatises. The Tibetan first case has never been clearly conceived 
as part of sentences, and if it was so conceived, then only as long as its actual function as the 
expression of a mere lexical meaning remains preserved. It is the lexical-semantic value of the 
first case which ultimately determines its range of application in the sources. The main issue is 
the fact that the Tibetan traditional version of the first case is not a relevant category for the 
morphosyntactic surface structure of Tibetan sentences. Nonetheless, the semantic information 
of ngo bo tsam remained an important linguistic category for the grammarians. Therefore, the 
Tibetan first case is characterized by a strong semantic focus, whereas the case’s validity as a 
grammatical category does not seem to have been grounded on its significance as an 
intrasentential relation nor any language-specific usage in WT – a most important fact for our 
understanding of the case model as a whole. 
We are not required to have the final word in this survey on the conception of the first case in 
the tradition before Si tu, since the outlined theories and the related issues primarily serve the 
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purpose to arrive at the historical and theoretical context which will facilitate an adequate and 
accurate assessment of Si tu’s agency. They already give a strong impression, which issues have 
been driving his specific theory formation. 
7.2 The First Case in the Great Commentary 
The SCP does not mention any function related to the first case, since the treatise’s actual topic 
is morphology and the meaning of a selection of syntactic links, and the first case does not take 
any link due to its zero-marking. Si tu’s exposition of the first case form is thus only located in 
his summary of case grammar at the end of the TKJ commentary: 
 de la rnam dbye dang po’i gcig tshig gi ming don gyi ngo bo tsam zhig ston pa ni/     bum 
 pa/     rtag pa/     bstand pa/     byas pa/     bsgrubs/     bsgrub/     sgrub/     lta bu ste/     
 bod skad la rnam dbye’i rjes logs med pas ming tsam de nyid yin zhing ming la ni bdag 
 gzhan dang dus gsum gyi dbye ba can rnams dang ming rkyang yang rung ste khyad 
 par med do/ 
 “Regarding the indication of a mere essence of a word stem’s meaning (ming don) by 
 the singular of the first case, this is e.g. ‘pot’ (bum pa), ‘permanent’ (rtag pa), ‘having 
 taught’ (bstand pa), ‘having done’ (byas pa), ‘has been established’ (bsgrubs), ‘is to be 
 established’ (bsgrub), ‘establish’ (sgrub). Since there are no separate endings of [this] 
 case in Tibetan language, it is precisely the mere word stem (ming tsam); and for 
 a word stem, it may be [items] that have a distinction into self and other or into the three 
 time aspects as well as proper nouns (ming rkyang), so this makes no difference.”399  
Si tu starts with a short definition of the first case as indicating the mere essence of a word 
stem’s meaning (ming don gyi ngo bo tsam ston pa). Like his predecessors, Si tu accepts the 
morphological identity between the first case and prātipadika (ming, ‘nominal stem’) due to 
the lack of a separate case ending (rnam dbye’i rjes). The listed examples of the first case qua 
ming resemble common illustrations in that they represent free lexical word forms without their 
implementation into sentences. However, his list includes not only proper nouns but also 
attributes as well as nominalized verbs and verbs proper. It is for the latter that ming no longer 
only refers to the nominal stem in the context of GC and was translated as ‘word stem.’  
Following his elaboration of the first and previous to the remaining cases, Si tu introduces an 
important distinction for all cases:     
                                                          
399 GC 598.2. 
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 rnam dbye gnyis pa la sogs pas ni don gyi ldog pa kho na ston gyi ngo bo ni nam yang 
 mi ston te/     dper na/ […] bum pas zhes pas de’i byed pa’i don ston pas tshig de dag 
 gis bum pa rang gi ngo bo tsam ma yin par de’i ldog pa ston pa lta bu’o/ 
 “Regarding the second case, etc., only variations (ltog pa) of the meaning are indicated 
 by them, whereas they never indicate the essence. For example, […] by means of ‘by 
 the pot’ (bum pas), [the pot’s] agency (de’i byed pa) is indicated. Therefore, these 
 syntactic forms indicate a [semantic-syntactic] variation of the pot, but they are not 
 the mere self-essence.”400 
This passage divides the cases into those which express only essential meaning and those which 
indicate a semantic-syntactic variation of this essential meaning, the latter being all the cases 
except for the first. The distinction into essential word meanings of the first and their variations 
(don gyi ldog pa) by means of the remaining cases directly resonates with his version of the 
tshogs gsum and the related pair ngo bo/khyad par.401 While cases number two to seven are 
therefore classified as tshig, the first case falls together with ming qua word stem. In Si tu’s 
model, the first case thus has a clearly defined derivational status, namely precisely that of ming 
qua extrasentential stem form that is then to be joined by a syntactic link to form an 
intrasentential, syntactically functioning tshig. 
However, Si tu’s taxonomy requires further clarification. His introduction of an overarching 
derivational scheme requires any kind of grammatical operation or category including the cases 
to be consistently subsumed under it. For Si tu, the option no longer exists to treat the derivation 
of the cases separately from the tshogs gsum and only vaguely subsume it under tshig without 
any considerations about the precise relation of the cases and the Abhidharmic theory. Whereas 
the classification of cases two to seven in a straightforward fashion is that of being a tshig as 
syntactically functioning and bound word form which take a link to express a semantic-
syntactic specification (don gyi khyad par), the derivational status of the first case as ming qua 
word stem is more intricate. On the one hand, it may be argued that the morphological (zero-
marking) as well as semantic (indication of a mere essence) identity is sufficient reason for a 
correlation between the first case and ming: since the first case neither expresses a semantic-
syntactic specification nor is it marked by any link, its classification as tshig would be 
contradictory. On the other hand, the question arises whether the morphological and semantic 
identity necessitates that they have the same grammatical-derivational status as well. Does zero-
                                                          
400 GC 599.1. 
401 Cf. chapter 5.3.3. 
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marking and the indication of ngo bo tsam automatically result in syntactically unbound, free 
word forms which constitute the derivational basis for the formation of syntactic word forms 
through affixation? Yes, if we assume that an unmarked word form that is absolutely restricted 
to the expression of lexical meaning cannot be in any relation to other arguments of the 
sentence; no, however, if we take into account Sanskrit grammar, in which the first case has 
been equally established as a mere lexical category without indicating any information about 
its relation to other arguments in the sentence. Si tu was of course very well aware that despite 
the exclusion of any other meaning than lexical, the Sanskrit first case form is not only affixed 
and therefore not a stem form to be affixed, but it is also a syntactically bound form in a 
sentence, a genuine pada (tshig) in the grammatical sense. The classification of the first case as 
ming in WT, which attributes the derivational status of extrasentential stem-forms to the case, 
was therefore not only the result of the morpho-semantic agreement of the two concepts, but it 
also resulted from the fact that the first case as ngo bo tsam ston pa has no other value in WT.402 
This is important insofar as Si tu claims that the cases have linguistic validity throughout all 
languages, but the full classification of the first case as ming remains language-specific. It was 
said above in the historical part of the current case that Tibetan grammarians may have looked 
upon the actual syntactic value of the Sanskrit first case suffix as secondary, since it only 
determines its use in the language and was covered by the manner in which it is triggered 
through certain grammatical conditions. It may therefore be concluded that Si tu’s Tibetan first 
case as a word stem on all levels of grammatical analysis likewise defines its use in WT. 
It might go against our linguistic intuition that a case is not part of a sentence and thus no 
syntactic entity, and even more so since this feature applies to only one of the cases, but it 
substantiates an important issue in the Tibetan case model: since there is no homogeneous 
syntactic criterion like that of dependent nouns which bear a relationship to their heads403 in 
order to define the grammatical category ‘case’ (rnam dbye) in the GC, it may be suspected that 
Si tu’s case model was developed along different lines and thus that its postulated validity must 
be sought elsewhere, namely its fundamental semantic value. 
                                                          
402 A form of Tibetan language may be imagined with a similar syntactic alignment like in Sanskrit (accusative 
language with diathesis), in which the Tibetan first case could still be unmarked for economical reasons. Then 
the morphological-semantic status between ming and the first case would remain identical, even though their 
grammatical-syntactic value diverges most significantly. 
403 Cf. supra 97f.; Blake 2004, 1. 
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The integration of the first case into the tshogs gsum together with its full identification with 
ming prompted two important modifications in Si tu’s conception compared to other 
grammarians, which will be further investigated in the following two sections. 
7.2.1 The Exclusion of any Syntactic Dimension from ngo bo tsam in the Great Commentary 
First, there is a modification of the case’s precise understanding as ngo bo tsam ston pa that 
arises most clearly in a critique against Zha lu Lotsāwa and his followers Rnam gling Paṇchen 
and Pra ti Rin chen don grub. They all relate the syntactic link slar bsdu, the first link discussed 
in the SCP, to the first case. Slar bsdu, also termed rdzogs tshig (‘syntactic form of 
termination’), is the technical term for the ten morphemes go, ngo, bo, mo, do, no, ’o, ro, lo and 
so, including also the eleventh form to that is not mentioned in SCP, which mark the end of a 
Tibetan sentence. The underlying reason for Zha lu et al. to demonstrate a relationship between 
the two grammatical categories of the first case and the terminating link seems to lie more in 
the structural features of the SCP and less in the theoretical considerations of their syntactic or 
semantic value. Since the rnam dbye brgyad represent an integral part of Tibetan traditional 
grammar, Tibetan grammarians such as Zha lu have apparently struggled with the fact that Thon 
mi did not include a presentation of the first case function in the SCP, whilst at the same time 
listing all others.404 It may be speculated that the commentators wished to defend him against 
the incompleteness of the treatise, a common deficiency to undermine the authority of a treatise 
in the Tibetan scholastic tradition.  
However, the relation between the first case form and slar bsdu has been based on theoretical 
reasons. In Zha lu’s commentary on SCP, this reasoning is unfortunately confined to a 
minimalistic and thus rather ambiguous statement on the connection between the two: 
 […] ’di yin no/ […] ’byung bar ’gyur ro/     ’od gsal lo/     mngon par rdzogs par sangs 
 rgyas so/     zhes pa lta bu rnams ni slar bsdu rdzogs tshig can dngos yin la/     bya’o 
 snyam  nas yod do zhes/     zhes sogs slar bsdu ma yin pa yang yod de/     de dag ni gtso 
 bor rnam dbye dang po dngos po tsam brjod pa dang ’brel ba shas che’o/ 
                                                          
404 None of the three commentators states this fact in their argumentation, but its importance clearly arises in Zha 
lu’s sa bcad (‘topical outline’). He organizes the main part of SCP, i.e. the exposition of syntactic links, 
exclusively along the lines of the eight cases, an indeed forceful act, since the root text applies different criteria 
for its rule ordering. In Zha lu’s commentary, the non-case links are all subsumed under the header of one of the 
cases, thus appearing only as secondary grammatical categories. The association of slar bsdu with the first case 
was a convenient solution to implement the latter, particularly as the syntactic link is the first grammatical 
morpheme discussed in SCP. Although Pra ti as the latest one of the three authors already demonstrates more 
awareness for SCP’s structure, he still adopts Zha lu’s theory, perhaps because it was already more established 
during his time due to Rnam gling’s reception. 
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“[…] ‘’di yin no’ (‘[…] this is.’), […], ‘’byung bar ’gyur ro’ (‘[…] will originate.’), 
‘’od gsal lo’ (‘[…] clear light.’), ‘mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas so’ (‘[…] the fully 
enlightened Buddha./has become fully enlightened.’), etc. are [examples of the] actual 
slar bsdu as a terminating syntactic form, whereas there are also [examples like] ‘bya’o 
snyam nas yod do’ (‘[…] having thought [it is] to be done, [it] existed.’), etc., which are 
not slar bsdu. These are mostly connected to the first case, the expression of a mere 
thing.”405  
The precise argument above remains unclear to me. Without discussing the two types of slar 
bsdu, first the question arises whether Tibetan de dag ni (‘these’) refers to both of them or only 
the second, slar bsdu ma yin pa (‘non-slar bsdu’ ~ non-actual or secondary slar bsdu). 
Secondly, in the sample phrases nouns and verbs are equally marked by the link in question, 
leaving open the question which of them qualify as an expression of the first case. The only 
definite point in the argument seems to be that ’brel ba (‘connection’) indicates that slar bsdu 
is not the first case as such but only connected to it. In the following, Rnam gling Paṇchen 
provides a more detailed account of the argument at hand: 
 ’di dag rnam dbye dang po’i don yin pa’i rgyu mtshan ni/ […] rnam dbye dang po’i 
 gcig tshig brjod pa dang/     ming phal che ba bod skad la khyad par med mod kyang/     
 slar bsdu ’di dag dang ’brel ba ni rnam dbye dang po’i don du shin tu gsal ba’i phyir 
 ro/ 
 “Now to the reason why these [syntactic links of slar bsdu] have the meaning of  the 
 first case form: [...] Even though the expression of the first case’s singular is identical 
 with most nominal stems in Tibetan, it is very clear that slar bsdu connected to these 
 [nominal stems] has the meaning of the first case.”406  
The argument follows the intuition that slar bsdu does not interfere with the semantics of the 
first case, since it has no semantic meaning but only the syntactic value of indicating the end of 
a sentence. As such, a noun which is marked only with this link indicates but the mere essence 
of the expressed phenomenon: 
 (1) me (‘fire’)  (2) me’o (‘fire.’) 
 (3) shing (‘wood’) (4) shing go (‘wood.’)407 
                                                          
405 Zha lu 2013A, 7. 
406 Rnam gling 2013, 66. 
407 Note that samples (2) and (4) may alternatively be translated as ‘There/This is fire’ and ‘There/This is wood’. 
However, commentators do not specify whether the expression of mere existence (‘there is’) or the use of the 
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Rnam gling Paṇchen very carefully distinguishes between the first case and its meaning. This 
suggests that while examples (2) and (4) are to him equivalent to the first case regarding the 
expressed semantic information, they are perhaps not fully identical in his view, since the first 
case remains morphologically distinct as the unmarked argument. Pra ti, however, establishes 
the relation of first case and slar bsdu much more directly: 
 bod ’dir ming tsam kho na la rnam dbye dang po zhes bya zhing/     rdzogs tshig sbyar 
 yang ming tsam las tshig tu mi ’grub bo/     de’i phyir bum pa’o zhes bya ba yang rnam 
 dbye dang po’i gcig tshig kho na’o/ 
 “Here in Tibet, only the mere nominal stem is called ‘first case,’ and even though a 
 terminating link has been applied, no syntactic form has been established other than the 
 mere nominal stem (ming tsam). Therefore, also ‘bum pa’o’ (‘pot.’) is exactly the 
 singular of the first case.”408 
Pra ti ignores the morphological inconsistency that a ming marked with slar bsdu no longer 
remains an unmarked stem form and thus is no longer a first case form. He seems to define the 
first case exclusively through its semantic value. The fact that slar bsdu in phrases like ‘pot.’ 
adds no information about the semantic constitution of the sentence or its content leads him to 
the conclusion that the two are not just semantically equal but also identical due to their 
semantic agreement. Turning finally to Si tu, his response to all three authors is very clear: 
 yang ’grel byed phal cher gyis/     slar bsdu’i sgra ’di rnam dbye dang po’i don du bshad 
 kyang shin tu ’thad par ma [sic!]409 mthong ste/     rnam dbye dang po’i gcig tshig gis 
 ni don gyi ngo bo tsam las gzhan mi ston la/     ’di ni sdud pa’i sgra yin pa’i phyir don 
 gyi ldog pa ston byed du ’gyur bas kyang khyad par che zhing/     khyod la’o/     ’di yis 
 so/     slongs mo par ro/     ’byung khungs nas so/     bdag gi’o/     shing la’o/     rtag 
 tu’o/     lta bu gnyis pa la sogs pa’i rnam dbye thams cad kyi mthar yang slar bsdu sbyar 
 ba yod pas/     khyed ltar na de rnams kyang rnam dbye dang po’i don can du ’dod dgos 
 pa’i phyir ro/ 
 “Furthermore, most commentators explained that this slar bsdu term has the meaning 
 of the first case, but [this] seems to be very unreasonable. The singular of the first case 
                                                          
copula fall under the category of ming. Strictly speaking, both add meaning (existence and identity respectively), 
for which reason it is more likely that the focus was on slar bsdu as a merely syntactic marker to indicate the end 
of a sentence. 
408 Pra ti 2013A, 194. 
409 I read mi. 
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 does not indicate anything other than the mere essence of a [word stem’s] meaning, 
 whereas this [slar bsdu here] becomes the indication of a semantic/syntactic variation, 
 because it is a collective term. For this reason, there is a great difference [between first 
 case and slar bsdu]. And since it occurs that [slar bsdu] is also applied at the end of all 
 cases, the second and so forth, e.g. in ‘to you.’ (khyod la’o), ‘by this.’ (’di yis so), ‘for 
 the beggar.’ (slong mo par ro), ‘from the source.’ (’byung khungs nas so), ‘of mine.’ 
 (bdag gi’o), ‘on the tree.’ (shing la’o), ‘forever.’ (rtag tu’o), it follows that according to 
 them, also these [examples] have to be assumed as having the meaning of the first 
 case.”410 
Si tu’s critique is directed against all the mentioned commentators, but it appears to draw mostly 
on Rnam gling’s exposition with its focus on the semantic equivalence of the first case and slar 
bsdu without postulating their full identity. It basically consists of two arguments, the second 
of which results from an immoderately exceeded equation of the two categories in question, 
which actually does not correspond to the outlined arguments in the criticized sources.  
To start with the first argument, Si tu denies that slar bsdu may have the meaning of the first 
case, because it indicates a variation in meaning (don gyi ldog pa) by encoding the additional 
information of collection (sdud pa),411 which, so Si tu, is outside the scope of the first case as 
ngo bo tsam ston pa. In contrast to Rnam gling, in his assessment of slar bsdu he treats the 
respective semantic and syntactic value of the two categories on the same level, and the 
exclusively syntactic value of the terminating link therefore interferes with the first case’s 
meaning according to his argument: 
 Rnam gling:  ngo bo (semantic) + sdud pa (syntactic) = ngo bo tsam 
 Si tu:  ngo bo (semantic) + sdud pa (syntactic) ≠ ngo bo tsam 
Even though semantically Rnam gling’s understanding remains valid and expressions like bum 
pa’o are mere statements of an entity or an entity’s essence without any further semantic 
specification, they do not qualify as an indication of the mere essence in a more inclusive 
analysis, in which all encoded information is taken into account. In other words, the difference 
of Si tu’s interpretation of the meaning of the first case compared to Rnam gling is that tsam 
                                                          
410 GC 470.6. 
411 Based on the etymology of the syntactic link slar bsdu, Si tu (GC 467.6) defines it as that through which “a 
current content’s meaning or syntactic expression becomes collected (bsdu ba) to the extent [of] that very 
[meaning or syntactic expression] (skabs bab kyi brjod bya’i don nam tshig de nyid gyis bsdu bar song ba […]).”  
In freer terms, this link gathers a certain portion of expressed information on a topic at hand into a collected and 
connected whole or unit, i.e. a sentence. Compare this definition also with Abhidharmic conceptions of pada as 
vākya, chapter 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. 
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ston pa (‘mere indication’) in ngo bo tsam ston pa has the entire grammatical structure of 
linguistic expressions as its reference point, in which both semantic and syntactic information 
is encoded. Thus, although in the GC it has lost any syntactic status as an intrasentential bound 
argument, Si tu’s conception of the first case involves more syntactic considerations than that 
of Rnam gling. This was also required by Si tu’s systematization of the tshogs gsum in Tibetan. 
Since in Si tu’s derivation phrases like bum pa’o consist of ming plus tshig phrad, they also 
belong to don gyi kyhad par and thus no longer are stem forms in the meaning of don gyi ngo 
bo. 
Conversely, it may be speculated whether Rnam gling as well as Zha lu and Pra ti arrived at 
their merely semantic interpretation of ngo bo tsam ston pa simply because they have not 
developed any comparable consistent scheme for the derivation of grammatical categories – a 
trace perhaps that they followed Dpang Lotsāwa and the standard tshogs gsum interpretation 
without implementing the cases in a consistent derivational scheme. The eight cases remain a 
closed set of semantic categories, while their status within the whole grammatical system 
remains open and undecided, especially in the context of cases like the first, for which the 
syntactic applicability is not self-evident. In view of what was stated in the introduction to 
modern case grammar, namely that languages usually do not represent the semantic structure 
of sentences in a direct one-to-one correspondence and also involve syntactic information, it 
may be concluded that Si tu’s strategy is preferable from a linguistic perspective and the demand 
of an adequate description of the morphosyntactic surface structure of a language.412 Obviously, 
Zha lu et al.’s semantically based equation of forms like bum pa and bum pa’o lack explanatory 
power in this context. However, also to Si tu the cases remain first of all a set of semantic 
categories. This semantic importance holds true for the first case, since we should not forget 
that, after all, this case encodes the crucial semantic information of a word stem’s lexical 
meaning also for Si tu. 
Si tu’s second argument to oppose the relation between ngo bo tsam and slar bsdu attempts to 
reduce Zha lu et al.’s point to absurdity and is based on a number of examples in which a case 
particle is followed by slar bsdu.413 These relate primarily to elliptic sentences in which the 
verb needs to be inferred from the context.414 Si tu’s point appears to be that if slar bsdu is 
interpreted in the meaning of ngo bo tsam bston pa, then it directly interferes with the semantic 
                                                          
412 Cf. supra 100f. and 105. 
413 ‘To you.’ (khyod la’o), ‘by this.’ (’di yis so), ‘for the beggar.’ (slong mo bar ro), ‘from the source.’ (’byung 
khungs nas so), ‘of mine.’ (bdag gi’o), ‘on the tree.’ (shing la’o), ‘forever.’ (rtag tu’o) (cf. supra 158f.). 
414 Another option perhaps are stylistic requirements in poetry in which the verb may indeed precede the noun 
phrase? 
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value of the other cases in the examples and consequently overrules them. However, in this case 
Si tu ignored the fact that neither Zha lu nor his followers have ever generally identified the 
first case with slar bsdu. It is clear from the argumentation of Rnam gling and Pra ti as well as 
their examples that slar bsdu may only take the meaning of a first case form in connection with 
unmarked word forms which are already first cases on their own. Their argument is not that 
slar bsdu as such is a first case marker which expresses the information of ngo bo tsam, but that 
this link simply does not add any semantic information which would change the meaning of the 
first case. However, Si tu’s counterexamples reveal the arbitrary character of their argument, 
since the very same applies to all the other cases as well. No matter which type of semantic 
information (agency, source, etc.) is expressed, the terminating link does not interfere with its 
semantic level, and thus this link equally relates to the remaining cases as to the first. This 
corroborates the hypothesis that Zha lu et al. were required to find a theoretical basis for why 
slar bsdu may be regarded as Thon mi’s indirect presentation of the first case in the SCP. As 
for Si tu, his critique as a whole confirms and substantiates that any intrasentential use of a first 
case as ming is prohibited and falls under the domain of don gyi khyad par/ldog pa as a part of 
tshig. 
7.2.2 The First Case and Verbs in the Great Commentary 
Apart from the syntactic blank value of the first case due to Si tu’s strict understanding of ngo 
bo tsam ston pa, Si tu’s second important modification of the first case due to its direct 
identification with ming is the subsumption of syntactically unbound, morphologically 
unmarked verb phrases. Si tu lists two nominalized verb forms (byas pa ‘that which is done’ 
and bstand pa ‘that which has been taught’) plus the proper verb sgrub (‘establish,’ 
‘accomplish’) in all three tenses.415 The derivational status of the nominalized forms in Si tu’s 
system is somewhat bivalent. The Tibetan nominalizer pa, referred to by the tradition as bdag 
sgra (‘possessive morpheme/term’), is included in the SCP and normally classified as a 
syntactic link.416 As such, Si tu’s model actually subsumes forms like byas pa or bstand pa 
                                                          
415 Additionally, Si tu lists rtag pa (‘permanent’), which is more difficult to classify. Although technically, rtag 
pa is a nominalized verb, the verbal form rtag (‘be permanent’) is very rare. One might therefore argue that it 
more likely attained the status of an attribute in WT, i.e. a proper nominal form on its own. I am not qualified to 
decide whether the scarcity of the verbal form may even be an argument for that rtag pa was the original form 
and the verb only a denominalization. Therefore, this sample will be excluded from my analysis, in order to 
avoid its misinterpretation. 
416 Cf. SCP 20.2-21.1. According to this conception, a form like byas pa indicates through pa that the marked 
stem form byas (‘has been done’) belongs to something else. Compare the following two examples: 
 (1) las ka byas pa ‘the work that has been done’ 
 (2) rta pa ‘horseman’ 
In the first clause, the nominalized byas pa is an attribute that belongs to (~ is owned by) las ka (‘work,’ ‘labor’), 
whereas in (2), the marker pa indicates that rta (‘horse’) belongs to (~ is owned by) someone, i.e. the horseman. 
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under tshig and thus outside the domain of the first case, since they are affixed words indicating 
the semantic/syntactic specification of ownership (bdag po, lit. ‘lord,’ ‘owner,’ ‘possessor’) and 
not only the essential meaning of the stem. On the contrary, they qualify as the basis for the 
affixation of an additional case marker, rendering them proper first cases according to Si tu’s 
model: 
 (1) byas (essence of a word stem’s meaning) + pa (syntactic link, ownership) = byas pa 
 (2) byas pa (essence of a word stem’s meaning) + s (case link, agency) = byas pas 
Si tu classifies the two nominalized examples in his list in accordance with (2), apparently 
regarding them as independent word forms expressing essential word meanings, which are then 
to be specified by additional links to form a tshig. As for the three verbal forms sgrub, bsgrubs 
and bsgrub, the rationale proposed by Si tu is apparently that in their syntactically unbound 
form they fulfill the necessary meaning condition (ngo bo tsam) and also correspond to the 
derivational behavior (stem form to be affixed) that defines Si tu’s first case. He justifies his 
classification for all five forms, nominalized or not, by claiming that a nominal stem (ming qua 
prātipadika) may be differentiated regarding bdag/gzhan (‘active/passive’)417 as well as the 
three temporal forms, as much as it can be a noun proper (ming rkyang). The explicit focus on 
ming in his argumentation already reveals that Si tu must have been aware of the bizarre 
character that verbs fall under the first case, for which reason he does not hesitate to 
immediately support his taxonomy by the help of his Sanskrit expertise: 
 dper na legs sbyar gyi skad du/     krī ṭa/     ka ra ṇa/     kāryya/     lta bu dus gsum dang 
 bdag gzhan gyi dbye ba yod pa’i sgra rnams kyang ming tsam nyid du mtshungs pa la 
 rnam dbyes tshig tu bsgrub dgos pa bzhin no/ 
 “[The fact that proper nouns, items distinguishable into bdag/gzhan as well as the 
 three temporal forms are ming] corresponds (bzhin), for example, with Sanskrit, where 
 also the terms which have a distinction into the three time aspects and self/other – e.g. 
 kr̥ta (‘having done’), karaṇa (‘means,’ ‘doing’), kārya (‘what is to be done’) – are 
 equivalent to the very mere nominal stem (ming tsam), which [then] has to be completed 
                                                          
417 This is a very inaccurate rendering of the two terms bdag (‘self’) and gzhan (‘other’) that would need further 
explanation. Yet, his comparison with Sanskrit reveals that in this context he indeed had the active/passive 
pattern of Sanskrit language in mind (cf. also HSGLT 2, 298f.). On the grammatical concept of bdag and gzhan, 
cf. Tillemans and Herforth 1989. 
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 as a complete, syntactically functioning word form (tshig, pada) through a case[-
 suffix].”418 
The classification of genuine verbs as a first case clearly goes against all of Sanskritic 
grammatical theory, since it violates the very basis of the Sanskrit derivation of padas, i.e. the 
distinction into nominal and verbal forms.419 However, Si tu provides the reader with three 
Sanskrit derivations that are classified as prātipadika, but nonetheless indicate time and 
diathesis.420 The first term, kr̥ta, is derived from the verbal root ḌUkr̥Ñ (‘to make’), after which 
the suffix Kta (P 3.2.102 + P 1.1.25) is added in the meaning of past (P 3.2.84) and karman (P 
3.4.70). The second example, karaṇa, is derived from the same verbal root ḌUkr̥Ñ in 
combination with suffix LyuṬ to express instrumentality (P 3.3.117). The third term, kārya, is 
once more derived from ḌUkr̥Ñ, this time in combination with suffix ṆyaT to express karman 
(P 3.4.70) and future.421 According to the Pāṇinian system, all three suffixes belong to the kr̥t-
class, which has the main function to nominalize verbal roots, which P 3.1.93 together with P 
1.2.46 then classifies as prātipadika (nominal stem), in order to qualify them for the affixation 
of case suffixes (P 4.1.1). Si tu shows full awareness of the Pāṇinian system and the fact that it 
indeed does treat these three examples as nominal stems regardless the different temporal 
information and grammatical voices they express. Si tu also demonstrates that the Sanskrit 
derivational system is fully in line with his argument that prātipadika (ming) is not only 
restricted to nouns but may also include word forms which express time and diathesis. In 
Tibetan, once words with these semantic values qualify as nominal stems, they simultaneously 
qualify as first cases as long as they are syntactically free or unbound and no marker or syntactic 
link has been added. Thus, so Si tu, the five Tibetan examples above are correct first cases.  
On the surface, Si tu’s argument is clearly flawed. His whole argumentation that verbs can be 
first cases is based on their derivational classification as a nominal stem, for which verbs fully 
qualify as long as they are unmarked (rjes logs pa med). Yet, the fact that nominal stems can 
encode the semantic information of tense and diathesis does not directly translate into the point 
that all word forms which encode this type of information are automatically nominal stems. In 
                                                          
418 GC 598.3. 
419 P 1.4.14 suptiṅantaṃ padam ‘[A] pada [is that which either] ends [in a] nominal suffix (sup) [or a] verbal 
suffix (tiṅ).’ 
420 The following analysis of the Sanskrit derivations is mainly based on HSGLT 2 (299), with a few minor 
additions necessary for our current purpose. 
421 Cf. HSGLT 2, 299. Therein, Verhagen mentions that ṆyaT indicates future. P 3.3.169, 171 and 172 attribute 
the meanings of ‘deserving’ (arha), ‘necessity’ (āvaśyaka), ‘being indebted’ (ādharmaṇya) and 
‘possibility/ability’ (śakti) to all kr̥tya-suffixes, under which ṆyaT is to be subsumed. Accordingly, European 
grammars usually classify it as a gerund from which perspective a future aspect in terms of ‘that which should be 
done’ is implied.  
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Sanskrit, even though there are nominalized verbs which are affixed by case suffixes, there still 
also remain verbs with the same type of information (time and diathesis) which cannot take any 
case suffixes, since they participate in a different derivational procedure with a different set of 
suffixes (tiṅ). The status of a nominal stem is determined through different criteria than the 
semantic information it conveys (e.g. time or diathesis), namely the manner in which the 
different word forms behave morphosyntactically as well as derivationally. From this 
perspective, Si tu’s argument to classify verbs as nominal stems because nominal stems can 
express time and diathesis is invalid. If they are not necessarily nominal stems, they also no 
longer necessarily qualify as first cases in the Tibetan context. Only the two nominalized 
examples make the exception and in fact directly correspond to the Sanskrit examples, thus 
being proper first cases in Si tu’s model. As for the three verbal forms sgrub (‘accomplish,’ 
‘establish’), etc., the Sanskrit examples cannot prove that verbs need to be first cases in Tibetan, 
since the parameters of grammatical voice and time do not provide sufficient criteria to include 
verbs into the nominal stems.  
However, what the Sanskrit examples can prove is that the semantic parameters of time and 
diathesis also do not exclude verbs per se, since the semantic information of time and 
grammatical voice can be encoded through both forms, nouns as well as verbs. If that were not 
be the case, then Sanskrit words like kr̥ta (‘having done,’ ~ past participle), karaṇa (‘means,’ 
‘doing’) and kārya (‘what is to be done’ ~ gerund) could not become complete padas through 
the addition of case suffixes. In other words, the semantic parameters in question are only of 
minor relevance regarding the distinction of nouns and verbs as well as nominal stems and 
verbal roots. In contrast, the relevant morphosyntactic and derivational behavior of the word 
forms is language-specific. Si tu’s whole point thus aims at the fact that verbs in Tibetan behave 
like genuine nouns and vice versa, both morphologically (unmarked) as well as from the 
perspective of the derivation (to be affixed with syntactic links), for which reason in his model 
a distinction between the two cannot be maintained. The foundational distinction of sup and tiṅ 
in Sanskrit is simply the result of Sanskrit morphosyntax, but since WT does not in the same 
way distinguish between two sets of suffixes for nouns and verbs, both word classes undergo 
the same derivational operation of the application of a syntactic link. As such, verbs qualify as 
ming as much as as any other word. This results in the already mentioned modification of ming 
in the sense that once the dichotomy of nominal stem (prātipadika) and verbal root (dhātu) has 
been nullified, ming is no longer fully equivalent to prātipadika (nominal stem) but rather refers 
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to a word stem in general.422 Ming is any unmarked, syntactically unbound word form (= 
prātipadika and dhātu) that expresses only the essence of a word stem’s meaning (~ nāma) and 
may be further specified (semantically and syntactically, ~ Abhidharmic and Patañjali’s pada) 
through adding syntactic links (~ Sanskrit grammatical pada), first of all the case markers. Any 
such ming then is identical with the first case on all levels, not only morphologically and 
semantically as in Dpang Lotsāwa and perhaps most of the preceding tradition. The first case 
is regarded as ming, and this modification again was inspired by Si tu’s systematic application 
of his derivational model to WT, this time in the issue of the subsumption of free lexical verb 
forms under the first case due to the morphosyntax specific to Tibetan. 
The distinction into nouns and verbs in Tibetan certainly is a more complex distributional issue 
than the way it is presented in Si tu’s treatment. Features like the verbal inflexion in WT into 
four forms traditionally referred to as ma ’ongs pa (‘future’), ’das pa (‘past’), da lta ba 
(‘present’) and skul tshig (‘imperative’) clearly sets verbs apart from nouns. Si tu apparently 
favored the option of including the information of tense in the essence of a word meaning (ming 
don gyi ngo bo), however the different tenses of a verb still raise the question whether they 
qualify as genuine stem forms which indicate the essence of a meaning, since they may equally 
be classified as a semantic/syntactic specification (khyad par, viśeṣa) of an actual root form.423 
Moreover, the precise distribution of the syntactic links demonstrates significant variations after 
nouns and verbs, in the sense that not all of them follow proper verbs and some of them encode 
different meanings when applied to nouns or verbs. Si tu did not consider these factors and was 
more concerned with the homogenization of the established concepts first case and ming. Even 
though Si tu’s conception was most definitely not only a theoretical exercise to reconcile and 
                                                          
422 This complicates the translation of Si tu’s commentary on the first case, since the same term, namely ming, 
refers to word stems in the Tibetan context, while in the Sanskrit context it of course remains confined to 
nominal stems. This is a paramount example for a shift in the meaning of a concept due to its de- and 
recontextualization from Sanskrit into the Tibetan linguistic environment, within one single treatise, even within 
one single passage.  
423 Otherwise, the classification of the different tense forms as a specification of a meaning (don gyi khyad par), 
and thus tshig would lead on to the question what kind of form could be the semantic and derivational basis, i.e. 
the actual essential meaning (don gyi ngo bo) of the different verbal forms. The options are then reduced (1) to 
ontological-semantic debates about the principal of the four forms, or (2) to introduce the concept of abstract, 
hypothetical verbal roots. 
Also note that in the Pāṇinian conception of dhātu, causative, desiderative or also intensive derivations of verbal 
roots are themselves classified as dhātu (cf. Abhyankar 1986, 207). As such, these deverbal forms are the 
derivational basis for further grammatical operations such as the affixation of suffixes in the formation of the 
optative, etc. Si tu may have looked upon the different tense forms of a Tibetan verb in a similar fashion, namely 
that they are derived from the same derivational basis, yet each on their own also represent separate derivational 
bases for the affixation of syntactic links. This multilayered derivation of verbal forms that always assigns the 
derivational basis (= stem form) depending on the current grammatical operation also resonates with Si tu’s 
classification of nominalized verbs as first cases and thus stem forms despite the fact that they are synthetic 
forms marked by bdag sgra (cf. supra 153 and the current chapter 7.2.2). 
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systematize hitherto incoherent Tibetan grammars but indeed aimed at a representative 
description of WT, the question whether or not his strategy has the highest explanatory value 
and was the most economical with regard to the language itself will be left to modern linguistics.  
7.2.3 Résumé on Si tu’s Conception of the First Case 
The task to reconcile all the established authorities, i.e. WT, Sanskritic and Tibetan grammatical 
sources as well as Buddhism, required a great effort. The Tibetan tradition from the earliest 
time onwards had contact with a variety of linguistic notions such as prātipadika, nāma, pada, 
prātipadikārtha, prathamā vibhakti, etc., which were originally developed against the backdrop 
of Sanskrit language and which already in the Sanskritic tradition had belonged at least to two 
different schools of thought. As shown above, all these notions are involved in the conception 
of the Tibetan first case. The decontextualization of these partially competing notions matches 
even less against the backdrop of the new linguistic environment of WT and thus required 
adaptation. In the TshSS, for example, there at least was an awareness about the morphological 
incongruence of the first case form in Sanskrit and Tibetan, but other than that the author 
adhered to the Sanskritic syntactic status of the cases as a pada. The competing authoritative 
theorems regarding pada (tshig) in Abhidharma and grammar were likewise adopted, but only 
reproduced next to each other without the courage of relating them to each other. Si tu’s strategy 
shifted focus away from these diverging authoritative conceptions and towards the language, in 
order to bring the different strands of the conceptual heritage back together into a consistent 
device that is operable in the Tibetan context. The ramifications of this daring homogenization 
were the syntactic blank value of the first case plus the inclusion of verbs, both significant 
deviations from Sanskritic taxonomies but at the same time never unreasoned. These are clear 
traces of Si tu’s self-proclaimed rational approach to the commentary of SCP and TKJ.424 His 
Sanskrit expertise enabled him to deviate from Sanskritic grammar mainly based on the 
extraction of the differences between the languages, so that the Sanskritic authority was not 
undermined but only recontextualized; and since TKJ only mentions the first case without 
further information and SCP fully omits the case due to the lack of a syntactic link, Si tu also 
had all hermeneutical freedom from the side of the Tibetan root texts. 
In any event, Si tu’s adaptations explicitly excluded the first case from pada and included verbs 
into case grammar, which corroborates that for him the cases did not have a predefined 
grammatical status, since their application may differ across languages in the sense that they 
are restricted to nominal inflexion in Sanskrit but cover verb phrases (VPs) in Tibetan. 
                                                          
424 Cf. chapters 3.3 and 4.2. 
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Accordingly, depending on the language, they may be syntactically functioning arguments or 
have the syntactic blank value of stem forms. As for the first case, it may be a marked argument 
in Sanskrit and still remain unmarked in Tibetan language. The validity of the first case rests 
therefore first and foremost on the semantic core value, the indication of the essence of a word 
stem’s meaning. The historical survey has demonstrated how the semantic focus of the case can 
be traced back to Sanskrit grammar, and the case’s implementation into Si tu’s modified 
derivational model was then only the result of his recontextualization and systematization of 
adopted models against the backdrop of the linguistic environment of WT. 
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8 Rnam dbye gnyis pa las or las su bya ba 
8.1 Historical Survey 
The Tibetan second case is commonly referred to as las (karman, lit. ‘action,’ ‘deed’) or the 
rather opaque las su bya ba (‘to be done as the karman’ ?) and is marked by la don (‘[having 
the same] meaning [as the morpheme] la’).425 La don, referred to as la sgra (‘la-morpheme’) in 
SCP 11.4, represents a morphological category that consists of the seven manifestations su, -r, 
ru, du, na, la plus tu, the latter not listed in the SCP but added by commentators already before 
Si tu.426 Illustrations of the second case vary strongly throughout the sources and comprise a 
variety of distinguishable grammatical constructions which reflect significant variations 
regarding the conception of the case and its meaning. The precise rationale has often not been 
made explicit, but common phrases come with a strong directional aspect, such as nam mkha’ 
la ’gro (‘[s/he] goes to heaven’) or shar phyogs su ’gro (‘[s/he] walks to the east’) in Rnam 
gling’s work.427 The diversity of the examples becomes manifest as soon as these phrases are 
compared with other types of clauses that have been equally classified as las by grammarians 
in and outside the context of Sum rtags: 
 shing gi rtse mo na gcod (‘to cut the tree at the top’) (Smr̥tijñānakīrti), shing de la lta 
 ba’am ’jog pa (‘to look at or chop into the wood/tree’) (Sakya Paṇḍita, KhJ), bsam du 
 med (lit. ‘not to be thought,’ meaning ‘unthinkable,’ ‘beyond our mind’) (Zha lu  and 
 Rnam gling), phyi rol tu bsdad (‘[s/he] dwelled outside’), se ra na chos ston (‘[s/he] 
 teaches the Dharma at Se ra’) (Pra ti)428  
This morphosyntactic diversity is not only attested between the sources, but it can be also 
observed within one and the same source. The collection of morphologically and semantically 
distinguishable categories such as DIRECTION, LOCATION, etc. in sample lists of 
grammatical treatises reveals that the classification of second cases did not follow the precise 
                                                          
425 Common glosses of la don are la’i don (‘meaning of la’) or in Zha lu’s commentary to SCP also la(’i sgra) 
dang don mthun pa (‘agreeing with the la-morpheme regarding the meaning,’ cf. ft. 426), which goes back to his 
quotation of Smra sgo and the verse ‘du, etc. agree with la’ (du la sogs pa la dang mthun, Smr̥ti 2002, 92). I 
have not further investigated the origins of la don, however, a similar notion compared to the Smra sgo is found 
already in the GNT under the second case, namely la dang cha mthun pa (‘partially agreeing with la’), where it 
only refers to the specific function of du and its allomorphs as de nyid (cf. infra 190f.). Additionally, the 
autocommentary on Smra sgo uses the term la’i don to refer exclusively to the functions of la. 
426 Cf. e.g. Zha lu 2013A, 9 on SCP 9.3-11.4:  
 de ltar su dang/     ru dang/     du dang/     na dang/     la dang ’di nas shugs kyis bstan pa’i tu yig rnams 
 ni/ […] la’i sgra dang don mthun pa yin te/  
 “Likewise, regarding su, ru, du, na, la and the letter tu taught only implicitly here (in the SCP), […] 
 [they] agree with the morpheme la regarding the meaning.” 
427 For more examples of the second case in Rnam gling’s Sum rtags commentary, cf. infra 207. 
428 My emphasis. 
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functioning of the la don morphemes in the different semantic and syntactic environments of 
Tibetan sentences, but it was based on other criteria that established the second case las or 
karman to be investigated in this chapter 8. 
8.1.1 Conceptions of the Second Case in Pāṇini, Kātantra and Cāndra and the Problem of the 
Tibetan Adoption of karman 
The second case’s prototypical function in Sanskritic grammar is that of karman. The principal 
Sanskritic conception of karman in the context of grammar goes back to Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī 
1.4.49-51:429 
 P 1.4.49 kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma “Karman is that which is most desired by the  
 agent.” 
 P 1.4.50 tathāyuktaṃ cānīpsitam “That which is undesired [but] connected in the same 
 way is also [karman].” 
 P 1.4.51 akathitaṃ ca ‘Also that which has not been mentioned [is karman].’ 
These three rules define the core notion of karman in Pāṇini, which belongs to the kārakas and 
represents the prototypical function of the second case suffix (vibhakti). The first rule is its basic 
definition and refers to most conventional instances of a PATIENT role in modern linguistic 
terminology,430 whereas the second rule covers those instances where the object of the action 
is undesired and thus not covered by the preceding rule.431 According to the commentarial 
tradition, the third rule finally refers mainly to double accusative constructions and sentences 
with more than one argument in the second case.432 In sum, the notion of karman is mainly 
defined in semantic terms based on the parameter of an agent’s desire for some item, and if the 
additional conditions of P 1.4.52 and 53 are included, generally speaking it covers a similar 
range of application compared to the grammatical category DIRECT OBJECT. 433  By 
                                                          
429 P 1.4.52-53 also define additional, syntactic values of karman in connection with certain verbs. Since these do 
not add any noteworthy information to the constitution of the Tibetan second case, their quotation has been 
omitted. 
430 Cf. two common examples quoted from Sharma 1990, 257: kaṭaṃ karoti ‘he makes a mat,’ grāmaṃ gacchati 
‘he goes to the village.’ 
431 Sharma 1990, 261: odanaṃ bhuñjāno viṣaṃ bhuṅkte ‘while eating rice he is consuming poison.’  
432 Ibid., 262: pāṇinā kāṃsyapātryāṃ gāṃ dogdhi payaḥ ‘he milks the cow by hand into a copper vessel.’ 
433 This comparison should not be misunderstood as an assumption of their identity. It should only help to gain a 
first orientation and should not hide the fact that there are noteworthy differences. Despite the clear semantic 
focus in its prototypical definition, it will not be decided whether karman in its entirety is best compared with the 
semantic role PATIENT or with the syntactic relation DIRECT OBJECT. For the traditional Pāṇinian 
interpretation of karman and its reception in the commentarial literature, cf. Sharma (1990) as well as Joshi and 
Roodbergen (1995) on the quoted rules.  
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comparison, Kātantra’s illustration of the meaning of karman only makes use of the Sanskrit 
morphosyntactic feature of diathesis: 
 K 2.4.13 yat kriyate tat karma “That which is done is karman.”434 
Finally, the Cāndravyākaraṇa, which does not provide any definition of kāraka and also omits 
the term karman, defines the prototypical of the second case function as follows: 
 C 2.1.43 kriyāpye dvitīyā “If to be reached by the action, a second [case suffix].” 
 Cāndravr̥tti: kriyayā vyāpye dvitīyā vibhaktir bhavati. kaṭaṃ karoti. “If to be reached 
 by the action, a second case suffix occurs. S/he makes a mat.” 
Cāndra’s designation of the second case label as āpya (‘reachable,’ ‘obtainable,’ ‘to be 
reached,’ etc.) instead of karman is closely connected to P 1.4.49, since it is etymologically 
related to īpsita, which in turn is the desiderative of the same verbal root āp of which āpya is 
the gerundive form.435 Candragomin’s Vr̥tti further clarifies that his definition encompasses the 
Pāṇinian rules under a single and more homogeneous parameter than an agent’s desire (īpsita): 
 īpsite ’pi vyāpyatvād dvitīyā siddhā: gāṃ dogdhi payaḥ. […] evam anīpsite ’pi: ahiṃ 
 laṅghayati. viṣaṃ bhakṣayati. yan naivepsitaṃ nāpy anīpsitaṃ tatrāpi bhavati: grāmaṃ 
 gacchan vr̥kṣamūlāny upasarpatīti. 
 “Also if desired, the second case suffix is established because of the reachability 
 (vyāpyatva) [of the desired, as in] ‘s/he milks the cow’s milk’ (gāṃ dogdhi payaḥ) […]. 
 Likewise, also if undesired [as in] […], ‘s/he eats poison’ (viṣaṃ bhakṣayati). Also in 
 case of that (tatrāpi) which is neither desired nor undesired, [the second case suffix] 
 occurs [because of its reachability], as in ‘whilst going to the village, s/he comes close 
 to the roots of a tree’ (grāmaṃ gacchan vr̥kṣamūlāny upasarpati).”436 
Candragomin’s kriyāpya or āpya is the direct terminological equivalent for the term karman in 
his grammar not only in the context of the second case function, but he systematically 
                                                          
434 In contrast to K 2.4.12 yena kriyate tat karaṇam, “by which [something] is done is the instrument” and K 
2.1.14 yaḥ karoti sa kartā, “that which does is the agent.”  
435 Cf. the entry on īps in Monier-Williams 1981, 170. The KV gives an etymological interpretation of Pāṇini’s 
īpsitatama under P 1.4.49 that resonates with the Cāndravr̥tti:  
 kartuḥ kriyayā yad āptum iṣṭatamaṃ tat kārakaṃ karmasaṃjñaṃ bhavati  
 “A kāraka which the agent most wishes to reach through his action is termed karman.” (transl. Sharma 
 1990, 257) 
436 Cāndravr̥tti on C 2.1.43. Sanskrit quoted from Liebich 1918, 103. 
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substitutes the former for the latter throughout his entire work, for example also anāpya (C 
1.2.97) for Pāṇinian akarmaka (‘without object,’ i.e. intransitive, P 3.2.148).437 
As for the Tibetan grammatical tradition, the problematic character of the second case starts 
with the fact that, although the category karman (las) was directly adopted and adhered to as 
the only function of the second case in the classical Tibetan case model, none of the quoted 
Sanskritic definitions exactly covers the Tibetan-specific functioning of the three 
morphosyntactically distinct morphemes na, la and du that are traditionally subsumed under 
the morphological category la don as the second case marker. From a descriptive-distributional 
perspective, the category la don needs to be distinguished in accordance with Tibetan 
morphosyntax at least into the three distinctive morphemes la, na and du together with tu, su 
and ru as allomorphs of the latter as well as -r as a variant of la and ru.438  
Following a more recent account of the morphemes, la as the main marker of la don principally 
indicates information of the type BENEFICIARY, POSSESSOR, ALLATIVE as well as 
different forms of LOCATIVE.439 Since la is governed by a fairly heterogeneous array of verbs 
with different semantic fields, the morpheme’s uses could be also subsumed under a more 
syntactic label such as “what would normally be called a dative, or an indirect object in a 
European language.”440 Hill’s study on the traditional la don category is restricted to the Old 
Tibetan Annals, listing the following examples for the regular uses of la: bab ‘fall on,’ phul 
‘give to,’ spos ‘transfer to,’ rdugs ‘reduce to’ and chags ‘be attached to.’ 441  In contrast, 
Tournadre uses the term INDIRECT OBJECT only as alternative for his BENEFICIARY 
function of la.442 If my understanding of this function in his article is correct, this category 
covers rather diverse uses that are specific to la and -r and not shared by du nor na. Generally 
speaking, a spatio-directional interpretation of la in terms of an ALLATIVE or DIRECTION 
seems to prevail in linguistic research regarding the morpheme’s prototypical function.  
The morpheme du appears to be more straightforward in its uses and shares with la the 
ALLATIVE/DIRECTION as well as LOCATIVE function, while according to Tournadre it 
additionally also encodes the information of PURPOSE and TRANSFORMATION.443 
                                                          
437 Note that this was also part of his strategy to avoid technical terms that are not self-explanatory and require 
separate definitions (cf. ft. 256). 
438 Cf. supra 93. 
439 Cf. Tournadre 2010, 106f. 
440 Hill 2011, 15. 
441 Cf. ibid. 
442 Cf. Tournadre 2010, 97. 
443 Cf. ibid., 108f. On the category of TRANSFORMATION and Tibetan conceptualizations of this particular 
use of du, cf. also chapter 8.2.5. 
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Finally, the marker na is restricted to mere static spatio-temporal information,444 in most basic 
terms a static LOCATIVE.445  
Even though at least DIRECTION constitutes a semantic field that can be covered by karman 
as well, as demonstrated by the classic example grāmaṃ gacchati (‘s/he goes to the village’),446 
the generic meaning of karman refers to those DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT-arguments of 
transitive Sanskrit sentences that remain unmarked in Tibetan sentences. Only exceptional uses 
of the morpheme la for emphatic case marking and other reasons may mark the DIRECT 
OBJECT/PATIENT, and this feature is referred to as optional or floating case marking447 and 
cannot be maintained as the morphemes’ generic use. As for the morphemes du and na that are 
equally considered second case markers, they do not even exceptionally encode the category 
DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT. Other than that, functions of the seven la don morphemes in 
Tibetan sentences such as POSSESSOR, PURPOSE, LOCATIVE, etc. are even further away 
from Sanskritic conceptions of karman than ALLATIVE/DIRECTION.  
So how did Tibetan grammarians regard this substantial divergence that none of the Tibetan la 
don morphemes directly correspond to the Sanskrit second case suffix in its function as karman? 
Why did they nonetheless associate the second case’s Sanskritic prototypical function of 
karman with the directional marker la and its traditional equivalents? And what is the resulting 
status of the unmarked argument that encodes the DIRECT OBJECT or PATIENT in Tibetan 
sentences? Finally, how did Tibetan grammarians argue for the homogeneity of la don in view 
of the seven morpheme’s morphosyntactic diversity? It is for questions such as these that the 
second case las is by far the most intricate of all, both linguistically and historically, and has 
been addressed in an important article by Bettina Zeisler. 448  For the sake of clarity, the 
following presentation of the history of the second case pre-Si tu will be separated into the early 
tradition with a  focus on NGg as well as GNT and then the remaining tradition before the GC. 
                                                          
444 Cf. Tournadre 2010, 110; Hill 2011, 19. 
445 This is by no means a comprehensive analysis of the morphemes. Each of the three comprises a range of 
functions, and the taxonomies significantly differ in the modern academic literature as well. For a more recent 
presentation, cf. Tournadre 2010. Also note that the presentation provided above is diachronically insensitive. 
Unfortunately, apart from Hill’s study on the Old Tibetan Annals, the diachronic, geographical as well as other 
variations between literary genres, etc. are only beginning to be understood in modern academia. An increase in 
knowledge about the precise constitution of these case markers would certainly also enhance the historical 
analysis of this dissertation. 
446 Cf. ft. 430. 
447 Cf. Zeisler 2006, 87ff. For an example of la’s use as a marker for the DIRECT OBJECT due to pragmatic 
reasons, cf. also supra 103ff. 
448 Cf. Zeisler 2006. 
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8.1.2 Early Conceptions of the Second Case 
Whereas SCP and GNT already group together the three morphemes la, na and du and attribute 
to them the second case function las, other early sources such as NG, NGg, MVY and Chos 
grub’s ’Jug pa’i sgra brgyad bstan pa tshig le’ur byas pa only mention la as the marker for the 
second case.449 The fact that early sources unanimously adhered to this position that all three 
morphemes qualify as second cases is difficult to evaluate due to the relative absence of 
information the sources provide on this issue. Most importantly, la sgra is not only the 
morphological marker for the second case function in the SCP, but it may express up to five 
different meanings: 
 las dang ched dang rten gnas dang/      
 de nyid tshe skabs la sgra yin/ 
 “karman, beneficiary, support, 
 identity [and] time [are] the la-morpheme (la sgra).”450  
Even though the root text does not mention the term ‘case,’ this passage still demonstrates that 
the morpheme la together with its equivalents comprises amongst its meanings three case 
functions, i.e. the second (las, ‘karman’), fourth (ched, ‘beneficiary’) and seventh (rten gnas 
‘support’). The same fact has been recognized and noted in the GNT: 
 de yang gnyis pa’i sgra ’di gang la zhes pa’i la yis ston te/     bod kyi sgra la ni bzhi pa 
 yang la yis ston pa yod la/     bdun pa yang la yis ston te/     gnyis pa dang/     bzhi pa 
 dang/     bdun pa’i bye brag rnams kyi don ma nor bar shes pa ni gal che ba kho na’o/ 
 “Likewise, this second [case] form is indicated through la, i.e. ‘upon which’ (gang la). 
 In Tibetan morphology (bod kyi sgra la), also the fourth [case] is indicated through la, 
 and the seventh [case] is expressed through la as well, but a knowledge of the meaning 
 of the specific second, fourth and seventh [cases] (gnyis pa dang bzhi pa dang bdun pa’i 
 bye brag rnams kyi don) without confusing [them] (ma nor bar) is of utmost 
 importance.”451  
GNT’s highlighting of the importance of the three cases despite their morphological identity in 
Tibetan ranks among the clearest textual evidence that the Tibetan case scheme was not based 
                                                          
449 NG: cf. CT 115 – 407 and 411f.; NGg: cf. CT 115 – 417ff. and 432; MVY: cf. HSGLT 2, 26; Chos grub: cf. 
HSGLT 2, 361f. 
450 SCP 11.3-11.4. 
451 CT 115 – 447. 
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on the same theoretical foundation as the Sanskritic tradition. Whereas Sanskritic grammars 
had based the number of cases on the language’s morphology and the distribution of 
morphemes, the Tibetan grammarians distinguished the cases merely on a functional basis. This 
fact alone is a strong indicator that the notion of ‘case’ in general refers more to the case 
functions and less to the morphemes. While the precise reasons for this remain to be 
investigated, in the meantime we may examine the very meaning of the Tibetan second case 
referred to as las or karman, which constitutes its proclaimed importance.  
Similar to the findings encountered in the investigation of the first case, the Tibetan conception 
of the second case is not a direct reproduction of any of the presented Sanskritic grammatical 
conceptions, although in this case its label las (karman) corresponds directly to Pāṇini and 
Kātantra.452 Apart from merging la, na and du together under la sgra and attributing to it the 
function of las, SCP is rather parsimonious when it comes to the conceptual foundation of the 
second case’s meaning. However, NGg and GNT focus on the two notions yul (‘place,’ ‘locus,’ 
‘domain’) and gzhi (‘base,’ ‘substratum’) respectively. Additionally, both these sources 
mention the alternative label of the second case las su bya ba (‘to be done as the karman’)453 
and thus fully prepare the key terminological framework prominent in Si tu’s GC and most 
other grammatical works. Especially this pair of yul and gzhi deserves a more detailed 
preliminary investigation as part of this study, not only because they convey crucial information 
about the Tibetan understanding of las, but also since the historical and conceptual origins of 
this focal Tibetan terminology so far has not yet received sufficient attention in modern 
academia.  
                                                          
452 As for Cāndra, Tibetan scholars may have seen āpya as synonymous in the grammatical context, and 
therefore they may have focused on karman as the more common term due to the resulting advantage of 
avoiding confusion caused by two competing terminological conventions. In fact, this is manifest in the Tibetan 
translation of the term. From HSGLT 2 (Appendix C, 356), we know of three Tibetan translations of kriyāpya, 
i.e. bya ba’i las (‘the karman of the action’), bya ba dang las (‘action and karman’) and bya ba (action). It might 
also be imagined that Tibetan translators apparently struggled with the Sanskrit compound form, perhaps lacking 
any reliable commentary regarding its precise interpretation. Interestingly, Peter Verhagen (HSGLT 1, 54) 
remarks that no Tibetan translation of a Cāndra commentary is known. As we have seen, the Vr̥tti clearly 
resolves the compound as a tr̥tīyā-tatpuruṣa and thus clarifies the precise meaning of the compound, something 
Tibetan translators could have hardly missed, if they would have known it.  
It may also be interesting to note that in Si tu’s Cāndra commentary the term is generally translated with bya 
ba’i las as well, even though Si tu quotes the definition of the Kāśikāvr̥tti inlcuding the verbal root āp which he 
translates literally with Tibetan khyab pa (cf.  infra 230f.). 
453 GNT: CT 115 – 449, NGg: CT 115 – 419. 
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8.1.2.1 The Second Case las as yul in the Gnas brgyad ’grel pa 
NGg offers two definitions of las that attract our interest: one in the context of the sixfold 
scheme of kāraka of topic one, the other in the definition of the second case under topic six 
(vibhakti, rnam dbye): 
Kāraka-definition of las:  
 gang la byed ces pa ni gnyis pa las kyi tshig ste/     las su bya ba gang zhig las byed pa 
 gzhan zhig yul du byas pa yin te/     shing la byed ces pa lta bu’o/   
 “So-called ‘gang la byed’ (‘to act upon something’) is the second, the syntactic form 
 karman (las kyi tshig). It says that something to be done as the karman (las su bya ba) 
 has been made into the domain (yul du byas pa) [by] something distinct that performs 
 an activity (las byed pa gzhan zhig), for example ‘to act upon the tree’.”454 
Vibhakti-definition of las: 
 gzhan gyis byas pa las su ston pa dang/     las lta bur byed pa ston pa’i phyir gnyis pa 
 las kyis455 yin no/ 
 “Since it indicates that which has been done by something distinct (gzhan gyis) as the 
 karman and that which is being done as if [it would be] the karman, it is the second 
 [case], the semantic domain (sa) of karman.”456 
The basic idea is that an activity (las) is performed (las byed pa) on or upon the karman as las 
su bya ba, the latter which takes on the part of the place or domain (yul) where the activity is 
being performed (kāraka-definition). Alternatively, las is simply that which is done by 
something distinct, presumably the agent (vibhakti-definition). These definitions exhibit two 
salient features of NGg’s conception of karman. 457  First, both emphasize the feature of 
distinctiveness or separateness through the addition of gzhan (‘other,’ ‘distinct’), which 
suggests a basic bivalency or bipolarity of an action in terms of the active performance of an 
activity (las byed pa), presumably that of an agent, and karman as las su bya ba. Secondly, the 
kāraka-definition further specifies karman as the yul du byas pa, indicating that the karman 
                                                          
454 CT 115 – 419. 
455 I read kyi sa. 
456 CT 115 – 432. 
457 A third one regards the temporal status of the karman as that which has been made (byas pa) or has been 
made into the domain (yul du byas pa). The past tense seems to be indicatory, otherwise the vibhakti-definition 
would not have added the “quasi-status” of karmans in the present (las lta bur byed pa). I was unable to make 
further sense of this, and since to my knowledge the later tradition refrained from drawing on this particular 
feature, it will not be further considered. 
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becomes the locus of the agent’s doing. Maybe more trenchantly, karman may be interpreted 
as the ‘domain’ or ‘focus’ of the agent’s performance, for example a piece of wood in the focus 
of a carpenter who cuts the wood, in a sentence such as ‘the carpenter cuts wood.’ The Tibetan 
term yul du byed pa (lit. ‘making into the place/domain/object) is a translation of Sanskrit viṣayī 
karoti in non-grammatical literature.458  I am not qualified to decide on the affinity of the 
semantic fields of Sanskrit viṣayī karoti (‘make an object’) and Cāndra’s (vy)āpya (‘to be 
reached’), but the idea of āpya according to which the patient of the sentence is to be reached 
or obtained through the action certainly resonates with the patient as a locus, domain or focus 
of the agent’s activity. In addition to this general conceptual propinquity or at least 
compatibility with C 2.1.43, NGg’s conception of the second case karman, especially its two 
major characteristics of distinctiveness of agent and karman as well as the specification of 
karman in terms of yul (viṣaya), already figures very directly in the Sanskritic tradition.  
8.1.2.2 On the Notion of viṣaya (yul) in Sanskritic Conceptions of karman 
Without attempting to determine the actual inspirational sources for the Tibetan accounts 
quoted above and below, it may be stated that the only Sanskritic sources where I encountered 
the direct explication of the idea that the kāraka karman is viṣaya are found in the Nyāya 
literature, i.e. non-Buddhist philosophical sources.459 The Nyāyavārttika (NV)460 introduces the 
term kriyāviṣaya (bya ba’i yul, ‘domain of the action’) in a discussion of the famous six kārakas 
in the context of Nyāyasūtra (NS) 2.1.16: 
 darśanenāptumiṣyamāṇatvād vr̥kṣaḥ karma, karmaṇi kaḥ kārakārthaḥ? 
 kriyāviṣayatvam. yat khalu kriyāyā viṣayabhāvena vyavatiṣṭhate tat karma. anena 
 karmalakṣaṇena tathāyuktaṃ cānīpsitam iti (= P 1.4.50) saṃgr̥hītam. 
 “[In ‘s/he looks at the tree’ (vr̥kṣaṃ paśyati),] the tree is karman, because it is that which 
 is desired to be reached through the [action of] looking (darśanenāptumiṣyamāṇatva). 
 What is the meaning of the kāraka in the case of karman? To be the domain of the action 
 (kriyāviṣayatva). Now that which is definitive/stands out (vyavatiṣṭhate) (?) as the 
                                                          
458 Cf. Negi 2003, 5860. 
459 The following investigation is mainly confined to only two of the earlier Nyāya sources in which are found 
simple and straightforward accounts of karman qua viṣaya and which precede the NGg or are at least positioned 
within the same early time frame. This serves the purpose of presenting the necessary textual evidence that such 
a conception of karman has already circulated in a very direct form in the Sanskritic tradition at the time of NG 
and NGg’s composition, yet it is not intended to establish any relation between Sanskritic Nyāya and Tibetan 
grammaticography which would amount to an astonishing twist in Tibetan intellectual history, but which is too 
early to be assumed and likely much more complex.  
460 Composed by Udyotakara (~ 6th/7th century). 
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 domain of the action is the karman. Through this definition of karman [also] ‘[that 
 which is] connected in the same way [but] undesired’ (= P 1.4.50) is included.”461 
Without a direct reference, NV’s darśanenāptumiṣyamāṇatva is the application of Pāṇinian 
kartur īpsitatamaṃ, even more literally that of KV’s kartuḥ kriyayā (yad) āptum iṣṭatamaṃ, 
and it stresses the idea of āp (‘to reach’) for karman.462 That which is desired to be reached, i.e. 
the karman, is simultaneously qualified by kriyāviṣaya. This Sanskrit term does not seem to be 
a common technical term in classical Sanskritic grammatical schools, at least I did not identify 
it in Pāṇini, Cāndra or Kātantra nor in commentaries like Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya or the later 
Kāśikāvr̥tti. Also Abhyankar did not include it in his Sanskrit grammatical dictionary.463 
If āptum (‘reached’) is determined as the main qualificand of karman in NV’s 
darśanenāptumiṣyamāṇatva and the iṣyamāṇa is neglected as a secondary specification 
reproducing the original desiderative information of the Pāṇinian maxim of īpsitatama, a direct 
relation becomes evident in this source between Sanskrit āp (‘to reach’) and viṣaya (‘domain’). 
To further develop my interpretation of NV, that item which is desired to be reached (āptum 
iṣyamāṇa) by means of the action, which of course is in closest proximity to that which is to be 
reached (āpya) by means of the action (C 2.1.43), lies in the focus of the reaching and thus 
becomes the focus or domain of the action (kriyāviṣaya). As clarified in NV, the reason for the 
shift of focus from a Pāṇinian definition that focuses on the parameter of desire to the more 
neutral kriyāviṣaya is that it provides a simple and pragmatic solution to summarize the different 
meanings of karman as defined in Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī 1.4.49-50. This is precisely the same 
rationale also encountered in Cāndra’s Vr̥tti and its substitution of kriyāpya for karman.464 
Vācaspati’s (~ 9th/10th century) subcommentary on the Nyāyavārttika, the 
Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā (NVTT), provides a much more theoretical and philosophical 
interpretation of kriyaviṣaya in the context of its commentary on the passage of NV quoted 
above: 
 uttaram – kriyāviṣayatvamiti. anātmasamavetakriyāphalaṣālitvaṃ kriyāviṣayatvaṃ 
 karmatvam. devadattasamavetayā hi kriyayā darśanalakṣaṇayā vr̥kṣaviṣayo ’nubhavo 
                                                          
461 Sanskrit transliterated from Thakur 1997, 189.1-4. 
462 Cf. supra 170 and ft. 435. The two sources are both dated to around the 6th/7th century. I am not able to 
answer, whether there is any textual evidence which could prove that Udyotakara knew about the KV. 
463 Cf. Abhyankar 1986. Note that Abhyankar (1986, 363) provides the notion viṣayaviṣayibhāva (‘relation 
between the object and the subject’) with a reference to Kaiyaṭa (11th century ?) on P 6.4.104. I have been 
unable to address how this notion may be related to the idea of kriyāviṣaya as presented in the following, but I 
could not identify any direct connection. 
464 Cf. supra 170. 
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 janyate. [...] etena ca karmalakṣaṇenāhiṃ laṅghayati grāmaṃ gacchan 
 vr̥kṣamūlānyupasarpatītyādayo ’pi saṃgr̥hītā veditavyāḥ. 
 “Next [is] ‘being the domain of the action (kriyāviṣayatva).’ To be endowed with
 the result of an action which is inherent in [something] distinct 
 (anātmasamavetakriyāphalaśālitva) is being the domain of the action, which is being 
 karman. [In ‘Devadatta looks at the tree,’] a direct cognition (anubhāva) of the tree as 
 the domain is produced by an action (kriyayā [...] janyate) inherent in (samaveta) 
 Devadatta and characterized by looking. [...] And through this definition of the karman, 
 also ‘walking to the village,’ ‘s/he steps over a snake,’ [or] ‘(s)he comes near the roots 
 of a tree’465 should be understood to be included. [...]”466 
In short, that very entity which is connected or endowed (śālitva) with the result of the action – 
that is to say, where the result manifests itself – that entity is the kriyāviṣaya (‘place/domain of 
the action’), which once again is intended to comprise at least two types of karman listed in 
Pāṇini’s grammar 1.4.49 and 50.  
Vācaspati’s elaboration of kriyāviṣaya adds important features compared to the account in NV. 
Although he adheres to the general idea that karman is the entity reached or to be reached by 
the action,467 in Vācaspati’s commentary viṣaya primarily refers to the experiencer or locus of 
the result of the action. The second important addition is his idea of the distinctiveness of agent 
and karman, which is made explicit by means of the anātmasamavetakriyā (‘action inherent in 
something distinct’). This notion deserves closer attention with regard to Si tu’s typology of 
actions, in which it corresponds to his definition of differentiated and non-differentiated actions 
(tha dad min) in terms of byed pa po gzhan dang dngos su (mi) ’brel ba’i bya ba (‘an action 
which is (or is not) directly related to a distinct agent’). As to the current context of case 
grammar, it suffices to say that this notion was introduced by Vācaspati to account for instances 
                                                          
465 These two examples are taken from Mahābhāṣya (MBh), Bhāṣya 6 and 7 respectively ad P 1.4.50. 
466 Sanskrit transliterated from Thakur 1996, 322.7-17. 
467 This becomes evident in the NVTT prior to the last quotation:  
 prcchati ‘karmaṇikaḥ kārakārthaḥ’. kārakaśabdārthaḥ kriyānimittaṃ hi kārakam. yat punaḥ kriyāyā 
 eva vyāpyaṃ na tat kriyānimittamiti na kārakam? 
 “[The NV] asks: ‘What is the meaning of the kāraka [in the context of] karman?’ The meaning of the 
 term kāraka is that kāraka [is] certainly the cause of the action. Conversely, is karman not a kāraka in 
 the sense that not that which is to be reached by actions (kriyāyā vyāpya) is a cause of the action?” 
 (Sanskrit transliterated from Thakur 1996, 322.5-7)  
The issue at hand is of little interest for the current investigation, and its solution is connected to the preexistence 
of karman/kriyāviṣaya prior to the action, for which reason it ultimately qualifies as a cause of the action and 
thus a kāraka despite being that entity which is to be reached. The karman as kriyāviṣaya is only endowed with 
the result, but not the result itself according to NVTT’s theory. What is of more interest here is that Vācaspati’s 
phrasing of kriyāyā vyāpya, which completely omits the idea of desire (īpsita, iṣṭatamaṃ, etc.), comes very close 
to Candragomin’s kriyayā vyāpya (‘that which is to be reached by the action’). 
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such as nagaraṃ gacchati caitraḥ (‘Caitra goes to town’). This phrase conveys the problem for 
his definition of kriyāphalaśālitva (‘being endowed with the result of the action’) that the result 
of the action of going, which he renders in accordance with the tradition as ‘reaching 
somewhere’ or ‘meeting with something’ (prāpti),468 qualifies both Caitra as well as the town, 
since the result of reaching or meeting can only take place between two entities.469 Therefore, 
Caitra, despite being the agent of the sentence, qualifies as karman in the same way as nagara 
does. The addition that the action is inherent in an agent which is distinct from the experiencer 
of the result then solves this issue by clarifying that Caitra, since the action is inherent in him 
as the goer, becomes the agent and thus can no longer experience the result.  
The importance of Vācaspati’s conception of karman in the Sanskritic tradition can be best seen 
from its appearance in the much later Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāraḥ of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa (17th 
century), who was a grammarian and thus in opposition to the Naiyāyikas:  
 tathā hi ‘karmaṇi dvitīyā’ [pā sū 2-3-2] tacca karturīpsitamaṃ [pā sū 1-4-49] 
 kriyājanyaphalāśraya ityarthaḥ. […] ‘tathā yuktaṃ cānīpsitam’ [pā sū 1-4-50] 
 ityādisaṃgrahāccaivameva yuktaṃ. 
 “Therefore, ‘a second [case suffix] if there is a karman’ (= P 2.3.2). That is ‘that 
 which is most desired by the agent’ (= P 1.4.49) [and is] ‘the substratum of the result 
 produced by the action’ (kriyājanyaphalāśraya). [...] It is also suitable in this 
 manner, because it includes ‘[That which is] connected in the same way [but] undesired’ 
 (= P 1.4.50), etc.”470 
This resonates directly with Vācaspati’s anātmasamavetakriyāphalaśālitva, with the variation 
that the karman is the substratum (āśraya) of the result and not endowed with it (śālin) as well 
as the omission of the anātmasamaveta, which is subsequently refuted by Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa. 
The entire conception of karman as kriyāviṣaya is closely connected to attempts towards a 
simplification and homogenization of the Pāṇinian approach which distinguishes between 
desired and undesired karmans. This approach occurs already in the Cāndravyākaraṇa and thus 
before the quoted Nyāya sources, however both feature a shift away from Pāṇinian īpsita 
(‘desired’) towards a more inclusive reinterpretation of karman in terms of either kriyāviṣaya 
(‘domain of action’) or āptum and āpya (‘reached’ and ‘to be reached’). 
                                                          
468 Cf. Thakur 1996, 322.17-21. 
469 Cf. also Joshi (1990, 268) for a discussion of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa’s critique of the anātmasamaveta as the solution 
of this issue, as well as Bhatta (2001, 720ff.) for the view of the Navya-Naiyāyika Gadādhara. 
470 Sanskrit transliterated from Penna 2013, 266. 
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Returning to the Himalayan plateau and NGg’s definition of karman, there are noteworthy 
differences compared to the Sanskritic sources. The Tibetan treatise does not employ the notion 
of kriyāviṣaya (bya ba’i yul) as such, but it only speaks of karman in terms of yul du byas pa 
(viṣayīkr̥ta, ‘being made (into) the domain’), which however is only a minor terminological-
conceptual variation. It is most important to note that the subsequent Tibetan grammatical 
tradition has discarded NGg’s yul du byas pa and frequently speaks instead of bya ba’i yul, a 
terminological convergence with Sanskritic kriyāviṣaya too striking to be a mere coincidence. 
Secondly, NGg employs the characteristic of distinctiveness between the agent and karman 
only in very general terms, and the related issues that prompted its implementation in the NVTT 
are completely lacking in the Tibetan source. Finally, NVTT’s notion of result (phala) is not 
found NGg at all.471  
NGg is at most a free and general rendition of the quoted conceptions of karman qua kriyāviṣaya 
with a focus on the very basics: a karman is that which is the domain (viṣaya, ~yul du byas pa) 
of an action done by a distinct agent (anātmasamavetakriyā, ~ las byed pa gzhan zhig), its 
domainhood being perhaps related to and developed in connection with karman as that which 
functions as the object of reaching (verbal root āp). 
Regardless the precise relation between NGg and NV(TT), the quoted sources above 
sufficiently reveal that detailed conceptions and discourses of the notion of the kāraka karman 
qua viṣaya had already occurred in the Sanskritic tradition and featured both major aspects of 
NGg’s definition of las, namely the ideas of domain and distinctiveness. It may therefore be 
concluded that the technical term yul in Tibetan grammaticography was likely adopted from the 
context of Sanskritic conceptions of karman as part of the kāraka theory – although questions 
as to the form and the medium through which these conceptions were transmitted to Tibet must 
still remain open. It could be imagined that Tibetan scholars were introduced to this conceptual 
framework through various scriptural sources already in the early stages of Tibetan linguistic 
studies, or perhaps also through an oral transmission of Indian scholars who had been familiar 
with these concepts in one way or another. This study will not address the question whether the 
technical term kriyāviṣaya for karman was a development specific to Nyāya and known as such 
in the Sanskritic tradition, or whether it circulated more freely and diffusely in different fields 
                                                          
471 However, an indirect indication of the importance of the resultative aspect of karman in NGg’s conception 
might perhaps be the use of byas pa in the perfect tense of both, the kāraka- and vibhakti-definition, in the sense 
that karman is that which has been made into the domain (kāraka) or that which has been made (vibhakti). In 
contrast, NGg explicitly distinguished these instances from the ‘quasi-karman’ that is being made (las lta bur 
byed pa) during the vibhakti-definition. 
 181 
 
of knowledge with or without existing terminological and conceptual variations.472 However, it 
is clear that at least the general attempt to homogenize the originally Pāṇinian conception of 
karman was a common theme in and outside the field of grammar which also motivated 
solutions such as Cāndra’s kriyāpya. 
8.1.2.3 The Second Case las as (bya ba’i) gzhi in the Sgra’i rnam par dbye ba bstan pa 
A similar idea to NGg’s yul du byas pa is also pronounced in the GNT in the form of gzhir byas 
pa (‘making into the substratum’) and implemented in another theory of equal importance for 
the following tradition and Si tu. The Sgra’i rnam par dbye ba bstan pa starts its discussion of 
the second case las with a most intriguing investigation into the nature of action:  
 de yang gnyis pa’i sgra ni las kyis473 kho na yin te/     las te yang rnam pa gnyis su ’gyur 
 te/     byed pa po la yod pa’i las dang bya ba’i gzhi la yod pa’i las gnyis so/     las de 
 gnyis kyang phyogs gcig la mtshon na sta res shing gcod pa lta bu la/     sta re steng du 
 ’gro ba dang/     ’og tu ’jug pa lta bu’i bya ba byed pa rnams ni byed pa po la yod pa’i 
 las yin la/     de’i dus su shing dum bu gnyis lta bur gyur pa ni bya ba’i gzhi la yod pa’i 
 las so/      de lta bu la sogs pa dngos po thams cad kyis las gnyis su she par bya ste/     de 
 la byed pa po la yod pa’i las ni gsum pa kho na yin gyi/     gnyis par mi lta’o/     gnas 
 gnyis pa ’dir ni bya ba’i gzhi la yod pa’i las kho na ston pa yin pas/     de’i bye brag ma 
 ’dzol ba yang kal te ba nyid to/     de yang shing la gcod ces pa’am/     shing la rko ’jog 
 ’brud ’dar ba la sogs pa shing bzhir [sic!]474 byas nas shing gi steng du las byed pa 
 rnams lta bu ste shing la chu chus zhes pa’am chu thong zhes pa lta bu shing gi dgos 
 pa rgyu mtshan du byas nas byed pa ni bzhi pa nyid yin gyi gnyis yin pa ma yin no/ 
“Furthermore, regarding the second [case-]term (gnyis pa’i sgra), it is only 
 karman (las). This karman, in turn, has two aspects, the karman existent in the agent 
(byed pa po la yod paʼi las) and the karman existent in the substratum of action (bya 
ba’i gzhi la yod paʼi las). If [we] illustrate these two karmans together, for example ‘to 
cut a tree with an axe,’ (sta res shing [!] gcod pa) the doing of actions (bya ba byed pa) 
like the axeʼs movement upwards and penetration downwards is the karman existent in 
the agent. At that time, the having-turned-into-something-like-two-pieces of the tree is 
the karman existent in the substratum of the action. In this manner, karman is to be 
                                                          
472 Only with regard to the specification of anātmasamavetakriyā (‘action inherent in something distinct’), it can 
be said with some more certainty that this must have circulated as a theory specific to the Nyāya in the Sanskritic 
tradition, since it was criticized by grammarians (cf. supra 179). 
473 I read las kyi sa. 
474 I read gzhir. 
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understood as  twofold throughout all things (dngos po). Now, regarding the karman 
existent in the  agent, this is only the third [case], whereas it is not to be regarded as the 
second [case]. Regarding this second semantic domain (gnas gnyis pa = second case), it 
only expresses the karman existent in the substratum of action, [and] therefore it is of 
particular importance to not confuse their specifics. Additionally, ‘cutting into the tree’ 
(shing la [!] gcod) or ‘carving into, putting onto, digging into, rubbing on (?) the tree’ 
(shing la [!] rko ’jog  ’brud ’dar ba), etc. are something like doings of karmans on top 
of (steng du) the tree,  after having made the tree into the substratum (gzhir byas nas), 
whereas e.g. ‘irrigating the tree [with] water’ or ‘send water!’ (?) are an acting after 
having taken the need of the tree as a reason. This [last instance] is precisely the fourth 
[case], but not the second.”475 
The use of las in this quotation is polysemous, since it first refers to the case function or kāraka, 
then to the two types of activities which constitute the main action, and finally to the main 
action itself. The GNT divides any kind of action in very clear and simple terms into two 
constitutive parts or aspects (rnam pa), one belonging to the agent (byed pa po) and the other 
to the substratum of action (bya ba’i gzhi), the latter part being then identified with the second 
case las. The dichotomy of an action’s active and passive part476 distributed onto the agent and 
karman respectively remains a prominent theory in later Tibetan grammar, with the major 
difference that in Sum rtags literature, it was converted from a description of the second case 
into the interpretation of the opaque, if not to say mysterious dichotomy of bdag and gzhan in 
TKJ 11.4-12.3. In the GC, where it is used likewise for bdag/gzhan, it constitutes the very basis 
of Si tu’s typology of action together with the mentioned idea of byed pa po gzhan dang dngos 
su (mi) ’brel ba.477 It suffices to note that the distinction itself together with the example of a 
moving axe splitting the tree into two parts was once more adopted from the Sanskritic tradition, 
where it has been rendered in terms of the dichotomy of vyāpāra (‘activity’) and phala 
(‘result’), a common distinction in later linguistic theories of the three schools of Vyākaraṇa, 
Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. Its historical origin remains unclear, but the most likely candidate are 
perhaps the Naiyāyikas, who focus on the example of cutting wood in their illustrations in 
sources like the NVTT,478 and a focus on phala (‘result’) was already encountered above in 
                                                          
475 CT 115 – 447.  
476 Not to be confused with grammatical voice. 
477 Cf. supra 178. For a detailed discussion of this bipolarity of actions in Si tu’s GC, cf. Tillemans and Herforth 
1989. 
478 For NVTT’s rendition of vyāpāra and phala, cf. infra 250f. On the possible beginning of this dichotomy by 
the school of Naiyāyikas, the following is stated in Joshi and Roodbergen 1994, 126: 
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NVTT’s rendition of karman qua kriyāviṣaya that is anātmasamavetakriyāphalaśālitva. Due to 
the relation of the example of cutting wood to the vyāpāra/phala concept, the connection of the 
second case qua las (karman) to the resultative part of the action (phala) is more prominent in 
the GNT compared to NGg, even though the Sanskitic terminology has not been directly 
adopted (phala = Tibetan ’bras bu).479  
In GNT, this resultative part of the action explicitly belongs to bya ba’i gzhi, the substratum of 
the action, which is further specified as the tree made (into) the substratum so that the action is 
done literally ‘on top’ (steng du) of it. The addition of Tibetan steng du thus further emphasizes 
a spatial-locative interpretation of bya ba’i gzhi and gzhir byas pa.  
The relation of GNT to the NGg on the one hand and Sanskritic kriyāviṣaya on the other requires 
interpretation, because GNT’s second case is not a simple reproduction of any of them. The 
following will be confined to a short remark, but a more detailed future study of this issue is a 
desideratum.  
First, there is the simple terminological divergence between yul/viṣaya (‘domain,’ ‘focus,’ 
‘object,’ etc.) and gzhi (‘substratum’). This may be a minor issue, since both are valid 
translations for Sanskrit viṣaya,480 and the substitution of āśraya (gzhi, ‘substratum’) for śālin 
(‘endowed with, possessing’) in the Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāraḥ shows that this notion has been 
used within the context of karman in the Sanskritic tradition as well.481 The change from yul to 
gzhi may have moreover been motivated in connection with the common seventh case label 
                                                          
 “Traditionally – but where this tradition starts is not clear, maybe from later Naiyāyikas – the meaning 
 of a transitive verb is analyzed into an activity (vyāpāra) and a result or effect (phala). As explained by 
 the Bālamanoramā on the SK (=Siddhāntakaumudī) here, the time-honoured example is pac- ‘to cook’. 
 The verbal base meaning is defined as viklittyanukūlavyāpāra ‘an activity leading to the softening (of 
 the rice-grains)’. Here viklitti ‘the softening (of the rice-grains)’ is the phala. The substratum (āśraya) 
 of the activity (really a conglomerate of activities, see Vt. VIII on P 1.4.23 and VP 3.8.4) is the agent 
 (kartr̥). The substratum of the result/effect is the direct object (karman). It is further assumed that in the 
 case of a transitive verb the word representing the vyāpāra and the word representing the phala must 
 not be coreferential. In fact, they must refer to different items.”  
In contrast, Diaconescu (2012, 215 and 225) traces the dichotomy at least back to Helārāja (10th century) and the 
example of rice-cooking in the context of the grammarians: 
 “It must be noticed however, that historically, the double meaning of verbal roots as action and result 
 (i.e. vikledana and viklitti for pac) has been asserted before Kaiyaṭa by Helārāja in his commentary on 
 Bhartr̥hari. [...] Moreover, with respect to the meaning of the root in the equation pacati pākaṃ karoti, 
 the meaning cognized from the word pac, i.e., vikledana ‘making soft (by cooking or boiling),’ is to be 
 distinguished from viklitti ‘becoming soft,’ related to the object in the real process. The meaning can be 
 put as viklidyatas taṇḍulān vikledayati ‘He softens the rice grains that are becoming soft.’ Therefore, 
 there is difference in cognition between ‘they become soft’ (viklidyanti) and ‘they cook’ (pacanti), on 
 account of the operations pertaining to the object and to the agent.” 
479 Note, however, that especially GNT’s use of gyur pa (‘has turned [into]’), a tha mi dad pa verb in the perfect 
tense that covers the semantic field of ‘becoming,’ strongly emphasizes the resultative aspect in the action of 
splitting the wood. 
480 Cf. Negi 2003, 5280. 
481 Cf. supra 179. 
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gnas gzhi (‘substratum of abiding,’ ‘abode’) that is equally marked by la don in order to 
establish a direct terminological contrast between bya gzhi and gnas gzhi.482 If it is correct to 
assume that in this context gzhi is equivalent to yul, GNT’s bya ba’i gzhi – in contrast to NGg’s 
yul du byas pa – directly corresponds to Sanskritic kriyāviṣaya. 
Secondly, yul du byas pa and gzhir byas pa definitely refer to identical or similar ideas, however 
GNT features a strong spatial-locative conception (steng du) in combination with the resultative 
part of the bipartite action model, whereas NGg only stresses the distinctiveness of an active 
part and karman. Certainly, this distinctiveness smoothly translates into GNT’s two parts of the 
action and perhaps it is nothing but another rendition of it, but it has also been demonstrated 
that the two concepts can also be traced back to different theories in the Sanskritic tradition, 
anātmasamavetakriyāphalaśālitva and vyāpāra/phala respectively. This issue may be resolved 
through a closer investigation into the relation of these two concepts in the Sanskritic tradition, 
since both figure prominently already in NVTT and they could not have been totally unrelated, 
a point corroborated also by their shared notion of phala. Nonetheless, there remains GNT’s 
addition of steng du, which is either a more interpretative account of Sanskritic kriyāviṣaya, 
which does not exhibit the spatial focus in the above quotations, or it was adopted from another 
source or context or represents an adaptation specific to Tibetan grammaticography. 
Despite the strong conceptual and terminological correspondences between Sanskritic and 
Tibetan sources, their precise relation cannot be determined at this point. As a working 
hypothesis, both presentations of the second case in NGg and GNT appear to be basic, 
condensed accounts of theories on kriyaviṣaya and vyāpāra/phala as they have evidently 
existed in Sanskritic sources. As for vyāpāra/phala, it is even ascertained that different forms 
and variations of this theory circulated in India on a broader basis.483 
Without resolving all the details in this survey, it nevertheless provides us with a basic and clear 
picture of the history of the Tibetan second case las/las su bya ba as yul/gzhi together with its 
conception in the early Tibetan tradition. In summary, it represents an entity that is the location, 
focal point or domain of the action and which is closely connected to the result of an agent’s 
doing. Historically, the cited Nyāya sources are a strong indication that the term was introduced 
in the Sanskritic tradition as kriyāviṣaya in order to combine and homogenize the different 
meanings of karman originally listed in Pāṇini and that it is perhaps related to Cāndra’s 
understanding of karman as kriyāpya. For the Tibetan tradition, this terminological-conceptual 
                                                          
482 Cf. chapter 13.1. 
483 The perhaps most fruitful approach would be to investigate the discourse on śābdabodha that received 
increased attention especially in the later Indian tradition (main period approx. 15th to 17th century.). Material 
regarding these theories are mainly available in the works especially of Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. 
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framework then would have been the obvious choice, since north of the Himalaya the 
Cāndravyākaraṇa was much more dominant than Pāṇini and its commentators.484  
8.1.2.4 A First Résumé on the Early Conception of the Second Case  
The presentation so far provides an utterly clear picture of the early approach to the Tibetan-
specific morphosyntactic differences between the four morphemes la, na, du and the unmarked 
argument of Tibetan sentences. Neither the Sanskritic nor the Tibetan sources have designed 
the basic conception of karman in such a way that it corresponds with the morphosyntactic 
distribution of the four Tibetan morphologies. As it was demonstrated, the whole conception of 
viṣaya was originally motivated by the rather opposite intention to unify subcategorizations. If 
we are to compare the presented theories on karman/las qua viṣaya/yul/gzhi with academic 
linguistic notions, they come closest to a genuine PATIENT role as the most affected entity. 
Regarding the functional difference between an ALLATIVE/DIRECTION function encoded 
by the second case’s prototypical marker la as well as du versus the DIRECT 
OBJECT/PATIENT of the unmarked argument, the NVTT even makes unmistakably clear that 
karman as kriyāviṣaya comprises both:  
 tena kriyāviṣayasya kriyātaḥ prāgbhāvād yuktaṃ kārakatvam. evaṃ ca 
 vikāryaprāpyayorupapannaḥ karmabhāvaḥ, nirvartyasya tu paṭāderyadyapi kriyāyāḥ 
 prāgbhāvo nāsti, tathāpi tadavayavānāṃ tantūnāṃ prāgbhāvaḥ, teṣāṃ ca tādarthyena 
 paṭatve upacārāt paṭaṃ karotīti yuktaḥ prayogaḥ. 
 “Thus, because of the preexistence of the domain of the action compared to the action, 
 [it] is a proper (yuktaṃ ?) kāraka. Accordingly, the vikārya- and prāpya-[karmans] are 
 established karmans. Yet, even if the garments, etc. as nirvartya[-karmans] 
 (nirvartyasya paṭādeḥ ?) are not prior to the action, there is the preexistence of the 
 threads [as the garments’] parts, and since their purpose [lies] in the garmentness (teṣāṃ 
 ca tādarthyena paṭatve ?), ‘s/he makes a garment’ is a proper use due to figurative 
 application (upacāra).”485 
                                                          
484 Also note at this point that a relatedness between Indian non-Buddhist schools such as Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya and 
Mīmāṃsā in the perception of Tibetan scholars is suggested by MVY’s organization and the fact that the 
grammatical terms (Sakaki 4705-4736) are grouped together with several categories which cover non-Buddhist 
‘heretical’ (mu stegs pa) terminology (cf. Verhagen 2015, 190). An influx of non-Buddhist linguistic knowledge 
– associated with a specific school such as Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya, etc. or circulating more diffusely in Sanskritic 
knowledge production – might have been negotiated as being linguistic or grammatical information and thus 
belonging to Vyākaraṇa by Tibetan scholars, especially if transmitted through grammatical sources or Indian 
grammarians and/or translators. 
485 Sanskrit transliterated from Thakur 1996, 322.10-14. For the context of this statement, cf. ft. 467. 
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The subcategorization of karman into the three main types of nirvartya (~ produced), vikārya 
(~ transformed) and prāpya (~ to be reached/destination), the first two of which are already 
discussed in Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya (MBh) ad P 1.4.49, goes back to Bhartr̥hari’s Vākyapadīya 
(VP 3.7.45). Of these three, the prāpya type comprises all those objects visibly unaffected by 
the action,486 which includes semantic fields such as looking somewhere, studying something 
as well as approaching a town (‘nagaram upasarpati’). 487  The semantic information of 
DIRECTION, which falls under the category of prāpya, is thus joined together with the other 
two forms of karman (nirvartya and vikārya) and equally qualifies as the domain of the action 
endowed with the result. From a Sanskrit grammatical perspective, such investigations into the 
nature of action and karman, no matter how metalinguistically or philosophically they may be 
coloured, remain in line with the language-specific morphosyntax and the distribution of the 
second case suffix and its function karman. The debates and resulting classifications remain 
within the grammatical framework offered by Sanskrit language as well as the semantic-
syntactic conditions defined in the grammars. But how was it possible for the early Tibetan 
grammarians to adhere to these investigations, if they do not correspond to the surface structure 
of their own language? And why did they not attempt any adaptation of the conception of 
karman? Did they not see the incompatibility of typical Sanskritic conceptions of karman with 
Tibetan language in general and the la don morphemes in particular? In fact, most of the early 
sources remain silent on this issue, but at least one source, namely the GNT, provides sufficient 
material for an answer. 
8.1.2.5 On the Semantic Nature of the Second Case in the Sgra’i rnam par dbye ba bstan pa 
It comes as no surprise that a source such as the GNT does not deviate from the Sanskritic 
conception of the second case and lacks any attempts at an adaptation according to the 
requirements of WT, since the treatise is dedicated to the cases in general and claims that they 
cover any type of term (tha snyad) concerning real phenomena in saṃsāra and nirvāṇa (ʼkhor 
ʼdas kyi dngos po).488 Since this text shows clear evidence of the cases as valid both in the 
Sanskrit and Tibetan context, GNT’s claim should be understood as stating that any existing 
term regardless of the language is covered by these eight cases. GNT attributes a strong and 
categorical validity to the cases. However, how is the treatise able to establish such a status for 
the second case in view of the fact that it directly faces counterevidence of this assumption in 
the morphosyntax of WT, even more so if las is associated with la don?  
                                                          
486 Cf. VP 3.7.51; Subramania 1992, 301f. 
487 Cf. Subramania 1992, 302. 
488 Cf. supra 95f. 
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Even though the Sgra’i rnam par dbye ba bstan pa identifies the la-morpheme as the 
morphological realization of the second case, the examples in the treatise show significant 
morphosyntactic variations. First, the treatise provides two versions for the prototypical 
example of wood cutting (sta res shing gcod pa and shing la gcod), one in which the wood as 
the karman remains unmarked and is thus represented as the DIRECT OBJECT or PATIENT 
according to Tibetan-specific syntax, as well as a second one in which the wood is represented 
as either the DIRECTION or INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT depending on the precise 
function of la in this clause.489 If we follow the common academic interpretation of la as an 
ALLATIVE/DIRECTION marker, the difference in meaning would then approximately be that 
of ‘to cut the wood’ vs. ‘to cut into the wood.’ In this instance, la as an indirect or secondary 
objective marker seems to be less intuitive, unless the morpheme was primarily used for 
emphatic reasons or perhaps to indicate some form of partitive meaning.490 In any case, the 
author apparently did not really bother with the morphosyntactic variation between la and 
unmarked; but the treatise does not only alternate between the precise grammatical construction 
in the prototypical example of wood cutting, it also explicitly mentions and elaborates on the 
use of the two remaining morphological categories na and du as second cases. Immediately 
following the above quotation, the author gives his exposition of the morpheme na: 
 gnyis pa’i la’i sgra ’di nyid ni na yis kyang ston nus te/     shing gi rtse mo na gcod 
 cing ’dug ces pa’am/     rked na ’jog ces pa’am/     rtsa ba nas rko zhes pa la sogs pa’ang 
 de las mi ’da’ ’o/     de bzhin du zhing gi zhabs na rmod cing ’dug ces pa la sogs pa’ang 
 shes par bya’o/ 
“This very la term (la’i sgra) [as] the second [case] can also be indicated by [the 
 morpheme] na: [the examples of] ‘residing at the top of the tree and cut [it]’ (shing gi 
 rtse mo na gcod cing ’dug), ‘split [it] at the trunk’ (rked na ’jog) or ‘dig [it] out from 
 the root’ (rtsa  ba nas rko), etc. do not go beyond karman. In the same way are to be 
understood ‘to reside at the bottom (?) of the field and plow [it]’ (zhing gi zhabs na rmod 
cing ’dug), etc.”491 
GNT provides two examples, one which employs the word ‘tree/wood’ (shing) and the other 
uses the word ‘field’ (zhing). The example of the tree can be further divided into three different 
                                                          
489 On the term SECONDARY OBJECT in this dissertation, cf. ft. 268. On the question of the functioning of la 
as either DIRECTION or INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT, cf. infra 201f. 
490 On la as an emphatic marker of the DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT, cf. supra 103f. and infra 200f. 
491 CT 115 – 447. 
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clauses, but the Tibetan phrasing makes clear that the cing ’dug of shing gi rtse mo na gcod 
cing ’dug belongs to all three and its omission in the remaining two represents a simple ellipse: 
 (1) (1.1) shing gi rtse mo na gcod cing ’dug ces pa’am/    (1.2) rked na ’jog ces pa’am/     
 (1.3) rtsa ba nas rko zhes pa/  
 ‘‘residing at the top of the tree and cut [it],’ ‘split [it] at the trunk,’ or ‘dig [it] out 
 from the root’’492  
 (2) zhing gi zhabs na rmod cing ’dug/  
 ‘to reside at the bottom of the field and plow [it]’ (or ‘to reside down at the field 
 and plow it’ ?) 
The illustrations are difficult to analyze and may be interpreted in different ways, but it is clear 
that the examples differ significantly from the previous zhing (la) gcod. The author added 
spatial specifications (rtse mo ‘top,’ rked ‘trunk,’ ‘stem,’ rtsa ba ‘root,’ zhabs ‘bottom’) of the 
entity representing the karman and then he added a second verb ’dug (lit. ‘to reside,’ ‘to sit,’ 
‘to exist somewhere’) after the main actions.  
The construction of a verb followed by cing ’dug offers two interpretations. First, the addition 
of ’dug may be a separate verb on the same hierarchical level as gcod, etc. in the examples and 
translated as ‘to reside [and cut, split, etc.].’ Alternatively, the construction verb plus cing ’dug 
may be an auxiliary construction to indicate the durative aspect of the main verb. In contrast to 
the translation offered above, a phrase like shing gi rtse mo na gcod cing ’dug could then be 
translated as ‘[someone] is cutting at the top of the tree,’ or perhaps more trenchantly 
‘[someone] dwells in cutting […]’ or ‘spends time cutting […],’ instead of the simple gcod that 
would be more factual in the sense of ‘cut’. It is obvious that the durative auxiliary use of ’dug 
is derived from its lexical value, and the demarcation line between the two readings of the 
examples is fluid and a matter of emphasis depending on the context. The durative construction 
implies the residence or dwelling of the agent at that place, in the same way as the use of ’dug 
as a separate verb implies that the action expressed in the first verb is the mode of how the agent 
dwells. Whatever reading is preferable, the addition of ’dug brings in a noticeable locative 
connotation, either as a durative auxiliary construction or as a separate verb, which is then 
further supported by the use of spatial specifications of where the agent needs to reside for the 
performance of cutting, etc. Yet, in both readings of the sample phrases the implication remains 
that the top, trunk, etc. of the tree are not just the locations of where an agent resides or is 
                                                          
492 A less literal but more accurate translation according to my interpretation would be: ‘‘residing at the top of 
the tree and cut [it],’ ‘[residing] at the trunk [and] split [it],’ or ‘[residing at] the root [and] dig [it] out from 
there.’’ 
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cutting, etc. something, but that the tree is that which is being cut, etc. In other words, it is 
indeed an important information e.g. in shing gi rtse mo na gcod cing ’dug that the tree is cut 
at the top. 
The modifications of sample phrases of the morpheme na compared to zhing (la) gcod resonate 
with Tournadre’s presentation of na as a mere locative493 as well as with the findings in Nathan 
Hill’s study on the Old Tibetan Annals, according to which na expresses mainly a mere static, 
locative meaning with locations but not with physical objects or beings.494 It is therefore clear 
in my view that the author made these additions to emphasize the locative aspect in these sample 
phrases and to provide a suitable syntactic-semantic environment for the use of na that is a clear 
locative marker in WT. The tree (shing) and field (zhing) as the karmans of cutting and plowing 
respectively, although an important information contained in these samples, are not directly 
encoded through grammatical marking but indirectly derived from the the lack of an unmarked 
argument and the consequent event-construal of the underlying situation at hand. From a 
morphosyntactic perspective, the arguments marked by na are clearly not instances of karman. 
Yet, it must be admitted that such constructions pose a challenge to grammatical analysis, since 
they are elliptic and encode the semantic double value of shing gi rtse mo gcod (‘to cut the top 
of the tree’) and shing gi rtse mo na ’dug/gcod (‘to reside/cut at the top of the tree’). One might 
therefore argue that the underlying semantic structure is more complex than its morphosyntactic 
representation on the surface of the sentence. The modern linguistic classification of this elliptic 
use of na is based on a distributional approach to extract the generic uses of the morpheme 
throughout the language, however one can hardly expect an early Tibetan tradition to have such 
a methodology readily at hand, especially in view of the metalinguistic-semantic character of 
the adopted grammatical terminology already in the Sanskritic tradition. GNT’s classification 
of na as a second rather than a seventh case was perhaps established due to the fact that in 
grammatical constructions in the form of a verb plus cing ’dug, indeed ’dug is often secondary 
to the action expressed in the main verb. The dominance of the main verb apparently facilitated 
the semantic interpretation of these phrases in terms of karman against the generic meaning of 
the case marker itself.495 
                                                          
493 Cf. Tournadre 2010, 110. 
494 Hill 2011, 19. 
495 Note that Smra sgo’s autocommentary provides GNT’s shing gi rtse mo na gcod (‘[s/he] cuts at the top of the 
tree’ → ‘[s/he] cuts the tree at the top’) without cing ’dug as the only illustration of na in the meaning of las. 
Such instances are perhaps even more challenging, assuming that they are not ungrammatical (cf. Smr̥ti 2002, 
79). 
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In any event, it is most striking that the author felt the need to significantly adjust the 
grammatical construction of the sample clauses compared to the more straightforward zhing 
(la) gcod. This move to adjust the grammatical construction of the samples to WT reveals the 
author’s sensitivity to the morphosyntactic, i.e. language-specific differences between la and 
na. Even more interesting in this context is the use of the morpheme nas in rtsa ba nas rko (‘dig 
out from the roots’), which may be just a corrupt passage, but in fact it is a correct grammatical 
construction in Tibetan and thus might have been intended by the author. 
Subsequent to the previous quotation, GNT addresses the morpheme du: 
 gzhan yang gnyis pa la’i sgra ’di nyis su ’gyur te/     la dngos gzhi sgra dang la dang 
 cha dang ’thun pa’i sgra’i/     de la dngos kyi sgra ni sngar bstan par zad do/     /la dang 
 cha ’thun pa’i sgra ni du dang ru dang su rnams kyis kyang ston te/     dper na khang 
 bzang gi bye brag ’ga’zhig thog dgu phar du phug     /dbyibs gru bzhi ru brtsigs shing 
 mig mangs ris sub dang zhes pa lta bu’o/     de rnam kyang las kho na ston par lta’o/ 
  “Furthermore, this second [case], the la-term, is twofold: the actual la-term (la dngos 
 gzhi sgra) and the term partially accordant with la (la dang cha dang ’thun pa’i sgra). 
 Now, as for the actual term (dngos kyi sgra), it has already been taught. As for the term 
 partially accordant with la, [it] is also indicated by [the morphemes] du, ru and su, for 
 example as in ‘some specifically well-made palaces are carved out (?) into more than 
 nine stories (thog dgu phar du phug), built in square form (dbyibs gru bzhi ru brtsigs) 
 and set into a checkered square design (mig mangs ris su btang).’ Also these [instances] 
 are to be regarded as indicating only karman.”496  
The author introduces a subcategory of la’i sgra (lit. ‘la-morpheme’ or ‘la-term’), the so-called 
la dang cha ’thun pa’i sgra (‘term partially accordant with la’), which is contrasted with the 
actual la-term. The specific function of the morpheme du in this example is also known in the 
tradition as de nyid (‘identity’), and Tournadre labels it “the transformative function,”497 a 
genuine meaning of du and only rarely of la. It will have to be decided elsewhere whether the 
subsumption of such instances under karman is based on a Sanskritic model, for example the 
double accusative constructions traditionally associated with P 1.4.51, or more on a 
consideration of Tibetan-specific syntax.  
                                                          
496 CT 115 – 447f.; my emphasis. 
497 Cf. Tournadre 2010, 108f. 
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Furthermore, unfortunately the phrasing of this passage is highly ambiguous regarding the 
proposed subcategorization. On the one hand, gnyis pa (‘the second’) suggests that the topic is 
that of the second case, i.e. karman, and thus we are facing a semantic-functional 
subcategorization into actual and partially accordant karmans. However, the la’i sgra appears 
to refer to morphology as the general term for all three of the morphemes la, na and du, if we 
read it against the backdrop of SCP’s la sgra.498 La dang cha ’thun pa (‘partially accordant with 
la’) may therefore also refer to the entire morpheme du rather than the transformative function, 
meaning that du is only partially accordant with la, because it indicates the second case las in 
the same way as la and na but additionally also the transformative function, which is normally 
not expressed by la. Although the employed terminology is perhaps more in favor of a 
morphological interpretation, the structure of the sentence as well as of the entire passage seem 
to corroborate the semantic-functional focus. For the time being, therefore the notion of la’i 
sgra – as ambiguous as it might be – will be read as a direct reference to the second case las as 
its alternative label and translated as ‘la-term’ instead of ‘la-morpheme.’499 La dang cha mthun 
then only establishes the distinction between transformative function and actual karman. It is 
not further explicated how this functional difference should be perceived, and various 
possibilities may be imagined.  
If my reading should turn out to be inconsistent, then the translation in the last two quotations 
of la’i sgra as ‘la-term’ should be replaced with ‘la-morpheme’ to emphasize the morphological 
reading outlined above. In any case, the author’s association of du with this function together 
with his use of this morpheme in the illustrations once again remain in line with the Tibetan-
specific morphosyntax and reveal his proficiency in the correct application of du.  
Finally, GNT gives a detailed specification of the morphological difference between the 
allomorphs du, ru and su and the ways in which they are triggered by the different final sounds 
of the preceding syllable: 
 gzhan yang ming gang yang rung ba’i mtha’ na/     ga dang nga la sogs pa’i rjes ’jug 
 bcus brten pa yod la/     de rnams kyang gnyis pa las su sbyor na/     du dang ru dang su 
 gsum kho na las su ’gyur te/ 
                                                          
498 SCP 9.3-11.4. 
499 Note that the term sgra (‘morpheme,’ ‘term’) generally refers to morphology in the grammatical context, 
especially within the pair sgra (‘sound, morpheme’) and don (‘meaning’), and often bears a bivalency in the 
sense that it is not just a morpheme but also a meaningful one, thus comprising both. This allows for a variety of 
different uses with different meanings, such as ‘term,’ ‘notion,’ etc. Cf. also GNT’s initial exposition of the 
second case, which speaks of gnyis pa’i sgra (‘the second [case-]term’), an unmistakable reference to the case 
function, supra 181.  
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“Moreover, at the end of whatever word that is affixed (~ brten pa) by the ten postscripts 
 ga and nga, etc., if [it] is also applied as the second [case] karman, the very (kho na ?) 
three, du and ru and su respectively (kho na ?)500 function as karman (~ las su ’gyur).”501 
GNT then lists the following examples as karman for the three allomorphs:502 
 du: (1) rgya nag tu ’gro, (2) rgya nag tu rgyug cig, (3) rgya nag tu phyin, (4) byang du 
 ’gro ba, (5) bod du ’gro ba, (6) o rgyan du ’gro ba, (7) mtha’ khob tu ’gro ba, (8) sum 
 cu rtsa gsum du ’gro ba, (9) rgyal bu rgyal byed kyi tshal du ’gro, (10) rgya gar du ’gro  
 ru: (11) ma ga dha ru ’gro 
 su: (12) dbus su ’gro 
Interestingly, only the verbs ’gro ba (‘to go,’ ‘walk’) (10 examples), rgyug pa (‘to run,’ ‘to 
ride’) (1 example, #2) and phyin pa (‘has gone,’ ‘has come’) (1 example, #3) are used in the 
examples. Once again, the grammatical construction of the sample phrases used by the author 
resonates with the observations made by Hill, according to which the primary function of the 
morpheme du in the Old Tibetan Annals is the LOCATION of actions and the DESTINATION 
of motion verbs.503 Regrettably, the treatise does not specify whether these examples are to be 
classified as actual or partially accordant la-terms. Although their classification as only partially 
accordant karmans seems much more unlikely, from the structure of the passage as well as the 
fact that the treatise focuses on Sanskritic-based semantic theories of karman with a validity 
across languages, this question will deliberately remain unaddressed, since their status as 
second cases and thus karman – either actual or only partially accordant – remains undisputed 
in the source. 
The overall presentation of the distribution of the three morphemes la, na and du in GNT is 
most intriguing and telling. The author accurately utilizes the three distinct grammatical 
morphemes la, na and du according to their generic uses in the written Tibetan language while 
even separating the three in his structured presentation. Thus, he demonstrates a palpable 
sensitivity for their difference, either deliberately or at least intuitively as a native speaker. Yet, 
the author also classifies all these different syntactic constructions as second cases, which 
                                                          
500 kho na (lit. ‘only’) as well as kyang (‘also’) and its allomorphs are excessively used in this treatise, raising the 
question whether in fact they add any noteworthy information to the meaning of the sentence.  
My translation attempts to make sense of kho na in this context in that the author emphasizes that he now 
focuses on these three particular morphemes. Or should kho na be understood in the sense of ‘respectively,’ 
meaning that only (kho na) one of the allomorphs du, su and ru may be used with one of the postscripts 
respectively? 
501 CT 115 – 448. 
502 Cf. ibid. 
503 Cf. Hill 2011, 35. 
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means that, according to him, they all qualify as karman in the sense of the substratum or 
domain, the locus where the resultative part of the action is located and upon which an action 
is performed. In other words, the language-specific categories of PATIENT, DIRECTION, 
LOCATION, and so forth, which in Tibetan are distributed across the different morphologies, 
are only secondary in the analysis of these examples. There is a disregard of the 
morphosyntactic surface structure, and apparently the ways in which the marked arguments can 
fit the definition of the second case matter much more. How should this be understood? I think 
that there are two important features which operate simultaneously in GNT’s approach to 
grammatical theory formation: 
1) First, the definition of the second case las and the bivalent action scheme do not describe any 
language-specific morphosyntactic surface structures, they describe the underlying phenomena 
or scenarios as such referred to in the different sample phrases.504 I argue that GNT regards the 
quoted sample phrases more from the perspective of the instances they represent, in other 
words, from the perspective of the underlying scenarios or phenomena. On that level, there is 
no difference between, for example, grāmaṃ gacchati and grong la ’gro, since both samples 
refer to the same scenario. The question which case is at hand then is no longer the matter of 
any language-specific morphosyntactic surface structures nor their underlying semantic 
structures, but of a semantic construal which is deemed representative for the scenario as such. 
If the investigation into the scenario of a sentence suggests that a participant is the locus of the 
resultative part of the action, it can be regarded as an instance of the second case karman. If a 
participant is karman in such a construal of the scenario, then the corresponding referent in the 
sentence together with its marker are classified as that karman. I therefore argue that there is a 
strong and direct amalgamation of morphosyntactic and semantic structures of linguistic 
expressions with the level of scenarios, resulting in DeLancey’s so-called “objectivist error.”505 
This also instantly explains how, outside these cases, there can be no single linguistic term 
which expresses a real phenomenon in saṃsāra or nirvāṇa (ʼkhor ʼdas kyi dngos po), simply 
because the scenarios or phenomena as such are representatively covered by these categories 
and linguistic expressions as representations of these phenomena can therefore equally be 
subsumed under the same categories. Treating linguistic expressions from the perspective of 
the underlying scenarios, the apparent implication is that since linguistic expressions are about 
                                                          
504 Note that I borrowed the notion of scenario from DeLancey (1991) and use it as another more general 
reference to phenomena as the ultimate basis of linguistic expressions (cf. also chapter 5.2). However, DeLancey 
seems to use it in a more nuanced way in his article as that what the verb describes, which may then be 
represented through different semantic construals or events (cf. DeLancey 1991, 345) expressed in a sentence. 
505 Cf. supra 105f. including ft. 302 on the use of the terms phenomenon and scenario in this dissertation. 
194 
 
the phenomenal world, a semantic construal deemed representative for a particular phenomenal 
scenario applies equally to those linguistic expressions expressing that scenario regardless the 
language. In other words, concrete linguistic expressions are regarded as more or less direct 
representations of phenomena.  
This approach to case grammar strongly resonates with the idea of linguistic universals in some 
form and the direct reference to the phenomenal world further prompts the question about the 
ontological basis of the cases’ universality.506 Unfortunately, GNT does not elaborate these 
issues other than through scattered comments like the quoted ones. The text did not develop 
any coherent theory on the universal character of the cases in all its linguistic-philosophical 
implications no matter how strong it is claimed by the text. What we can see are perhaps 
remnants and influxes, may they come from Sanskritic kāraka-theories, discourses in the larger 
context of śābdabodha (‘verbal cognition’), or Buddhist linguistic-philosophical discourses on 
matters such as linguistic signs (brda), etc.507 In any event, this has to remain speculation at this 
point. 
However, due to the systematicity in which sources like the GNT derived the meanings of case 
morphemes from an analysis of the phenomenal world and its various manifestations, as well 
as the open question about this approach’s foundation in theories on linguistic universals, etc., 
this feature will not be referred to as an ‘error’, but as an objectivist approach to case grammar 
and an objectivist focus in more general terms. 
It has to be noted that if this approach is characterized as problematic or even erroneous in 
certain contexts, then not due to the general claim of the cases’ universality, but because of the 
ways in which these cases, as linguistic universals or not, have been directly applied to Tibetan 
morphosyntax without any further mediation between phenomenal world and its representation 
in a particular language. This led to misclassifications of sample phrases and grammatical 
markers, since the language-specific functioning of Tibetan grammatical structures was 
neglected and ‘objectified’ based on the assumption that it directly rests on the constitution of 
our shared phenomenal world. The precise nature of the presupposed ‘objectivity’ of a 
phenomenon’s construal is intimately related to the cases’ universality and would probably need 
to be decided for each source separately. Again, texts such as the GNT mostly omit any 
                                                          
506 On the notion of universals in modern linguistic theory, cf. e.g. Bach and Harms 1968. 
507 Cf. e.g. chapters 5.4 and 8.1.2.2 as well as infra 250f. on kārakas and śābdabodha. For more information 
regarding the linguistic-philosophical foundation of the universal character of the cases and the objectivist focus 
in Tibetan grammar, cf. also point 5 of chapter 15, in particular infra 427ff. 
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elaboration of these issues. Consequently, we can only define ‘objective’ in the sense of 
‘deemed representative for the phenomenal world as such’ in this dissertation.508 
2) Secondly, an important feature of the definition of karman in terms of the resultative part of 
the action or the substratum upon which an action is performed is its sufficient generality, so 
that it may be applied to all various grammatical constructions subsumed under the second case. 
The directional functioning of du in rgya gar du ’gro can be rendered in terms of marking that 
entity which experiences the result of the action, or that upon which an agent performs the 
action. In fact, this is how in Sanskrit Indian grammarians have already rendered the instance 
of going to account for its second case marking. Likewise, any function of la in terms of 
DIRECTION or INDIRECT OBJECT may be explained in these terms as much as the 
PATIENT of the unmarked argument. Perhaps even the locative shing gi rtse mo na may be 
included in this definition as the substratum of the action that experiences the resultative part.509 
From this perspective, GNT does not necessarily impose an incorrect semantic construal of the 
underlying scenarios that directly contradict Tibetan morphosyntax. The point is that the 
category karman and its definition are deemed as covering Tibetan-specific morphosyntax. It 
follows from the above that this is how the treatise retains the cases’ validity across all linguistic 
terms and regardless of the language, since they cover all possible semantic categories and 
subcategories that may be thought about in languages and thus make any others unnecessary. 
If the author of GNT had an accurate knowledge of the syntax of different constructions 
classified as second case, it may be argued that he saw it as covered by his definition. This 
feature of GNT’s second case definition is less objectivist in the sense of neglecting 
morphosyntax in favor of one’s understanding of the underlying scenario, but it still considers 
and acknowledges Tibetan-specific morphosyntax. Therefore, this feature, which is particularly 
important for the second case, will be referred to as interpretative or semantic-interpretative. 
The combination of these two points above (objectivist and semantic-interpretative) in GNT’s 
case grammar completely blurs the morphosyntactic surface structure in instances such as the 
second case, and moreover it is highly arbitrary. How can it be decided, for example in phrases 
with locative la, na or du, if the morphemes are to be classified as karman or as a seventh case 
                                                          
508 The terms ‘objectivist’ and ‘objectify’ would require further elaboration, particularly against the background 
of various philosophical and Buddhological discourses one may think of in the Tibetan context. However, these 
notions are used in a technical sense as defined here and by DeLancey, and Tibetan grammatical sources provide 
little to no reference to such discourses. 
509 Although I find it more likely in this case that the author did not see the locative value of na included in the 
definition, but that he rather focused on the genuine PATIENT role that becomes visible only in the scenario as 
such or in the underlying semantic double value of shing gi rtse mo in the Tibetan sentence. Whichever of these 
two levels the author of GNT had in mind, he then directly applied it to the marker na (cf. supra 187ff.). 
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location? And when is a certain semantic construal deemed more representative for the 
underlying scenario and thus for a sentence representing this scenario? Or in which instances is 
the Tibetan-specific use of case morphemes meant to be covered by a definition? Here the 
classification of morphemes as karman or not-karman becomes mostly a matter of weighing in 
Sanskritic role models (Sanskrit case marking patterns and their conceptualizations), 
metalinguistic investigations into the nature of scenarios, Tibetan case marking patterns and 
perhaps other factors. It remains that any clear-cut methodology of how to arrive at the 
classification of case morphemes is absent. However, in this kind of grammatical analysis, it is 
comprehensible that the eight basic case functions adopted from the Sanskritic tradition, 
especially the kāraka-functions, are deemed to be a representative analytical framework. These 
are proven and tested categories for the description of Sanskrit semantic structures, and if there 
is no manifest distinction between language-specific semantic structures in sentences and their 
underlying scenarios, the language-specific semantic structures – and together with them the 
semantic case categories – are accepted to be shared by all languages. 
In the remaining part II, it will become evident that such a direct form of the objectivist-
interpretative approach was not common to all Tibetan grammaticography. However, numerous 
instances will be encountered that demonstrate how grammatical theory formation throughout 
the Tibetan tradition is deeply permeated by different variants of the objectivist approach as 
well as the interpretative approach. 
A decisive point remains that already the Sanskritic tradition, embodied by the grammarians, 
Naiyāyikas, or others, had exhibited a strong metalinguistic focus in the kāraka theory or the 
conception of vyāpāra/phala. 510  However, within their natural environment of Sanskrit 
language, these theories on the constitution of actions and the definition of karman do not go 
against the morphosyntactic surface structure and are even nourished by it. However, in the 
Land of Snow and a dramatically altered linguistic environment, the decontextualization of 
metalinguistically-informed concepts such as kriyāviṣaya (bya ba’i yul/gzhi) results in 
discourses on these grammatical categories that are objectivist, interpretative and ultimately 
unrelated to and thus unrepresentative for Tibetan-specific language structures. And even in 
case the Sanskritic investigations into the nature of actions, etc. was not already objectivist per 
se, it could have easily been misinterpreted as objectivist. Thus, an author like the one of the 
                                                          
510 Cf. chapter 5.4, as well as supra 176ff. and infra 250f. 
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GNT did not develop this form of grammatical analysis by himself, but he was surely inspired 
in some form by Sanskritic modes of linguistic analysis.  
8.1.2.6 Second Résumé on the Early Conception of the Second Case 
With the GNT there is at least one fairly clear account of the reasons why the second case 
comprises the three distinct Tibetan morphological categories la, na and du – or even four if 
we also include the unmarked argument like in this source. Since the remaining sources of the 
early period provide much less material regarding this matter, there remains a certain doubt 
regarding the representative character of GNT within this period. The similarities to the 
definition of karman in NGg as well as the almost identical example of na for the second case 
in the Smra sgo commentary511 speak in favor of a broader acceptance of GNT’s approach in 
some form.  
Apart from this, there may have also been disagreement regarding the number of morphemes 
qualifying as second case marker. NGg and MVY mention only la, whereas SCP does not 
explicitly mention whether the unmarked morphology may also express las of SCP 11.3. In 
NGg and MVY, the omission of the other morphemes may be explained by their exclusive 
focus on the prototypical markers for each case, whereas SCP’s omission of zero-marking could 
simply be caused by its focus on a presentation of syntactic links, which is missing in the 
unmarked PATIENT. It is also possible that alternative approaches coexisted during this 
formative period of Tibetan grammar, and that these established different morphologies as well 
as parameters for which grammatical construction represents the second case las. The issue of 
the case status of the Tibetan unmarked argument as the PATIENT/DIRECT OBJECT in 
Tibetan grammatical sources – whether it is a second case or a case at all – remains decisive, 
but it cannot be addressed here. 
Of most importance for the later tradition in general and Si tu in particular are the notions of 
yul/gzhi as well as the bipartite action-model of GNT and NGg. Moreover, the merging of up 
to four distinct morphologies as second-case markers with la as the prototypical marker, for 
which we encountered at least one attestable explanation in the GNT, represents precisely this 
conceptual heritage which is at the core of the issues surrounding the second case and which 
has dominated every later conception of the subsequent tradition. Finally, GNT’s approach of 
conceiving the second case las from an objectivist-interpretative perspective – although this 
takes on different manifestations and/or degrees throughout the centuries – constitutes a 
                                                          
511 Cf. ft. 495. Note that the examples for the case markers in the Smra sgo frequently resonate with those in 
GNT. 
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recurrent feature in the entire tradition. Even Si tu, who in his conception of grammatical 
categories in general and his derivational model in particular attempts to account more for the 
Tibetan-specific structures, will frequently return to this very same approach in his examination 
of the cases. 
The missing piece in the puzzle of the early conception of the second case is certainly 
represented by the question why all early sources unequivocally name la as the prototypical 
marker and not the unmarked argument, while at least the presented theories on karman, 
although they cover all the different uses of la and its traditional allomorphs, appear to be 
conceptually dominated by the grammatical PATIENT role and thus closest to the unmarked 
morphology. There are several possibilities here, three of which will now be discussed as a final 
addendum to the early tradition. 
8.1.2.7 Three Hypotheses on the Prototypicality of la 
(1) Assuming that the prototypical function of the morpheme la is that of a directional-locative 
marker, a first option might be the locative conception of las as yul/gzhi and yul du/gzhir byas 
pa, which allows to conceive basically any object-related grammatical construction in the 
prototypical form of gang la byed (‘to act upon’), even in the most PATIENT-dominant 
instances: 
 dgra gsod pa ‘to kill a foe’ → *dgra la gsod par byed pa ‘to perform the killing upon a 
 foe’ 
The zero-marking of the Tibetan prototypical karman is then simply another language-specific, 
morphological variation on the surface structure, like na or du, whereas the focus was more on 
the concept-specific prototypical marker la. 
(2) Another option might manifest itself in the kāraka-topic of NGg. The eightfold kāraka-
scheme, so far to my knowledge unattested in any Sanskritic source, strongly resonates with 
the classical eightfold case scheme, however it does so not in a direct one-for-one 
correspondence. The most prominent difference compared to the case model are represented by 
the first two kārakas in this scheme, which presumably should refer to the first two cases: 
 de la tshig brgyad ni gang byed ces pa la sogs pa ste de la gang byed ces pa ni dang 
 po’i byed pa’i dngos po’am don tsam gyi tshig yin te/     ’di ltar ’bras chan ’tshed pa’i 
 byed pa po lha sbyin yin pa dang ’dra bar nyon mongs skyed pa’i byed pa po tshul bzhin 
 ma yin pa yid la byed pa yin pa dang/     lam skye ba’i byed pa po chos rgyu ’bras la yid 
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 ches lta ba [sic!]512 dang/     rnam par shes pa skye ba’i byed pa po ’du byed sems pa  
 yin pa lta bu ni dngos po ngo bo’i tshig ces bya’o/     yang na gang ’tshed par byed na 
 ’bras chan ’tshed par byed pa dang ’dra bar gang skyed par byed na nyon mongs pa 
 dang lam rnam par shes pa skyed par byed ces don gyi ngo bo tsam ston par byed pa ni 
 dang po’i tshig ces bya’o/     gang gi sa zhes bya ba ni dper na lha sbyin ni ’bras chan 
 ’tshed par byed pa po dmigs ’dzin pa’am/     yang na gang zhig la ’tsed par byed na 
 ’bras chan la ’tshed par byed ces las kyi dmigs ’dzin par byed pa bzhin du tshul bzhin 
 ma yin pa ni nyon mongs pa skyed par byed pa la sogs pa’am/     nyon mongs la byed 
 ces pa la sogs  pa ni gnyis pa dmigs ’dzin pa’i tshig ces bya’o/ 
 “As regards the eight syntactic forms [that are the kārakas-], [these] are ‘to act/do 
 something’ (gang byed) and so forth. As for ‘to act/do something’ (gang byed), this is 
 the first, the syntactic form of the active entity (byed pa’i dngos po) or of the mere 
 meaning (don tsam, arthamātra). Thus, similar to (1) ‘The agent of cooking the rice is 
 Devadatta.’ (’bras chan ’tshed pa’i byed pa po lha sbyin yin pa) are for example (2) 
 ‘The agent of producing mental afflictions are the incorrect thoughts.’ (nyon mongs 
 skyed pa’i byed pa po tshul bzhin ma yin pa yid la byed pa yin pa), (3) ‘The agent of 
 producing the path [is] the faith in Dharma, cause and effect.’ (lam skye ba’i byed pa po 
 chos rgyu ’bras la yid ches)513 and (4) ‘The agent of producing consciousness are the 
 mental (?) formations.’ (rnam par shes pa skye ba’i byed pa po ’du byed sems pa yin 
 pa).514 [These are] called the syntactic form of the entity [or] essence (dngos po ngo bo’i 
 tshig).  
 Alternatively, if [one asks] what is cooked, rice is cooked (’bras chan ’tshed par byed 
 pa). Similarly, if [one asks] what is produced (gang skyed par byed), [the answer] ‘the 
 mental afflictions, the path [and] consciousness are produced’ (nyon mongs pa dang lam 
 rnam par shes pa skyed par byed) indicates the mere essence of a meaning, which is 
 called the syntactic form of the first [kāraka of the eightfold scheme].  
 As for [the second kāraka, called] ‘the semantic position of something’ (?) (gang gi sa), 
 this is the emphasis of the agent (byed pa po dmigs ’dzin pa), for example ‘As regards 
                                                          
512 I read bu. 
513 Lit. ‘the agent of the arising path’ (lam skye ba’i byed pa po), since the verb skye is tha mi dad pa and thus 
has intransitive meaning (‘to come forth,’ ‘be born,’ ‘arise’). However, the construction skye ba’i byed pa (‘the 
making of the arising’) is very close if not equivalent to skye bar byed (‘to make arise’) that is a periphrastic 
construction with the same meaning as skye ba’s tha dad pa pendant skyed pa (‘to bring forth,’ ‘produce’). 
Moreover, in the next sentence of this quotation it is seen that he repeats all examples and used skyed pa (‘to 
produce’) also in the context of lam (‘path’). 
514 Cf. ft. 513 that equally applies to example (4). 
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 Devadatta, [he] cooks rice.’ (lha sbyin ni ’bras chan ’tshed par byed). Or  alternatively, 
 if [one asks] what is cooked (gang zhig la ’tshed par byed), [it is] the emphasis of the 
 karman (las kyi dmigs ’dzin pa) [as in] ‘The rice is cooked.’ (’bras chan la ’tshed par 
 byed). Likewise, ‘As regards the incorrect thoughts, [they] produce mental afflictions.’ 
 (tshul bzhin ma yin pa ni nyon mongs pa skyed par byed pa), etc., or ‘Mental afflictions 
 are [produced].’ (nyon mongs la byed) are called the second, the syntactic form of 
 emphasis (dmigs ’dzin pa’i tshig).”515 
The meaning of the second kāraka, namely gang gi sa, remains elusive, however the quotation 
makes very clear why the author did not choose the expected gang la byed (‘to act upon 
something’). For our current purpose, it suffices to note that Lce Khyi ’brug apparently 
attempted to explain the phenomenon of grammatical voice and the basic active/passive pattern 
of Sanskrit sentences by reproducing it in Tibetan. That this was not an easy task can be best 
seen from the first kāraka in the active meaning. The author obviously wanted to avoid ergative 
marking in order to maintain the zero-marking plus the meaning of don tsam (arthamātra), just 
like the Sanskritic analysis of agents in active sentences, therefore in WT he was left only with 
a copula-construction plus genitive attribute. The passive pattern is then reproduced by means 
of default construction in WT of an unmarked argument plus verb, apparently interpreting the 
former as having only lexical value in this construction, just like the Sanskritic interpretation 
of karmans in passive sentences. The second kāraka is thus turned into something like a 
complementary to the first kāraka, representing the marked patterns of agent and karman. This 
is then labelled ‘the emphatic syntactic form’ (dmigs ’dzin pa’i tshig) and distinguished into the 
emphasis of the agent (byed pa po dmigs ’dzin pa) and the emphasis of the karman (las kyi 
dmigs ’dzin pa), indicated through ni and la respectively. 
Since the treatise’s status is not fully evident, it is difficult to say whether this was meant as a 
mere illustration of Sanskrit syntax or indeed an attempt to apply this theory to Tibetan. If it 
was deemed relevant in the Tibetan context as well, there may have been the idea due to the 
Sanskritic role model that the unmarked argument of a Tibetan sentence equals a first case 
indicating only mere lexical information, whereas ultimately only la indicates – or emphasizes, 
as demonstrated by the second kāraka dmigs ’dzin pa ‘emphasis’ – the second case las. Yet, 
apart from the eightfold kāraka-scheme in NGg, no other sources or theories where an 
unmarked argument of the sentence represents a first case were encountered in this research. 
                                                          
515 CT 115 – 417. 
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Alternatively, the emphatic case marking of a PATIENT with la, explicit also in the above 
quotation, may have even had a specific linguistic significance in the old Tibetan context, 
perhaps inherited from Proto-Tibetan.516 In contrast to the initial interpretation of GNT’s shing 
gcod vs. shing la gcod as ‘to cut wood’ vs. ‘to cut into the wood,’517 the second phrase may in 
fact be an example of emphatic case marking, which would also explain why the author did not 
bother to consider the morphosyntactic variation between the two employed phrases. The 
morpheme la was perhaps regarded as the prototypical marker, since the emphatic case 
marking, which stresses the information of the DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT, represents a 
grammatical operation similar to the affixation of a Sanskrit second case suffix to mark the 
DIRECT OBJECT. Both indicate karman, but Tibetan zero-marking, despite being the default 
construction, does not indicate any function due to the lack of a marker. The PATIENT-role 
manifests only through the word’s implementation into a grammatical construction and not 
through the affixation of a case marker. The equalization of the pragmatic-emphatic function 
of la to stress las with the syntactic function of the Sanskrit second case suffix to mark karman 
is understandable, since their difference is an important but difficult nuance.  
However, given the emphatic function of la for the PATIENT as attested in NGg, the preference 
of la as the second case over zero-marking may also have resulted from the fact that la as the 
most versatile marker, including emphatic PATIENT, ALLATIVE, and a variety of other 
functions, simply covers most instances of las/karman in the early objectivist, semantic-
interpretative conceptions and was thus perceived as the most inclusive morphology in the 
Tibetan tradition. 
(3) The third and final option in this discussion is connected to the precise understanding of the 
distribution of the morpheme la, which continues to pose a challenge to modern linguistics. 
Despite the general consensus that la is a strong directional-locative marker, such as in skyed 
tshal la ’gro (‘to go to the park’)518  or khri la bla ma bzhugs (‘the lama resides on the 
throne’),519 it remains unclear which of the morpheme’s diverse uses may be regarded as 
prototypical and how its various functions may be connected. So far, in modern research no 
sufficient evidence has been adduced regarding the diachronic distribution of this morpheme, 
but based on Hill’s findings in the Old Tibetan Annals, it is possible that the use of la was more 
                                                          
516 Cf. Zeisler 2006, 79. 
517 Cf. supra 187. 
518 Cf. Rnam gling 2013, 69f. 
519 Cf. Tournadre 2010, 106. 
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restricted and that the “allative (= la) does not appear to imply any spatial movement.”520 Hill 
states that “in those instances in which movement is involved, it is always made explicit in a 
verb of motion and the destination themselves are marked in the terminative (= du).” While this 
is no occasion for linguistic investigations, the following question still begs to be asked: if 
indeed the use of la was more restricted, and if its perception by Tibetan speakers as well as 
grammarians of the early period did not exhibit any noticeable or noteworthy directional 
connotation, how should the main function of la be conceptualized? An answer is challenging 
also since it is perhaps the most diverse of all case markers and governed by a whole array of 
verbs with different semantics. Yet, from a linguistic perspective it may be said that an 
interpretation in terms of karman – more as a general object-category and less as a narrow 
DIRECT OBJECT in the strict sense – might have been indeed the closest option to a Tibetan 
grammarian’s comprehension of la’s generic meaning and use. Of particular interest are those 
constructions in which the morpheme la cannot be substituted by du or na, such as for example 
ngas gzugs la lta (‘I look at the form’) or nga bu mo la dga’ (‘I love the girl’). Both verbs are 
bivalent, lta ba (‘to look at’) usually governs an ergative for the agent of looking and la for the 
object, and dga’ ba (‘to like,’ ‘to love,’ ‘to be fond of’) also triggers la for the object of loving, 
while the one affected by love remains unmarked. If the bivalency model of GNT – and 
probably also NGg – is applied in terms of agentive and resultative parts of the action, the object 
of lta ba qualifies more as the karman than the agent. As for dga’ ba, if we are to determine the 
use of la based on the object’s participation within the same bivalency-scheme, it is without 
agency and thus definitely more on the resultative side, although the ‘I’ as the experiencer of 
the affection remains unmarked and thus appears even more strongly affected by the result of 
loving. In fact, under the hypothesis that la is not a directional marker per se, both examples 
allow for an understanding of la as an INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT that is unaffected 
or less affected, similar to the prāpya-type karman in Sanskritic conceptions. The ways in which 
such a function of la may possibly retain its explanatory power throughout other verb frames is 
a much more intricate question and will need to be investigated elsewhere.  
Facing the limited possibilities for evaluating the rationale of Tibetan grammarians without a 
more detailed knowledge of the precise diachronic distribution of la, it may only tentatively be 
concluded for this third option that – if among the many uses of la its prototypical function was 
not necessarily locative-directional – the morpheme’s conceptualization in terms of karman as 
a broader object-marker may have been the most accurate choice among the available options 
                                                          
520 Hill 2011, 15. Cf. also supra 187ff., in particular 192f., on the distribution of morphemes in GNT’s 
presentation of the second case, which corroborates this statement. 
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in the case model. In this case, the early Tibetan grammarians’ strategy could have had at least 
a limited Tibetan-specific, linguistic basis that renders the identification of la with the second 
case much more comprehensible also from a linguistic perspective. The prototypicality of la is 
then derived from the fact that, among the three la, na and du, its generic functioning comes 
closest to karman, whereas the unmarked argument’s prototypicality was ruled out due to the 
reasons outlined in option (2) above. 
8.1.3 The Development of the Second Case up to Si tu 
After the terminological history of the second case and the issues related to its ‘missing’ 
adaptation in the early Tibetan context, the following will give a shorter summary of the 
remaining developments leading up to Si tu. Although the prototypicality of the morpheme la 
remained unquestionable, the conception of the second case as yul/gzhi and the 
active/resultative distinction was neither the only one, nor did the objectivist-interpretative 
focus prevent further language-specific reinterpretations of the second case.  
Regarding first the works outside the Sum rtags genre, Sakya Paṇḍita labelled the second case 
as bya ba’i tshig and defines it as bya ba la sbyor ba (‘application to an action’),521 a phrase we 
will reencounter in Si tu’s definition of the third case, although with an important addition.522 
Dpang Lotsāwa gives bya ba’i las (‘the karman of the action’) as his definition in the TshSS, 
obviously a direct reference to his translation of Cāndra’s kriyāpya in C 2.1.43, for which he 
uses the same Tibetan term.523 It may further be speculated whether bya ba’i las reflects the 
same idea as bya ba’i yul, an issue for which some material is provided in the TshSS,524 but 
which will be followed any further, since it was of no particular importance in Si tu’s work.  
Then, within the Sum rtags commentarial literature, there is an important reinterpretation of the 
second case compared to the Sanskritic and Tibetan conceptions presented thus far. Whereas 
the second case las – in Sum rtags commentaries predominantly las su bya ba – is identified 
with the term las in SCP 11.3 as one of the five functions of la’i sgra (= la don), the distinction 
of GNT into an active and resultative part of the action has been outsourced by many 
commentators to TKJ 11.4-12.3 as an explanation for the opaque bdag (‘self’) and gzhan 
(‘other’).525 Omitting the bipartite action theory in the context of the second case, the common 
practice was to explain the term las in SCP by paraphrasing it as las su bya ba (‘to be done as 
                                                          
521 Cf. KhJ 2009, 25. 
522 Cf. chapter 9.2. 
523 Cf. HSGLT 1, CG24; HSGLT 2, 356. 
524 Cf. Dpang Blo gros brtan pa 2004, 250. 
525 For more details on the separate meanings of las in SCP and TKJ respectively, cf. also Zeisler 2006, 58ff. 
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the karman’), while supplementing examples and presuming their comprehensibility, at least 
for natives. The strategy was to clarify the terminology via illustrations rather than to specify 
clear-cut semantic or syntactic criteria to explain the cases’ use in the examples. Illustrations 
are restricted to the la don morphemes listed in SCP. This left open the possibility of interpreting 
the second case along the lines of la don and narrow it down to a function specific to la don, 
whereas the genuine resultative function, identified with dngos po gzhan (‘other-thing’), was 
more closely related to the unmarked PATIENT in Tibetan sentences. 526  The prevalent 
terminological overlap of both categories, second case and gzhan, with the concepts of las as 
well as yul/gzhi was resolved partially by using las su bya ba for the second case and las for 
gzhan, and partially by remaining silent about any possible relation or separation between the 
two categories which belong to two different passages in the root texts and thus letting the 
examples speak for themselves.  
It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether already the author(s) or editor(s) of SCP 
and TKJ themselves had intended any relation or separation between TKJ’s gzhan and SCP’s 
las along the lines of unmarked PATIENT versus la don, first of all because the bdag/gzhan 
terminology is too cryptic for a decision regarding its original meaning. It is likewise 
challenging to determine the time when the outlined interpretation first started appearing in the 
commentarial literature. In the Sum rtags commentary of Rnam gling, the active/resultative 
scheme already features in his exposition of TKJ’s bdag/gzhan but not in his presentation of 
the second case on SCP 11.3.527 His numerous references to other sources further suggests that 
the interpretation bdag/gzhan qua active/resultative had proven popular already before his 
times. On the other hand, interpretations of bdag and gzhan such as the one of his direct 
predecessor Zha lu Lotsāwa, who does not note any relation between bdag/gzhan and the 
active/resultative dichotomy in his TKJ commentary, demonstrate that this strategy to outsource 
the resultative function from the second case to gzhan was not as simple and straightforward 
within the tradition.528  
Moreover, it should be noted that the sources are not fully clear on whether the outsourcing of 
the resultative meaning of las from the second case was really intended to distinguish between 
the second case marked by la don and the unmarked PATIENT, or whether authors adhered to 
the idea that both are identical, related or at least to be subsumed under an overarching 
                                                          
526 Unfortunately, commentaries vary significantly regarding the extent to which they provide clear illustrations 
to clarify such details. 
527 Cf. Rnam gling 2013, 69f. and 117f. 
528 Cf. Zha lu 2013B, 25ff. 
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conception of las. The decisive issue concerns not only whether the resultative part of the action 
expressed by the unmarked argument is a second case, but also whether its general status qua 
case is lost in a complete separation of the two. Although Pra ti, for example, follows the 
strategy of introducing the active/resultative pair in the context of TKJ’s bdag/gzhan without 
mentioning it in relation to la don, his definition of the second case as gzhi gzhan la bya ba 
byed pa (‘to perform an action upon a distinct substratum’) resonates with the old definitions 
in NGg or GNT, and thus it could easily subsume genuine PATIENTs and dngos po gzhan as 
well.529 The commentary of Rnam gling likewise exhibits inconsistencies that complicate the 
question of whether or not he fully separates SCP’s las qua second case from TKJ’s gzhan qua 
resultative part of the action. Most interestingly, in his explanation of gzhan and bdag, he quotes 
Kātantra’s definition of karman and agent in K 2.4.13 and 14. This makes unmistakably clear 
that he associates TKJ’s gzhan with the prototypical Sanskritic second case function, but he 
does not explicate any connection to his la don-specific second case which belongs to SCP 
11.3.530 His numerous sample phrases for gzhan suggest that this category in principle includes 
the unmarked PATIENT, yet they are morphosyntactically too diverse to decide without a 
separate study whether he excluded la don from gzhan, without a separate study.531 
The common strategy to reconcile the different notions of second case, that is las, las su bya 
ba, gzhan and the resultative part of the action, was a certain silence presumably to avoid 
obvious conflicts of the traditional Sanskritic and Tibetan case models with the structures of 
written Tibetan. This silence, unfortunately, lacks clarity regarding the details of this 
terminology. Different (preliminary ?) forms of separating second case from gzhan evidently 
emerged before Si tu through the commentarial practice of associating the grammatical notions 
with two different sections in SCP and TKJ, and the precise status of this separation prior to Si 
tu’s work would require another future study.532 
Despite all inconsistencies and the lack of clarifications, this separation definitely was an 
important step towards a more accurate analysis of Tibetan language, and it reflects an increased 
awareness of and/or attention to the language-specific structures compared to what is 
encountered in GNT. The unmarked morphology of the actual PATIENT role and the non-
PATIENT character of the case markers la, na and du must have been too strongly compelling 
to later grammarians for them to remain fully neglected in grammatical analysis. However, it 
                                                          
529 Cf. supra 175 and 181f.; Pra ti 2013A, 204; Pra ti 2013B, 241. 
530 Cf. Rnam gling 2013, 117. 
531 Cf. ibid., 118f. 
532 For a Tibetan account post-Si tu that is based on the traditional terminological-conceptual framework and yet 
elaborates this difference more explicitly, cf. ft. 594. 
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could have been only a step within the framework of the authoritative tradition, in particular 
SCP and TKJ. The analytical framework offered and established by the early tradition obscured 
the precise distribution of the three case morphemes and restricted options for developing a 
more accurate representation of Tibetan syntax. The equivalence of na, la and du, inherited 
from SCP and also attested in GNT and the Smra sgo, remained to be reconciled with the 
structures of Tibetan language up to and after Si tu. Commentators, who would often omit an 
elaborated exposition of the second case’s meaning, were still faced with the task to classify 
these three morphemes against their actual distribution as one morphological category within 
the case model, while simultaneously also maintaining the distinction of second, fourth and 
seventh case. In the context of the second case, this refers to the issue of consistent parameters 
that allow all three morphemes na, la and du to encode a homogeneous function which 
represents the second case las su bya ba. From the degrees of variation in the sources’ selected 
sample phrases, it may be assumed that the precise criteria to establish the second case’s 
meaning varied as well.533 The following examples for the second case are provided by Zha lu 
and Rnam gling under SCP 9.3-11.4: 
Zha lu Lotsāwa: 
shar phyogs su ’gro (‘to go to the east’), sangs rgyas la skyabs su mchi (‘to go to the 
 Buddha as the refuge,’ in the meaning ‘to take refuge to the Buddha’),534 ’di ru mgon 
po rtag bzhugs nas (‘after the protector resided perpetually here’),535 ’dir ni rgyal ba 
dgra rgyal (‘As regards this [life], the victorious [truth] conquers the enemy […]’),536 
der ni  khyad rnams phyin par ’gyur (‘you reached there’), dbugs dbyung du gsol (‘to 
 pray/ask/request for relief’), bshad du gsol (‘to ask/request to explain’), mdun du bkug 
 (‘to bend forwards’), bsam du med (lit. ‘not to be thought,’ in the meaning of 
 ‘unthinkable,’ ‘beyond our mind’), shing la rlung gis bskyod pa (‘the wind 
 moving/shaking the tree’)537 
                                                          
533 This selection of sample phrases most definitely bears invaluable information about a grammarian’s 
understanding of the case. Future research on these sample lists will hopefully bring more clarity and refine our 
understanding about the grammarians’ precise conception of the second case before Si tu. 
534 la and su are both considered to be a second case in Zha lu’s grammar. 
535 Apparently, this is a quotation from another source, which I have been unable to identify. 
536 This quotation appears in several Tibetan sources (cf. TBRC). I assume it goes back to the canonical source 
Rig sngags kyi rgyal mo rma bya chen mo las gsungs pa’i smon lam dang bden tshig: 
“Rig sngags kyi rgyal mo rma bya chen mo las gsungs pa’i smon lam dang bden tshig.” In bka’ ’gyur (Sde dge 
par phud). TBRC W22084. 101: 540 - 541. Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Chodhey Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 
1976-1979. http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O1GS12980|O1GS1298001JW14656$W22084 (accessed May 5th, 2017) 
The whole sentence reads:  
 ’dir ni rgyal ba dgra rgyal bden gang gis/     shin tu bden pa gsung zhing brdzun med pa/     bden pa de 
 yis ’dir ni dge bar shog/  
537 Cf. Zha lu 2013A, 7f. 
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Rnam gling Paṇchen: 
shar phyogs su ’gro (‘to go to the east’), zhing gi gyas su ’gro (‘to go right of the tree’ 
 or ‘to go to the right [side] of the tree’?), rgya gar du ’gro (‘to go to India’), mnyan yod 
 du ’gro (‘to go to Śravasti’), mdun du bkug (‘to bend forwards’), bsam du med (lit. ‘not 
 to be thought,’ in the meaning of ‘unthinkable,’ ‘beyond our mind’), gsal du btang 
(‘[s/he] made clearer, clarified’), nang du bcug (‘[s/he] put inside, inserted’), dga’ ldan 
na chos ston (‘to teach Dharma at Dga’ ldan’), nam mkha’ la ’gro (‘to go to the heaven’), 
skyed  tshal la ’gro (‘to go to the park’), mngon dga’ ru ’gro (‘to go to Abhirati’),538 
phor pa ru chu bcus (‘[s/he] poured water into the pot’),539 rgyab tu gos gyon (‘to 
wear/put on cloths at the back’), mig tu sman blug (‘to apply medicine to  the eyes’), 
pha rol tu bsgral (lit. ‘[s/he] has got free to the other side’ ?), dbang bskur du gsol (‘to 
request for an initiation/empowerment’)540 
The examples in each of these two lists differ regarding the employed verb frames, 
morphological markers and the syntactic/semantic information encoded by them. Thus, their 
classification as one and the same case cannot provide an accurate representation of Tibetan 
syntax. An explanation regarding the rationale of their selections is lacking, which perhaps 
suggests that they followed an intuitive approach, or perhaps also that they struggled to provide 
clear-cut definitions maintaining the traditional taxonomy, while simultaneously remaining in 
line with the peculiarities of the language.  
In contrast to his two predecessors, Pra ti attempts to explicate a homogeneous parameter to 
define the second case and distinguish it from the fourth and seventh in his presentation of SCP 
11.3-4: 
 des na ’di dag gi khyad par ni/     thab la med btang zhes pa lta bu/     gzhi gzhan la bya 
 ba byas pa dang/     byed pa sogs ston pa’i la sgra rnams rnam dbye gnyis pa dang/ 
 mgron po la me btang lta bu bya ba byed pa’i gzhi dngos ma yin par/     de la me bdang 
 ba ni/     de’i ched du me btang ba yin la/     de ltar dgos pa la/     la sgra sbyar te/     bya 
 ba me btang bar ston pa’i la’i sgra ni rnam dbye gzhi pa’o/     thab la me yod lta bu/     
 gzhi thab la me btang ba sogs kyi bya ba byas pa mi brjod par/     me’i ngo bo tsam yod 
 par brjod pa’i la’i sgra ni rnam dbye btun pa’o […] 
                                                          
538 Abhirati is the Buddhafield associated with Buddha Akṣobhya. 
539 Note that according to the Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo (2006, 866), the standard grammatical construction 
of the verb ’chu ba (to take/bring water’) normally marks the container by means of which the water is taken 
with byed sgra rather than with la don: zangs skyogs kyis chu ’chu (‘to take water with a copper ladle’). 
540 Cf. Rnam gling 2013, 69f. 
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 “Therefore, as regards the difference between these [five functions in SCP 11.3-4], a la-
 morpheme indicating that an action has been performed or is being performed, etc. upon 
 some distinct substratum (gzhi gzhan la bya ba byas pa dang byed pa sogs), is the second 
 case, as in ‘to light a fire on the stove’ (‘thab la me btang’). In ‘having lit a fire for the 
 guest’ (mgron po la me btang), without being the actual substratum where the action is 
 performed, ‘having lit a fire for him’ (de la me btang ba) [means that] the fire is lit for 
 the sake of him (de’i ched du). Accordingly, a la-morpheme indicating the action of 
 fire-lighting for a purpose (dgos pa) to which the la-morpheme has been applied, is a 
 fourth case. In ‘there is fire on the stove’ (thab la med yod), not saying that an action of 
 lighting a fire on the stove, etc., has been performed, a la-morpheme expressing that the 
 mere essence of fire exists (me’i ngo bo tsam yod pa) is the seventh case.”541 
The definition of Pra ti’s second case amounts to a distinction of active vs. existential verbs or 
verbs of abiding, meaning that any la don with an action verb results in a second case, whereas 
la don plus verb of existence or abidance qualifies as a seventh case.542 However, a la don with 
action verb where the marked argument figures as the purpose or beneficiary is a fourth case. 
Interestingly, his illustrations of the second case are mostly restricted to indications of locative 
meanings, such as gyas la nyal (‘to sleep on the right’), se ra na chos nyan (‘to listen to the 
Dharma in Se ra’), khog ma ru sha ’tshos (‘to digest meat in the stomach’).543 If he would have 
followed the traditional practice to add also phrases with a directional meaning, like shar 
phyogs su/la ’gro (‘to go to the east’), which equally fall under his definition of the second case, 
the arbitrariness of his definition with regard to Tibetan syntax and the distribution of the 
morphemes would have been more evident. In fact, the case markers in sentences like se ra na 
chos nyan and shar phyogs su ’gro do not encode the same type of information and thus cannot 
be the same case from the perspective of the morphemes’ function. Pra ti focuses merely on the 
verbs and a single, very general semantic parameter of actions in general, instead of analyzing 
the meaning and function of the different case morphemes as present in the language.544  
In any case, he achieved to establish a homogeneous criterion for all three morphemes to 
function as genuine second cases, without one of them prevailing over the others and with a 
                                                          
541 Pra ti 2013A, 203f. 
542 On this distinction, cf. also chapter 13. 
543 Cf. Pra ti 2013A, 197. 
544 It may also be noted that this criterion leaves room for competing interpretations as to which verbs are active 
and which are only verbs of existence/abiding. Compare his examples of phyi rol tu bsdad (‘to stay outside’) or 
gyas la nyal (‘to sleep on the right’) for the second case with his seventh case example rab gsal du dpon po 
bzhugs (‘the chief resided in Rab gsal’) (cf. ibid.). 
 209 
 
clear separation of the second case from the fourth and seventh despite their identical 
morphology. Therefore, Pra ti’s definition was a systematic solution in view of the early 
tradition’s heritage, and it continued to remain even after Si tu. The source of this distinction, 
however, may be even more ancient, as demonstrated by Rnam gling’s example for the second 
case, dga’ ldan na chos ston (‘[s/he] teaches the Dharma at Dga’ ldan’), as well as Zha lu’s list 
with comparable instances. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that it goes back to the earliest stages 
of Tibetan grammaticography.545  
8.1.4 A Note on the Notion of las su bya ba (‘to be done as the karman’) 
A final remark in this survey of the times leading up to Si tu is in place concerning the term las 
su bya ba (‘to be done as karman’), which gradually evolved into a more prominent label for 
the second case than las in Sum rtags. Admittedly, my current translation of this term is but a 
tentative rendition, since the transition in meaning from las to las su bya ba remains unclear. 
Bettina Zeisler, for example, has translated the term as ‘action towards/for a deed,’ thus 
emphasizing the directional meaning of the second case due to its prototypical marker la.546 
Yet, it has already been demonstrated in the survey above that many classical commentators 
such as Zha lu et. al did not develop a clear directional conception of the second case, nor was 
it the original meaning of the term in the Tibetan tradition. The nomenclature las su bya ba is 
attested as early as in the NGg and GNT, where it refers to the kāraka karman without any 
difference regarding PATIENT, DIRECTION, etc.  
Furthermore, su in las su bya ba should be interpreted as a classical instance of de nyid 
(‘identity’), which is supported also by Mkhas dbang nyan shul mkhyen rab ’od gsal’s 
commentary to SCP, entitled Sum cu pa’i rnam bshad gsal ba’i sgron me.547 Yet, the term’s 
                                                          
545 Further research is highly suggested, but possible antecedents may be as early as Sakya Paṇḍita’s definition of 
bya ba la sbyor ba (‘that which is applied to an action’) or it may even be related to Tibetan translations of the 
original Cāndrian kriyāpya as bya ba’i las (CG 24) or bya ba (CG 6, CG 37) (cf. HSGLT 2, 356). They all leave 
enough room to reinterpret the second case as a general action case.  
Despite GNT’s bya ba’i gzhi (second case) vs. gnas gzhi (seventh case) dichotomy, which also resonates with 
Pra ti’s definition, it is questionable whether such instances would have qualified as a second case in the works 
of NGg, GNT or Smra sgo. Compare GNT’s shing gi rtse mo na gcod cing ’dug (cf. supra 187f.) and Smra sgo’s 
shing gi rtse mo na gcod (cf. ft. 495) with Pra ti’s se ra na chos nyan (cf. supra 208): in the former two 
examples, both arguments marked by na are second cases, because they qualify in a non-Tibetan-specific general 
construal of the scenario as genuine PATIENTs in terms of karman. The resultative part is already occupied by 
chos in Pra ti’s example, for which reason se ra na must have been a seventh case in the earlier sources. 
Unfortunately, Pra ti’s type of example is missing therein, thus leaving open the question about GNT’s and Smra 
sgo’s standpoint regarding such constructions. 
546 Cf. Zeisler 2006, 59. 
547  spyir ’di skabs kyi las su bya ba zhes pa’i su sgra ni rnam dbye gnyis pa’i nang gses de nyid kyi don yin 
 zhing su sgra bsdus na las bya ba zhes pa ste don du bya ba byed pa’am phal skad du las ka byed pa 
 zhes pa dang ’dra/ 
 “In general, the morpheme su of the current ‘las su bya ba’ has the meaning of de nyid, the subcategory 
 of the second case. If the su-morpheme is contracted, [it results in] ‘las bya ba,’ the meaning being 
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origins as well as its meaning still remain unclear. It is even unclear whether the version las su 
bya ba in fact reflects any additional meaning compared to the simpler las. In his Tibetan-
Sanskrit dictionary, Negi mentions both las and las su bya ba as a translation for vyāpāra.548 
Perhaps the Tibetan term was also developed as part of the complementary pair las su bya ba/las 
byed pa in the bivalent action model of NGg. Alternatively, there may also be a relation to the 
fourth case ched du bya ba (lit. ‘to be done as the purpose,’ i.e. the beneficiary or purpose of 
the action), the two perhaps being connected to Cāndra’s kriyāpya (prototypical second case 
function, C 2.1.43) and tādarthya (secondary fourth case function, C 2.1.79) respectively.549 
Since at this point these are but speculations groping in the dark, this dissertation will adhere to 
my tentative translation of ‘to be done as the karman.’  
8.1.5 Résumé of the Second Case pre-Si tu 
In sum, the classical Sum rtags conception of the second case before Si tu represents the paragon 
of Tibetan grammatical theory formation within the Tibetan scholastic environment and its 
methodology. Early conceptions of the Tibetan second case drew upon Sanskritic theories of 
karman and established a taxonomy that was apparently (if GNT’s account is representative) 
strongly based on general considerations of karman and the semantic construal of scenarios 
referred to in sample phrases largely disconnected from Tibetan-specific morphosyntax. This 
taxonomical framework became authoritative in the later Sum rtags tradition as preserved in 
SCP and TKJ. The disequilibrium between early taxonomies in SCP, NGg, GNT (perhaps also 
Smra sgo ?) and Tibetan language evoked a process of reconciliation to account for authoritative 
conceptions of the second case and simultaneously develop it as a homogeneous category in 
Tibetan language marked by la don. Naturally, due to the gap between the authoritative 
conceptual framework and the language, this resulted less in a nice and neat consensus and 
more in uneasy compromises in which often silence prevailed. However, the obscured 
distribution of the la don morphemes in the context of the second case probably did only a little 
harm to students of Tibetan grammar, since as native speakers they were proficient regarding 
the precise use of the language’s grammatical inventory.  
                                                          
 somewhat like ‘bya ba byed pa’ (to do an action’) or in colloquial language ‘las ka byed pa’ (‘to do the 
 work’).” (Mkhas dbang nyan shul mkhyen rab ’od gsal 2009, 20) 
Note that Mkhas dbang nyan shul mkhyen rab ’od gsal explicitly separates the two types of las under SCP and 
TKJ respectively, but of course he is positioned much later than Si tu.  
548 Cf. Negi 2004, 6625 and 6646. 
549 Cf. also the entry on ched, dgos ched and sbyin in HSGLT 2, 217. 
 211 
 
In the case of Si tu, the outlined terminological apparatus as well as the issues surrounding the 
established conceptions of the second case and the actual distribution of la don would have 
great impact on his theory formation and classification of sample phrases. 
8.2 The Second Case in the Great Commentary 
With the second case, we are entering the domain of tshig (pada, ‘syntactic form,’ ‘syntactically 
bound word form’) in Si tu’s derivational model, that is to say, all remaining cases including 
the second are intrasentential arguments marked by a syntactic link in order to express a 
semantic-syntactic variation (don gyi khyad par/ldog pa) of the lexical word meaning 
specifying its participation in the meaning of the sentence.  
In the GC, the association of the second case with SCP and the identification of the resultative 
part of the action with gzhan in TKJ has been accepted in accordance with the preceding Sum 
rtags tradition. Si tu’s extensive illustration of dngos po gzhan makes it evident that the 
resultative part has been identified with the unmarked argument of differentiated actions (tha 
dad pa) and thus corresponds more or less to the function of DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT.550 
Likewise, the la don morphemes stated in SCP 9.3-11.2 form a single category in Si tu’s work, 
which expresses the five meanings of SCP 11.3-4, including las (karman) which is identified 
in accordance with Si tu’s predecessors as the second case (rnam dbye gnyis pa). In view of the 
basic setup of the preceding tradition, what was Si tu’s strategy to retain the second case las as 
a single, homogeneous category marked by the three distinct morphemes la, na and du, which 
also mark the seventh and fourth case? And how did Si tu perceive this separation of la don gyi 
las and dngos po gzhan? 
8.2.1 Two Definitions of the Second Case 
8.2.1.1 First Definition 
Following the commentarial tradition before him, Si tu’s exposition of the second case starts 
under SCP 9.3-11.4. In his paraphrase of the root text, subsequent to the morphological 
derivation of the la don morphemes, Si tu provides the first, uncommented example of skyabs 
su mchi’o (lit. ‘[s/he] goes to the refuge,’ in the meaning of ‘to take refuge’), classifying it as 
las kyi sgra (‘karman morpheme’) in the meaning of the second case las su bya ba551 and 
implying that this is the same function as referred to by the root text. As part of his commentary 
                                                          
550 Cf. e.g. GC 547.2. 
551 ’di dag kyang skyabs su mchi’o lta bu rnam dbye gnyis pa las su bya ba’i don can du sbyar na las kyi sgra 
[…]  
“If these [la don-morphemes] are applied in the meaning of the second case ‘to-be-done-as-the-karman,’ as in ‘to 
go to the refuge,’ [they are] the karman-morpheme […]” (GC 472.1) 
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on SCP 9.3-11.4, he also provides a first concise definition in the section on the functional mode 
of application (don gyi sbyor tshul) of the la don morphemes: 
 la na gnyis de nyid kyi don du mi ’jug cing gzhan la ’jug pa dang/     su ra ru du tu lnga 
 po de rnams las sogs don lnga la mtshungs par ’jug pa yin pas de rnams ji ltar sbyor 
 na/     byed pa pos bya ba gang la byed pa’i las kyi don can du ’gyur ba rnam dbye gnyis 
 pa ni/     shar phyogs su ’gro/     rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed/     mtha’ ru ’khyol/     rgya 
 gar du ’gro/     rgyab tu phyogs/     pha rold tu phyin/     gzugs la lta/     mdun na  rgyu/     
 zhes sogs mtha’ yas par bsgres nas sbyar bar bya’o/ 
 “The two [morphemes] la and na are not applied in the meaning of de nyid but take on 
 the other [four meanings defined in SCP 11.3-4]. The five [morphemes] su, -r, ru, du, 
 tu take on equally [all] five meanings karman, etc. If [someone] therefore [asks] how 
 these [seven morphemes] are applied, becoming endowed with the meaning of a 
 karman, upon which an agent performs an action (byed pa pos bya ba gang la byed pa’i 
 las), [they result in] the second case. As for [this second case], it is to be applied by 
 indefinitely extrapolating from [examples] such as (1) ‘going to the east’ (shar phyogs 
 su ’gro), (2) ‘making/carving a picture onto/on/to the stone’ (rdo bar gzugs brnyan 
 byed), (3) ‘getting to an end/to become finished’ (mtha’ ru ’khyol), (4) ‘going to India’ 
 (rgya gar du ’gro), (5) ‘turn to the back’ (rgyab tu phyogs), (6) ‘gone to the other side’ 
 (pha rold tu phyin), (7) ‘to look at the form’ (gzugs la lta), (8) ‘to move in front of/to 
 move forward (?)’ (mdun na rgyu).”552 
Regarding the morphology, Si tu does not add anything new and adheres to the established 
category of la don consisting of seven morphemes. The exclusion of la and na from de nyid 
varies throughout the commentaries, since not all have identified de nyid with the 
transformative function of the morpheme du. Si tu’s version probably followed Smra sgo and 
perhaps he also knew about it from GNT, but he does not refer to this latter source in the GC. 
It is interesting to note that Si tu starts the entire section on the meaning of la don by recognizing 
that la and na share the same four meanings while du has an additional one, taking this 
distribution as the reason for inquiring into the precise application of the morphemes and the 
meaning of their functions. Thus, may this be read as his awareness that the traditional 
taxonomy is not necessarily self-evident from a Tibetan point of view? 
                                                          
552 GC 473.4. 
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The brief definition Si tu places before the examples is rather dissatisfying, since he 
implemented only one of the oldest labels of the second case, gang la (‘upon which’), in one of 
the most general phrases imaginable, namely byed pa pos bya ba byed pa (‘an agent performs 
an action’). Given the presented conceptual background of karman in the history of Tibetan 
grammaticography, the resulting byed pa pos bya ba gang la byed pa’i las (‘the karman upon 
which an agent performs the action’) remains rather indifferent regarding any of the linguistic 
issues surrounding the three morphemes and the second case. Paradigmatic for the Sum rtags 
tradition, this definition has to be read against the backdrop of the examples to understand its 
meaning.  
8.2.1.2 Discussion of Examples in the First Definition 
Si tu provided eight examples, one for each morpheme plus an additional one for tu. A similar 
pattern will be encountered in the context of the other cases, which reveals that Si tu attempted 
to prove that all seven morphemes indeed qualify as indicating a second case. The grammatical 
constructions of the samples exhibit a total of six different verb frames, ’gro ba (‘to go’), byed 
pa (‘to make’), ’khyol ba (‘to come to an end,’ ‘to become finished/completed’), phyogs pa (‘to 
turn oneself towards’), lta ba (‘to look at’) and rgyu ba (‘to move’), with’gro ba being repeated 
twice, once in the perfect tense phyin pa (‘has gone’). Both types of verbs, tha dad pa as well 
as tha mi dad pa, are listed indifferently. The majority consists of bivalent verb frames which 
govern one unmarked plus one la don argument (1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8) as their most common value in 
a default construction, however there is also one bivalent verb frame with one agentive plus one 
la don argument (7) as well as one bivalent verb frame that governs one agentive plus one 
unmarked argument in which the entity marked by la don constitutes the third value of the verb 
(2). 
In a semantic construal of the scenarios expressed by all eight examples, a directional value of 
the argument marked by la don is conceivable to varying degrees, and this may thus be regarded 
as the overarching information encoded by la don that prevails throughout the examples. 
According to this reading of the examples, Si tu’s strategy to demarcate the second case would 
be the formation of the homogeneous parameter DIRECTION/ALLATIVE. This would then 
lead to an altered reading of his definition byed pa pos bya ba gang la byed pa’i las as ‘the 
karman towards which the action is performed by the agent,’ instead of the older understanding 
(GNT, NGg) in terms of ‘the karman upon which the action is performed by the agent.’ Yet, 
both suppositions, namely that the actual information encoded by la don in all examples is 
indeed DIRECTION as well as that Si tu’s strategy of focusing on such a directional value of 
la don, require closer scrutinization since the situation at hand is much more complex in view 
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of the heterogeneous distribution of the three morphemes (especially la) and the many other 
issues involved in the second case already outlined in the historical survey above. 
From a linguistic perspective, only the five examples (1), (3), (4), (5) and (6) can be more easily 
identified with DIRECTION/ALLATIVE, as they all exhibit either a verb of spatial (1, 4, 5, 6) 
or metaphorical movement (3) and are marked by du or its allomorphs, of which the 
ALLATIVE function appears to be more distinctive compared to the other markers and also 
established in modern research. Example (3) may be alternatively classified as an instance of 
the transformative function, since the ‘end’ (mtha’) in question is that of the object to be finished 
itself, but this is but a minor issue in the current investigation. Although semantic construals of 
the scenarios expressed by examples (2), (7) and (8) allow for a directional value in one way or 
another, they are more problematic.  
In example (8) (mdun na rgyu ‘to move in front of’ or ‘to move forward’ ?), the directional 
meaning is somehow compromised due to the morpheme na as static locative marker. Hahn’s 
textbook on Classical Tibetan mentions a “very rare” directional function of na in phrases such 
as gyas na phyag ’tshal lo (‘S/he prostrates to the right [side].’), although he also adds that such 
examples may be restricted to grammatical sources.553 The phrase is very close to the English 
‘to move/go in front of [the house, etc.],’ which bears the same ambiguity of whether ‘in front 
of’ has mere locative or directional meaning. The two different resulting scenarios amount to 
the question whether the goer is going to the house from another place, or whether the goer is 
already located in front of the house and performs the action of going at that very place. Whether 
the directional or locative meaning prevails in such phrases is a matter of linguistic analysis for 
which I lack qualification as either linguist or native speaker.554 Phrase (8) may therefore be a 
rare and exceptional use of na – perhaps also a fixed expression – but it still represents a genuine 
indication of DIRECTION, or alternatively a counterexample with no directional but only a 
locative value. However, since this is the only phrase for the morpheme na in this list, it is 
obvious that Si tu was looking for the most representative instance of this morpheme in the 
meaning of the second case. Whatever his general interpretation of the second case las and thus 
also of the marker na in (8), a locative preposition (mdun ‘before’) with a verb of strong 
directional movement was perhaps the best option to withdraw from the actual locative function 
                                                          
553 Cf. Hahn 2005, 92. This information is important insofar as it bears the issue that such phrases could have 
been introduced to support the specific taxonomical decisions of grammarians rather than being representative 
for the language. 
554 On a personal remark, note that during an informal consultation with Tibetan native speakers, I was given the 
feedback that the phrase may in fact have both meanings. 
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of na, which in Si tu’s model would be a seventh case, and to approximate the morpheme to the 
remaining examples. 
The verb byed pa (‘to do’) in phrase number (2) (rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed ‘making/carving 
a picture onto/on/to the stone’) does not have any directional meaning per se, and in a hierarchy 
of the verb’s valency la don follows as the third only after the agentive und unmarked 
arguments. The default construction is thus that of an agent who is doing something, and thus 
the question arises how the information encoded by la don in this phrase should be understood. 
The la don morpheme at hand is that of -r, which raises the further question of whether to read 
the morpheme as an allomorph of la or a variant of ru.555 Based on modern understandings of 
la and du, the precise meaning of the rdo bar gzugs snyan byed might range from ‘to make a 
picture onto the stone’ (= DIRECTION/ALLATIVE) to ‘to make a picture on the stone’ (= 
LOCATIVE), and in view of the statements on the marker la in the historical survey of the 
current case, the option ‘to make a picture ~ to the stone’ (= SECONDARY or INDIRECT 
OBJECT’) also beeds to be taken into account.556 In the case of a variant of ru and thus du, the 
directional reading seems to be the most probable candidate, with the alternative of a locative 
reading.557  
In case we have to read the phrase as an instance of la, the same basic problem is encountered 
as for (7) (gzugs la lta ‘to look at the form’), namely whether the indeed possible directional –
and for (2) also locative – interpretation of the morpheme la is representative for the information 
actually encoded within the sentence. Similar to what was stated in the context of the precise 
functioning of la in the historical survey,558 if la in these two phrases does not primarily have a 
                                                          
555 Cf. Tournadre 2010, 97. 
556 The ‘to’ in the last translation is not a grammatically correct construction in English, however it is intended to 
emphasize the indirect objecthood or secondary affectedness in contrast to the two other versions. 
557 Tshe tan zhabs drung (2005, 121 and 124f.) correctly remarks Si tu’s inconsistency to classify (2) as an 
instance of the second case but lcags la gser ’byug (‘to apply gold to the iron’ or ‘to spread gold on the iron’ ?) 
as a seventh case. He therefore concludes that Si tu should have chosen the same classification for both, arguing 
that the option of a seventh case can cover (2) as well by making reference to one of Si tu’s renditions of the 
seventh case (bya ba’i rten ‘support of the action’). For more details, cf. infra 391ff. 
Such contradictive classifications which figure prominently in Tibetan grammatical sources are probably 
challenging for every taxonomy. In this particular instance, Si tu’s seemingly inconsistent classification of the 
two converging examples together with Tshe tan zhabs drung’s alternative classification as a seventh case are a 
sign that the lexical semantics of the verb apparently remain indifferent regarding the precise participation of the 
actants and thus allows for different readings. There may therefore be the possibility that each of the two phrases 
indeed allows for both values, directional and locative, depending on the mental construal of the expressed 
scenarios by the speaker or hearer. This construal may be further influenced by the context and regional 
variations or in the context of grammar of course also by Sanskrit role models, which might have had an impact 
on the precise interpretation and classification of an example. 
Apart from the historical constitution of the case model, challenging examples like (2) are probably another 
reason why grammarians like Pra ti took resort to the rather insignificant distinction of action vs. residential verb 
to define the second and seventh cases, since this criterion has no difficulties with these phrases, for they employ 
action-verbs and can thus only be second cases. 
558 Cf. supra 201f. 
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directional-locative meaning, what are the other options? And may its function indeed be that 
of an objective marker in terms of the INDIRECT/SECONDARY as the less affected OBJECT?    
This entire issue is of utmost importance, since la unquestionably is the traditional prototypical 
marker of the second case and the question arises why Si tu chose not to further specify his first 
definition of the second case as an ALLATIVE function, but leave it in such general terms close 
to earlier conceptions?  
If, after all, la indeed encodes directional meaning in (2) and (7), and thus all eight examples 
are a fairly homogeneous set of ALLATIVES, a first option would be that he simply presumed 
that the definition as an ALLATIVE is more or less self-explanatory against the backdrop of 
the examples. Yet, I find this option unlikely in view of the heterogeneous definitions of the 
second case throughout the tradition on the one hand, and his adoption of old renderings of the 
second case as gang la that were clearly not intended as ALLATIVE definitions on the other. 
While I do not qualify as a native speaker of 18th century Tibetan, I argue that Si tu’s first 
definition does not appear as self-evident. 
A second option under the condition that la encodes ALLATIVE information is that his version 
of the second case is that of an ALLATIVE, but that he desisted from a direct explication in 
order to remain closer to conceptions of the former tradition and avoid possible conflicts which 
might have revealed inconsistencies of the traditional case model. 
Alternatively, although all eight illustrations are instances of ALLATIVE – with or without 
his awareness of this fact –, he might have nonetheless adhered to older accounts like in NG(g) 
or GNT according to which the second case is a genuine karman. 
If la does not necessarily encode directional-locative meaning in its only examples (2) and (7), 
then the first option is that this first definition of the second case (byed pa pos bya ba gang la 
byed pa’i las) may have been based more on its morphosyntactic significance with regard to 
the case’s prototypical marker la as having some form of objective function.  
A second option regarding la as a non-directional marker is that Si tu regarded them as having 
directional value, and thus he construed an ALLATIVE function through the selection of 
examples by choosing mainly clear instances of direction and interpreting the semantics of the 
remaining (2, 7, 8) against their backdrop. Presumably, he also refrained from further specifying 
his ALLATIVE in the first definition to remain in line with the tradition and avoid possible 
conflicts.  
The intricacies surrounding the entire issue of the second case are evident from the multiple 
options and speculations resulting from the initial question which variant -r is in (2), the 
 217 
 
meaning of la in (2) and (7) from a linguistic perspective, and finally the historical question 
about Si tu’s strategy to establish the second case within the basic framework offered by SCP 
and the preceding tradition. In sum, five (1, 3, 4, 5, 6) of the eight examples are unambiguous 
instances of DIRECTION marked by either du or one of its allomorphs, whereas (8) bears a 
certain ambiguity but was intended to fit the set of examples as well as Si tu’s definition of the 
second case as the only instance of na, which is a clear static locative marker and thus requires 
a compromise in any event. The two remaining samples for -r and la, however, offered multiple 
options that are left open at this point.  
Based on the majority of samples, the resulting picture suggests that in this first definition Si tu 
focused mainly on a DIRECTION/ALLATIVE-function. Yet, as pointed out at the beginning 
of this subsection, this majority has little significance in the sense that the rationale for the 
selection of examples was not exclusively aiming at the most representative phrases for the 
second case function, but priority was rather given to finding representative instances of the 
second case for all seven la don morphemes. That the directional value therefore prevails is 
more the result of the fact that four of the seven markers represent du and its allomorphs, with 
-r perhaps even representing a fifth. The criterion of the majority of samples is thus not 
sufficiently indicative. Moreover, if the prototypical marker la is taken into account, the picture 
is immediately more complicated in view of the heterogeneity of the morpheme and the 
different options outlined above.  
With this analysis of Si tu’s first definition in mind, this chapter will now turn to his second 
definition which will teach us more about his conception of the second case las.  
8.2.1.3 Si tu’s Second Definition of the Second Case 
In his summary of Tibetan case grammar following his commentary on TKJ 25.4-28.3, Si tu 
provided an additional definition of the second case: 
 de la la don rnams rnam dbye gnyis pa las la ’jug pa’i tshul ni/     dper na/     lha la 
 phyag  ’tshal/     gzugs la lta/     shar du ’gro/     lta bu’i lha/     gzugs/     shar rnams ni 
 phyag ’tshal ba dang/     lta ba dang ’gro ba rnams kyi bya ba ’jug pa’i yul yin pas de 
 dag la las kyi  rnam dbye ’jug pa yin no/ 
 “Now as to the mode in which [the syntactic link] la don takes on the second case, 
 karman: For example, ‘god,’ ‘form’ and ‘east’ of [the sentences] (1) ‘to prostrate to the 
 god/deity’ (lha la phyag ’tshal),559 (2) ‘to look at the form’ (gzugs la lta), (3) ‘to go to 
                                                          
559 Lit. ‘to perform the prostration to/towards the deity.’ 
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 the east’ (shar phyogs su ’gro) are the domain (yul) in wich the actions of ‘to prostrate,’ 
 ‘to look at’ and ‘to go’ engage (’jug pa). Therefore, the case karman joins to them.”560 
Two of the three examples (2, 3) are already known from the first definition, with the only new 
illustration being (1). The default construction of (1) requires three participants, the agent who 
performs the prostration marked by byed sgra, the object of prostration marked by la and the 
prostration (phyag) as the unmarked argument. Alternatively, the entire phrase phyag ’tshal ba 
may be classified as a synthetic verb form, which would require only two other arguments. 
Depending on which option is to be preferred, we are thus facing a construction equivalent to 
(2) in the first definition561 or (2) in the second definition, but it should be mentioned that – to 
my knowledge – the expression phyag ’tshal ba (‘to prostrate, to perform a prostration’), like 
the verb lta ba, governs only la or its allomorph which cannot be substituted by du. Thus, once 
again we are confronted with the issue of the precise information la expresses within this phrase 
and the question of Si tu’s interpretation of it.  
In contrast to Si tu, commentators such as Zha lu et. al. classified the grammatical construction 
of la don plus phyag ’tshal ba (‘to pay homage,’ ‘to prostrate’) as a fourth case. Si tu criticizes 
this classification, since according to him it is nothing but an exaggerated application of 
Sanskrit-specific case grammar to Tibetan language.562 Si tu’s critique is probably correct, 
insofar as the Sanskritic role model was certainly an important factor in the decision process of 
his opponents. This classification may further be connected to the heterogeneous distribution 
of the morpheme la and questions about its generic uses, with BENEFICIARY/RECIPIENT as 
another possible candidate.563 Therefore, while one may or may not agree with Si tu’s analysis, 
both questions remain. Does la encodes the information of DIRECTION, BENEFICIARY or 
INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT within the surface structure of the sentence? And which 
conception of the second case led Si tu to his classification of (1) as a second case while ruling 
out the fourth case? 
In sum, the three illustrations of the second definition provide a more heterogeneous distribution 
compared to those of the first definition, with only one clear instance of an ALLATIVE marker 
(3), one repetition of an example for la (2) in which the precise function of the marker remains 
                                                          
560 GC 599.2. 
561 rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed ‘making/carving a picture onto/on/to the stone’ 
562 Cf. chapter 10.2.2. 
563 Cf. Tourndre 2010, 106. 
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unclear, and finally the even more problematic clause (1) in which la allows for up to three 
readings (ALLATIVE, BENEFICIARY, INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT). 
Apart from the examples, Si tu further specifies the second case with the old notion of (bya 
ba’i) yul (‘domain (of the action)’), which he renders as bya ba ’jug pa’i yul (‘the domain in 
which the action engages’). The verb ’jug pa, here apparently in its tha mi dad pa meaning ‘to 
enter,’ ‘engage’, has a strong directional connotation which may be read as Si tu’s theoretical 
reflection of a directional understanding of the second case. Again, bya ba ’jug pa’i yul is 
sufficiently general to be interpreted along the lines of older definitions such as NGg’s yul du 
byas pa (‘having been made into the domain’) or even the parameter of active vs. residential (= 
static and inactive abiding) explicated in Pra ti’s grammar, thus leaving the possibility for a 
broader understanding of the second case than merely DIRECTION/ALLATIVE.  
Since the GC offers a number of additional examples for the second case beyond these two 
definitions, it is imperative to examine the distribution of all the selected examples to arrive at 
a more representative picture of Si tu’s version of the second case. 
8.2.2 On the Morphosyntactic Distribution of the Examples Classified as Second Cases 
I have identified 22 phrases in the GC which are classified as second cases, two of which are 
listed twice and may thus be omitted, while others are equivalent or differ only insignificantly 
from a grammatical perspective.564 The following provides a full list of the examples:565 
1) dkon cog de la phyag ’tshal lo ‘[I] prostrate to these jewels’ (SCP 1.2, Rnam gling, Pra ti: 
4th case) 
2) skyabs su mchi’o lit. ‘to go to the refuge’ (Zha lu: sangs rgyas la skyabs su mchi) (~3) 
3) shar phyogs su ’gro ‘to go to the east’ (Zha lu, Rnam gling) 
4) rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed ‘to make/carve a picture onto/on the stone’ 
5) mtha’ ru ’khyol ‘to get to an end’ i.e. ‘to become finished/completed’ 
6) rgya gar du ’gro ‘to go to India’ (Rnam gling) (~3) 
7) rgyab tu phyogs ‘to turn backwards’ 
8) pha rold tu phyin ‘gone to the other side’ (Zha lu: pha rol tu) (~3) 
                                                          
564 Note that Tshe tan zhabs drung (2005, 120) identifies 18 phrases for the second case in the GC, however, it is 
not fully clear to me, whether this refers to the total number of examples or only those that are correct in his 
view. 
565 The translations are intended to be as literal as possible, even though some of them may appear awkward in 
English. They also need to be regarded only as tentative. I have added possible antecedents in the grammars of 
Zha lu, Rnam gling and Pra ti, the three main sources of inspiration for Si tu as well as his main opponents. The 
treatises’ resemblances are more numerous than mentioned in the list, and I have only provided information 
about identical examples or those in which Si tu has added or omitted parts. 
220 
 
9) gzugs la lta ‘to look at the form’ (listed twice) 
10) mdun na rgyu ‘to move in front of’  
11) mchog gsum la skyabs su shes ‘to know/recognize the three jewels as the refuge’ 
12) gzugs la mi lta ‘to not look at the form’ (~3) 
13) gun la dga’ ‘to like/love all’, alternatively ‘to like/love totally’? (Rnam gling: de nyid) 
14) de ru skyid ‘to be delighted about it’ (Rnam gling: de nyid) 
15) rgyab tu spro ‘to emanate/spread/radiate backwards’ (Rnam gling: de nyid) 
16) lha la phyag ’tshal ‘to prostrate to the god’ (~1) 
17) shar du ’gro ‘to go to the east’ (~3) 
18) gzugs la lta bar byed ‘to perform the looking at the form’ (~9) 
19) bum par chu blugs ‘to pour water into the pot’ (listed twice) 
20) mgo bor dbyug pas bsnun ‘to hit at the head with a stick’ 
If we exclude the redundant grammatical constructions566 from this list based on the employed 
verbs, Si tu provides 13 different verb frames for the second case. 567  Among these, the 
prototypical marker la is used four times (1, 9, 11, 13), du and its allomorphs tu, su and ru five 
times (3, 5, 7, 14, 15), -r three times (4, 19, 20) and na only once (10). Supplementing the 
thirteen distinctive verb frames with the missing participants of their default construction, they 
exhibit the following syntactic patterns, summarized into five types according to traditional 
morphology:568  
(1):    [byed sgra] + unmarked + la 
(4), (19):   [byed sgra] + unmarked + -r (=la or du?)     
(20):   [byed sgra] + byed sgra + -r (=la or du?)  
(9):    [byed sgra] + la     byed sgra + la don 
(13):    [unmarked] + la        
(3), (5), (7), (14), (15): [unmarked] + du     unmarked + la don 
(10):    [unmarked] + na 
(11):    [byed sgra] + la + du    unmarked + la don + la don 
With the exception of the morpheme du in (14) and the morpheme la in (11), which both raise 
questions, all the remaining constructions may safely assumed to be grammatical.  
                                                          
566 2, 6, 8, 12, 16, 17, 18. 
567 These are the highlighted examples. 
568 Supplemented arguments which are missing in the examples have been put into brackets. 
byed sgra + unmarked + la don  
 
byed sgra + byed sgra + la don  
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In view of the above examinations, only four of these thirteen (3, 5, 7, 15) are clear candidates 
for DIRECTION, insofar as they employ the morpheme du and a verb with a perceptible 
directional value. As already elaborated in Si tu’s two definitions of the second case, the 
grammatical function of la and -r in the grammatical constructions of (1), (4) and (9) are 
difficult to assess without a better understanding of the morphemes’ general distribution and 
their meaning, leaving the possibility for the three candidates ALLATIVE, INDIRECT 
OBJECT and – in the case of (1) – also BENEFICIARY. Furthermore, (10) as the only instance 
of na in the entire list has a special status, and thus the morpheme’s precise morphosyntactic 
functioning is little help in determining Si tu’s understanding of the second case and the 
rationale of his selection. However, the remaining five phrases (11), (13), (14), (19) and (20) 
deserve a closer examination as they contain new material for the present analysis.   
(11) (mchog gsum la skyabs su shes ‘to know/recognize the three jewels as the refuge’) 
resembles (4) insofar as the verb shes pa (‘to know’) on its own does not exhibit any clear 
directional meaning and normally governs two nominal arguments, an unmarked PATIENT as 
the object of knowing and the knower marked by byed sgra. In contrast to (4), the directional 
meaning is much less apparent from the semantic construal of the phrase’s content, since mchog 
gsum (‘three jewels’) is the direct object of knowing, unlike the rdo ba in (11), which is either 
a LOCATION, DIRECTION or INDIRECT OBJECT. Tshe tan zhabs drung notes that the 
addition of la in this phrase is unnecessary or even “uneasy/awkward to say” (brjod mi bde 
ba).569 He compares it with phrases such as don drub dbang rgyal pha ru shes (‘to recognize 
Don drub Dbang rgyal as the father’) and dismisses don drub dbang rgyal la pha ru shes as 
equally awkward. However, Si tu’s classification is intelligible from the context and the fact 
that he uses this particular phrase to explain the difference between the second case and de 
nyid.570 Thus, Si tu required a representative example which employs both these functions 
within a single clause. It is not visible to me, why he did not simply refer to the much more 
common and unproblematic mchog gsum la skyabs su mchi (‘to take refuge to the Buddha’). 
The exact semantic or syntactic value of la in this clause as well as Si tu’s perception of this 
value remains open. However, it should be kept in mind that the object of knowing remains 
unaffected through the process of knowing, which may have prompted Si tu (incorrectly) to 
                                                          
569 Cf. Tshe tan zhabs drung 2005, 124. In his Tibetan verb lexicon, Hacket also classifies shes pa as a type V 
verb according to his scheme, a so-called ‘agentive-nominative verb’ which is differentiated (tha dad pa) (cf. 
Hackett 2003, 169f.). 
570 Cf. infra 239f. 
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apply the morpheme la, in case the latter is a marker for SECONDARY OBJECTS in the sense 
of little or no affectedness. 
(13) (gun la dga’ ‘to like/love all’) and (14) (de ru skyid ‘to be delighted about it’) are equally 
problematic. Both belong to the type of verbs in Tibetan which express affection or states of 
emotion, with other common instances being, for example, ’jigs pa (‘to fear’), skrag pa (‘to be 
frightened’), khro ba (‘to hate’) and sdang ba (‘id.’). They form a group insofar as all follow 
the same syntactic pattern in which the experiencer of the affection remains unmarked whereas 
the object of the affection is marked by la and cannot take du or its allomorphs. Apparently, Si 
tu either missed or neglected this important language-specific feature of these verbs forming a 
homogeneous pattern, which Tshe tan zhabs drung criticizes by stating that Si tu classifies 
instances like sdig pa la ’jigs (‘to fear misdeeds’) or seng ge la skrag pa (‘to fear the lion’) not 
as second but as seventh cases.571 As will be seen below, an instance such as dman par brtse ba 
(‘to feel loving kindness for the inferior beings’) was even classified as a fourth case, i.e. 
beneficiary. On the one hand, this obvious inconsistency may be explained through an 
objectivist approach by switching from an analysis of the sentence structures to the 
interpretation of the underlying scenarios, for example in the classification of rtse ba.572 
However, it still remains unclear why Si tu would distinguish between the instances of being 
happy and having fear, and how this relates to his conception of the second case. More material 
will be found in the context of the seventh case on this issue of his classification of verbs of 
fear as seventh case in relation to Sanskrit case marking patterns as well as his understanding 
of the underlying scenario of fear.573  
Linguistically, the group of affective verbs may support arguments in favor of the hypothesis 
that la can have indirect/secondary objective meaning – in its prototypical function or not – for 
without additional information on their etymology, the directional value of these verbs, while 
not impossible, is much less intuitive compared to other uses of la.574 Furthermore, la with these 
verbs may usually not be substituted by the directional marker du, just like the verb lta ba.575  
                                                          
571 Tshe tan zhabs drung 2005, 120. 
572 If we suppose that loving kindness towards beings results in some benefit for them. 
573 For more information on the issue of Si tu’s classification of affection verbs and the reasons why he classified 
verbs of fear as a seventh case, cf. infra 302ff. 
574 Note that Tournadre (2010, 106), for example, subsumes this use of la under BENEFICIARY, not its 
ALLATIVE-function. 
575 Note, however, that this is contradicted by (14) de ru skyid (‘to be delighted about it’), where Si tu adopted a 
phrase from Rnam gling who used du’s allomorph ru. One option to explain this use may be ru’s morphological 
affinity to -r, thus the two interpreting de ru as the substitute for der in a vocalic environment where an 
additional syllable is required. 
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Unfortunately, a comparison to other authors in this issue is lacking since no further 
representative passages dealing with this type of verbs could be identified in other classical 
sources. While the exact function of la in these examples deserves further investigations, for 
the time being the hypothesis will be assumed that the very distinct use of la with verbs of 
affection has no directional value but rather that of an INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT. 
From the perspective of the functioning of la in (13) and (14), these two sample phrases are 
therefore in favor of an objective interpretation of Si tu’s second case as opposed to a directional 
one, although the possibility cannot be ruled out that Si tu interpreted (13) and (14) as examples 
of DIRECTION despite their objective value. 
In the case of (19) (bum par chu blugs ‘to pour water into the pot’), even though its grammatical 
construction equals that of (4) as well as – given that -r here is an allomorph of la – that of (1), 
which raises similar problems regarding the case marker’s precise functioning on the level of 
the surface structure of the sentence, a directional value would be an intuitively comprehensible 
semantic construal of the scenario at hand.576 
Finally, (20) (mgo bor dbyug pas bsnun ‘to hit with a stick at/on the head’) is an interesting 
case. If we abstain from all acrobatic interpretations of this phrase and its underlying semantic 
structure, this is a clear instance where -r is substituted for the directional marker ru or where -
r as an allomorph of la has clear directional-locative meaning in the sense of the phrase’s 
translation. It must only be noted that snun pa (‘to press,’ ‘to hit’) may also be used in 
grammatical constructions such as dgra bo la mtshon cha snun pa (‘to push the weapon into 
the enemy,’ i.e. ‘to stab the enemy’),577 which again corresponds to (1), (4) and (19). 
If this investigation now moves from the discussion of Si tu’s selection of examples for the 
second case on to a comparison with those provided by Zha lu et al.,578 it is observed that there 
are two major homogenizations of the selected corpus in GC. In contrast to Zha lu and Rnam 
gling, Si tu omitted any example of the type bzhad du gsol (‘to ask to explain’), bsam du med 
(lit. ‘not to be thought,’ in the meaning of ‘unthinkable,’ ‘beyond our mind’) or drag tu brgyal 
(‘to fall/faint violently’) which he would classify as de nyid (‘identity’) in accordance with Smra 
sgo, Pra ti and GNT.579 Despite the fact that Si tu never classifies such examples as an actual 
                                                          
576 For more details on this example, cf. infra 232ff. On example (4), rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed, cf. supra 215. 
577 Cf. Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo 2006, 1596. 
578 Cf. supra 206ff. 
579 Although he did not list these particular examples. Also note that Pra ti would disagree with my classification 
of phrases with the verb gsol ba (‘to ask,’ ‘request’) as de nyid, since he interprets them as fourth cases in the 
sense of ‘to ask for an explanation’ (bzhad du gsol), bzhad pa being the purpose of the request. It is definitely a 
challenging question whether the morpheme du in such instances should be seen in its purposive function, in 
which case Pra ti’s classification is preferable, or alternatively as the indication of a verbal attribute similar to Si 
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second case las su bya ba but rather as de nyid, he nonetheless subsumes the latter as a 
subcategory under the former. The exclusion of these examples from the actual second case is 
therefore more a refinement within the second case itself.580 
Si tu’s second deviation from his predecessors regards the already mentioned examples of the 
type ’di ru mgon po rtag bzhugs nas (‘after the protector resided perpetually here;’ Zha lu)581 
or dga’ ldan na chos ston (‘to teach Dharma at Dga’ ldan;’ Rnam gling) apparent in Zha lu, 
Rnam gling as well as Pra ti. Si tu omits these examples here as well, and instead they are 
encountered under the seventh case. He thus broke with the action vs. existential/residential 
distinction between the second and seventh case, which was directly explicated in Pra ti. 
Consequently, the GC allows for seventh cases with proper action verbs but not proper locatives 
under the second case. 
8.2.3 Résumé on Si tu’s Two Definitions and his Selection of Illustrations 
The overall picture of Si tu’s presentation of the second case is anything but simple or clear. 
There are two general definitions in terms of byed pa pos bya ba gang las byed pa’s las and 
bya ba ’jug pa’i yul, both of which may be independently interpreted as either an ALLATIVE 
definition or that of a general objective case function, the latter either exclusively for la don in 
the sense of a INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT or including also the unmarked PATIENT. 
In sources such as the GNT or NGg, the second case was defined in terms of a genuine 
PATIENT, whereas Pra ti proposed his ‘action case.’ At least it is clear that Si tu distanced 
himself from the latter option by classifying locative uses of la don with action verbs as a 
seventh case. The directional meaning in terms of an ALLATIVE, which is frequently attributed 
to the morpheme la in modern linguistics and would smoothly match with the morpheme du as 
another second case marker, has not been explicated as the meaning of the second case previous 
to Si tu, yet it remains a possible interpretation of Si tu’s second case. In order to resolve the 
issue of the remaining possibility of either ALLATIVE or OBJECT (either INDIRECT 
OBJECT, DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT or both) in his conception, examples of the second case 
throughout the entire GC were collected and analyzed. Unfortunately, these sample phrases 
                                                          
tu’s understanding of de nyid (cf. chapter 8.2.5). The difference in translation would then be that of ‘to 
ask/request for (the sake of) an explanation’ (purposive) or ‘to ask/request that (something) will be explained.’ 
The morpheme du is used in instances where they correspond to adverbs (cf. Tournadre 2010, 108f.), but the 
question remains as to the precise parameters to demarcate the purposive from the adverbial function of this 
morpheme, perhaps a good example for the intricacies of distributional analysis. 
580 Cf. chapter 8.2.5. 
581 Apparently, Zha lu quoted this example from another source. 
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pose further questions surrounding the same issue, which amount to the following two 
interrelated points: 
From a linguistic perspective, what is the precise syntactic or semantic information encoded by 
the seven la don morphemes on the level of the sentence in these examples? 
From a historical perspective, how did Si tu interpret the function of the seven la don 
morphemes in these examples? 
These two questions together also carry with them important insights into the linguistic 
significance of and the strategies behind Si tu’s conceptions. It was argued that the main 
difficulty here is the exact functioning of the second case’s prototypical marker la, which covers 
a heterogeneous array of semantic-syntactic environments in which it can be used. A precise 
classification in terms of directional-locative vs. objective in many instances is more a matter 
of interpretation, which bears the danger of DeLancey’s objectivist error.582 The two remaining 
morphemes of the second case, i.e. du and na, are less problematic, mostly because their use 
appears to be more homogenous and their generic functioning as directional-locative and static 
locative markers respectively are more established in modern linguistics. Based on a cursory 
analysis of the examples, I offer the following summary of the sample phrases: 
From the thirteen distinct grammatical constructions, only four (3, 5, 7, 15; 30,8%) can be 
classified as more or less unproblematic, unequivocal instances of DIRECTION/ALLATIVE, 
since they employ a verb with a strong directional value and the morpheme du. One more 
example (10; 7,7%) has an exceptional status but would still rather unproblematically fit the 
directional option, since it is the only instance of na in this list which illustrate its use as the 
second case despite being the most distinct and specialized marker. 
Seven additional examples (1, 4, 9, 11, 13, 14, 19; 53,8%) remain problematic insofar as they 
employ la or -r, thus raising the question of the exact intrasentential information encoded by 
these morphemes. From a syntactic perspective, they cover five different grammatical 
constructions (construction 1: 1; constr. 2: 9; constr. 3: 11; constr. 4: 13; constr. 5: 14), with 
examples 4 and 19 either belonging to construction 1 or forming a separate group, depending 
on the status of -r as either a variant of la or du. From a semantic perspective, they either allow 
for a directional as well as non-directional interpretation (1, 4, 9, 19) or their directional value 
is not directly obvious (11, 13, 14) although not impossible. The degrees to which either the 
directional or non-directional value prevails in the four semantically bivalent examples is a 
                                                          
582 Cf. e.g. the discussion of sample phrases in chapter 8.2.1.2, especially supra 215f. As for the objectivist error, 
cf. supra 105f. 
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matter of semantic interpretation. Example 14 is problematic in two ways, since its use of ru 
instead of la remains unclear.  
A final example (20; 7,7%), although also marked by -r, can hardly be interpreted as a 
secondary, indirect or less affected object and thus must be an instance of DIRECTION.   
From a semantic-interpretational perspective, most if not all examples in the list may be read 
as having a directional value in one way or another. Yet, since I am not a linguist, I will refrain 
from deciding on the question of the meaning of la. With the heterogeneity as well as possible 
semantic ambiguities of the examples of la in mind, let us instead trace Si tu’s version of the 
second case further. It is most insightful in this context to contrast Si tu’s second case las or las 
su bya ba with las as dngos po gzhan, the latter covering the genuine DIRECT 
OBJECT/PATIENT function prototypically encoded by the unmarked argument in Tibetan 
sentences. 
8.2.4 On the Relation between la don gyi las and dngos pos gzhan gyi las583 
It was stated in the historical part on this case that the separation of la don and its function from 
the genuine resultative part of the action (bya ba’i gzhi la yod pa’i las), which was used in the 
context of Sum rtags as the explanation for dngos po gzhan, enabled Tibetan grammarians to 
distinguish at least between la don vs. unmarked morphology.584 However, the terminological 
heritage from the original Sanskritic conception that las and yul/gzhi are used in both contexts 
was also still prevalent. Whether this overlap was regarded as indicative for some functional 
connection between the two remained mostly unaddressed in the grammatical works before the 
times of Si tu. But the question remains of high importance for its intimate relation to the 
understanding of the second case as well as for the status of the unmarked argument within the 
traditional case model. If dngos po gzhan together with dngos po gzhan gyi las/yul 
(‘karman/domain of the other thing’) are unconnected to la don and la don gyi las/yul (‘the 
karman/domain of the la don-morphemes’) as the second case, what may this most central 
grammatical function represent apart from the second case? Is it part of another case or no case 
at all? And what does this mean for the second case? The GC follows former Sum rtags 
commentators and identifies the resultative part of the action with dngos po gzhan and without 
mentioning it as a meaning of la don. Thus, Si tu’s taxonomy bears the same issues, and Si tu 
needed to find a strategy to resolve them. 
                                                          
583 While these two Tibetan terms are not used in Tibetan grammars, I introduce them here for the sake of clarity 
regarding the two functions of the second case, which is marked by la don, and the PATIENT/DIRECT OBJECT 
expressed through zero-marking, which is referred to as dngos po gzhan in the GC. 
584 Cf. chapter 8.1.3. 
 227 
 
In GC, the notion of yul is not only utilized in the second definition of the second case, but it 
figures almost more prominently during the exposition of dngos po gzhan, in which it refers to 
the unmarked PATIENT/DIRECT OBJECT and is rendered as [byed pa po] des bsgrub par bya 
ba’i yul (‘the domain which is to be accomplished by that [agent]’). Likewise, at least one 
example is found, namely bum par chu blugs (‘to pour water into the pot’),585 in which Si tu 
rendered chu – obviously an instantiation of dngos po gzhan – as the blugs par bya rgyu’i las 
(‘karman to be poured’).586 Therefore, in the GC, la don gyi las/yul and dngos po gzhan gyi 
las/yul may be contrasted as follows: 
la don gyi las/las su bya ba dngos po gzhan gyi las 
byed pa pos bya ba gang la byed pa’i las [bya bar] (~blugs par) bya rgyu’i las587 
bya ba ’jug pa’i yul byed pa pos bsgrub par bya ba’i yul 
Figure 8: Comparison between la don gyi las (= las su bya ba) and dngos po gzhan gyi las in the Great Commentary 1
588
 
The following general observations may be made here: first, yul and las equally qualify both of 
them. In a direct confrontation, the ALLATIVE hypothesis regarding Si tu’s conception of the 
second case appears to be the most straightforward choice. The difference between the two las 
would then be that one karman is the directional object towards which (gang la) the action is 
performed, whereas the other karman would be the direct object which is to be done (bya par 
bya rgyu’i las). The difference regarding yul likewise would be that in the case of la don, yul is 
that domain in which the action engages (’jug pa), whereas for gzhan the domain is that which 
is to be accomplished by the agent (bsgrub pa). In total, this would be Si tu’s theoretical 
reflection of the difference between la don marking and zero-marking, which basically amounts 
to the functional difference of ALLATIVE/DIRECTION and DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT.  
This interpretation of the terminology should be kept in mind, since it represents a plausible 
possibility that Si tu not only recognized and acknowledged a difference between the la don 
and unmarked argument, but even directly accounted for it in his definitions in terms of 
DIRECTION and PATIENT. Yet, some precaution is suggested, for the respective passages in 
which bsgrub par bya ba’i yul and bya ba ’jug pa’i yul are discussed are unrelated in the GC 
and Si tu omitted any theoretical encounter of the two. The same holds true for the respective 
                                                          
585 Number 19 in the overall list of examples. 
586 Cf. infra 232f. 
587 Note that Si tu did not make use of the term bya bar bya rgyu’i las (‘karman to be done’) himself, but I have 
derived and abstracted it from his blugs par bya rgyu’i las (‘karman to be poured’). 
588 The respective translations are:  
 la don: ‘the karman upon/towards which the action is performed by the agent,’ ‘the domain in which the 
 action engages.’ 
 dngos po gzhan: ‘the karman which is to be done,’ ‘the domain which is to be accomplished by the 
 agent.’ 
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versions of las. Since on their own, both definitions of the second case in GC as either byed pa 
pos bya ba gang la byed pa’las or bya ba ’jug pa’i yul are not sufficiently specific to exclude 
other functions previously subsumed under the second case, it cannot be precluded that Si tu 
wanted to leave space for dngos po gzhan gyi las/yul to remain part of the two definitions of 
the la don case. 
A further distinguishing criterion between the two might become manifest if Si tu’s varying 
paraphrasings of tha dad pa/tha mi dad pa (‘differentiated/non-differentiated’) in the context 
of his verb typology are read against the backdrop of Si tu’s distinction of the second case into 
principal and subordinate karman.589 Si tu distinguishes actions in terms of being differentiated 
(tha da pa) or non-differentiated (tha mi dad pa), first of all in order to account for the syntactic 
and semantic difference of verbs like skor ba (‘[some distinct agent actively] turns [a wheel, 
etc.]’) and ’khor ba (‘[a wheel, etc.] is turning [by itself]’). 590  In his introduction to this 
terminology under TKJ 11.3, Si tu glosses the technical term tha (mi) dad pa (‘differentiated/not 
differentiated’) as byed po dang bya ba tha (mi) dad pa’i las kyi tshig (‘verbs in which agent 
and action are (in)different’), and he also alternatively renders tha mi da dpa verbs at least once 
as byed po dang bya yul ngo bo gcig pa’i las kyi tshig (‘verbs in which agent and domain of 
action are identical’).591 The bya yul (‘domain of action’) in this context refers exclusively to 
dngos po gzhan and thus the unmarked PATIENT of Tibetan sentences. If the two renditions 
of tha dad min are in fact equivalent, which they must be, it may be inferred that in case the 
agent is indifferent (tha mi dad pa = identical, ngo bo gcig) with the action, it is also identical 
with the domain of the action. Conversely, if it is different from the action, it must also be 
different from the domain of the action. Si tu did not explicate the resulting relation between 
action and karman, however from his presentation it may be inferred that the action (bya ba) 
and the domain of action (bya yul), i.e. dngos po gzhan, are conceived as a general relationship 
of identity (ngo bo gcig). 
This is especially noteworthy in the present context, insofar as Si tu introduces an analogous 
subdivision of the second case marked by la don in order to distinguish between instances such 
as shar phyogs su ’gro (‘to go to the east’) and sgrol ma tshe’i lha ru bsten (‘to rely on Tara as 
the deity of longevity’). The latter phrase represents an instance of the transformative function 
of the morpheme du that Tibetan grammaticography refers to as de nyid.592 In the GC, the basic 
                                                          
589 Cf. chapter 8.2.5. 
590 In English, this would be mainly distinguished by the transitive/intransitive use of a single verb. 
591 Cf. GC 541.1 and 541.2. 
592 Cf. Tournadre 2010, 108f. 
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distinguishing criterion between the two is the identity with or separation from the action (bya 
ba dang thad dad mi dad): shar phyogs in shar phyogs su ’gro would then be a principal (gtso 
bo) karman, because it is a domain of the action different from the action itself (bya ba dang 
tha dad pa), whereas tshe’i lhar in tshe’i lha ru bsten only qualifies as a secondary or 
subordinate (phal pa) karman due to its identity (ngo bo gcig) with the action:593 
la don gyi las vs. dngos po gzhan gyi las 
las dang bya ba tha dad pa = las tso bo:  
shar phyogs su ’gro (‘to go to the east’) 
gzugs la lta (‘to look at the form’) 
 
vs. 
inferred from Si tu’s two renditions of 
tha dad min: 
las dang bya ba tha mi dad pa/ngo bo 
gcig pa: 
chu blugs (‘to pour water’) 
las dang bya ba ngo bo gcig pa = las phal pa:  
sgrol ma tshe’i lha ru bsten  
(‘to rely on Tara as the deity of longevity’) 
 
? 
Figure 9: Comparison between la don gyi las (= las su bya ba) and dngos po gzhan gyi las in the Great Commentary 2 
The whole argument amounts to the point that another distinguishing criterion in the GC 
between la don gyi las/yul and dngos po gzhan gyi las/yul may be that of the difference from 
the action for the principal la don gyi las vs. the identity with the action for dngos po gzhan. 
In other words, if this argument is valid, Si tu conceptualized the unmarked PATIENT as the 
resultative part of the action (bya ba’i yul la yod pa’i las) identical with the action but arguments 
marked by la don as separate from the action.594 The obvious resulting question, of course, then 
                                                          
593 Cf. chapter 8.2.5. 
594 That such a line of thought was relevant in the Tibetan tradition is evident at least after Si tu’s times from 
Dmu dge bsam tan, who has established the distinction between second case marked by la don and unmarked 
argument precisely through the very identity with the action, which only qualifies the latter of the two: 
 de bzhin du la don sbyar tshul la’ang khyad par yod de/     mig gis gzugs la lta zhes pa’i skabs/     gzugs 
 yul du byas nas de la blta ba’i bya ba byas pas/     gzugs dang blta ba’i bya ba gnyis tha dad pa’i tshul 
 du yod de/     gzugs yul dang lta ba bya ba byas te brjod pa’i rgyu mthsan gyis/      la don sbyor dgos/     
 mig gis gzugs mthong zhes pa’i skabs/     brjod tshul gyi dbang gis/     mig byed pa dang gzugs mthong 
 ba bya ba yin pas/     gzugs dang mthong ba gnyis bya ba’i ngo bor gcig tu ’brel nas yod pas la don mi 
 ’thob bo/ 
 “Likewise, there is also a difference in la don’s mode of application: For instance, ‘to look at the form 
 with the eyes’ (mig gis gzugs la lta), after having made the form into the domain (yul du byas nas), the 
 action of looking at it is performed, for which reason the two, form and action of looking, exist in 
 separate form (tha dad pa’i tshul du yod), namely the form is the domain (yul) and looking the 
 performed action. Because [it] is expressed [in this way], la don must be applied. In the instance ‘to 
 see the form with the eyes’ (mig gis gzugs mthong), due to the way [it] is expressed, the eyes are that 
 which performs [the action] (byed pa) and the seeing-the-form (gzugs mthong ba) is the action (bya ba). 
 Thus, the two, form and seeing, exist connected in the single identity of the action (bya ba’i ngo bor 
 gcig tu ’brel nas yod pa), for which reason no la don follows (~ mi ’thob).” (Dmu dge bsam tan 2006B, 
 59) 
Dmu dge bsam tan also goes on to explain the same difference between la don, i.e. the second case las su bya ba, 
and the unmarked argument, i.e. dngos po gzhan, by means of the sample pair ‘to contest a foe’ (dgra la rgol) 
and ‘to conquer/beat/overcome a foe’ (dgra ’joms) as well as other examples. He did not use the term las for the 
second case, which in his work he labels las su bya ba and associates with the category yul (‘domain’), whereas 
simple las is the category associated with dngos po gzhan (cf. also Dmu dge bsam gtan 2006A, 18ff. and 77f.). 
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concerns the difference between unmarked dngos po gzhan as bya ba dang ngo bo gcig pa and 
the subsidiary karman marked by la don, which is equally bya ba dang ngo bo gcig pa. 
It is difficult to evaluate how the parameter of separation vs. identity would have to be translated 
into concrete grammatical categories, and without Si tu having confronted all the different 
conceptions surrounding the two types of las/yul in the GC, we are left to our own interpretation. 
No real difference in terms of ALLATIVE and PATIENT manifests in these theories on the 
identity and separation with the action, yet, this has also not been fully excluded, especially if 
separation and identity are interpreted in terms of spatial proximity to the action.  
To make things even more intricate than they already are, a distinction of bya ba’i yul in terms 
of spatial proximity is precisely what Si tu articulated in his Cāndra commentary on C 2.1.43: 
 kri yā pye dwi tī yā/     bya ba’i las la gnyis pa’o/     byed pa pos bya ba byed pa’i tshe 
 bya ba’i yul gyi dngos po de la byed pa can gyi las zhes brjod pas de la rnam dbye gnyis 
 pa ’gyur te/     ka ṭa dang/     o da na dang/     ā di tya rnams las gnyis pa’i gcig tshig 
 am/     am la sngon ma ’os/     am’i a dang/     rtags mtha’i a dag gcig tu gyur/     byed 
 tshig dang sbyar/     hal la ma’i nga ro byas pas/     ka ṭaṃ ka ro ti de ba dattaḥ/     lhas 
 byin gyis rtswa lhas byed/     o da naṃ pa ca ti ya dznya dattaḥ/     mchod byin gyis zas 
 ’tshed/     ā di tyaṃ pa shya ti bi praḥ/     bram ze nyi ma la lta bar byed lta bu’o/      ’dir 
 rgya ’grel rnams su byed pa po’i bya bas gang zhig shin tu khyab par ’dod pa de ni 
 byed pa can gyi las kyi ming can du ’gyur ro/     zhes bshad pas bya ba’i yul la’ang nye 
 ba dang ring ba gnyis las de ma thag bar ma chad par bya ba ’jug pa’i yul de la byed 
 pa can gyi las zhes bya bas de ni rnam dbye gnyis pa ’jug pa’i yul yin no/ 
 “kriyāpye dvitīyā (C 2.1.43), ‘the second [case suffix] when the karman of action (bya 
 ba’las).’ During the performance of an action by the agent, that entity [which is] the 
 domain of the action (bya ba’i yul gyi dngos po) is called the karma-kāraka (byed pa 
 can gyi las), for which reason a second case suffix is [added] to it. After [the 
 nominal stems] kaṭa (‘mat’), odana (‘rice’) and āditya (‘sun’), the singular of the second 
 [case suffix] am [is added]. By [the rule C 5.1.113] ‘the former (= the nominal stem’s 
 final vowel) if am’ (am la sngon ma ’o), the a of am is fused with the stem’s final 
 a. If applied with a verb, since [in front of] a hal[-sound] (= consonant) an anusvara is 
 applied to m, [these word forms would become], for example, kaṭaṃ karoti devadattaḥ 
                                                          
Also note that his conception of the second case is that of Pra ti. In sum, Dmu dge bsam gtan much more clearly 
distinguished between la don as second case and unmarked argument as dngos po gzhan than the Tibetan 
accounts thus far presented, and he rendered this distinction in terms of separateness/identity with the action. 
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 ‘Devadatta makes a mat’ (lhas byin gyis rtswa lhas byed ?), odanaṃ pacati yajñadattaḥ 
 ‘Yajñadatta cooks rice,’ ādityaṃ paśyati vipraḥ ‘the Brahmin looks at the sun.’ In this 
 context, it is explained in the Sanskrit commentaries that ‘that which is desired to be 
 thoroughly obtained by the agent’s action is termed the karma-kāraka.’ Therefore, 
 among the two [types] for the domain of action (bya ba’i yul), the  more proximate (nye 
 ba) and more distant (ring ba), that domain in which the action engages (bya ba ’jug 
 pa’i yul) immediately (de ma thag par) [and] without discontinuation (ma chad par), is 
 called karma-kāraka, for which reason it is the place where the second case suffix 
 adjoins.”595  
The Sanskrit second case suffix marks the kriyāpya (bya ba’i las), i.e. the kāraka-function 
karman according to Si tu, which is equally identified with the bya ba’i yul (‘domain of action’). 
The examples make clear that the morphosyntactic entity in question is that of the DIRECT 
OBJECT or PATIENT in Sanskrit sentences. Since Si tu further quotes the widespread karman 
definition of the Kāśikāvr̥tti on P 1.4.49,596 it is safe to assume that he refers to the prototypical 
function of the Sanskrit second case suffix as it was traditionally conceived, the karma-kāraka 
in its most genuine sense. He then introduces a distinction of the bya ba’i yul into more 
proximate (nye ba) and more distant (ring ba), specifying the current function of C 2.1.43 as 
that domain which is immediately (de ma thag par) or without discontinuation (ma chad par) 
engaged by the action. Si tu argues for the identification with the proximate domain based on 
the definition from the Kāśikāvr̥tti, and thus the immediate engagement of the action must 
conceptually relate to the Sanskritic definition in his view. It may therefore be inferred that 
there must consequently be a non-immediate, gradual, mediated, indirect, etc. engagement of 
the action with the domain, which results in the distant type. This concept is a suitable 
foundation for distinguishing between the Tibetan-specific la don gyi las/yul and dngos po 
gzhan gyi las/yul, yet, the background of the distinction into proximate and distant domains of 
an action remains completely in the dark. No other sources or further passage in Si tu’s collected 
works were encountered in this research which would further elaborate on this concept, nor any 
other Sanskritic or Tibetan source that would utilize it. While the proximate type clearly refers 
to the DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT in Sanskrit sentences, it remains completely open what 
kind of grammatical entity the distant domain supposedly represents. Furthermore, there is also 
                                                          
595 Si tu 2.26.2. 
596 Cf. in the last quotation: byed pa po’i bya bas gang zhig shin tu khyab par ’dod pa de ni byed pa can gyi las 
kyi ming can du ’gyur ro/ For a comparison with the Sanskrit version, cf. ft. 435. 
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no clarification of the concept’s linguistic status, whether it was specific to Sanskrit or also 
applicable to Tibetan.  
Therefore, for the time being, this quotation may only be regarded as a third possibility in Si 
tu’s grammatical repertoire to distinguish between the Tibetan second case marked by la don 
(~ distant domain) and dngos pa gzhan as the unmarked argument (~ proximate domain). 
However, the use of the bya ba ’jug pa’i yul for the Sanskrit DIRECT OBJECT/PATIENT has 
utmost importance in this passage, since it is precisely the phrase of Si tu’s second definition 
of the Tibetan second case. This makes clear that whatever was Si tu’s exact understanding of 
the examples for the second case in the GC, the definition of bya ba ’jug pa’i yul is not meant 
to provide any specification in terms of ALLATIVE, INDIRECT OBJECT, etc. This strongly 
corroborates the option that both definitions in the GC, namely byed pa pos bya ba gang la 
byed pa’s las and bya ba ’jug pa’i yul, refer simply to a general objective function which 
remains indifferent regarding further specifications. 
This rather technical cross-reading of passages either related to Si tu’s conception of the second 
case, dngos po gzhan or the Sanskritic second case suffix makes evident that the relation of la 
don gyi las/gzhi and dngos po gzhan consists mostly of fragments, like pieces of a puzzle 
dispersed throughout the GC and even outside of it, without ever fully developing or rendering 
them into a complete and systematic picture. Accordingly, I am not aware of any passage in the 
GC which would unequivocally decide on the relation between the two types of las/yul. Possible 
resolutions may be speculated, some of which have been touched upon in this chapter, however, 
especially in view of Si tu’s own restraint, any such attempts must be regarded as later 
interpretations. It was demonstrated that although there are clear traces of such a distinction in 
his work, there also was a limited readiness to directly articulate and theorize it, which fact 
leaves space for a possible reconciliation of the two. This point is particularly interesting, since 
in the final statement on the second case in his case summary at the end of TKJ, Si tu finally 
drops the bomb: 
 de bzhin du bum par chu blugs zhes pa lta bu bum pa la bya ba blugs pa’i yul yin pas 
 gnyis pa’am chu brten pa’i cha nas gnas gzhi ste rnam dbye gnyis gang rung ’jug 
 cing/     chu ni blugs par bya rgyu’i las nyid yin pas de nyid kyi don la gnyis pa kho na 
 ’jug mod/     phyi ma ’di rigs kyi rnam dbye bod skad la med pa mang ngo/ 
 “Likewise, for example in ‘having poured water into a pot’ (bum par chu blugs), since 
 the pot is the domain of the action of ‘having poured’ (bya ba blugs pa’i yul), the second 
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 [case], or from the perspective of the water being supported, the abode (gnas gzhi)597 – 
 whichever of the two cases – join to [‘the pot’]. Regarding the water, since it is the very 
 karman which is to be poured (blugs par bya rgyu’i las), only the second case joins [to 
 the water] in that very meaning. However, cases of this latter type are often 
 absent in Tibetan.”598 
This statement is the only direct confrontation in Si tu’s work of an argument marked by la don 
with an unmarked argument,599 and unfortunately he does not elaborate any conceptual details. 
Si tu chose a very representative example, namely bum par chu blugs, in which both arguments 
in question appear within one single phrase. Despite possible ambiguities in this example 
regarding the information encoded by -r, the fact that there is a significant functional difference 
between la don and the unmarked morphology is unmistakably clear. The pot represents the 
location where the water is poured, and the water is the entity to be poured.600 Regarding bum 
par, Si tu offers a seemingly strange double-classification as either a second or seventh case 
depending on whether the pot is the domain in which the pouring engages (= second case) or 
whether the pot is that which supports the water (= seventh case). The underlying rationale of 
this double classification remains unclear, although it may have been inspired by Sanskrit case 
marking patterns in which the pot is indeed marked by a seventh case, 601  Si tu perhaps 
attempting to account for both language-specific constructions. Yet, Si tu’s argument seems to 
go beyond the fact that these two constructions exist in both Tibetan and Sanskrit, but that bum 
par in the Tibetan phrase may carry both meanings depending which perspective is taken on. If 
he was not just indecisive in this statement which of the two semantic construals is the one 
encoded in the Tibetan phrase, but if he indeed accepted both as valid classifications of bum 
par, this seems like the recourse to an objectivist investigation that explores the instance of 
pouring water into a pot as such, with the resulting semantic construals deciding that two case 
                                                          
597 I.e. the seventh case. 
598 GC 599.4. 
599 Nor have I thus far encountered any direct comparison of the two intrasentential arguments of Tibetan 
sentences in any other grammatical source pre-Si tu. 
600 In the current context, the precise functioning of -r and related questions in this phrase are only of secondary 
importance. For more information cf. supra 223. 
601 Cf. for example the following entry on blugs in Negi (2002, 3915): 
 phyed ni dge slong rnams kyi lhung bzed du blugs  
 upārdhaṃ bhikṣuṇāṃ pātre pātayanti  
 ‘They put one half into the alms bowl of the monks.’  
Which rule in the Sanskrit grammars covers this use of the seventh case suffix remains unclear. Is it simply part 
of the kāraka-function adhikaraṇa/ādhāra despite the directional connotation? Concerning the second case, it 
will have to be left open whether Sanskrit grammar would allow the pot (kumbha, ghaṭa) to be alternatively 
classified as karman by P 1.4.51, in order to form a double-accusative construction in which the pot would then 
be marked by a second case suffix. In any case, from a Tibetan perspective it may be safely assumed that the 
non-locative meaning in the example prevails despite Si tu’s double-classification. 
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functions of du are at hand. If this represents Si tu’s intended line of argumentation, and it is 
asked why both classifications are a representative construal of the scenario of pouring, we are 
left with mere speculations. Perhaps Si tu conceived the entire situation of pouring water into a 
pot as a temporally extended process in which parts of the water are still to be poured into the 
pot, whereas the already poured part is located in the pot. From that perspective, the scenario 
as such allows for both semantic construals, second and seventh case, which then explains the 
Sanskrit case marking pattern and allows for the double value of -r in the Tibetan clause. As 
further instances will be encountered in which Si tu more obviously follows a strategy to 
compare Sanskrit and Tibetan case marking patterns based on an interpretation of the 
underlying scenario as such, it is not unlikely that Si tu followed an objectivist approach also 
in this instance. 
The most interesting part of this quotation regards chu (‘water’) as the DIRECT OBJECT. 
According to Si tu, since it is the blugs par bya rgyu’i las (‘the karman to be poured’), only 
(kho na) a second case can be applied, in contrast to the double-classification of bum pa. The 
kho na refers to the two options for bum par and indicates that chu allows for only one 
classification, i.e. the second case. However, Si tu also acknowledges that this type of second 
case is often lacking in Tibetan. The reason of being the blugs par bya rgyu’i las that causes 
the affixation of a second case form thus applies only to other languages, presumably Sanskrit, 
but generally not to Tibetan. The decisive question – and a detail Si tu unfortunately did not 
further explicate – remains the reason for Tibetan language so “often” lacking a second case 
marking, i.e. the application of la don, for the blugs par bya rgyu’i las. Consequently, what is 
the status of the unmarked argument within the case model? Are we supposed to see the reason 
in the fact that 
1) in Tibetan, the blugs par bya rgyu’i las is a distinct category, and thus there are two 
morphologically distinguished functions (la don kyi las and dngos po gzhan) which form a 
single category and are marked identically in other languages such as Sanskrit? 
  Tibetan    Sanskrit (and other languages?) 
  2 morphologies = 2 functions 1 morphology = 1 function 
In this case, Si tu accepts a language-specific difference between Sanskrit and Tibetan. His 
Tibetan version of the second case must then be restricted to the function of la don without 
including unmarked DIRECT OBJECTS/PATIENTS, leaving open the question why the 
second case las (karman) is identified with the la don function but not with the much more 
prototypical function of dngos po gzhan. A further ramification is that dngos po gzhan would 
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no longer belong to the case model, an option which conveys a clear conflict with traditional 
Sanskritic and Tibetan taxonomies. 
2) the zero-marking of the blugs par bya rgyu’i las is nothing but a morphological variation 
without any difference in meaning compared to the second case marked by la don? While 
Tibetan and Sanskrit share the same grammatical function of karman, its morphological 
marking differs only in Tibetan: 
  Tibetan    Sanskrit (and other languages?) 
  2 morphologies = 1 function  1 morphology = 1 function 
This type of argument would allow Si tu to maintain the relation between Tibetan and Sanskrit 
as well as the case status of the unmarked PATIENT. Yet, the establishment of a single function 
for both Tibetan morphologies (unmarked and la don) results in a complete arbitrariness of 
morphological case marking, which not only neglects the actual case marking patterns of 
Tibetan language and the semantic/syntactic parameters which govern them, but also raises the 
question why Si tu chose not to include any unmarked PATIENTs in his numerous examples 
of the second case. Thus, this option opposes the factual language and is further not 
corroborated by Si tu’s list of examples. 
3) the blugs par bya rgyu’i las is indeed a separate functional category which is marked 
(inaccurately) with the same case suffix only in Sanskrit (and perhaps other languages)? 
  Tibetan    Sanskrit (and other languages?) 
  2 morphologies = 2 functions 1 morphology = 2 functions 
In this case, Si tu would fully account for Tibetan-specific syntax. However, this option 
contradicts the basic conceptions of karman as encountered in the historical survey above, 
especially the attempts of Cāndra and the Naiyāyikas to homogenize this category. Si tu may 
have circumvented this issue by taking recourse to Sanskritic subcategorizations such as 
nirvartya, vikārya, prāpya and the like, but this option is rather unlikely. From the perspective 
of the basic, i.e. generic morphosyntactic distribution of the Sanskrit second case, the Tibetan 
pair of la don gyi las and dngos po gzhan gyi las is one grammatical category, and we can safely 
assume that Si tu was well aware of this fact.602 
                                                          
602 The fourth and final logical option is that of two distinct Tibetan morphologies which express a single 
function of karman, whereas Sanskrit exploits only a single morphology expressing two distinct functions: 
Tibetan     Sanskrit (and other languages?) 
 2 morphologies = 1 function  1 morphology = 2 functions 
Since this makes only little sense linguistically as well as historically, this option will be excluded. Any other 
version in which the Tibetan morphology is reduced from two to one or the Sanskrit morphology extended from 
one to two is impossible from Si tu’s quotation. 
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This may be regarded as a true scholastic-commentarial dilemma, which also makes Si tu’s 
reticence much more comprehensible. The main issue concerns the already elaborated tension 
between the language-specific difference of la don versus unmarked morphology and the 
traditional Sanskritic conception of the second case, which comprises functions of both. 
Splitting the second case into two Tibetan-specific functions (option 1) would only disprove 
the authoritative status of the second case and raise the question why la don gyi las qualifies 
more as second case than dngos po gzhan. The alternative avenue to maintain the linguistic 
validity of the case by claiming a single category of karman (option 2), however, is blocked by 
Tibetan language and Si tu’s more Tibetan-sensitive conception of the second case. Thus, what 
may Si tu’s standpoints have been in view of these options? 
Again, we are left to our own interpretation. However, at least we can read additions like de 
nyid gyi don la (‘in that very meaning’) and phyi ma ’di rigs kyi rnams dbye (‘this latter type of 
case’) in the quoted passage as indications or hints that Si tu indeed saw a noticeable functional 
difference between the two. Moreover, the clear separation of la don gyi las/yul and dngos po 
gzhan gyi las/yul into two unrelated sections of the root texts and the lack of any direct 
association of the resultative part of the action with la don are further strong suggestions of a 
separation between the function specific to la don and the function of the unmarked argument 
in the GC. Yet, a different question altogether is how far Si tu was ready to follow this direction 
and – apart from the mere morphological fact that the blugs par bya rgyu’i las in Tibetan is no 
longer a second case due to the lack of la don – whether he fully accepted a functional separation 
in the language between la don gyi las and blugs par bya rgyu’i las.  
Apart from the selection of examples in which he left out instances for unmarked arguments, 
Si tu never openly considered a separation in his conception of the second case. In the above 
investigation, the two definitions and especially the second proved to be more inclusive and 
remain indifferent regarding any functional difference between the two types of las/yul. The 
reason for this inclusive approach to the definition of the second case despite the exclusion of 
sample phrases for unmarked arguments is probably contained in Si tu’s statement that the 
second case marking as the only option for the blugs par bya rgyu’i las is often absent in 
Tibetan. This means that the blugs par bya rgyu’i las apparently takes a second case form 
outside the Tibetan context, with the implication that the Tibetan unmarked pattern seems like 
a more a language-specific variation of the generic pattern. Even more so, if it is marked, then 
only (kho na) by a second case and not by any other, according to Si tu’s statement. Si tu justifies 
this by stating that only the second case marker joins to the blugs par bya rgyu’i las, simply 
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because it is the blugs par bya rgyu’i las (blugs par bya rgyu’i las yin pas), which also makes 
it clear that the second case form remains intimately connected to the blugs par bya rgyu’i las. 
If marked by the second case form and only by that, then it must be part of the second case 
function karman as the only second case function in the Tibetan case model. The peculiarity in 
WT of the unmarked blugs par bya rgyu’i las therefore remains of minor significance compared 
to the general use of the case that follows more closely the Sanskritic version, in which the 
blugs par bya rgyu’i las represents karman marked by the second case suffix. In this sense, the 
blugs par bya rgyu’i las remains part of the second case even in Si tu’s conception, and I would 
argue that he needed to account for this type of karman in his definitions of the second case. I 
therefore argue that Si tu’s two definitions of the second case intend to also cover the resultative 
part of an action, even though this type of karman is not marked in Tibetan. After all, it must 
be bared in mind that Si tu claims linguistic validity for the traditional Tibetan case model 
across all meaning-expressing languages. A full separation of the blugs par bya rgyu’i las from 
the second case would go against Sanskritic morphosyntax and Sanskritic conceptions of 
karman, thus revealing that the validity of the traditional second case does not persist across 
languages.  
The conclusion of this entire analysis therefore is that Si tu’s conception of the second case is 
more likely that of a general objective case that subsumes all instances of a domain in which 
the action engages in (bya ba ’jug pa’i yul) or that karman upon which an action is performed 
by an agent (byed pa pos bya ba gang la byed pa’i las). Any further specification in terms of 
ALLATIVE, PATIENT, etc. was presumably left open deliberately. The coherency of the 
second case across the different morphologies is then established only by the fact that the two 
definitions are sufficiently general and versatile to cover the different functions of the la don 
morphemes as well as the unmarked PATIENT. While in one instance the action engages in the 
DIRECTION, it might engage in an INDIRECT OBJECT in the context of affections or equally 
engage in the PATIENT, thus all instances of the second case. In similarity to what was stated 
above on the approach of GNT, it is evident that Si tu’s general definition does not go directly 
against any function encoded by the case markers. Nonetheless, his definition totally blurs the 
morphosyntactic surface structure of Tibetan sentences without much explanatory power for 
the meaning of the case markers. While the two definitions as such are not manifest in the 
Tibetan surface structure, they are general enough for being reinterpreted in terms of the 
morpheme-specific functions and vice versa. The only more apparent distinction in the GC is 
that of la don gyis las/yul and dngos po gzhan gyi las/yul, at least in the form that la don no 
longer is a case marker for the resultative part of the action. Apart from the general definitions 
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of the second case and the differentiation between non-PATIENT la don and unmarked 
PATIENT, the exact understanding of particular second case markers in particular sentences 
has been left to the reader, for native speakers anyway a minor issue.  
It is argued that a definition sufficiently general to cover all uses of la don and unmarked 
morphology was Si tu’s strategy to retain the traditional taxonomy while simultaneously 
avoiding any conflict with Tibetan language, no matter how much awareness he may have had 
about the precise functioning of the different morphologies subsumed under the second case. If 
this strategy was not based on an objectivist approach, it was at least very interpretative.603   
I sincerely hope that this presentation will provoke further research on Si tu’s second case in 
general and the final quotation in particular, as to enhance our understanding of the intricacies 
of this most notorious Tibetan traditional second case. Regardless of its terse and vague 
character, this passage is the earliest testimony I thus far encountered in the tradition which 
openly addresses the difference between unmarked argument and argument marked by la don 
in WT. 
A final important point, which is closely connected to the morpheme du and its adverbial as 
well as transformative functioning, regards Si tu’s distinction into principal (gtso bo) and 
subordinate/secondary (phal pa) karmans. Important as it is for the historical constitution of Si 
tu’s second case, this does not add much new information about the main conception of las, 
apart from the already outlined distinction into las dang bya ba tha dad mi dad (‘karman and 
action differentiated [or] identical’). Therefore, its presentation will be restricted to the basic 
conception and its historical background. 
8.2.5 The Secondary or Subordinate karman  
Si tu’s subordinate or secondary karman is the de nyid function of SCP 11.4, which he subsumes 
under the second case. This technical term de nyid (‘identity’) evoked several interpretations in 
the commentarial tradition. While Zha lu and Rnam gling offer dngos po’i de kho na nyid (‘a 
phenomenon’s real nature’)604 and nges bzung ba (‘determination/emphasis’)605 respectively, 
Si tu basically adhered to Smra sgo, where de nyid has been used unrelated to SCP and refers 
to the transformative function exclusive to the morpheme du with nearly the same example as 
in GNT.606 Based on the given examples, although Pra ti renders de nyid as ’den pa (‘truth’), 
                                                          
603 Conclusive material on the systematic character of Si tu’s objectivist approach to case grammar in general 
and thus also regarding his definitions of the second case is presented especially infra 314ff. and in chapter 16. 
604 Cf. Zha lu 2013A, 9. 
605 Cf. Rnam gling 2013, 68f. 
606 Cf. Smr̥ti 2002, 92; supra 190. 
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his understanding of the term covers the same type of use of morpheme du as in Si tu.607 A look 
at Zha lu’s and Rnam gling’s examples for the second case reveals that, even though they did 
not associate de nyid with the morpheme du’s extra-function, they already subsumed this type 
of use under the second case. Si tu’s association of the transformative function with de nyid and 
the consequent supsumption under the second case is therefore less an innovation, but rather a 
refinement that accounts for the semantic/syntactic differences between genuine second cases 
marked by the various la don morphemes and morpheme du in its additional function. 
Si tu dedicates a relatively large passage to his conception of de nyid in GC’s section on la 
don’s functional mode of application (don gyi sbyor tshul), subsequent to his exposition of the 
three cases. He starts as follows: 
 rnam dbye gnyis pa’i bye brag yul gang zhig la bya ba gang zhig byed pa’i tshe/     las 
 de kho na nyid kyi ngo bor gyur pas las dang bya ba ngo bo gcig pa yin pa de lta bu’i 
 las kyi don la ’jug pa ni/      mchog gsum la skyabs su shes/     lhar gsal/     sra bar byed/     
 brtan par gyur/     sgrol ma tshe’i lha ru bsten/     ’od du ’tsher/     gcig tu gyur/     sogs 
 su shes par bya ste/ 
“A specific [instance] of the second case is the essential identity of karman and action 
 during the performance of some action towards some domain, because [the action] 
 has become the essence of that very karman itself (las de kho na nyid kyi ngo bo). 
 As regards the application [of the morphemes su, ru, -r, du and tu] in the meaning of 
 such karmans, it is to be understood as in (1) ‘to know/recognize the three jewels as the 
refuge’ (mchog gsum la skyabs su shes), (2) ‘to visualize as the deity’ (lhar gsal), (3) 
‘to make solid/to solidify’ (sra bar byed), (4) ‘having turned/being stable’ (brtan par 
gyur), (5) ‘to rely on Tara as the deity of longevity’ (sgrol ma tshe’i lha ru bsten), (6) 
‘to shine brightly’ (’od du gsal), (7) ‘having turned into one/being united’ (gcig tu gyur), 
etc.”608 
Si tu provides a very specific theory of this term, according to which he establishes an identity 
(de nyid) between the action and the argument marked by du. After noting the difficult character 
of this point, he goes on to elaborate it in more detail: 
 mchog gsum la skyabs su shes zhes pa lta bu la/     spyir btang/     skyabs su shes pa ni 
 bya ba/     mchog gsum ni bya ba de’i yul yin pas de la las kyi rnam dbye sbyor ba yin 
                                                          
607 Cf. Pra ti 2013A, 198. 
608 GC 474.3. 
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 mod/     bye brag phye na las dang bya ba tha dad mi dad kyi dbang gis las kyi rnam 
 dbye ’jug pa’i yul gtso phal gnyis las gtso bo ni de nyid dang/     phal pa’am ’dir bstan 
 de nyid kyi don can ni bya ba nyid la las dang bya ba gnyis su dbye ba’i/     shes pa ni 
 bya ba/     skyabs ni shes par bya rgyu’i las yin pas der la don gyi rnam dbye ’jug pa de 
 nyid de/     skyabs dang shes pa gnyis spyir tha dad yin yang bya ba gcig la sbyor ba ’di 
 ’dra’i skabs su shes pa nyid skyabs yin no snyam pa’i ngo bor skyes pa brjod pa yin pas/     
 shes pa yul can dang skyabs yul du mi gzung bar/     mchog gsum yul dang/     skyabs 
 dang shes pa bsdams pa’i tshig nus yul can gyi ngo bo gcig ston pa yin no/     des na 
 bya las ngo bo gcig pa’i phyir la don ’di rigs la gzhung ’dir de nyid kyi sgras bstan cing/     
 ngo bo gcig la bya ba dngos mi ’byung bas/     ’phags yul pa’i brda sprod pa dag gis las 
 kyi don gtso bo ma yin pa’am phal pa zhes ser ro/ 
 “Generally speaking, in ‘to know the three jewels as the refuge’ (mchog gsum la skyabs 
 su shes), ‘to know as the refuge’ (skyabs su shes) is the action and the three jewels are 
 that action’s domain (bya ba de’i yul), for which reason the karman case is applied to 
 the [three jewels]. But more specifically, from the perspective of the separation and 
 identity of karman and action (las dang bya ba tha dad mi dad), the argument to which 
 the karman case joins [is divided into] principal (gtso bo) and secondary (phal pa) 
 [karman]. Among these two, the main [karman] is these very [three jewels]. [After] 
 dividing the action itself into the two, karman and action, ‘to know’ is the action and 
 ‘refuge’ [is] the karman to be known, which has the meaning of the secondary [karman] 
 and is taught here [in the SCP] as ‘identity’ (de nyid). Therefore, [if] a la don case joins 
 to that [entity which is the refuge], it is de nyid. 
 In general, both ‘refuge’ and ‘to know’ are different, but in such applications 
 within one action, [de nyid] expresses the formation of an essence (ngo bor skyes pa) in 
 the sense of ‘the knowing itself is the refuge.’ Therefore, instead of apprehending ‘to 
 know’ as the located (yul can) and the ‘refuge’ as the locus (= domain, yul), ‘three 
 jewels’ are the locus (= domain, yul), whereas the syntactically fit form (tshig nus) that 
 combines ‘refuge’ and ‘to know’ is the indication of a single essence as that which is 
 located (yul can). Thus, since action and karman are identical, in this treatise this type 
 of la don is taught by the term ‘de nyid’ (‘identity’). Since within a single essence no 
 real action arises, the grammarians of the Noble Land called it the non-principal (gtso 
 bo ma yin pa, apradhāna) or secondary (phal pa, guṇa) meaning of karman.”609 
                                                          
609 GC 474.4. 
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Si tu establishes a subcategorization for the second case las/las su bya ba into principal and 
secondary and illustrates it through the phrase mchog gsum la skyabs su shes (‘to know the 
three jewels as the refuge’), which employs one verb and two arguments marked by la don. The 
first argument, mchog gsum (‘three jewels’), is classified as the main or principal second case, 
whereas in this example skyabs (‘refuge’) only qualifies as a secondary karman. The 
distinguishing criterion is their identity or distinctiveness with the action (las dang bya ba tha 
dad mi dad), according to which skyabs becomes identical with the action to form a single, 
syntactically fit form (tshig nus) that represents the action and takes mchog gsum as its object 
or domain (yul). 
Thus, Si tu treats arguments classified as de nyid basically like verbal attributes. Instead of 
establishing the identity between the noun phrases in the sense of ‘to know the three jewels as 
the refuge’ – perhaps the more intuitive interpretation from a translational point of view – his 
understanding comes closer to ‘to refuge-know the three jewels.’ Likewise, his example (2) 
(lhar gsal ‘to visualize [someone/-thing] as the deity’) would in Si tu’s theory be more 
accurately given as ‘to deity-visualize [someone/-thing]’. Whether this is in fact the 
linguistically most satisfying representation of WT cannot be addressed here, however it 
certainly allowed Si tu to group together instances like mchog gsum la skyabs su shes, in which 
skyabs as de nyid specifies the noun phrase mchog gsum, and rab tu gsal (‘very clear’), where 
de nyid appears as a clear adverb in English translations.610 
Si tu’s reference to Sanskrit grammar in this context bears its historical problems. The 
distinction into principal (pradhāna) and secondary (apradhāna/guṇa) karman indeed is a 
prominent subcategorization in the Pāṇinian commentarial literature, but I could not find any 
traces that in the Sanskritic tradition the guṇakarman was derived from the fact that no action 
can take place within one essence. The locus classicus for the two karmans in the commentarial 
literature is P 1.4.51 which relates to double-accusative constructions. According to Joshi and 
Roodbergen, the classification as either principal or secondary follows first of all the parameter 
which of the two second cases is the īpsitatama (‘the most desired’).611 Additionally, Patañjali’s 
quotation of Ślokavārttika 1 under P 1.4.51 evoked hermeneutical “acrobatics”612 to explain 
why, for example, in māṇavakaṃ dharmaṃ brūte (‘he tells the boy duty’), dharma becomes 
                                                          
610 In modern academia, there exist apparently different strategies to account for these instances. While 
Tournadre (2010, 109) distinguishes between a transformative and adverbial function of du, Schwieger (2006, 
263ff.) seems to be more in line with Si tu and subsumes both uses together with several others under the bigger 
category of “adverbiale Bestimmungen.” 
611 Joshi and Roodbergen 1975, 182ff. 
612 Joshi and Roodbergen 1995, 141. 
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the guṇakarman despite being the most desired (īpsitatama) item. The answers vary from 
dharma being subordinate (guṇa) to the action due to its status as kāraka, i.e. a means 
(‘sādhana’) for the action, to dharma being that entity which does not undergo a change of case 
marking in the passivization of the sentence; and Si tu’s identity of action and secondary 
karman does not intuitively fit into any of these ideas from my understanding.  
I can only offer my own “acrobatic” attempt at the origin of Si tu’s theory, i.e. the observation 
that the entire phrase in his explanations, shes pa nyid skyabs yin no snyam pa’i ngo bor skyes 
pa brjod pa yin pas […] skyabs dang shes pa bsdams pa’i tshig nus yul can gyi ngo bo gcig 
ston pa yin no,613 is reminiscent of compound formations.614 In fact, if we substitute Tibetan 
bsdams pa (‘bound,’ ‘combined,’ etc.) with its cognate bsdus pa (‘collected,’ ‘compounded,’ 
etc.), the result is the proper technical term for ‘compound’ (samāsa) in Tibetan. Perhaps only 
a coincidence, the term nus (‘syntactically fit’) in Si tu’s quotation corresponds to the Sanskrit 
samartha, which is the heading condition that governs the entire compound section in Pāṇini’s 
Aṣṭādhyāyī.615 Unfortunately, apart from such speculations, the precise conceptual background 
for Si tu’s theory has to remain in the dark for the time being.  
A further line of inquiry concerns the reason of Si tu’s subsumption of the de nyid function 
under the second case. On the one hand, it may simply be regarded as related to both the Tibetan 
                                                          
613 ‘[De nyid] expresses the formation of an essence (ngo bor skyes pa) in the sense of ‘the knowing itself is the 
refuge.’ Therefore, […] the syntactically fit form (tshig nus) that combines ‘refuge’ and ‘to know’ is the 
indication of a single essence as that which is located (yul can).’ 
614 One option could be Tibetan descriptions of karmadhāraya compounds. Cf. e.g. NGg’s topic number two on 
compounds: 
khyad par gyis mdor bsdus pa ni sngon po yang de nyid utpa la yang de nyid yin pa ni utpa la sngon po 
gzhan spong ba’i tshig mdor bsdus pa’o/ 
“As for the compounding by [means of] a specification (khyad par gyis mdor bsdus pa), [since it says 
that] the blue is that very same [entity] as well as the lotus is also that very same [entity], ‘blue-lotus’ 
(utpa la sngon po) is a compounded syntactic form which excludes other [instances of the item, in this 
case other lotuses].” (CT 115 – 421) 
Note that khyad par gyis mdor bsdus pa is this treatise’s name for the karmadhāraya. More common names in 
Tibetan would be las ’dzin (pa) or khyad par can. Also note that the Tibetan translation of the Sanskrit 
karmadhāraya compound nīlotpala (‘blue lotus’) as utpala sngon po is no equivalent compound form, since 
Tibetan language simply does not offer such a grammatical construction. The Tibetan form is that of noun plus 
adjective. 
From the perspective of a karmadhāraya, Si tu treats karman and action as essentially identical (ngo bo gcig), 
because they both refer to one and the same referent (the action) and are thus coreferential (samānādhikaraṇa). 
This is not only the idea expressed in NGg’s example, but the actual definition of the karmadhāraya in P 1.2.42. 
Furthermore, the skyabs in skyabs su shes would then be a specification (khyad par) of shes pa, while being 
essentially the same. 
Cf. also Tubb and Boose’s definition of the karmadhāraya: 
 “Karmadhārayas (Pāṇini 2.1.49-2.1.72; ‘descriptive compounds,’ Whitney 1279-1291) are tatpuruṣa 
 compounds in which the two members appear in grammatical apposition in the analysis. Although some 
 important types of karmadhāraya involve the additional notion of comparison and thus require special 
 formulas of analysis (Section 1.55), in most karmadhārayas the first member simply adds a 
 specification of the thing expressed by the second member.” (Tubb and Boose 2007, 102) 
615 P 2.1.1 samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ ‘An operation concerning fully inflected words is to be syntactically related’ 
(transl. Sharma 1995, 1). 
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and Sanskritic tradition. Sources such as GNT but also Zha lu and Rnam gling have already 
subsumed the same function of the morpheme du that Si tu identified with de nyid under the 
second case. Since he also saw a relation to the double-accusative constructions in Sanskrit, his 
strategy then was the obvious choice. 
8.2.6 Conclusory Remark on Si tu’s Second Case 
Si tu clearly set himself apart from Pra ti’s conception of the second case as a mere action case 
that perhaps was also at the core of Zha lu and Rnam gling’s understanding. While Pra ti 
achieved a very clear-cut and straightforward definition of the second case, his parameter of 
action verbs vs. non-action verbs could not account for most significant functional differences, 
such as gzugs la lta (‘to look at the form’) vs. se ra na chos ston (‘to teach Dharma at Se ra’). 
Si tu’s theory of the second case, which outsources latter instances to the seventh case, seems 
more sensitive in this regard. Nonetheless, his two definitions of las and bya ba’i yul refer to a 
very general and inclusive objective case to cover a variety of Tibetan-specific syntactic-
semantic functions which need to be distinguished more accurately. The second case is that of 
the karman upon which an action is performed, or the domain in which the action engages, 
without further specifications of any precise function encoded by the la don morphemes. 
Despite the indication in his work that la don gyi las/yul and dngos po gzhan gyi las/yul are not 
one and the same category in Tibetan, it was proposed that both fall under his two definitions 
of the second case. The GC has not clarified the ways in which a relation or difference between 
the two may be conceived. Thus, it can only be said that both fall under the notion of the two 
definitions and that yul/las marked by la don is no longer connected to the resultative part of 
the action. 
Si tu’s entire conception reveals that he adhered to a strong interpretative approach to this case. 
The status as general object over three distinct morphemes together with their relation to dngos 
po gzhan are mainly carried by the fact that the definition is sufficiently general to cover all the 
morphemes’ respective functions. It remains difficult to assess whether his definitions of the 
second case consisted not only in his coarse and interpretative account that merges Tibetan-
specific morphosyntactic categories such as ALLATIVE, etc., but was additionally based on a 
semantic interpretation of phenomena that he directly imposed on the case markers while 
neglecting their morphosyntactic functioning. The remaining cases, however, will reveal that 
he frequently followed an objectivist approach in his work and thus his conception was very 
likely also in this case influenced by it.616 
                                                          
616 Cf. especially infra 314ff., as well as chapter 16. 
244 
 
9 Rnam dbye gsum pa byed pa po 
9.1 Historical Survey 
The standard designation for the traditional Tibetan third case is byed pa po (kartr̥, ‘doer,’ 
‘agent’) or byed pa (lit. ‘doing,’ ‘agency;’ karaṇa, ‘instrument’), and is expressed by the 
morphological category byed sgra (‘the agentive morpheme’) with its five manifestations gis, 
kyis, ’is, yis, gyis. The presentation of these allomorphs is incomplete in SCP which omits yis.617 
In contrast to the morphological category la don and its seven morphemes, the homogeneity of 
byed sgra remains established in modern linguistics, as does the agent as its prototypical 
function. 
As regards Sum rtags, reference is made three times in the root texts to either byed pa po or 
byed pa. SCP 13.4-14.1 encapsulates the morphology as well as the semantics of the 
grammatical category ‘agent’ (byed pa po) without any reference to case grammar:  
 de nyid la ni bcu pa sbyar/     byed pa po ru shes par bya/ 
 “[If] a tenth [postscript] is affixed to that very [morphemes gi, kyi, ’i and gyi, this] is to 
 be known as the agent.”618 
SCP derives these four byed sgra morphemes that express agency from the preceding 
presentation of the morphological category ’brel sgra (‘connection-morpheme’),619 since the 
only difference between them is the addition of the postscript sa. TKJ 22.3 and 24.4 both refer 
to the third case with its alternative label byed pa (lit. ‘doing’ or ‘instrument’).  
Pra ti demonstrates the third case in simple terms in his commentary on SCP 13.4-14.1: 
 […] gis kyis ’is gyis/     zhes grub pa ni/     rnam dbye gsum pa byed pa zhes bya ba/     
 byed pa po gtso bor ston pa’i rnam dbye’o/ […] dper na bdag gis thos/     rang gis byas/     
 khyod kyis bshad/     shes rab kyis dpyad/     sras kyis nyan/     sems dpa’is bslabs/     
 gzhan gyis go/     dgra bcom gyis spangs/     gser gyis nyos/     zhal gyis bzhes lta bu’o/ 
 “[…] ‘gis, kyis, ’is [and] gyis’ are the third case called ‘doing/agency’ (byed pa), which 
 is the case indicating primarily the agent. […] For example, ‘I heard (bdag gis thos), 
 ‘oneself did’ (rang gis byas), ‘you explained’ (khyod kyis bshad), ‘analyzed with 
 wisdom’ (shes rab kyis dpyad), ‘the Bodhisattva taught’ (sems dpa’is bslabs), 
                                                          
617 Cf. SCP 12.3-13.3. 
618 SCP 13.4-14.1 
619 Cf. SCP 12.3-13.3 and chapter 12. 
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 ‘someone else understood/heard (gzhan gyis go), ‘the Arhat abandoned’ (dgra bcom 
 gyis spangs), ‘bought with gold’ (gser gyis nyos), ‘accepted with the mouth’ (= to assert, 
 accept; zhal gyis bzhes).”620 
 In general, these examples exhibit two basic functions, namely the agent in phrases such as 
bdag gis thos (‘I heard’) as well as the instrument in phrases such as gser gyis nyos (‘bought 
with gold’). That this functional difference is indeed operational on the surface level of WT 
despite the use of the same case marker can be easily demonstrated by a simple distributional 
feature. In sentences with both, agent and instrument, each argument needs to be marked 
separately with byed sgra, whereas several agents or instruments within a single sentence may 
only take one byed sgra after the final agent or instrument: 
 (a) bdag gis gser gyis nyos ‘I bought with gold’ (1 agent + 1 instrument) 
 (b) bdag dang khyod kyis nyos ‘I and you bought’ (2 agents) 
 (c) dngul dang gser gyis nyos ‘bought with silver and gold’ (2 instruments) 
However, these two functions are often not distinguished in pre-Si tu Tibetan grammatical 
sources before Si tu and instead were fused together within the single category of the third case.  
This fact complicates the understanding of the third case’s label byed pa, which in a single 
source may appear as the only designation but frequently also together with byed pa po, the 
latter option being more common to Sum rtags commentaries due to both labels’ occurance in 
SCP and TKJ. Although Tibetan byed pa po and byed pa appear to be direct translations of their 
Sanskrit equivalents kartr̥ (‘agent’) and karaṇa (‘instrument’), which are the two kārakas and 
the prototypical functions of the third case suffix in Sanskrit grammar, byed pa bears the 
ambiguity whether it alternatively refers more literally to the agent’s ‘doing’ as a 
nominalization of the verb byed (‘do’).621 While this issue needs to be addressed separately for 
each Tibetan grammatical source, the passage from Pra ti’s grammar quoted above is a good 
illustration of an instance in which byed pa more likely has the meaning of ‘the doing’ or 
                                                          
620 Pra ti 2013A, 206f. 
621 Cf. also Sakya Paṇḍita’s Mkhas ’jug on the third case: 
 […] shing gi khang pa byed ces bya ba lta bu gsum pa byed pa […] 
 “[…] ‘to make a wooden house’ is the third [case called] ‘doing/agency’ […]” (KhJ 2009, 25)  
Here, the third case’s label byed pa has to draw on the verb byed (‘to do, make’) from the sample phrase, since 
neither an agent nor instrument are added in the example. 
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perhaps even ‘agency,’ since ‘instrument’ would contradict the case’s definition as that which 
indicates the agent.622  
The relation of the Tibetan version of the third case to Sanskritic grammar is obvious from all 
the major grammatical schools of the latter, where the third case suffix (vibhakti) is associated 
with the very same two functions: 
 P 2.3.18 kartr̥karaṇayos tr̥tīyā “A third [case suffix occurs], if there is an agent or 
 instrument.” 
 C 2.1.62 kartari tr̥tīyā “A third [case suffix occurs], if there is an agent.”              
 C 2.1.63 karaṇe “[And] if there is an instrument.” 
 K 2.4.33 kartari ca “[A third case suffix occurs] also, if there is an agent.”623 
The general relation between the Sanskritic and Tibetan third case is indubitable. However, the 
question remains why the two functions of agent and instrument were already fully developed 
in the Sanskritic tradition, yet this distinction was not followed by the Tibetan authors of most 
grammatical texts previous to Si tu, despite its significance for WT. One simple answer 
probably lies in the fact that despite the clear-cut conceptual distinction of the two kārakas 
agent and instrument, the Tibetan case model is based on the principle of a single function per 
case, and thus the two categories had to be combined in one way or another. In WT, the agentive 
function is certainly the more dominant than byed sgra’s instrumental use, thus this choice 
seems to be fairly comprehensible. 
While Cāndra did not provide any definition of kartr̥ due to the strategy to omit separate 
saṃjñāsūtras, Pāṇini and Kātantra offer the following: 
 P 1.4.54 svatantraḥ karttā “The agent is the independent [one].” 
 K 2.4.14 yaḥ karoti sa kartā “That which does is the agent.” 
However, it is ascertained that the Pāṇinian svatantra-maxim of the agent did not play any 
significant role north of the Himalaya, and it may be speculated whether this was related to the 
influx of Buddhist thought or rather the caveat that an independent agent is in contradiction 
                                                          
622 But note that Pra ti used byed pa as the third case’s function in this quotation based on his version of SCP 
14.1:  
 byed pa’i sar ni shes par bya “is to be known as the semantic domain of doing/instrument (?)” 
In contrast, the majority of commentaries including that of Si tu read: byed pa po ru shes par bya ‘is to be known 
as the agent.’ 
623 In Kātantra, the affixation of a third case suffix in the meaning of karaṇa (‘instrument’) is already covered by 
K 2.4.19, which attributes one prototypical case function to each of the case suffixes except for the first. 
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with basic Buddhist doctrines of causality and selflessness. Kātantra’s minimalistic definition 
of the agent as the doer624 as well as Cāndra’s strategy to fully abstain from any further 
explanation of the term, thus assuming its self-explanatory power, resonate much more with 
Tibetan grammatical sources. Moreover, Kātantra’s rendering of kartr̥ in terms of karoti might 
have been an inspiration for the alternative Tibetan third case label byed pa in the sense of 
‘doing/agency,’ even though it does not explain the lack of the distinction between agent and 
instrument, which is fully adhered to in Kātantra. 
In general, Tibetan sources for the most part focused neither on explanations of the agent’s 
agency nor on syntactic conditions or semantic parameters that trigger agentive marking, etc.625 
What prevails is a concise presentational style similar to the one of Pra ti, if not even more 
concise in many cases. This fact impedes a precise understanding of the terminology at hand, 
namely that of the term byed pa, and obscures the question about the fusion of agent and 
instrument into one category. A rare exception in this regard again is the GNT, which not only 
identifies the third case with the active part of the action (= vyāpāra) in the already presented 
bivalent action scheme,626 but it also provides numerous subcategories to demonstrate the 
significance of the category agent: 
 da ni gnas gsum pa ste/     de yang gsum pa gang gis shes pa ni byed pa po’i sa bstan 
 pa nyid yin la/     ’di ni byed pa po yod pa’i bya ba kho na ston gyi bya ba’i gzhi la yod 
 pa ni cung zad kyang ston pa ma yin no/     byed pa po de yang ldog pa mi ’dra ba du 
 mar ’gyur te/     ’phral gyi bya ba byed pa’i byed pa po dang mi ’thun pa’i phyogs spong 
 bar byed pa’i byed pa po dang/     rgyud la yon tan skyed cing thob par byed pa’i byed 
 pa po dang/     phan tshun du stobs ’gran zhing ’thab mo’i byed pa’i byed pa po dang/     
 rgyu rnams kyi ’bras bu skyed par byed pa’i byed pa po la sogs pa chos can dang ldog 
 pa so so’i bye brag gis byed pa po mang du yod la/     de yang ’phral gyis [sic!]627 bya 
 ba byed pa’i byed pa po ni mda’ yis brgyab ces pa’am/     gri yis bcad ces pa’am/     sta 
 res gcod ces pa la sogs pa ’phral gyi bya ba byed pa po’i bye brag du mar lta’o/ 
                                                          
624 From a semantic perspective, this definition does not seem to add any noteworthy insights into what the term 
kartr̥ itself already contains, but it has a certain explanatory power in the context of Kātantra’s remaining 
definitions of kāraka, especially that of karman: 
K 2.4.13 yat kriyate tat karma “That which is done is the karman.”  
The change of diathesis is significant in these definitions, which seem to make use of syntactic features of 
Sanskrit instead of semantic or philosophical conceptions to explain the term. 
625 Although it should be noted that syntactic conditions for the use of any of the kārakas, e.g. verb frames, etc., 
are not provided in Sanskrit grammar either. 
626 Cf. supra 181f. 
627 I read ’phral gyi. 
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“As for now, the third semantic domain: the third [case is] called ‘by which’ (gang gis) 
 [and] is only the indication of the semantic domain ‘agent.’ This indicates only the 
 activity existent in the agent, whereas it does not whatsoever indicate [that activity 
 which is] possessed by the substratum of the action (bya ba’i gzhi). This agent also has 
 many different variations: the agent that performs the action of separation (’phral gyi 
 bya ba byed pa’i byed pa po), the agent that abandons the discordant aspects (mi ’thun 
 pa’i phyogs spongs bar byed pa’i byed pa po), the agent that brings forth and attains 
 virtues in the [mental] continuum (rgyud la yon tan skyed cing thob par byed pa’i byed 
 pa po), the agent[s] that perform competitions and fight with each other (phan tshun du 
 stobs ’gran zhing ’thab mo’i byed pa’i byed pa po), the agent that brings forth the result 
 of the causes (rgyu rnams kyi ’bras bu skyed par byed pa’i byed pa po), etc.  Due to the 
 specifics of the respective manifestations (~ chos can) and variants (ldog pa), the agent 
 exists in manifold ways. Furthermore, regarding the agent who performs the action of 
 separation, it should be regarded as many instances of the agent of separating actions 
 like ‘is to be shot by an arrow’ (mda’ yis brgyab) or ‘was cut by a knife’ (gri yis bcad) 
or ‘cut by an axe’ (sta res gcod).”628  
Although neither these subcategories nor the general strategy to form such subcategories for 
the third case were followed by the later grammarians, GNT may offer additional insights into 
the issue of the functional fusion of agent and instrument in the Tibetan context. 
9.1.1 On the Fusion of Agent and Instrument under the Third Case  
The general definition of the third case in the GNT is byed pa po (la) yod pa’i las/bya ba 
(activity existent in the agent), which is identified as the complementary part of karman’s 
activity.629 In the exposition of the second case, the activity existent in the agent (byed pa po la 
yod pa) is demonstrated by help of an axe moving up and down, and it may therefore be assumed 
that it is the agent who instigates and controls this movement. In the bilateral action model 
presented in the GNT, agent and instrument are therefore both constitutive for the byed pa po 
la yod pa’i las and form a single unit that brings about the result of the action. 
It is interesting that already the historically problematic Smra ba kun630 demonstrates clear signs 
of a fusion of agent and instrument. The latter parts of the root text contain a short enumeration 
of grammatical functions under the somewhat opaque header of byed pa’i dus (lit. ‘the time of 
                                                          
628 CT 115 – 450. 
629 Cf. supra 181f. and 247f. 
630 Cf. supra 32 and HSGLT 1, CG 16 and 17. 
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kāraka/doing/[grammatical] functioning’ ?) that lists not byed pa po but only byed pa as a 
function: 
 byed pa’i dus ni de nyid la/     the tshom gcod byed ’dus byas yin/     de yang las dang 
 byed pa dang/     ched dang ’byung khungs ’brel pa dang/     gzhi dang zla bsdu lhag 
 bcas dang/     dgag sgrub brnan dang bdag po dang/     rgyan dang kha skong dus la 
 ’jug 631 
The commentary then gives the following concise definition of byed pa: 
 byed pa ni byed pa po dang bcas pa ste/ 
 “Regarding the instrument/agency (byed pa), it is [that which is] endowed with the 
 agent.”632 
That this understanding of byed pa comprises both, the agent and the instrument of classical 
Sanskritic accounts, is evident from the commentary’s subsequent demonstration of the 
catuṣkoṭi (mu bzhi, ‘four alternatives’) on the ways in which single and multiple byed pas may 
perform single and multiple actions. An example of the four alternatives in which multiple byed 
pas perform a single action is the following: 
 rnam par ’jog byed ni lhas byin dang lag chu’i [sic!]633 tshogs lta bu du mas shing lta 
 bu bya ba gcig la byed pa […]. 
 “As for performing the cutting, multiple [instruments/agencies] such as the combination 
 of Devadatta and the tool (lhas byin dang lag cha’i tshogs) perform a single action such 
 as upon the tree (shing lta bu bya ba gcig la byed pa).”634 
In classical Sanskritic grammatical accounts, Devadatta is the agent, and the tool, presumably 
the axe, is the instrument to perform the action of cutting a tree. Although the precise meaning 
                                                          
631 Due to the difficult character of this passage, a tentative translation is only offered in this footnote: 
 “As for the section/time of [grammatical] functioning, it is the composite formation (’dus byas) that 
 eradicates doubts regarding these very [compound forms that have been discussed right before]. 
 Furthermore, las, byed pa, ’byung khungs, ’brel pa, gzhi, zla bsdu, lhag bcas, dgag sgrub, brnan, bdag 
 po, rgyan and kha skong belong to this section/time (dus la ’jug ?).” (CT 109 – 1701) 
The list does not stop here but goes on to enumerate a total of 35 grammatical categories, including, for example, 
the pair ātmanepada and parasmaipada (bdag/gzhan gyi tshig). Note that the quoted parts of the list are 
especially interesting since they clearly resonate with the non-case functions listed in SCP, the history of which 
still remains unstudied. For our current context, it suffices to note that the term byed pa po has been omitted and 
only byed pa was included. 
632 CT 109 – 1711. 
633 In accordance with the Peking and Narthang edition of the bstan ’gyur, I read lag cha’i (cf. CT 109 – 1712, ft. 
9). 
634 CT 109 – 1712. Or “perform [the cutting] upon a single [entity] to be done such as the tree” (shing lta bu bya 
ba gcig la byed pa)? 
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of byed pa requires future scrutiny, in Smra ba kun both entities are equally classified as byed 
pa that combined (tshogs) constitute multiple byed pas performing a single action.635 Since both 
the root text and the commentary are contained in the Tibetan bstan ’gyur, it is likely that this 
source played a part in the Tibetan development of the third case and the fusion of agent and 
instrument. However, the Sanskritic origin of the two texts, although claimed in the colophon 
of the Tibetan texts CG 16 and 17, remains unattested and at least an authoritative Sanskritic 
origin has been denied by Si tu.636 
If the fusion of agent and instrument is traced further back in the Sanskritic tradition, the notion 
of vyāpāra is an important direction to follow. In the Tibetan second case, it was argued that 
the conception of byed pa po in terms of the byed pa po la yod pa’i las together with its 
counterpart bya ba’i gzhi la yod pa’i las was derived from the Sanskritic vyāpāra/phala 
dichotomy. The Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā provides an early definition of Sanskritic vyāpāra 
in its commentary on Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1: 
 sarvaḥ kartā karaṇagocaravyāpāro na tu sākṣāt phale vyāpriyate. karaṇaṃ ca dvidhā 
 siddhasasiddhaṃ ca. tatra siddhaṃ paraśvādi dārudvaidhībhāvāyodyamyodyamya 
 dāruṇi nipātayan dāru cchinattītyucyate, na tu sākṣāt kartr̥vyāpāragocaro 
 dārudvaidhībhāvaḥ, kiṃ tu sparśavadvegavataḥ karaṇībhūtasya paraśoḥ 
 saṃyogasyodyamananipātanalakṣaṇastu kartr̥vyāpāraḥ parśugocara eva. evaṃ 
 svargakāmo ’pi kartā na sākṣāt svarge vyāpriyate, kiṃ tu tatkaraṇam yāgamasiddhaṃ 
 sādhayati. 
 “Each agent has an activity (vyāpāra) which has the instrument as its domain/sphere 
 [and] does not directly engage in (vyāpriyate) the result (phala). And the instrument is 
 twofold, accomplished or unaccomplished. Accomplished means (ucyate, lit. ‘is 
 explained’) that an axe, etc., having raised and raised and letting it down for the being-
 split-into-two of the wood, cuts the wood. But the being-split-into-two of the wood is 
 not directly the domain/sphere of the activity of the agent. [The being-split-into-two of 
 the wood is directly the domain] of the connection of the axe, which is the contacting 
 and fast instrument, [with the wood], whereas the activity of the agent, characterized by 
 lifting up and letting down, has only the axe as its domain/sphere. Likewise, also the 
                                                          
635 Perhaps because either Devadatta as the agent and the tool as the instrument are two instantiations of 
agency/activity (byed pa), or perhaps because both are instrumental (byed pa) to bring about the action? 
636 Cf. HSGLT 1 CG 16 and 17; GC 607.5. 
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 agent, who desires heaven, does not directly engage in heaven, but accomplishes the 
 instrument for it, the unaccomplished sacrifice.”637 
The context of this statement is neither grammatical nor linguistic. As a commentary on NS 
1.1.1, it is concerned with introducing a selection of key notions for the attainment of valid 
knowledge or cognition, with the means that lead to valid cognition (pramāṇa) representing a 
major part in the process. This passage attempts to explain the basic constitution of an action 
less to develop a linguistic action theory than to analyze the action process by help of simple 
examples as an analogy to the process of cognition. Thus, the quoted passage first of all follows 
an epistemological purpose. The most important terminology for our current context, i.e. 
vyāpāra and phala, together with the already familiar example of splitting wood into two pieces 
are all used in this passage. The quotation utilizes an etymological explanation of vyāpāra 
(‘activity’) in terms of an agent who engages (vyāpriyate) not directly in the result of the action, 
but is only occupied with the instrument that ultimately brings about the result. In the 
Naiyāyika’s context, this point is pivotal, since the result of the process of valid cognition is 
analogically based on the idea that only by means of a valid instrument, i.e. one of the 
pramāṇas, such a cognition may be brought forth.  
The instrument, be it an axe or a pramāṇa, works as a necessary intermediary without which 
the agent is unable to generate the result of the action. Thus, vyāpāra is constituted by the agent 
and his handling of the instrument in order to indirectly bring about the result. The leap from 
this model to the agent’s and instrument’s unit with the result of the action (‘phala’) as its 
counterpart is not too far anymore, perhaps only a matter of interpretation of such passages.  
The precise history of this entire model in the Sanskritic as well as Tibetan tradition is yet to be 
investigated, but in the following centuries the conception of an action in terms of vyāpāra and 
phala surfaced in different fields of knowledge and figured prominently in the works of 
Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas and grammarians, particularly in the context of śābdabodha (‘verbal 
cognition’).638  
9.1.2 Résumé on the Third Case before Si tu 
In sum, despite a few minor issues surrounding its conception, the third case byed pa po or byed 
pa is much less problematic compared to the first two cases. This is probably due to the fact 
                                                          
637 Sanskrit transliterated from Thakur 1996, 18.20-19.6. Note that the Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā on NS 1.1.1 
discusses the same example of woodcutting and its constituent parts (the moving up and down of the axe and the 
being split in two parts of the wood) in the context of the general theory of kāraka (cf. Thakur 1996, 18.20-19.1). 
This passage was briefly discussed in Cardona 2008, 107.  
638 Cf. also supra 182. 
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that the category of the agent (byed pa po, kartr̥) is much more homogeneous and distinctive in 
WT compared to the notion of karman (las). The only noteworthy modification compared to 
classical Sanskritic grammars is the fusion of agent and instrument into one category, however 
the historical survey revealed that this is not necessarily a Tibetan invention. 
9.2 The Third Case in the Great Commentary 
After his quote of SCP 13.4-14.1,639 Si tu paraphrases and supplements the root text as follows: 
 sngar bshad pa’i rnam dbye drug pa’i sgra gi la sogs pa de dag nyid la rjes ’jug bcu pa 
 sa yig sbyar bas/     gis/     kyis/     ’is/     yis/     gyis rnams su grub pa ni byed pa pos 
 bya ba la sbyor ba ston pas na gzhung gzhan du rnam dbye gsum pa zhes ’byung ba 
 byed pa po’i sa ru shes par bya’o/ 
 “If the tenth postscript, the letter sa, is affixed to exactly the morphemes of the just 
 explained sixth case, [i.e.] gi etc., [this] results in gis, kyis, ’is, yis [and] gyis. Since it 
 indicates the application to an action by an agent (byed pa pos bya ba la sbyor ba), it is 
 to be known as the semantic domain of the agent, which in other treatises occurs as the 
 third case.”640 
Si tu’s paraphrase of SCP 13.4-14.1 is inspired by Zha lu’s commentary but includes 
additions. 641  For both morphological categories, ’brel sgra as well as byed sgra, Si tu’s 
commentary adds the allomorphs yi and yis respectively, which were omitted in the SCP and 
usually serve the purpose of filling an additional syllable in metric treatises as substitutes for ’i 
and ’is respectively. In this approach, Si tu has probably followed Zha lu and Rnam gling 
Paṇchen, both who have used similar paraphrases and have included the derivation of yis from 
yi in their commentary. In his commentary on SCP 12.3-13.3, Si tu reasons that the morpheme 
yi “does not occur explicitly, since here (= SCP) is taught mainly the functioning of the 
postscript.”642 The commentarial tradition including Si tu usually declares the main topic of 
SCP as the functioning of the postscript, in contrast to TKJ which is said to focus more on the 
prescript. This is derived from the fact that SCP’s main part is dedicated to a presentation of 
the syntactic links (tshig phrad) that the root text consistently derives from the ten postscript 
letters throughout the entire text. Si tu therefore correctly observes that ya, the root letter (ming 
gzhi) of the morphemes yi and yis, is not a postscript, and he thus concluded that they are outside 
                                                          
639 Cf. supra 244. 
640 GC 485.5. 
641 Cf. Zha lu on SCP 13.4-14.1 (Zha lu 2013A, 10): sngar bshad ma thag pa’i gi kyi gyi ’i yi zhes pa’i sgra lnga 
po de dag nyid la ni rjes ’jug bcu pa sa yig sbyar ba ni/     rnam dbye gsum pa byed pa po ru shes par bya’o/ 
642 […] ’dir rjes ’jug gi yi ge’i bya ba gtso bor bstan pas dngos su mi ’byung […] (GC 484.5). 
 253 
 
the scope of SCP’s standard derivational procedure, an argument which has true appeal and 
successfully defends the root text against its incompleteness. 
One of Si tu’s additions to the paraphrase of the root text is the short definition of the third case 
in terms of byed pa pos bya ba la sbyor ba (lit. ‘the application to an action by the agent’). This 
phrase leaves open what exactly is applied to the action by the agent. Si tu uses the phrase bya 
ba la sbyor ba without the addition of byed pa pos in his commentary on Cāndra in 2.1.68, 
where it is probably derived from Sanskrit kriyāyoga of the Cāndravr̥tti on the same rule.643 
Pāṇini used the Sanskrit term in P 1.4.59, where it refers to the connection of upasargas (~ 
verbal prefixes) with the verb, thus expressing a morphological connection which cannot be the 
meaning in the current context. Additionally, Sakya Paṇḍita in the Mkhas ’jug uses the same 
phrase bya ba la sbyor ba without byed pa pos in his definition of the second case: 
 shing de la lta ba’am ’jog pa lta bu bya ba la sbyor ba shing la zhes bya ba lta bu gnyis 
 pa bya ba’i tshig/ 
 “The application [of that tree] to an action, e.g. ‘to look at or cut into that tree’, is the 
 second [case], the syntactic form ‘to be done’, as in ‘upon the tree’.”644 
Although my understanding of the passage differs from the one of Gold, I agree that it must be 
the object that is connected with or applied to the action (bya ba la sbyor ba; Gold translates 
‘associates with’). No further elaboration on the expression’s conceptual foundation were 
encountered as part of this research in the grammatical treatises, nor have I been able to directly 
relate it to any Sanskritic technical term. Although the underlying conception of the term may 
reach much deeper, the phrase seems to be a rather general characterization of the second case 
in Sakya Paṇḍita’s KhJ, which is understood here as highlighting the requirement for karman 
that an action must be applied to that entity which is to become the karman or second case. 
                                                          
643 Compare Cāndravr̥tti with Si tu:  
 C 2.1.68 hetau “If a cause.”  
Vr̥tti: tatkriyāyogye tr̥tīyā syāt  
“If this [cause] is connected/used with an action, a third [case suffix] results.” (Sanskrit quoted from 
Liebich 1918, 108). 
he tau/     rgyu la’o/ (C 2.1.68)     rgyu ste bya ba la sbyor ba’i rgyu mtshan la gsum pa ’gyur te/ 
“’Hetau,’ ‘If a cause.’ (C 2.1.68) For a cause, i.e. (ste) the reason an action is applied for (bya ba 
la sbyor ba), a third [case suffix] occurs.” (Si tu 2.39.6) 
Note that – granted my reading of the respective passages is correct – Si tu’s understanding of kriyāyoga/bya ba 
la sbyor ba deviates from Cāndra. While the latter seems to refer to the simple point that a cause (hetu) and a 
verb or action (kriyā) are used together in a sentence (tatkriyāyoga; tat = hetu), Si tu seems to aim at the idea that 
cause (hetu, rgyu) refers to the reason causing the application/performance of an action (bya ba la sbyor ba’i 
rgyu mtshan). 
644 KhJ 2009, 25. Compare also the different translation of Gold 2008, 168:  
 “As in looking at or cutting down that tree, the expression ‘with respect to a tree’ associates [the tree] 
 with an action. Thus, the second is an action[-related, or object] inflection.” 
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Likewise, Si tu’s use of bya ba la sbyor ba in C 2.1.68 as well as in the GC does not seem to 
amount to more than the fact that an action is taking place. Si tu’s definition of the third case in 
SCP 13.4-14.1 then only states that a third case, the agentive, indicates that such an application 
to or of an action is performed by an agent. This does not provide any deeper insights into the 
underlying concept of agency. The correct understanding of the agentive link and its use rather 
needs to be inferred from the list of examples:  
 byed pa po’i sgra de rnams tshig grogs dang ji ltar sbyor ba’ang/     bdag gis bstan/     
 gang gis bsgrubs/     thams cad kyis ’dud/     rab kyis bkur/     phyogs kyis dbye/     de’is 
 mtshon/     zhes sam/     skad gsar bcad ltar na/     des mtshon/     de yis thams cad dbang 
 du byed/     gzhan gyis gsos/     lam gyis ’tsho/     gser gyis byug     dpal gyis brgyan/     
 kund kyis skyong/     rab ’byord kyis gsol/     zild kyis mnan/     ces sogs rgya cher sbyar 
 nas shes par bya’o/ 
 “Furthermore, how these agentive morphemes are applied to an accompanying phrase 
 (tshigs grogs) is to be known from extensive application such as (1) ‘I taught’ (bdag gis 
 bstan), (2) ‘somebody/-thing accomplished’ (gang gis bsgrubs), (3) ‘all bowed’ (thams 
 cad kyis ’dud), (4) ‘to serve excellently’ (rab kyis bkur), (5) ‘divided through 
 directions/extremes/sides’ (~ divided into directions/extremes/sides) (phyogs kyis dbye), 
 (6) ‘this/that illustrates’ (de’is mtshon) or according to the revision of the script (7) 
 ‘this/that illustrates’ (des mtshon), (8) ‘s/he/it conquers everything’ (de yis thams cad 
 dbang du byed), (9) ‘nourished/taken care of by someone/-thing else’ (gzhan gyis gsos), 
 (10) ‘to live by means of the path’ (~ to live according to the path) (lam gyis ’tsho), (11) 
 ‘to coat with gold’ (gser gyis byug), (12) ‘to ornament with glory’ (dpal gyis brgyan), 
 (13) ‘everyone protects’ (or ‘totally protected,’ kund kyis skyong), (14) ‘Subhūti asks’ 
 (rab ’byord kyis gsol), (15) ‘to overwhelm with splendor’ (zild kyis mnan).”645 
The examples are regarded as sufficient representations of the correct meaning and use of the 
third case, and the GC lacks any analysis of their syntactic-semantic patterns to abstract rules 
or restrictions. This fact may perhaps be interpreted as a sign of Si tu’s metalinguistic-semantic 
focus that is less concerned with language-specific syntactic patterns and more with the general 
constitution of the category agent that is fairly self-explanatory. Taking over the task of an 
analysis, they all consist of a verb and an additional argument marked by byed sgra. The 
selection of the 15 sample phrases first of all aims at a representative illustration of the different 
                                                          
645 GC 486.2. 
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morphological derivations of the allomorphs. One phrase is dedicated to each of the ten 
postscript letters and the respective agentive allomorph triggered by it (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 
12), with the exception of the postscript letter sa. The latter is nonetheless covered by (5), which 
together with the phrases (13), (14) and (15) demonstrates the use of byed sgra when triggered 
by the letters sa and da in secondary postscript position. (7) and (8) are both morphological 
variations for the postscript ’a (covered in (6)), with (7) being the much more common version 
compared to (6) after the language revisions, whereas (8) illustrates the use of the allomorph 
yis after ’a in instances where an additional syllable is required due to metrics, etc.  
The illustration of da drag (secondary postscript da) by means of three instead of simply one 
phrase may be explained by the fact that its use has become less common and thus more difficult 
in current orthographic conventions. Da drag is usually no longer put into writing, yet it remains 
operational in grammar since it has an impact on the morphology of the following syntactic 
link, in this case triggering the allomorph kyis. Compare the application of byed sgra after the 
future and past tense of the verb ston pa (‘teach’) respectively: 
 Future:  bstan gyis (‘because to be taught’ or ‘will be taught’) 
 Past:  bstan kyis (‘because it was taught’) 
As demonstrated in these examples, the past tense of ston pa does take a da drag and thus 
triggers a different allomorph compared to the future tense, however the letter da is no longer 
spelled out. Thus, it is likely that Si tu wanted to provide more than one example in order to 
illustrate the tricky usage of da drag. 
All the employed verb frames are differentiated (tha dad pa), with the exception of (9), which 
I interpret as a non-differentiated use of the verb ’tsho ba (‘to live’). The selected arguments 
marked by byed sgra differ significantly from each other regarding their word class, ranging 
from proper nouns to pronouns as well as adjectives. The different word classes as well as 
lexical meanings of the marked arguments impact the syntactic-semantic information expressed 
by the third case markers. There are unproblematic agents in (1), (3) and (14) as well as 
instruments in (5), (10), (11), (12) and (15). (2), (6), (7), (8) and (9) are more ambiguous and 
could refer to either an agent or an instrument due to the use of pronouns or the term gzhan 
(‘other’). Finally, (4) and (13) appear more as adverbial specifications of the verb rather than 
separate arguments, although (13) could be a genuine agent in the sense of ‘protected by all.’ It 
would require closer linguistic scrutiny to assess whether byed sgra in WT has a distinctive 
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adverbial function or rather a broader instrumental usage.646 The feature that additions such as 
rab kyis or kund kyis directly precede the verb and cannot be removed from it may serve as a 
strong argument for their separate grammatical status in terms of adverbs, although the 
etymological relation to the instrumental function remains apparent.647 In total, the phrases 
therefore exhibit up to three functions, with agent and instrument being clearly distinguishable 
and adverb probably forming a third significant category. In Si tu’s commentary on SCP, all 
phrases are equally treated as instantiations of the third case and its definition byed pa pos bya 
ba la sbyor ba, regardless any semantic or syntactic variations. The outlined fusion in the 
Tibetan tradition of agent and instrument under the category of the agent has therefore been 
consistently retained in the GC, with a few examples in SCP-GC stretching the agent category 
to rather abstract uses. 
However, Si tu’s second presentation of the third case in the summary of cases following his 
commentary on TKJ 25.4-28.3 then remarks on this difference between agent and instrument:  
 rnam dbye gsum pa byed pa po la ’jug pa ni/     lhas bstan/     rdo rjes phug/     khyod 
 kyis skyong/     bdag gis brjod lta bu ste/     bstan/     phug     skyong/     brjod rnams bya 
 ba yin pas de byed mkhan gyi don du rim par/     lha/     rdo rje/     khyod/     bdag rnams 
 la rnam dbye gsum pa byed pa po’i tshig ’jug pa yin no/     de’ang zhib mor dpyad na/     
 bdag gis rig sngags kyis tshe sgrub lta bur bdag dang rig sngags gnyi ga spyir byed pa 
 po yin pas gnyis ka la rnam dbye gsum pa ’jug kyang/     bdag byed po gtso bo dang 
 rig sngags byed po phal pa yin pa’i dbye ba yod cing/     yang na bdag byed pa po dang 
 rig sngags ni byed pa tsam yin pa’i bye brag shes par bya dgos so/     rgyu mtshan gyi 
 don la gsum pa ’jug pa’ang rgyu mtshan des de ltar ’grub par byed pas byed pa po dang 
 mtshungs pa’i phyir ro/ 
 “Regarding [how] the third case takes on [the meaning of] the agent, it is like in ‘the 
 deity taught’ (lhas bstan), ‘pierced by the Vajra’ (rdo rjes phug), ‘you protect’ (khyod 
 kyis skyong), ‘I expressed’ (bdag gis brjod). Since ‘taught,’ ‘pierced,’ ‘protect’ [and] 
 ‘expressed’ are actions, a third case, the syntactic form of the agent, joins to the ‘deity,’ 
 ‘Vajra,’ ‘you’ and ‘I’ respectively in the meaning of the one who does these [actions] 
 (byed mkhan). If [we] examine this [third case] in detail, then e.g. in ‘I perform the long
 life practice with mantra,’ the ‘I’ and the ‘mantra’ generally are both agents [and] 
 therefore a third case joins to both. Yet, it should be known that there is the distinction 
                                                          
646 (4): lit. ‘by means of excellence’ → excellently; (13): lit. ‘by means of everything/by all means’ → totally. 
647 Tournadre, for example, attributes an adverbial function to byed sgra (cf. Tournadre 2010, 102ff.). 
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 that the ‘I’ is the main agent and the ‘mantra’ is the secondary agent (byed po phal pa), 
 or alternatively that the ‘I’ is the agent and the ‘mantra’ the instrument (byed pa). 
 Additionally, the third [case] also takes on the meaning of reason (rgyu mtshan), because 
 [it] is equivalent to an agent, for [it means that] a particular reason accomplishes (’grub 
 par byed pa) [something] in a particular way.”648 
Si tu acknowledges the difference between agent and instrument, although their unity remains 
equally established, since byed pa (‘instrument’) becomes only the secondary or subordinate 
type (phal pa) of the third case’s main function agent (byed pa po). Any further detailed 
conceptions of the third case or the notions of agent and instrument are missing.  
At the very end of the third case’s presentation under TKJ 25.4-28.3, Si tu briefly mentions a 
third meaning of this case, namely that of reason or cause (rgyu mtshan). He has already 
introduced this category in SCP 13.4-14.1 in the context of a short refutation of Smra sgo. 
According to this latter source, the byed sgra morphemes may take on the meaning of a so-
called ‘discordant ornament’ (mi mthun pa’i rgyan), i.e. a concessive and adversative 
meaning.649 Without here going into the details of this critique, Si tu relates one of Smra sgo’s 
examples for byed sgra’s discordant function, namely de lda mod kyis (‘though indeed it is like 
that’), to constructions such as rtag par yod gyis mi rtag par ma yin no (‘since it exists 
permanently, it is not impermanent’). Si tu’s reasons for connecting these two examples remain 
unclear, since they are rather unrelated grammatical constructions, however he concludes that 
“such kyis morphemes, etc. are agentive cases in the meaning of reason (rgyu mtshan).”650  
Si tu’s sample phrase allows for both proposed logical structures, i.e. Smra sgo’s adversative 
relation in the sense of ‘it exists permanently, whereas/but it is not impermanent’ as well as Si 
tu’s causal relation in the sense of ‘because it exists permanently, it is not impermanent.’ The 
issue of which of the two relations is ultimately expressed by byed sgra in the sentence cannot 
be pursued in this work. Tournadre does attribute a rare adversative function to byed sgra,651 
and although it is frequently associated with the instrumental function, the causal function of 
the morpheme following proper and nominalized verbs is so prominent in WT that it can hardly 
be neglected by any modern linguistic taxonomy.652 That rgyu mtshan is indeed a syntactically 
                                                          
648 GC 599.5.  
649 Cf. Smr̥ti 2002, 90f. 
650 […] de ’dra’i kyis sogs kyi sgra de rgyu mtshan gyi don gyi byed pa po’i rnam dbye yin […] (GC 486.5) 
651 Cf. Tournadre 2010, 104. 
652 Cf. e.g. ibid., 102ff. and Schwieger 2006, 242ff. 
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distinctive function of byed sgra and thus significant in the context of WT may again be 
demonstrated by byed sgra’s distribution in sentences with marked agents or instruments: 
 dngul med pas bdag gis zas mi nyos so ‘Because [I] had no money, I did not buy food.’ 
The clause dngul med (pa) (‘[I] had no money’) requires separate marking by byed sgra to 
indicate its relation to the other parts of the sentence – in this case a causal relation with the 
second clause bdag gis zas mi nyos – and thus it represents a distinct grammatical entity in the 
sentence. Apart from the linguistic significance of the function rgyu mtshan, the introduction 
of this subcategory was also in line with Sanskritic grammar, at least insofar as reason or cause 
(hetu) already figured as a secondary condition for the third case suffix in Pāṇini (P 2.3.23) and 
Cāndra (C 2.1.68) to cover instances such as annena vasati (‘(s)he lives due to food’) or vidyayā 
yaśaḥ (‘famous due to knowledge’).653 
Si tu explicitly classifies the rtag par yod gyis mi rtag par ma yin no as an instance of the 
agentive case. This fact reveals the degree to which the demarcation between cases is based on 
semantic conformity of the case functions. Comparing the verbal use of byed sgra with that of 
la don, it is striking that Si tu lists functions of the morpheme na such as reason (rgyu mtshan) 
or the connective function (mtshams sbyor ba) of la under the category of ‘other (i.e. non-case) 
modes, how [la and na] join semantically [to a lexical word form]’ (don gyi ’jugs tshul 
gzhan).654 The same applies to ’brel sgra’s adversative use after verbs, which Si tu characterizes 
as “also taking on a different, [i.e.] non-case meaning.”655 If the number of cases would have 
been based on morphemes like in Sanskritic grammar, such uses would need to be classified as 
case uses as well. The subsumption of reason under the third case, in turn, is obviously related 
to the intuitive proximity of the categories agent, instrument and reason.656 
What still remains open is the relation of reason (rgyu mtshan) to the other two third case 
functions developed by Si tu, namely agent (byed pa po) and instrument (byed pa). Fortunately, 
Si tu’s grammatical work contains additional material to be considered in this context. 
                                                          
653 Cf. Sharma 1995, 129 and Liebich 1918, 108. 
654 Cf. GC 475.5. 
655 […] rnam dbye’i don ma yin pa gzhan la’ang ’jug pa […] (GC 485.4) 
656 Note, however, also the inconsistency in Si tu’s taxonomy of classifying the category rgyu mtshan indicated 
by byed sgra as a third case, yet the related rgyu mtshan function of na as a non-case function and not a third 
case (cf. GC 475.6). This reveals that the morphological parameter to conform with the agent’s morphology also 
plays a role in this taxonomy (cf. also infra 299 and 420f.). 
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9.2.1 Addendum on the Relation between Agent, Instrument and Reason  
It may be argued that the semantic conformity of all three categories is fairly intuitive and 
probably even has a linguistic-historical basis in WT due to their identical morphological 
realization. Given the fact that they are moreover attested as third case functions in Sanskritic 
grammar,657 it is intelligible that Si tu omitted any detailed discussion of this point in his GC, 
restricting himself to the already quoted statement at the very end of the third case’s summary 
under TKJ 25.4-28.3: 
 rgyu mtshan gyi don la gsum pa ’jug pa’ang rgyu mtshan des de ltar ’grub par byed 
 pas byed pa po dang mtshungs pa’i phyir ro/ 
 “Additionally, the third [case] also takes on the meaning of reason (rgyu mtshan), 
 because [it] is equivalent to an agent, for [it means that] a particular reason accomplishes 
 (’grub par byed pa) [something] in a particular way.”658 
Si tu argues that the semantic fields of reason and agent are equivalent insofar as a reason 
accomplishes something. ‘Accomplishment’ (’grub par byed pa) therefore appears to be the 
common ground of the two categories, and consequently Si tu’s argument seems to amount to 
the point that this notion constitutes the main characteristic of the entire agentive case together 
with its three subcategories. If we ask what is to be accomplished (bsgrub par bya ba) by the 
argument marked with byed sgra, we are left in the dark, however it must either be the karman 
(las) together with the resultative part of the action (bya ba’i yul la yod pa’i las) or the action 
(bya ba) in general; and both these options are corroborated by Si tu’s theoretical exposition of 
dngos po bdag/gzhan in TKJ 11.3: 
 1) bsgrub par bya ba = karman and the resultative part of the action (bya las): in his 
 first definition of dngos po bdag/gzhan, Si tu renders dngos po gzhan as “that entitiy 
 which is the domain to be accomplished by that [agent and his doing] together with what 
 is to be done (= the resultative part of the action).”659  
 2) bsgrub par bya ba = action in general (bya ba): still in TKJ 11.3, Si tu also defines 
 those actions which are directly connected with a distinct agent (byed pa po gzhan dang 
                                                          
657 It should be noted, however, that in Sanskritic grammars the status as a third case function of all three is 
primarily based on their morphological rather than a functional-conceptual conformity. 
658 GC 600.1. 
659 […] des bsgrub par bya ba’i yul gyi dngos po bya ba dang bcas pa […] (GC 535.4). 
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 dngos su ’brel ba’i las = bya byed thad dad pa) as “that action which is directly 
 accomplished (sgrub par byed pa) by a distinct agent.”660  
Whichever of the two options Si tu may have preferred in our current context, the third case in 
the GC appears constituted mainly by a causal relation in terms of an accomplisher (either the 
agent, the instrument or the reason) and that which is accomplished by this very accomplisher. 
Without further textual evidence at hand, it is assumed that it is this causal relation Si tu was 
trying to highlight through his use of the demonstrative pronouns in the definition of the rgyu 
mtshan function of the third case: 
 rgyu mtshan des de ltar ’grub par byed 
A particular reason or cause accomplishes something in a particular way (rgyu mtshan des de 
ltar ’grub par byed) to refer to the fact that, for example, a seer (= agent) accomplishes the 
action of seeing form (and not that of hearing sound), and a particular reason accomplishes only 
the matching result or consequence. 
While the notion of ’grub par byed pa establishes a homogeneity of the third case with its three 
subcategories, the conceptual distinctiveness as well as relation between them remains open. Si 
tu’s Cāndra commentary may be of help in this context, since it contains most interesting 
additions to his standpoint regarding the relation of agent, instrument and reason, although it 
should also be kept in mind that his composition of the Cāndra commentary dates to the years 
1750-1756 and is therefore subsequent to the completion of the GC.  
In his commentary on C 2.1.68, which introduces hetu (rgyu, rgyu mtshan; ‘cause,’ ‘reason’) 
as a trigger of the third case suffix, Si tu discusses a possible objection against the need for a 
separate rule for this case trigger: 
 he tau/     /rgyu la’o/     /rgyu ste bya ba la sbyor ba’i rgyu mtshan la gsum pa ’gyur te/ 
 […] ’dir gong du byed pa la gsum pa ’jug par bshad na rgyu’ang byed pa yin pas ched 
 du smos mi dgos so snyam na/     rgyu dang byed pa gnyis la dbye ba yod de/     rgyu la 
 rag lus pa ni byed pa po yin zhing byed pa po la rag lus pa ni byed pa yin pas so/     des 
 na zas kyi rgyu mtshan gyis gnas pa ni rgyu mtshan nges pa can yin la/     zor bas gcod 
 pa sogs ni de lta ma yin no/ 
                                                          
660 […] las gang zhig byed pa po gzhan gyis dngos su sgrub par byed pa de […] (GC 537.1). Note that in this 
context las refers not to karman but to the action. 
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 “’Hetau’, ‘If a cause.’ (C 2.1.68) In case of a cause, i.e. (ste) a reason for the application 
 to an action (bya ba la sbyor ba), a third [case suffix] occurs. […] One might think here 
 that since it was explained above that the third [case suffix] takes on the meaning of 
 instrument (byed pa), there is no need to mention cause (rgyu) purposely (ched du smos), 
 since it is also an instrument. [Yet,] there is a difference between the two, cause and 
 instrument, because that which is dependent (rag lus pa) on the cause is the agent and 
 that which is dependent on the agent is the instrument. Thus, ‘to live due to food’ (zas 
 kyi rgyu mtshan gyis gnas pa) is certainly a reason, whereas ‘to cut with a sickle’ (zor 
 bas gcod pa), etc. are not like that.”661 
To argue for the status of hetu as a separate category, Si tu offers a model of unidirectional 
dependency consisting of the three layers instrument, agent and cause/reason. Starting from the 
bottom, the instrument relies on the agent during the performance of the action and the agent 
relies on the cause or reason to act. The comparison of the two examples zas kyis gnas pa (‘to 
live due to food’) and zor bas gcod pa (‘to cut with a sickle’) illustrates the difference between 
instrument and reason, despite the fact that the phrase zas kyis gnas pa, which Si tu obviously 
chose because the Cāndravr̥tti cites it as one of the examples for hetu,662  is a somewhat 
unfortunate choice, since without context it is rather ambiguous as to the difference between 
instrument and reason. Si tu’s understanding seems to be that the one who lives does not make 
use of food as an instrument in order to live, but that food enables or instigates the one who 
lives to perform the action of living. As such, in Si tu’s interpretation of this example, the one 
who lives (~ the agent) relies on food, while the food does not rely on the agent’s handling of 
it. In any case, at least the phrase zor bas gcod pa makes unmistakably clear that there is a 
significant semantic difference between the two grammatical categories, since the sickle as the 
reason or cause for the cutting would result in an entirely different, rather counterintuitive 
meaning of the sentence.  
Returning to GC’s conception of the Tibetan third case, the relation of unidirectional 
dependency between the three functions is compatible with the idea of ’grub par byed pa, in 
the sense that all three remain involved in the act of accomplishment, each having its own sphere 
of influence (cause/reason → agent → instrument). Yet, it remains unanswered to which extent 
Si tu already had any such model in mind during the composition of his GC. 
                                                          
661 Si tu 2.39.6. 
662 annena vasati ‘s/he lives due to food’ (cf. Liebich 1918, 108). 
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9.2.2 Résumé on Si tu’s Third Case 
As already stated in the historical survey of this case, the third case of byed pa po (‘agent’) or 
byed pa (‘doing,’ ‘agency,’ ‘instrument’) poses much fewer historical and linguistic problems 
compared to the first two cases. Its conceptual and terminological framework was adopted much 
more directly from Sanskritic grammar, due to the fact that the use of a single morphological 
category (byed sgra) corresponds much more directly to the adopted terminology. Therefore, 
also Si tu’s conception stayed in line with the preceding tradition. 
Si tu developed three subcategories of the agent, namely the main or primary agent (byed pa po 
gtso bo), the secondary agent (byed pa po phal pa) or instrument (byed pa) and the reason (rgyu 
mtshan) – a taxonomy which in this research was not encountered in other Tibetan grammatical 
sources. However, the sample phrases of several grammatical works before Si tu’s times 
approve that at least the category of instrument was commonly subsumed under the agentive 
case, even though an explicit mention of this category is usually lacking. Furthermore, all three 
functions of Si tu’s conception were already featured as distinct categories of the third case 
suffix in Sanskritic grammar. Although Sanskrit and Tibetan have important differences in the 
use of agentive, instrumental and causal marking, the significance of these three functions 
remains established in the latter, which is also corroborated by modern linguistic taxonomies. 
The three functions’ coherence as part of a single agentive function was only briefly touched 
upon by Si tu, to whom this was apparently connected with the idea that all three presumably 
accomplish (’grub par byed) the action or alternatively only the resultative part of the action 
together with the karman. In contrast, their distinctiveness as three subcategories of the agent 
is problematized not in the GC but only in his commentary to Cāndra, which he composed 
several years after the completion of the GC and in which he provides his views on this issue 
in the Sanskrit context. 
Apart from generic instances of both the agent and instrument, Si tu’s list of examples includes 
also grammatical constructions such as rab kyis bkur (‘to serve excellently’), and he chose not 
to introduce a separate non-case function for this type of use, a solution which would not have 
severely interfered with authoritative taxonomies and which he favored for a variety of uses of 
la don. It must remain open at this point why Si tu decided to include such constructions in the 
third case, whether he saw a semantic relation to the categories of agent, instrument and reason, 
and whether this was in fact the best possible solution. The same questions arise with regard to 
Si tu’s treatment of the phrase rtag par yod gyis mi rtag par ma yin no (‘Since it exists 
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permanently, it is not impermanent.’ or ‘It exists permanently, whereas it is not impermanent.’) 
and a possible adversative use of byed sgra in such constructions.  
However, the recent account of byed sgra in Tournadre provides not only a more diverse variety 
of sample phrases but also more functional distinctions, including an adverbial and adversative 
function.663 How Si tu would have classified such additional examples and whether he omitted 
them intentionally or simply chose not to go into the further details of the use of byed sgra –
lacking awareness of a possibly more diverse distribution – are thought-provoking impulses 
which should be considered in Si tu’s decision making. Although these questions and their 
answer will hopefully refine the presented picture, we can for now conclude that the conception 
of the third case in and before the GC required much less acrobatic efforts and reconciliation 
than compared to the first and especially the second case. 
  
                                                          
663 Cf. Tournadre 2010, 102ff. 
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10 Rnam dbye bzhi pa dgos ched 
10.1 Historical Survey 
The classical Tibetan fourth case is labelled as dgos ched (dgos pa ‘to need,’ ‘purpose,’ ched 
‘purpose,’ ‘sake’) as well as ched du bya ba (lit. ‘for the sake of which [the action is done]). 
Apart from minor variants, such as dgos pa’i tshig,664 sources also refer to the fourth case as 
either sbyin pa (‘giving’) or the related yang dag par rab tu sbyin pa (sampradāna, ‘proper 
giving’).665 While dgos ched/ched du bya ba and (yang dag par rab tu) sbyin pa have become 
fossilized nomenclatures that are used interchangeably in Sum rtags commentaries, their 
relation in the early Tibetan sources NGg and GNT is less categorical.666 Moreover, these two 
notions can be traced back to different categories in Sanskritic grammar.667 The fourth case is 
the second case after las/las su bya ba which is marked by the morphological category la don, 
although the precise morphological realization of the fourth case varies significantly throughout 
the sources.  
Based on SCP 9.3-11.4, Sum rtags commentators have usually associated the entire set of 
morphemes subsumed under the category la don or la sgra with all three case functions listed 
in SCP 11.3-4 (las, ched, rten gnas), and therefore la don in its entirety is typically classified 
as a marker for the fourth case. Although the integration of all morphemes and functions into 
the single category la sgra in the final statement of SCP 11.4 easily prompts such a conclusion, 
the passage itself does not directly explicate this. The section only states that the listed 
morphemes carry these five meanings and are grouped together under the label of la sgra, 
presumably due to their functional conformity. Yet, the precise distribution of the morphemes 
– whether we have to understand SCP that they can all equally take on the listed functions or 
whether they are grouped together due to a more general functional accordance that can have 
exceptions – remains questionable; and this latter option is indeed what Si tu proposes in the 
context of the function de nyid, by arguing that the seven manifestations of la don concur only 
regarding a majority of their functions, since la and na are exempt from indicating the 
information of de nyid.668 Although Si tu adhered to the common interpretation of na as a 
marker of the fourth case, his proviso regarding de nyid also corroborates the fact that the 
                                                          
664 Cf. KhJ 2009, 25. 
665 Cf. e.g. TKJ 22.4. 
666 Cf. chapter 10.1.2. 
667 Cf. chapter 10.1.1.1. 
668 GC 473f. and 483.3ff. Note that he therefore comes to the daring conclusion that the term la sgra was less 
based on the prototypicality of la throughout the five functions mentioned in SCP, but since it is the last letter in 
the alphabetical order of the seven la don morphemes (cf. GC 483.4f.) 
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passage does not necessarily exclude restrictions or exceptions of the morphemes’ agreement. 
Thus, despite the general agreement of na with la, du, etc., the root text’s author or authors have 
perhaps not associated every la don morpheme with the purposive function, i.e. the fourth case. 
Additionally, there was the common practice the tradition to associate constructions such as 
’brel sgra + phyir du, ched du or don du, all of which exhibit purposive meaning in the broader 
sense, with the fourth case. Already the earliest sources have identified the construction ’brel 
sgra + phyir (e.g. thob pa’i spyir, ‘for the sake of attaining’) with the fourth case, either 
exclusively or additionally to la don. Only phyir is listed in MVY 4741669 as well as in Chos 
grub’s’Jug pa’i sgra brgyad bstan pa tshig le’ur byas pa. 670  NGg and GNT use both 
morphological realizations in their presentations of the fourth case, although the form ’brel sgra 
+ phyir seems to be regarded as the more generic form.671 As for the category la don, many of 
the grammatical texts which are not directly dedicated to Sum rtags and include la as a fourth 
case marker focus exclusively on the morpheme la and fail to explicitly mention the three 
distinguishable la don morphemes la, na and du. Particularly the early sources lack na and du, 
although du does already appear at least in auxiliary constructions such as ched du in the GNT. 
In early Tibetan grammaticography, SCP would perhaps be the exception regarding the 
mentioning of na and du, depending on the precise understanding of SCP 9.3-11.4. It will have 
to be addressed elsewhere whether any of these morphological variations is connected to a 
diachronic or synchronic disagreement concerning which of the morphemes may mark the 
fourth case. This may be an interesting line of inquiry particularly in the context of na, since it 
will be demonstrated below that this is most clearly not a purposive marker in WT. The earliest 
source identified in this research to unmistakably classify na as a marker for the fourth case is 
the Smra sgo;672 and concerning du, the Smra sgo states that it shares all its functions with la, 
however no explicit examples of the three case functions are given.673 
Regardless of all morphological and conceptual variations, the basic function associated with 
the Tibetan fourth case in all grammatical sources is the purpose of the action, which 
grammarians usually refer to under the nomenclature of dgos ched, ched du bya ba, etc. If the 
terminology is allowed to speak for itself, the two main notions dgos pa and ched emphasize 
different facets of what in this dissertation is rendered as the purposive meaning. The more 
literal meaning of dgos pa as a verb is ‘to need’ or ‘to require,’ with its derived nominal meaning 
                                                          
669 Cf. HSGLT 2, 26. 
670 Cf. ibid., 362. 
671 Cf. CT 115 – 432f. and 454f. 
672 Cf. Smr̥ti 2002,79. 
673 Cf. ibid., 92. 
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of ‘objective,’ ‘intent,’ purpose’ (dmigs yul)674 often also used as a translation for Sanskrit 
prayojana.675 In the context of the fourth case, dgos pa therefore emphasizes that the action 
serves a certain need of the marked argument or that the action fulfills a certain requirement for 
the attainment of the marked argument, in which senses the marked argument is then the 
objective or purpose. The term ched, in contrast, directly indicates the sake or purpose for which 
an action is performed, implying that the action is done or not done in favor of ched’s reference 
point or the attainment of this reference point. Other important notions in this context that add 
further characteristics surrounding the purposive meaning expressed by the Tibetan fourth case 
are, for example, don (lit. ‘meaning’) or phyir (a causal connector that indicates final clauses in 
the context of the fourth case, ‘for the purpose of’), which are used in auxiliary constructions 
in the form ’brel sgra + don du/phyir du (‘for the sake of’) and are typically classified in 
grammatical sources as fourth cases.  
These different etymological nuances of the purposive terminology, although certainly 
conducive to a general understanding, should however not be overemphasized, since they seem 
to have had little importance to the grammarians, who used the terms interchangeably or even 
as paraphrases for each other.676 Also from a grammatical point of view, constructions such as 
de’i ched du (‘for the sake of that’), de’i phyir du (‘id.’) or de’i don du (‘id.’) may for the most 
part be used interchangeably in purposive instances.  
Dpang Lotsāwa encapsulated the fourth case in short terms as follows: 
 bzhi pa dgos ched kyi rnam dbye’i tshig gsum sbyar ba/     shing gi ched du/     shing 
 dag gi  ched du/     shing rnams kyis ched du chu drongs zhes pa lta bu’o/ 
“The three syntactic fourth case forms of purpose (dgos ched) are to be applied as in 
 ‘Pull/bring water (chu drongs; = ‘to irrigate,’ ‘to water’) for the sake of the tree (shing 
 gi ched du)!’ [or] ‘for the sake of the two trees (shing dag gi ched du)’ [or] ‘for the sake 
of the trees (shing  rnams gi ched du)’.”677 
The default construction of the example would be that of shing la chu ’dren pa (lit. ‘to pull/bring 
water to the tree,’ i.e. to water the tree). Thus, the verb frame ’dren pa triggers la-marking 
which the author substituted with ched du (‘for the sake of’) in order to emphasize the purposive 
meaning of the sentence. This example figures very prominently in Tibetan grammatical 
                                                          
674 Cf. Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo 2006, 462. 
675 Cf. Negi 1993, 640. 
676 Cf. e.g. NGg’s definition of the meaning of the fourth case, infra 285. 
677 Dpang Blo gros brtan pa 2004, 250. 
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sources from the earliest time, either with shing (‘tree’) or zhing (‘field’) as the argument in the 
fourth case. Apparently, it was adopted from the Sanskritic tradition.678 While it cannot be 
addressed here whether Dpang Lotsāwa substituted ched du for la because he regarded both 
constructions as interchangeable or because he was aware of the non-purposive functioning of 
la in this clause, in general grammarians did not hesitate to provide also shing la chu ’dren as 
an example for the fourth case.  
The equation of the syntactic forms shing la and shing gi ched du may be questioned from a 
syntactic perspective, since la typically expresses information such as INDIRECT OBJECT, 
DIRECTION or, in this concrete example, perhaps also RECIPIENT or TARGET (?),679 
however without any indication of an involved need or purpose of the tree. Although a 
purposive meaning for the tree to be watered is readily comprehensible in the expressed 
scenario, an alternative classification of this and similar constructions as a second case in the 
traditional model would have also been possible and even more representative of WT. The non-
purposive meaning of la in connection with the construction chu ’dren pa can be easily 
demonstrated when la and ched du are combined in one sentence: 
 shing tog gi ched du shing la chu ’dren ‘to bring water to the tree for the sake of fruits’ 
Through the addition of shing tog gi ched du, the sentence makes clear that the intended purpose 
of the action is that of gaining fruits from the tree. Although the tree is not the purpose of the 
action, the case marking pattern remains the same. Thus, la only expresses the information that 
the tree represents the TARGET, INDIRECT OBJECT, etc., but not the purpose of the 
watering.680 The classification of la don as a fourth case in shing/zhing la chu ’dren is thus a 
genuine instance of an objectivist focus.681 
Following academic accounts, the purposive functioning of la in general deserves closer 
scrutiny, but at least Michael Hahn identified rare purposive uses of la which he classified as 
“Lokativ des Ziels.”  
                                                          
678 I have encountered the example in the Nyāyavārttika (NV) as the only example for sampradāna in the 
Sanskrit equivalent construction vr̥kṣāyodakamāsiñcati (cf. Thakur 1997, 189.9) as well as in the Tibetan 
canonical version of the Kalāpavyākaraṇasūtravr̥ttiśiṣyahitā (HSGLT 1, CG 14) in an altered form in the 
context of the upasarga anu: vrīkṣaṃ vrīkṣa ma nu si tsa ti (cf. CT 109 – 277). 
679 On the general issue of the syntactic functioning of morpheme la in WT, cf. supra 201f. 
680 Also note that Tournadre classifies the use of du in zhing du chu ’dren (‘to pull water onto the field’) as an 
instance of du’s allative function, not the morpheme’s purposive function (cf. Tourndadre 2010, 108). Dpang 
Lotsāwa did not specify the status of du as a fourth case, but for most Sum rtags commentators it can be assured 
that Tournadre’s example would be fully equivalent with both, zhing la and zhing gi ched du. 
681 Cf. supra 106. 
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 “Der Lokativ des Ziels gibt an, zu welchem Zweck oder Ziel eine Verbalhandlung 
 vollzogen wird. 
 zhing pa rnams kyis lo tog smin pa la chu ’dren no 
 ‘Die Bauern leiten Wasser herbei, damit die Saat reif wird (… für die Reife der Saat).’ 
 Der Lokativ des Ziels ist nicht sehr häufig anzutreffen. Ein Finalsatz wird meist durch 
 den Terminativ des Verbalsubstantivs oder durch perphrastische Konstruktionen mit 
 finalen Postpositionen ausgedrückt.”682 
The purposive function of du as well as -r with nominalized verbs, in contrast, is well attested 
in modern academia and easily demonstrable in nominal, nominalized and verbal 
constructions:683 
 (1) rong bas lto gos su zhing btab ‘The farmer ploughs the field for his subsistence.’ 
 (2) ring [sic!]684 po che len du song ‘(X) went to fetch precious (stones).’ 
 (3) rin po che len par song ‘id.’ 
Although the precise taxonomies and categories vary also throughout the modern linguistic 
accounts, in principle they still support the general significance of the purposive function as a 
relevant semantic-syntactic category in the Tibetan context. More problematic, however, is 
once again the status of the morpheme na. Tournadre convincingly demonstrates that na sgra 
encodes inessive locative meaning in the sense of ‘in’ or ‘at,’ but he does not mention any 
purposive functioning.685 The relatively narrow locative-temporal functioning of na in WT is 
also supported by numerous other studies.686 
Similar to what was already encountered in the analysis of the second case, a comparison of 
more extensive lists of examples for the fourth case in Tibetan sources demonstrates a 
significant variety of different grammatical constructions. Zha lu and Pra ti, for example, in 
                                                          
682 Hahn 2005, 94. Also note Si tu’s example (6) gar lta ba la sgron me thogs ‘to take a lamp in order to look 
there/somewhere’ (cf. infra 305f.). 
683 Examples (1) and (2) together with their translation are quoted from Tournadre 2010, 108f. (3) is my 
adaptation of (2). In the context of the verbal use of the morpheme du as a final clause maker (cf. example 2), 
Tournadre states that “for this function, along with du sgra DU (or its variants), one can also use BAR (or its 
variant PAR).” (ibid.) 
684 I read rin. 
685 Cf. Tournadre 2010, 110. 
686 Cf. e.g. Hahn 2005, 91ff.; Schwieger 2006, 277ff.; Hill 2011, 19. 
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their commentary on the category ched in SCP 11.3, which belongs to the five la sgra functions, 
give the following phrases to illustrate the fourth case:687 
Zha lu:688 
 deng ’dir bde legs shog (‘Happiness for now!’), de’i ched du (‘for the sake of that’), de’i 
 phyir du (‘for the purpose of that’), bram ze la gzan byin (‘food was given to the 
 brahmin’), zhing la chu drongs (lit. ‘Pull/Bring water onto the field!’ = ‘Irrigate the 
 field!’), bdag la thugs brtse bar mdzod (lit. ‘Act compassionately to/towards me!’ ~ 
 ‘Show  compassion for me!’), zas la sred (‘to crave for food’) 
Pra ti:689 
 mtho ris su smon lam thob (‘to attain/master (?) prayers for the [rebirth] in the higher 
 realms’), thar pa thob pa ru bdag med bsgom (‘to meditate on selflessness for the 
 attainment of liberation [from cyclic existence]’), gral gyi ched du ’tshangs 
 (‘[someone] squeezed in for the queue,’or perhaps ‘to queue up’ ?), ’gyed kyi phyir du 
 bsgrims (‘to concentrate for debate’), skal ba’i don du ’thab (‘to fight for [one’s] 
 fortune/destiny/inheritance),  rgyan du gser brdungs (‘to cast gold for/into ornaments’), 
 tshogs na mang ja bskol (‘offering tea is to be cooked in/during/among the 
 community/gathering’), thar pa bsgrub tu nges ’byung bskyed (‘to bring forth 
 renunciation in order to accomplish liberation [from cyclic existence]’) 
Zha lu restricted himself to one very general example for each ched du and phyir. He also only 
gives phrases with the morpheme la, except for the marker -r in the first phrase (deng ’dir legs 
shog) which may be interpreted as either an allomorph of la or du. A purposive meaning is 
indeed in some way perceptible in a semantic interpretation of all the depicted scenarios. 
However, is the purposive construal of these scenarios also present in the structure of the sample 
phrases? While ched du and phyir du clearly express these meanings, all examples of la would 
equally qualify as instances of INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT or DIRECTION with 
regard to a semantic construal of the scenarios, and based on our knowledge of the distribution 
of la, this is the preferred understanding. Any need of the arguments marked by la that is at 
hand in the respective scenarios as such is not encoded in the semantic or syntactic structures 
                                                          
687 The following will be restricted to only a few important observations, however a more detailed examination 
of these examples would certainly result in additional insights and a more accurate picture. 
688 Zha lu 2013A, 7f. 
689 Pra ti 2013A, 197. 
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of the samples for la.690 Furthermore, morpheme -r in deng ’dir may simply be a specification 
of time. Of special interest is the final example, zas la sred (‘to crave for food’), which not only 
requires an effortful interpretation to extract any purposive meaning691 but also employs a verb 
of the group of affection verbs that all trigger la, regardless of whether the marked argument is 
craved, loved, cared, hated, feared, etc. Perhaps this was included by Zha lu because the verb 
sred pa in the translation of Sanskritic grammatical sources is the translational equivalent of 
the Sanskrit verbal root ruc (‘to please’),692  and the semantic field of ruc belongs to the 
Sanskritic prototypical fourth case function sampradāna in Pāṇini and Kātantra.693 From a 
Tibetan linguistic point of view,  I argue that Zha lu’s classifications of la fall short; they are 
the result of the objectivist focus which applies a wrong semantic construal of scenarios in the 
sample phrases and associates this construal with the morpheme la. Apart from the auxiliary 
constructions ched du and phyir du, Zha lu omits any samples for du as well as any 
exemplification of the fourth case usage of na.  
Pra ti’s list is somehow reverse to Zha lu’s selection, since it includes mainly phrases with the 
morpheme du and its allomorphs as well as an example for na, while la is omitted. Following 
this list, however, he does note that “in all [examples] the letter la can be aptly applied [as 
well].”694 The evaluation of this concise statement would require further investigation, but even 
if la may be substituted in all the examples for either du or na, the question remains whether 
the substituted la would still expresses the same type of information, or whether it would alter 
the sentence’s meaning. Like in Zha lu’s list, all the clauses allow for a purposive or beneficiary 
reading in a semantic construal of the situations referred to in the phrases, but there are also 
clearly instances which may be classified differently as well. In his example rgyan du gser 
brdungs (‘to cast gold for/into ornaments’), rgyan as the goal of the action may be interpreted 
as the purpose of the casting (‘for ornaments’) but equally qualifies as an instance of the 
transformative function specific to du (‘into ornaments’). This double value of rgyan 
(‘ornament’) obviously results from its status of being the result of the action, which directly 
                                                          
690 Cf. e.g. Zha lu’s example bram ze la gzan byin, if we add a purposive syntactic form: 
 a ma’i ched du bram ze la gzan byin ‘food was given to the brahmin for [his] mother’ 
Although the served need or action’s purpose is clearly not that of the Brahmin but that of the mother, the case 
marking pattern does not change, which reveals that la does not encode purposive information. 
691 In view of the tradition, two options may be offered: 
1) The purpose or need is that of the agent, but not that of the marked object (cf. NGg on the fourth case, 
infra 287f.) 
2) The craving is favorable for the attainment of food, that is to say not for the marked argument, but an 
implied action connected to the marked argument (cf. infra 294f.). 
692 Cf. e.g. K 2.4.10 in HSGLT 2, 359. 
693 Cf. infra 272f. 
694 […] thams cad la la yig sbyor rung ba […] (Pra ti 2013A, 197) 
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relates to both functions. As will be evident also from the GC, examples of the fourth case in 
Si tu’s list bear the same classificatory complication.695 
Most interesting is Pra ti’s only example for the morpheme na, namely tshogs na mang ja bskol 
(‘offering tea is to be cooked in/among the community’). From the lexical meanings of the 
words mang ja (‘offering tea’), bskol (‘is to be cooked’) as well as tshogs (‘the community,’ 
‘the gathering’), it is clear that this sentence refers to the common practice of the preparation 
of tea, which is usually offered during certain religious as well as secular gatherings of 
communities or people which may be identified as those favored or served in this entire 
scenario. Yet, tshogs na expresses much more the information ‘in/within/among the 
community,’ perhaps even temporally ‘during the gathering,’ if tshogs na is understood more 
freely in terms of tshogs pa na. Since na does not express purposive meaning but has a very 
distinctive locative function and therefore is difficult to exemplify, the choice of a phrase with 
a readily comprehensive purposive meaning when envisaging the situation at hand might have 
been Pra ti’s strategy to circumvent this issue and establish the fourth case status of this 
morpheme. In any case, this example is yet another genuine instance of the objectivist focus 
triggered by the need to find representative examples for the established taxonomy of the fourth 
case. 
The fact that the locative marker na in the context of the fourth case was the most troublesome 
of the la don morphemes to the grammarians is even more evident from Rnam gling’s only 
example, namely ’tshang rgya ’dod na chos gyis (‘If [you] want to become enlightened, practice 
Dharma!’).696 Although he chose a common and established type of grammatical construction, 
it goes without saying that the morpheme na in this clause does definitely not express any 
purposive or beneficiary meaning, although it may still be agreed that serving the wish to 
become enlightened is a purpose of Dharma practice. Again, the strategy was to focus on a 
semantic interpretation of the underlying scenario as such rather than the sentence-specific 
representation of it (= objectivist focus), in this case with the result of an erroneous 
classification. 
Even though the conception of the fourth case function as the purpose of the action is highly 
distinct and even represents a linguistically significant category in WT, the overall picture of 
the fourth case thus far presented reveals that there were noteworthy differences as to the type 
of grammatical constructions classified as fourth case. Moreover, within the traditional 
                                                          
695 Cf. infra 300ff. 
696 Cf. Rnam gling 2013, 70. 
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taxonomy and against the backdrop of Tibetan syntax, many of the sample phrases more 
accurately qualify as the second case las su bya ba. Finally, the morpheme na caused substantial 
difficulties due to its clear non-purposive, locative functioning in WT, which in the Sum rtags 
commentaries evoked various acrobatic strategies concerning its implementation into the fourth 
case.  
As to get a better understanding of the ways in which Tibetan grammarians have decided to 
adopt, adapt and adhere to the fourth case as dgos ched or ched du bya ba, the remaining 
historical survey will now address the relation between the Tibetan fourth case and the 
conception of the fourth case suffix in the Sanskritic tradition. 
10.1.1 The Development of the Tibetan Fourth Case out of Sanskritic Grammar 
10.1.1.1 On the Sanskritic Conception of the Fourth Case suffix  
In most basic terms, the Sanskritic kāraka-function sampradāna697 represents the prototypical 
trigger of the fourth case suffix in Sanskritic grammatical sources.698 The Pāṇinian definition 
of sampradāna is that of  
 P 1.4.32 karmaṇā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam, “Someone, whom [the agent] 
 approaches through the karman, is sampradāna.”699  
A classic example for this rule is upādhyāyāya gāṃ dadāti (‘he gives a cow to the teacher’).700 
The prototypical instantiation of this kāraka is naturally that of giving something to someone, 
since ‘to give’ (dā) is already part of the technical term itself. 701  Apart from the general 
characterization in P 1.4.32, the kāraka sampradāna covers a variety of additional meanings, 
such as the object of anger (P 1.4.37), whoever is pleased in connection with verbs signifying 
the meaning of ruc (‘to please;’ P 1.4.33), etc., which are listed in P 1.4.33-1.4.41, excluding P 
1.4.38, which is dedicated to karman.702 In contrast, Kātantra explains the term in a much less 
abstract way: 
                                                          
697 samyak pradīyate asmai “He to whom something is properly given.” (Sharma 1990, 242)  
698 Cf. P 1.4.32, C 2.1.73, K 2.4.10/19. 
699 Cf. Sharma 1990, 242: “Someone, whom [an agent] intends as a goal of the object;” Joshi and Roodbergen 
(1995, 103) translate: “[the item] which one has in view through the karman [is called] sampradāna [when it 
becomes instrumental in bringing about an action].” On sampradāna’s definition in P 1.4.32, cf. also Cardona 
1974, 232. 
700 Transl. Sharma 1990, 242. 
701 Sampradāna is commonly recognized as an etymologically significant term (anvartha), that is to say the term 
itself already indicates the meaning represented by the grammatical category (cf. Sharma 1990, 243). 
702 Cf. Sharma 1990, 242ff. 
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 K 2.4.10 yasmai ditsā rocate dhārayate vā tat sampradānam “The one to whom one 
 wants  to give, [who] is pleased or [to whom] one owes is sampradānam.”703 
This definition merges the definitions of kāraka in P 1.4.32, 1.4.33 and 1.4.35 into a single rule 
and omits a more general or abstract definition such as P 1.4.32. It is important to remember 
that sampradāna is only the prototypical use of the Sanskrit fourth case suffix, the latter for 
which Pāṇini lists a total of seven different functions (P 2.3.12-17 and P 2.3.73), Kātantra lists 
six (K 2.4.19, 24-28), whereas Cāndra defines eleven triggers (C 2.1.64, C 2.1.72-80, C 2.1.97). 
Altogether, the Sanskritic fourth case suffix comprises a whole set of different uses. Even 
though the Sanskritic prototypical fourth case function sampradāna survived in Tibetan 
grammar in the form of (yang dag par rab tu) sbyin pa, the main Tibetan labels of dgos ched 
and ched du bya ba are neither a direct translation of the Sanskritic term, nor do they directly 
reflect the quoted Sanskritic explanations of this kāraka. Thus, the transition from the Sanskritic 
to the Tibetan conception of the prototypical fourth case function deserves closer scrutiny. 
The Tibetan canonical translations of all three Sanskritic grammars 704  as well as Si tu’s 
commentary on Cāndra705 have rendered Sanskrit sampradāna more literally as yang dag par 
rab tu sbyin pa.706 Furthermore, Pāṇini’s definition of sampradāna in P 1.4.33-41 (excluding 
P 1.4.38) as well as the one of Kātantra in K 2.4.10 have associated several concrete semantic 
fields with this kāraka, but without explicitly mentioning any purposive function. The 
introduction of the standard Tibetan nomenclature dgos ched/ched du bya ba is historically 
much more likely connected to Sanskrit tādarthya (‘for the sake of that’),707 which is a separate 
fourth case trigger in K 2.4.27 and C 2.1.79: 
 K 2.4.27 tādarthye “If [there is the meaning] for the sake of which, [a fourth case suffix 
 occurs].” 
 C 2.1.79 tādarthye “id.” 
 Example in the Vr̥tti of both grammars: yūpāya dāru ‘wood for the sacrificial post.’708 
The rule of tādarthya as a separate fourth case trigger in Cāndra and Kātantra is an amalgam 
of at least two rules in Pāṇini’s grammar, and the latter source has no direct counterpart: 
                                                          
703 Cf. Liebich 1919, 43: ‘Dem man geben will (schenkt), gefällt oder schuldet, der (heißt) Saṃpradāna.’ 
704 Cf. HSGLT 1, CG 1 (Cāndra), CG 10 (Kātantra) and CG 46 (Pāṇini). 
705 Cf. Si tu 2.42.5. 
706 Cf. HSGLT 2, Appendix C. 
707 Cf. also ibid., 217. 
708 Cf. Liebich 1919, 46; Liebich 1918, 109. 
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1) Pāṇini attributed the meaning of tādarthya to the fourth case suffix only in the section on 
samāsa (‘compounds’), where in P 2.1.36 he states that a word form which ends in a fourth 
case may be combined into a tatpuruṣa in connection with a word form to denote tadartha (‘a 
thing for that’),709 for example: 
 yupāya dāru → yūpadāru (‘wood for the sacrificial post’) 
This meaning of the caturthī was not included in Aṣṭādhyāyī’s section on vibhakti.710 However, 
already Kātyāyana in his first Vārttika on P 2.3.13 (caturthī sampradāne ‘If there is a 
sampradāna, a fourth [case suffix occurs].’) has proposed to add the form tādarthye (‘if there 
is a tādarthya’) as an additional trigger in this rule. 711  If we follow Patañjali and the 
grammatical tradition on his Bhāṣya 1 ad P  2.3.13, the main reason for this Vārttika is to 
account for instances like yupāya dāru, which uses a fourth case suffix but does not indicate a 
relation of kāraka, because the relation is that between two substantives, whereas a kāraka as 
an accomplisher of the action must be related to the action.712 Kaiyaṭa in the 11th century (?) 
further described tādarthya relations in terms of material cause and effect (kārya), as readily 
comprehensible from the example yupāya dāru. While Patañjali concluded in his Bhāṣya 14 on 
P 2.3.13 that the Vārttika’s addition of tādarthye in the section on vibhakti is unnecessary 
because P 2.1.36 already covers this use of the caturthī indirectly in the section on samāsa, 
Cāndra as well as Kātantra have both added a separate rule. Yet, examples such as yuddhāya 
saṃnahyate (‘he equips himself for battle’) in the Vr̥tti’s to both non-Pāṇinian grammars reveal 
that neither Patañjali’s point according to which instances such as yupāya dāru are only 
substantive relations nor Kaiyaṭa’s much later explanation of tādarthya in terms of a relation 
between material cause and effect have been followed in K 2.4.27 or C 2.1.79. 
2) Patañjali’s discussion of P 1.4.32 in Bhāṣyas 7ff. investigates Pāṇini’s definition of 
sampradāna, according to which a direct object (karman) is required through which the entity 
classified as sampradāna is approached.713 Pāṇini’s definition leads to the problem of how to 
explain intransitive uses of sampradāna in examples like śrāddhāya nigarhate (‘he speaks with 
disapproval of the śraddha ceremony’), yuddhāya saṃnahyate (‘he equips himself for battle’), 
or patye śete (‘she lies down for the husband’). Patañjali provides different solutions as to how 
                                                          
709 Kaiyaṭa derives tadartha from tasmā idam (‘a (thing) for that’) and tādarthya based on Patañjali (P 2.3.13, 
Bhāṣya 3) from tadarthasya bhāvaḥ (‘being a thing for that).’ For more information on the derivation of these 
technical terms, cf. particularly ft. 314 and 316 in Joshi and Roodbergen 1976, 108. 
710 Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1975, 110. 
711 Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1976, 107. 
712 Cf. ibid., 107ff. 
713 Cf. supra 272. 
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the rule P 1.4.32 may still account for such instances but without a satisfactory solution, since 
they are either revised by Patañjali himself or have been subjected to criticism by later 
commentators.714 The problematic character of these examples due to Pāṇini’s karman-centered 
definition might have further supported Cāndra’s and Kātantra’s addition of the tādarthya rule. 
This is also suggested by the fact that precisely these examples of Patañjali were outsourced 
from sampradāna in the Vr̥tti’s of Cāndra and Kātantra in which they are covered by tādarthya 
(‘purpose’). This conveniently solves the problem of the suffix’s intransitive use.715 
3) and 4) In addition to P 2.1.36 and the problematic examples discussed by Patañjali under P 
1.4.32, two more Pāṇinian rules in the vibhakti-section on the fourth case suffix probably were 
involved in Cāndra’s and Kātantra’s formation of the tādarthya-rule, namely P 2.3.14 and 15: 
 P 2.3.14 kriyārthopapadasya ca karmaṇi sthāninaḥ “[A fourth case suffix] also [occurs] 
 if [there is] a karman of a conjoined, [though] not expressed intended action.”  
 P 2.3.15 tumarthāc ca bhāvavacanāt “[A fourth case suffix] also [occurs] after an 
 action[-denoting] word form in the [same] meaning like [the affix] tumUN.”716  
Both are connected to a purposive meaning of the fourth case suffix. The former rule deals with 
sentences like edhebhyo vrajati (‘he is going in order to bring some firewood’),717 where no 
additional verb is explicitly mentioned but needs to be inferred from the meaning of the clause. 
A phrase like ‘to go for firewood’ results in ‘to go in order to bring firewood’ according to P 
2.3.14, where the action of bringing is the actual purpose or intention of the main action of 
going. P 2.3.15 then refers to nominalized word forms which express bhāva (‘the state of the 
action’ or ‘action per se’) and have a meaning equivalent to that of the infinitive (tumUN), e.g. 
pākāya vrajati (‘he is going in order to do the cooking’). P 2.3.14 was omitted in Kātantra as 
well as Cāndra, which suggests that they included it in tādarthya. Kātantra did add an 
equivalent rule for P 2.3.15 following the tādarthya rule,718 but Cāndra omitted this fourth case 
trigger as well. The relation of P 2.3.14-15 to the tādarthya condition in K 2.4.27 and C 2.1.79 
is more intricate compared to P 2.1.36 and Patañjali’s treatment of P 1.4.32, since the 
comparison of sample phrases in the commentarial literature does not reveal any direct 
                                                          
714 Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1995, 103ff. 
715 Cf. Liebich 1919, 46; Liebich 1918, 109. Note that Joshi and Roodbergen (1975, 110) do not see a tādarthya 
meaning in the phrase śrāddhāya nigarhate (‘he speaks with disapproval of the śraddha ceremony’). 
Nonetheless, the Cāndravr̥tti – not that of Kātantra – listed it under C 2.1.79 as an instance of tādarthya. 
716 For more information on these two rules, cf. Sharma 1995, 121ff. Also note that P 2.3.15 corresponds to K 
2.4.28. 
717 Transl. Sharma 1995, 121. 
718 Cf. K 2.4.28. 
276 
 
borrowings. However, Kātantra’s and Cāndra’s (partial) omission of these two Pāṇinian rules 
with a clear purposive meaning does corroborate a connection. 
The current investigation has demonstrated that the tādarthya trigger of the fourth case suffix 
in K 2.4.27 and C 2.1.79 as the most likely terminological antecedent of Tibetan dgos ched/ched 
du bya ba gathered together several purposive uses of the fourth case suffix that were more 
widely dispersed in the Aṣṭādhyāyī. Yet, is there any relation between sampradāna and 
tādarthya in view of the fact that Tibetan grammarians focused more on a purposive 
interpretation of their fourth case function? 
10.1.1.2 On the Relation of sampradāna and tādarthya in the Sanskritic Tradition 
A first, most obvious direction to follow would be that the technical term sampradāna in terms 
of samyak pradīyate asmai (‘he to whom something is properly given’) involves the category 
of tādarthya (‘for the sake of’) or at least a purposive connotation in general and somehow 
refers to a purposeful giving that is intended for the sake of the recipient. Thus, the term raises 
the question of how to understand its specification samyak (‘correctly,’ ‘properly,’ ‘in the right 
way’). A classical approach in the Sanskrit grammatical schools for explaining sampradāna is 
by means of the term’s prototypical domain ‘giving’ and the counterexample rajakasya vastraṃ 
dadāti (‘s/he gives clothes to the washerman’).719 Compare the following contrastation: 
 (a) rajakāya vastraṃ dadāti ‘S/he gives clothes to the washerman.’ (fourth case) 
 (b) rajakasya vastraṃ dadāti ‘S/he gives clothes to the washerman.’ (sixth case) 
Both clauses have the same basic meaning of someone giving clothes to the washerman. 
However, the difference is that in (a) the clothes are given away for good, whereas in (b) the 
clothes are expected to be returnd upon washing. Therefore, there must be an exchange of 
ownership involved in the proper giving (sampradāna), otherwise a sixth case suffix is triggered 
by the condition of śeṣa (P 2.3.50ff.).720 In his basic definition of sampradāna in Vākyapadīya 
3.7.129, Bhartr̥hari adds the further specifications that the giver must not be prohibited (by the 
recipient), or that the recipient requests the giving or that he gives his consent.721  
                                                          
719 Cf. Sharma 1990, 243; Liebich 1918, 108; CG 14, 109 – 355; the following comparison of the example’s 
variations is based on Sharma 1990, 243. 
720 Cf. ibid. 
721 V 3.7.129:  
 anirākaraṇāt kartus tyāgāṅgaṃ karmaṇepsitam/     preraṇānumatibhyāṃ ca labhate sampradānatām  
 “Was im Zusammenhang mit einer Hingabe durch ein Objekt erstrebt wird, ohne daß der Agens [vom 
 Empfänger] abgewiesen würde, und zu dem [der Empfänger] auffordert oder zustimmt, erhält die 
 Bezeichnung ‘Empfänger’ (sampradāna).”  (Sanskrit and transl. quoted from Rau 2002, 228).   
Cf. also Subramania 1971, 223: 
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The counterexample of rajakasya vastraṃ dadāti clearly reveals that the addition of samyak 
was first of all intended to account for the Sanskrit-specific syntactic feature that there are 
instances of giving without the fourth case suffix.722 The presented semantic analysis to explain 
this syntactic feature shows that a purposive interpretation was not suggested by these 
authoritative sources. While not mutually exclusive, the parameters of ownership, prohibition, 
request or consent do not automatically imply a purposive meaning. They do so only mediated 
through additional interpretation, if it is assumed, for example, that a change in ownership 
implies that the act of giving is for the sake or in favor of the recipient.  
Already the early Sanskritic tradition has discussed the relation between sampradāna and 
tādarthya, however less based on the etymological derivation of the kāraka than in view of 
Kātyāyana’s addition of tādarthye in his first Vārttika on P 2.3.13 (caturthī sampradāne ‘If 
there is a sampradāna, a fourth [case suffix occurs].’). Already Patañjali has provided the 
following objection in Bhāṣya 11 on P 2.3.13: 
 yadi tādarthya upasaṅkhyānaṃ kriyate nārthaḥ sampradānagrahaṇena. yo ’pi 
 hyupādhyāyāya gaurdīyata upādhyāyārthaḥ sa bhavati. tatra tādarthya ityeva siddham. 
“If (the word) tādarthye: ‘in (the sense of) being a thing for the sake of that’ is (added), 
 there is no point in mentioning (the word) sampradāne: ‘to convey the (sense of) 
 recipient’ (anymore). Because (we can say that) the cow which is given to the teacher 
 becomes a thing for the teacher. Therefore we can manage by just (saying) tādarthye.”723 
Since prototypical instances of sampradāna, such as upādhyāyāya gāṃ dadāti (‘he gives a cow 
to the teacher’), equally fall under the semantic condition of tādarthya, according to the 
opponent’s argument there is no longer a need for sampradāna. Patañjali immediately rejects 
this objection by stating that instances like chātrāya rucitam ‘it has pleased the student,’ which 
are not part of the semantic field of giving but belong to the domain of sampradāna by P 1.4.33, 
still require sampradāna as a separate fourth case trigger in P 2.3.13.724 This information 
demonstrates that certain semantic fields or verb frames defined by Pāṇini as sampradāna are 
certainly not regarded as allowing for a purposive meaning in Patañjali’s view.725 However, an 
                                                          
 “That factor in the act of giving which is sought to be reached by the thing given is called sampradāna 
 when he does not prohibit the giver, or requests him or gives his consent.” 
722 Cf. also Si tu’s discussion of the washerman example in his Cāndra commentary (Si tu 2.43.1). 
723 Sanskrit transliterated from Joshi and Roodbergen 1976, 41; transl. Joshi and Roodbergen 1976, 112. 
724 cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1976, 113. 
725 It has already been demonstrated how Zha lu has classified the Tibetan term sred pa (‘to crave for’) that is 
used as a translation of ruc in the grammatical context as a Tibetan fourth case dgos ched (cf. supra 269f.). He 
apparently followed the Sanskrit syntactic pattern of ruc, while contradicting or lacking awareness of the point 
that Sanskritic grammarians such as Patañjali did not attribute any purposive meaning to it.  
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overlap of tādarthya with sampradāna’s prototypical instances, i.e. the verb frame giving, was 
not refuted and thus indirectly accepted – willingly or not – by Patañjali,  the argument seems 
only that  tādarthya cannot cover the full range of sampradāna. Although Patañjali did not 
directly refute a purposive interpretation of the recipient in the action of giving in his response 
to the quoted objection, this does not necessarily imply that sampradāna as such involves a 
purposive aspect in terms of tādarthya. It may be only a subtle nuance, but I think Patañjali’s 
point in the objection is that the recipient of the action of giving allows for two semantic 
construals, sampradāna and tādarthya, and in that sense these two are different semantic 
categories in his conception. An important distinguishing parameter between the two is 
probably the mentioned difference that sampradāna as a kāraka represents an accomplisher of 
the action, whereas tādarthya only establishes a relation of one thing that is for the sake of 
another thing in examples such as yupāya dāru (‘wood for the sacrificial post’).726 
In any case, other Vaiyākaraṇas questioned much more openly the purposive interpretation of 
sampradāna’s generic domain ‘giving,’ for example Helārāja (10th century) 727  in his 
commentary to the already quoted Vākyapadīya 3.7.129: 
 dānakriyārthaṃ hi sampradānam, na tu dānakriyā tadarthā kārakāṇāṃ kriyārthatvāt 
 saṃpradānārthaṃ tu dīyamānaṃ karmeti vākyārthabhūtāyā dānakriyāyā 
 atādaryyāt[sic!] 728  tādarthyacaturthyā aprāptau tadarthaṃ sampradānasaṃjñā 
 nyāyyā. 
 “Therefore, the sampradāna is for the action of giving (dānakriyārthaṃ), but the action 
 of giving is not for [the kārakas], because the kārakas are for the action, nor has the 
 action of giving a meaning in the sense that the given karman is for the sampradāna, 
 because [the action of giving] is without purpose (atādaryyāt [sic!]). Therefore, when a 
 fourth case suffix [in the meaning of] tādarthya has not been triggered (~ aprāptau), the 
 technical term sampradāna (sampradānasaṃjñā) is correct.”729 
There is no need to address the details of this very technical discussion which requires detailed 
knowledge of the concept of kārakas. If we follow Subramania’s summary of the argument at 
hand,730 the underlying rationale originates with the idea that sampradāna is a relation of 
kāraka and as such an accomplisher of the action or, in Helārāja’s words, for the action 
                                                          
726 Cf. supra 274, as well as Joshi and Roodbergen 1976, 109. 
727 On Helārāja and his work, cf. Raja 1990, 194ff. 
728 I read atādarthyāt. 
729 Sanskrit transliterated from Subramania 1992, 525. 
730 Cf. ibid., 316f. and Subramania 1971, 223. 
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(kriyārtham). The category tādarthya, in contrast, indicates the opposite relation, that is to say 
the action is for something. In this sense, sampradāna as one constituent part in the 
accomplishment of the action cannot be tādarthya. And regarding the act of giving as the 
prototypical instance of sampradāna, it belongs to the domain of sampradāna but not to 
tādarthya according to the above understanding of Helārāja. Finally, the author concludes that 
a fourth case suffix in the meaning of sampradāna occurs in case there is no meaning of 
tādarthya at hand.  
The two above passages of Patañjali and Helārāja hopefully demonstrated that the relation of 
tādarthya and sampradāna evoked scholarly attention in the Sanskritic tradition and posed 
various problems within the conceptual framework of Sanskritic grammaticography. Both 
authors were rather critical and established different criteria of distinguishing between 
tādarthya and the kāraka function. Yet, at least Patañjali did not explicitly refute the argument 
that instances such as upādhyāyāya gāṃ dadāti (‘he gives a cow to the teacher,’) can be 
interpreted in that the cow is for the teacher.  
Turning to Kātantra and Cāndra, although they have not directly commented upon sampradāna 
as purposeful giving, the two grammars still feature noteworthy differences between the 
Sanskritic notions sampradāna and tādarthya. Perhaps the most crucial difference for the 
current context of the Tibetan fourth case is the fact that tādarthya represents a separate trigger 
for the fourth case in both the grammars of Cāndra and Kātantra, and it is definitely not a 
kāraka and consequently a non-prototypical use of the fourth case suffix that covers a different 
range of semantic fields compared to sampradāna. Compare the following examples for 
Kātantra’s sampradāna (K 2.4.10), which comprises the categories of giving, pleasing and 
owing, with that of tādarthya (K 2.4.27): 731 
sampradāna (K 2.4.10): 
 (1) brāhmaṇāya gāṃ dadāti ‘s/he gives a cow to the Brahmin’ 
 (2) Devadattāya rocate modakaḥ ‘Devadatta is pleased by/likes the sweet’ 
 (3) Viṣṇumitrāya gāṃ dhārayati ‘s/he owes Viśṇumitra a cow’ 
tādarthya (K 2.4.27): 
 (4) yūpāya dāru ‘wood for the sacrificial pillar’ 
                                                          
731 Examples are taken from Liebich 1919, 43f. 
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 (5) randhanāya sthālī ‘a pot for cooking’ 
 (6) yuddhāya saṃnahyate ‘he equips himself for battle’ 
 (7) patye śete ‘she lies down for the husband’ 
Note that Cāndra, in contrast to Kātantra, restricts sampradāna to its generic domain of giving 
and outsources the domains of owing and pleasing both to separate rules. 732  In view of 
Patañjali’s argument that sampradāna cannot be replaced by tādarthya only due to such 
additional domains covered by the kāraka, Cāndra’s outsourcing may open space to substitute 
tādarthya for sampradāna or even allow for a more purposive interpretation of the latter itself. 
Yet, Cāndra did not follow this direction, since it adds nonetheless the rule of tādarthya (C 
2.1.79) separately from sampradāna. Thus, whatever was the precise stance of the authors of 
Cāndra and Kātantra taken in their grammars, no relation between the two categories was 
suggested by them. 
In contrast to the above sources which were critical of the relation of sampradāna and tādarthya 
or at least did not suggest any equivalence of the two, there are also traces which suggest that 
there were Sanskritic conceptions of the fourth case that attributed a purposive meaning to 
sampradāna. 
Addressing first the historically earlier but also more problematic source, root text and 
commentary of the Smra ba kun are both unmistakable advocates of the fact that the kāraka 
sampradāna is a purposive category. In fact, already the short and concise root text refers to 
the kāraka sampradāna as ched: 
 […] las dang byed dang byed pa dang/     ched dang ’byung khungs ’brel pa dang/     
 gzhi dang […] 
 “[…] karman (las) and agency/instrument (byed pa) and purpose (ched) and 
 source/origin (’byung khungs), connection (’brel ba) and substratum (gzhi) and […]”733 
The commentary defines sampradāna as follows: 
 sbyin pa ni gang gi ched dang don dang dgos pa dang ’bras bu lta bu la’am/     gang la 
 mchod sbyin dang phyag ’tshal ba’i sa ste/     ’di ltar las dang byed pa’i ’bras bu ni bya 
 ba ste/     bya ba’i don ni ’dir yang dag par sbyin pa’o/ 
                                                          
732 Cf. C 2.1.73-75. 
733 CT 109 – 1701. 
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 “As for giving (sbyin pa), it is the semantic position (sa) of the sake (ched), 
 meaning/intent (don), need/purpose (dgos pa) and result (’bras bu) of something, or [the 
 semantic position of] offering (mchod sbyin) and paying homage (phyag ’tshal ba) to 
 something. In that manner, the result of karman (las) and agency/instrument (byed pa) 
 is the action, whereas the meaning/intent of the action (bya ba’i don) here is 
 sampradāna (yang dag par sbyin pa).”734 
Thus, (yang dag par) sbyin pa has been defined as covering the semantic positions of ched, 
dgos pa, don, ’bras bu, mchod sbyin and phyag ’tshal ba. The final and overall definition of 
sampradāna at the end of this quotation suggests that all these semantic categories may be 
subsumed under the general meaning of the action’s meaning, intent or purpose (bya ba’i don). 
If the commentary that uses sbyin pa as the kāraka’s designation is read against the backdrop 
of the root text’s ched, the two categories were thus used interchangeably.  
A similar and most likely historically connected definition of the fourth case will be 
encountered in the NGg, where the two categories of phyag ’tshal ba and mchod sbyin will be 
discussed in more detail, demonstrating that the former can be directly traced back to Sanskritic 
grammatical sources as a separate fourth case trigger apart from sampradāna while the latter’s 
interpretation is more difficult. All the remaining notions of ched, dgos pa, don and ’bras bu 
are different renditions of the purposive function, with ’bras bu as the only unusual term which 
may perhaps be conceptually related to Kaiyaṭa’s idea that the purposive function tādarthya 
indicates a relation between material cause and effect.735 While a clear instance of a purposive 
interpretation of the technical term sampradāna itself is apparent, the Sanskritic origin of root 
text and commentary remains unclear and questionable. Whatever the sources’ historical status, 
in the Sanskritic tradition the above definition would certainly be an unorthodox interpretation 
of sampradāna, most notably because the inclusion of phyag ’tshal ba (namas, ‘to pay 
homage’) expands the domain of the kāraka to a use which was not seen as part of it in 
Sanskritic grammar. Perhaps less problematic but still noteworthy, the idea of sampradāna as 
the meaning, intent or purpose of the action (bya ba’i don) directly contradicts Helārāja’s 
quoted argument that distinguishes between sampradāna and tādarthya precisely on the ground 
that the kāraka is for the action, not the other way around.736 
                                                          
734 CT 109 – 1712.  
735 Cf. supra 274. 
736 Cf. supra 278. 
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The second trace that indicates a purposive understanding of sampradāna in Sanskritic 
grammar is the Tibetan translation of the Sārasvataprakriyā, 737  a commentary to the 
Sārasvatavyākaraṇa(sūtra),738  both attributed to Anubhūti (13th-14th century). 739  The two 
sources are known to have flourished south of the Himalaya and are preserved in Sanskrit as 
well as in the bstan ’gyur in the form of a translation from the 17th century.740 In the section on 
kārakas (byed pa can gyi rab tu byed pa) under sūtra 17.4,741 the Tibetan translation of the 
Sārasvataprakriyā adds a Sanskrit quotation followed by a short summary of the definition of 
kārakas and their respective case suffixes. Regarding sampradāna, the Tibetan text reads as 
follows: 
 smras pa/     karta karma tsa ka ra ṇaṃ saṃ pra dā naṃ ta thai ba tsa/     a pā dā nā dhi 
 ka ra ṇa mi tyā hu kā ra kā ni ṣaṭ/     byed pa po dang las dang byed pa dang/     yang 
 dag rab tu sbyin dang de bzhin ’di/     nges par sbyin dang lhag par byed pa dang/      
 byed can drug po ’dir ni bshad par bya/ […] yang dag par rab tu sbyin pa ste de’i ched 
 du yod nges dang ’grub nges pa’i don la bzhi pa/ 
 “It is said (smras pa ?): ‘kartā karma ca karaṇaṃ sampradānaṃ tathaiva ca, 
 apādānādhikaraṇam ityāhuḥ kārakāṇi ṣaṭ.’ Agent, karman, instrument, sampradāna 
 and likewise apādāna (nges par sbyin) and adhikaraṇa (lhag par byed pa) are the six 
 kārakas to be explained here. […] The fourth [case suffix occurs] when [there is] the 
 meaning of sampradāna (yang dag par rab tu sbyin pa), i.e. that [something/some 
 action (?)] is set to take place (yod nges) or to be accomplished (’grub nges) for the sake 
 of that [which is marked] (de’i ched du).”742 
Thus, while the passage clearly and directly identifies the category of sampradāna with de’i 
ched du (‘for the sake of that,’ ~ tādarthya), the text does not add any further information on 
this point in the context of the detailed discussion of the kārakas, and so it remains unclear how 
precisely this relation between sampradāna and de’i ched du has been established.  
                                                          
737 Cf. HSGLT 1, CG 44; M.S. Joshi 2011. 
738 Cf. HSGLT 1, CG 31 and 43. 
739 Cf. Scharfe 1977, 189. For the controversy sourrounding the authorship of the sūtrapāṭha, cf. M.S. Joshi 
2011, chapter 3. Some sources name Narendrācārya as the root text’s author. Narendrācārya’s dates seem to be 
uncertain, but if he was the author, the dates of the Sārasvatasūtra’s could be moved perhaps even to the 10th 
cent. (cf. M.S. Joshi 2011, 96). 
740 Cf. HSGLT 1, 138ff. 
741 I have consulted two editions of the Sanskrit text, M.S. Joshi 2011 and Nava Kishora Kara 1967. I relied on 
the latter edition for the numbering of the sūtras. In M.S. Joshi’s edition, the following quotation is found under 
sūtra 240. 
742 CT 110 – 125f. 
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Yet, upon comparing the Tibetan version with the two Sanskrit versions available to me, it has 
become evident that the entire passage on the summary of kārakas and their case affixes which 
starts with smras pa is in fact not contained in the Sārasvataprakriyā and seems to be an 
addition to CG 44. Also the passage which follows this summary provides a short exposition of 
four types of karman that are listed in the consulted Sanskrit versions of the Sārasvataprakriyā, 
yet without this exposition. After a preliminary comparison with the Candrakīrti’s Subodhikā 
commentary (16th century),743 this text includes the same quotation ‘kartā karma ca karaṇaṃ 
sampradānaṃ tathaiva ca, apādānādhikaraṇe744 ityāhuḥ kārakāṇi ṣaṭ’ under sūtra 17.4, but it 
leaves out the subsequent summary of kārakas found in CG 44.745 Unfortunately, Candrakīrti 
also does not provide any reference to the given quotation. However, in his Subodhikā, he goes 
on to discuss the four types of karman despite their descriptions being only loosely connected 
to those found in CG 44. Given these observations, there is the possibility that the translators 
of CG 44 may have consulted this additional commentary (or another). Whatever was in fact 
the case, the identical Sanskrit quotation in Subodhikā may suggest that also the quoted 
definition of sampradāna in CG 44 was not just a Tibetan addition but goes back to Sanskritic 
sources, although at this point this is mere speculation.  
A third noteworthy commentary of the Sārasvata school of Sanskrit grammar is the 
Sārasvataprasāda of Vāsudevabhaṭṭa (16th century). 746  Under Sārasvatasūtra 17.4, the 
Prasāda states the following concerning the notion of sampradāna, which in the 
Sārasvataprakriyā has already been explained by means of the paraphrase dānapātra (‘vessel 
of giving,’ sbyin pa’i snod, ~ RECIPIENT): 
 dānapātre ityetadvyākhyāṃ kurute sampradānakārake iti. dānaṃ nāma 
 pūjānugrahakāmanayā svasvatvaparityāgena parasvatvāpādanaṃ tasya pātram. 
 “The utterance ‘when [there is] a dānapātra’ (dānapatre) is made in the sense of ‘when 
 [there is] the kāraka sampradāna.’ The so-called giving (dānaṃ nāma) is the removal 
 of another’s ownership through the renunciation of one’s own ownership with respect 
 and favor in mind (pūjānugrahakāmanayā). The vessel (pārtra) of that [is the 
 dānapātra].”747 
                                                          
743 For general information on this commentary, cf. M.S. Joshi 2011, 176. The Sanskrit text of this commentary 
is contained in Nava Kishora Kara 1967. 
744 CG 44 reads apādānādhikaraṇam 
745 Cf. Nava Kishora Kara 1967, 211. 
746 The Sanskrit text of this source is included in Nava Kishora Kara 1967. 
747 Sanskrit transliterated from Nava Kishora Kara 1967, 215. 
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The commentary explains that sampradāna involves a change of ownership constituted by the 
renunciation of the giver’s ownership, through which the gift then belongs to the recipient 
without any ownership of another person than the recipient itself. While this is very much in 
line with what was already discussed above, 748  this text does add the specifications pūjā 
(‘worship,’ ‘honour,’ ‘respect’) and anugrahaka (‘kind,’ ‘favoring,’ facilitating,’ ‘gracious’). 
These terms are neither direct equivalents of the Tibetan notion de’i ched du in 
Sārasvataprakriyā’s Tibetan translation (CG 44), nor of the Tibetan fourth case function dgos 
ched/ched du bya ba in general, but nevertheless the leap to a purposive interpretation of the 
kāraka is not far from there. It should be noted at this point that both characteristics (pūjā and 
anugrahaka) are well in line with the meaning of dāna as not just a neutral giving but more 
specifically in the sense of a donation (to monks, beggars, etc.) that includes a strong aspect of 
charity, and in fact dāna is the common term for donations also in the Buddhist context. If the 
category ‘giving’ (sampradāna) is therefore understood more in this sense, it automatically 
comes closer to a purposive or favoring meaning. This is especially noteworthy also for the 
Tibetan context, in which donation is an important issue in Buddhist theory and practice. It 
would thus be only natural to understand donation as the most genuine form of giving.  
A final remark on the Sārasvatavyākaraṇa concerns the fact that, since its root text and the 
quoted commentaries of the Sārasvata school of grammar have arisen much later than the 
earlier Tibetan sources NGg and GNT, they cannot have been direct inspirational sources in the 
early development of the Tibetan fourth case. However, as established and well-known 
Sanskritic grammars, they attest that some Sanskritic conceptions have allowed room for a more 
purposive interpretation of sampradāna, and it is possible that such understandings have 
already circulated before the time of the Sārasvata grammar. And if the quoted passages from 
Smra ba kun (CG 16 and 17) indeed are of Sanskritic origin, a genuine purposive interpretation 
of the term sampradāna existed in the Sanskritic tradition before Sārasvata. 
The investigation in this section has hopefully demonstrated that the Sanskritic tradition offered 
a multifaceted discourse with various conceptions of sampradāna and the functioning of the 
fourth case suffix in general. The different Sanskritic discussions on the semantics of 
sampradāna, be it the focus on the change of ownership, the recipient’s consent or the favoring 
and respecting of the recipient, have not necessarily aimed at a purposive reading. Some sources 
have even stated their critique of a purposive understanding in terms of tādarthya, but none of 
the defined characteristics are mutually exclusive with such an understanding, the category of 
                                                          
748 Cf. supra 276f. 
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anugrahaka in the Sārasvataprasāda even coming close to it. Additionally, the Smra ba kun 
could have been a concrete source of inspiration for a purposive reinterpretation of sampradāna, 
although the history of this text still remains unresolved. Whatever the historical and linguistic 
reasons involved in the transition from sampradāna as the Sanskritic prototypical fourth case 
function to Tibetan dgos ched, the presented range of conceptions has hopefully demonstrated 
that the idea of a purposive meaning was certainly not a novelty, but that it must have been 
prepared in the Sanskritic tradition, either indirectly through the existence of a recurrent 
discourse on the relation between sampradāna and tādarthya, or it was more directly inspired 
by conceptions as existent in grammars such as the Smra ba kun or the Sārasvata.  
Turning next to Tibetan conceptions of the fourth case themselves, the early Tibetan linguistic 
sources offer their own perspective on moving away from conventional sampradāna and 
towards a purposive interpretation of the fourth case. 
10.1.2 Two Early Tibetan Conceptions of the Fourth Case in Gnas brgyad ’grel pa and Sgra’i 
rnam par dbye ba bstan pa 
The two early Tibetan sources NGg and GNT provided additional information regarding the 
concepts at hand but only mention a selection of a few, fairly specific uses: 
NGg:  
 gang la dgos ched dam/     don nam gang la mchod sbyin dang phyag ’tshal ba […] 
 “[This fourth case form expresses] a purpose (dgos ched) or intent (~ don) for 
 someone/-thing or an offering (mchod sbyin) or homage to someone/-thing (phyag ’thsal 
 ba) [...].”749 
GNT:  
 de yang bzhi pa gang gis [sic!]750 phyir zhes pa ni sbyin pa dang/     phyag ’tshal ba 
 dang/     ched gyis [sic!]751 bstan pa nyid yin […] 
 “Furthermore, the fourth [case], ‘for the sake of someone/-thing’, is the indication of 
 the semantic domains giving (sbyin pa), paying homage (phyag ’tshal ba) and purpose 
 (ched) […].”752 
                                                          
749 NGg CT 115 – 432. 
750 I read gi. 
751 I read gyi. 
752 GNT CT 115 – 454. Note that although the reading of ched gyis bstan pa is not impossible, I read ched gyi sa 
bstan pa, since this is the common construction also used during the remaining cases in GNT. 
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NGg provides four (dgos ched, don, mchod sbyin and phyag ’tshal ba) and GNT three notions 
(sbyin pa, phyag ’tshal ba and ched) to describe the meaning of the fourth case. Both 
demonstrate a conceptual affinity to the definition of sbyin pa in the Smra ba kun la ’jug pa’i 
sgra’i bstan bcos quoted above, NGg even to the extent that it could be a partial, slightly altered 
and condensed paraphrase.753 The presented lists will shortly be discussed in the following: 
1) NGg’s notions dgos ched (‘sake,’ ‘purpose’) and don (artha, ‘meaning,’ ‘purpose,’ ‘intent’) 
are closely connected semantically and thus most likely to be understood as one and the same 
category, since they are synonymous in terms of their lexical value ‘purpose’754 and probably 
related to Sanskritic tādarthya (‘for the sake of that’). Don (‘meaning, purpose’) is 
etymologically even closer to the Sanskrit term than dgos ched, and it represents the default 
translation of Sanskrit artha in Tibetan literature. Moreover, NGg’s category of ched or don 
also figures in GNT in the form of ched. 
2) The Sanskrit sampradāna has survived in the GNT in the form of the additional category 
sbyin pa (‘giving’), and following the quoted passage of NGg it is also mentioned as a fourth 
case function. Moreover, in the Sum rtags tradition up to Si tu, sbyin pa frequently figures as 
an interchangeable label for dgos ched/ched du bya ba, less because of theoretical reasons and 
more due to the term’s appearance in TKJ 22.4. 
3) Interestingly and perhaps also relating to the Smra ba kun la ’jug pa’i sgra’i bstan bcos, both 
treatises list phyag ’tshal ba (‘to pay homage,’ ‘to prostrate’) as a meaning of the fourth case, 
which has remained so even up to the time of Si tu, who then explicated his strong critique 
against this classification in the Tibetan context.755 This function unambiguously goes back to 
the Sanskritic grammatical classification of namas, for which phyag ’tshal ba is the standard 
translational equivalent in WT. In Sanskrit, namas triggers a fourth case suffix: 
 namo devebhyaḥ ‘our obeisance to the gods’756 
Pāṇini (P 2.3.16), Cāndra (C 2.1.78) and Kātantra (K 2.4.26) each include namas in a separate 
rule which covers several word forms that trigger a fourth case suffix without being an instance 
                                                          
753 Smra ba kun la ’jug pa’i sgra’i bstan bcos: 
 sbyin pa ni gang gi ched dang don dang dgos pa dang ’bras bu lta bu la’am/     gang la mchod sbyin 
 dang phyag ’tshal ba’i sa ste/     ’di ltar las dang byed pa’i ’bras bu ni bya ba ste/     bya ba’i don ni 
 ’dir yang dag par sbyin pa’o/ (CT 109 – 1712; my emphasis) 
NGg: 
 gang la dgos ched dam/     don nam gang la mchod sbyin dang phyag ’tshal ba […] (NGg CT 115 – 
 432) 
754 Negi (1995, 1222), for example, gives don du (‘for the sake of’) as a synonym of ched du (‘for the sake of’). 
755 Cf. chapter 10.2.2. 
756 Example taken from Sharma 1995, 124. 
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of sampradāna. Thus, namas neither belongs to the kārakas nor is it prototypical, but it is an 
additional or exceptional use of the fourth case suffix in Sanskrit. The classification of namas 
as a fourth case suffix has been retained and adopted by the early Tibetan grammarians. 
4) Finally, the category of mchod sbyin (‘offering’) in NGg as well as in the Smra ba kun must 
either be an alternative rendition of the category phyag ’tshal ba or an unusual reference to the 
semantic field of giving (sbyin pa), however the treatises themselves provide no clear 
information on this question. If the use of the word gang (‘someone/-thing’) in NGg’s quotation 
is an indication how to distinguish between the listed categories, then the structure of the 
sentence suggests that mchod sbyin forms a group with phyag ’tshal ba as much as dgos ched 
and don. Also the version in Smra ba kun gives the impression that mchod sbyin and phyag 
’tshal ba belong to one category. On the contrary, mchod sbyin’s lexical value may also indicate 
a reference to the RECIPIENT role and thus be connected to the category of (yang dag par rab 
tu) sbyin pa/sampradāna.  
In relation to the four semantic categories which describe the meaning of the fourth case, NGg 
introduces an unusual theory thus far unattested elsewhere:757 
 gang la dgos ched dam/     don nam gang la mchod sbyin dang phyag ’tshal bas kha cig 
 yul de nyid kyi ched du sbyor ba yang yod/     kha cig mchod sbyin gyi yul du sbyor ba 
 yang yod de/     don gyis na byed pa po’i ched yin par sbyar bar bya ste/ 
 “Since [the fourth case expresses] a purpose (dgos ched) or intent (~ don) for someone/-
 thing or an offering (mchod sbyin) or homage to someone/-thing (phyag ’thsal ba), there 
 are some applications [of the fourth case in the sense of being] for the sake of that very 
 locus/domain itself (kha cig yul de nyid du sbyor ba) as well as some applications [of 
 the fourth case] as the locus/domain of offering (kha cig mchod sbyin gyi yul du sbyor 
 ba) that are actually to be applied in the sense of being for the sake of the agent.”758 
The term sbyor ba (‘application’) in this passage requires further scrutiny regarding the object 
of application, that is to say whether it refers to the application of the fourth case or the 
application of the action to the entity representing the fourth case. It may also be possible that 
sbyor ba more generally refers to the combination of word forms and thus has the meaning of  
                                                          
757 In the following, the entire passage is quoted in order to provide a more representative picture of the treatise, 
including the already quoted portion about the fourth case meanings. 
758 NGg CT 115 – 432f. 
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‘grammatical construction.’ In the quotation above, the option that it means ‘the application of 
the fourth case’ has been tentatively favored. 
In the current context, it suffices to note that NGg distinguishes between instances of the fourth 
case in which the argument in the fourth case itself represents the purpose, and those instances 
in which the marked argument becomes the locus/domain of the action of offering (~ 
RECIPIENT), however without being the purpose which is to be the agent. NGg provides two 
illustrations of this latter type for the sake of clarification: 
 de’i phyir bzhi pa sbyin pa dang phyag ’tshal ba zhes bya ba/     shing gi phyir chu ’dren 
 pa yang shing nyid rgyas pa dang/     smin pa’i phyir sbyor yang/     don gyis chu ’dren 
 pa’i byed pa po’i ched yin par ’gyur ba dang/     mchod rten la phyag ’tshal ba yang/     
 mchod rten nyid phyag gi yul lam gnas su sbyar yang don gyis phyag ’tshal ba’i ched 
 yin par ’gyur ba […] 
“Therefore, the fourth [case] called ‘giving and homage’ (sbyin pa dang phyag ’tshal 
 ba) [in] ’to pull/bring water for the sake of the tree’ (shing gi phyir chu ’dren pa) is an 
 application [in the sense of being] for the sake of the growing and ripening of the tree 
 itself (shing nyid rgyas pa dang smin pa’i phyir sbyor).759 However, actually it is for the 
 sake of the agent of pulling/bringing water. And also [in] ‘to pay homage to the stupa’ 
(mchod rten la phyag ’tshal ba), although the stupa itself is to be applied as the locus or 
domain (mchod rten nyid phyag gi yul lam gnas su sbyar),760 it is actually for the sake 
of the homage […].”761 
It will be demonstrated below in Si tu’s lengthy critique of phyag ’tshal ba as a fourth case that 
he refused to accept NGg’s claim of an agent’s purpose. Regardless of the philological and 
theoretical details of the two quotations above, this entire section in the NGg clearly 
demonstrates that its author considered ched as the prevailing semantic parameter throughout 
the different categories of the fourth case proposed in the text (dgos ched, don, mchod sbyin, 
phyag ’tshal ba). This reading is derived from the explanation in NGg that among these four 
instances, some are for (ched) the marked object and some are for the agent, which is further 
illustrated by means of two examples, with the first presumably representing an instance of 
                                                          
759 Alternatively: ‘an application [of the action] for the sake of growing and ripening of the tree itself’ (?) 
760 Alternatively:  
 (1) ‘although [a fourth case] is to be applied to the very stupa, the locus or domain of homage’ (?) 
 (2) ‘although [an action] is to be applied to the very stupa, the locus or domain of homage’ (?) 
761 NGg CT 115 – 433. 
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sbyin pa, and the second an instance of phyag ’tshal ba. The author apparently saw – or perhaps 
construed – a purpose involved in all different uses of the fourth case he has initially outlined. 
An important point which should also be considered regards the purposive interpretation of 
phyag ’tshal ba. P 2.3.16, C 2.1.78 and K 2.4.26 all cover the use of the fourth case suffix in 
connection with namas and thus clearly belong to the class of upapadavibhakti, i.e. case 
suffixes triggered by another word form in the sentence but not by any semantic condition of a 
kāraka. The semantic background for this class of case attributions often remains unclear, and 
many of the upapadavibhaktis are therefore regarded as additional or even exceptional uses of 
the case suffixes. It is thus safe to assume that the connection of the semantic conditions 
sampradāna and tādarthya to namas as a merely syntactically triggered condition was not 
suggested by any orthodox view of Sanskritic grammar. Yet, if the Smra ba kun goes indeed 
back to a Sanskritic source, it would provide strong evidence that this was less a Tibetan 
reinterpretation than an adoption of Sanskritic grammatical knowledge. 
Furthermore, NGg’s theory of a purpose either for the agent or the object of giving and 
prostration reveals the objectivist focus also in this work. The grammatical structures in shing 
gi phyir chu ’dren pa do not allow for the derivation of a purpose for the agent of watering the 
tree, such an interpretation is merely an investigation of the scenario at hand completely 
disconnected from syntax and reflects merely the author’s understanding of the situation and 
its outcome. 
The GNT seems to have pursued a similar approach to that of NGg, although it initially 
maintains its proposed threefold subcategorization into sbyin pa, ched and phyag ’tshal ba more 
consistently, providing separate exemplifications for each:762 
 sbyin pa:   bram ze la zan byin ‘food was given to the brahmin’ 
 ched or rgyu mtshan:  zhing la chu grongs [sic!]763 zhes pa ni zhing gi phyir ram ched 
    du ’dren pa “’Prag/Bring water on the fields!’, that is to say that 
    water is pulled/brought (= irrigated) for the sake of the field.” 
    shing gi phyir ram ched du chu ’dren pa la sogs pa “‘to pull/bring 
    water for the sake of the tree,’ etc.” 
                                                          
762 The full list will not be provided and the following is restricted to a selection in order to illustrate their 
meaning. All examples are quoted from CT 115 – 454. 
763 I read drongs. 
290 
 
 phyag ’tshal ba: sangs rgyas la phyag ’thsal lo ‘[S/he] pays homage/prostrates 
    to the Buddha.’ 
As indicated in this list, GNT alternatively refers to the function of ched as rgyu mtshan 
(‘reason’), presumably in the sense of a final reason as expressed by the construction ’brel sgra 
+ phyir (‘in order to’). The selected examples demonstrate the three different meanings 
straightforward. Despite this initially clear separation of the functions, the author brakes with it 
in the context of his short summary at the end of the section on the fourth case:764 
 de ltar na bzhi pa ’di ni ched dam rgyu mtshan gtsor byas pa’i sbyin pa dang/     phyag 
 ’tshal ba kho na la blta bar bya lte/     de yang bslangs te/     shing la chu ni sbyin par 
 gyis zhes pa lta bu’i don yin no/ 
 “In such a manner, this fourth case should be regarded exclusively as a giving or as an 
 homage (phyag ’tshal ba), [both in] which [the idea of] purpose or reason prevails (ched 
 dam rgyu mtshan gtsor byas pa’i sbyin pa). [It] has the meaning such as [in] ‘give water 
 to the tree so that it can grow further!’ (de yang bslangs te shing la chu ni sbyin par 
 gyis ?)”765 
GNT directly explicates that ched (‘purpose’) or rgyu mtshan (‘reason’) is the dominant or 
prevailing (gtsor byas pa) feature at least for the category of sbyin pa. There arises the 
philological question as to whether the genitive attribute ched dam rgyu mtshan gtsor byas pa’i 
(‘[in] which [the idea of] purpose or reason prevails’) specifies only sbyin pa or also phyag 
’tshal ba. Against the backdrop of NGg as well as Smra ba kun la ’jug pa’i sgra’i bstan bcos, 
the more likely option seems that a purpose is also included in phyag ’thsal ba. Against the 
backdrop of the presented Sanskritic grammatical sources, phyag ’tshal ba may have also been 
regarded as an exceptional use to be separated from the prototypical function ched. In any case, 
it becomes evident from this final quotation that the author was not fully coherent in his initial 
distinction between the three subclasses sbyin pa, ched and phyag ’tshal ba and finally regarded 
ched as the most dominant, perhaps even overarching category. 
10.1.3 Note on the Term yul in the Context of the Fourth Case 
Before this historical survey is concluded and Si tu’s views are addressed, a final issue must be 
noted regarding the distinction of second and fourth case, namely the use of the grammatical 
                                                          
764 Note that these final summaries form a pattern at the end of every case’s presentation and are not an exception 
for the fourth case. 
765 CT 115 – 455. 
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term yul (‘locus,’ ‘domain,’ ‘focus’). This term already forms an integral part of the conceptual 
foundation of the second case, and in both the NGg and GNT it reappears in the context of the 
fourth case. The term was already encountered in NGg’s distinction into purposes of the agent 
(byed pa po) and the recipient (mchod sbyin gyi yul),766  and the following passage is an 
illustrative example of the term’s use under the fourth case in the GNT: 
 bzhi pa ’di la rgya gar gyi sgra sbyar na/     gcig dang/     gnyis dang mang po’i tshig 
 rnams te/     dang po ni manydzu badzra [sic!]767 ya zhes pa lta bu ming gi yi ge tha ma 
 bsrings la ya yis mtshan pas ’jam pa’i rdo rje la/     zhes bya ba la phyag ’tshal ba’i yul 
 du bzhag par grub ste/     de yang bye brag pa gcig tsam la phyag ’tshal ba’o/ 
“If [we] apply Sanskrit morphology to this fourth [case], then there are the singular, dual 
 and plural forms: as for the first, for example ‘Mañjuvajrāya’, through the 
 prolongation of the final sound (yi ge tha ma) and the addition of ya, ‘for Mañjuvajra’ 
is established as the locus/domain of homage (phyag ’tshal ba’i yul). This is the homage 
 for only a single entity (bye brag pa). [...]”768  
The author chose a classic Buddhist example for his illustration of the Sanskrit fourth case 
suffix’s morphology, namely the homage to a deity. According to this passage, the fourth case 
in this example indicates the locus/domain of homage (phyag ’tshal ba’i yul). I have not been 
able to trace this notion back to any Sanskritic source, however Subba Rao makes the general 
mention that viṣayatvam (‘objecthood’) occurs as a fourth case function in the Sanskritic 
tradition.769 Neither the GNT nor the NGg indicate any relation to the notion of yul/gzhi in their 
respective expositions of the second case. Without more knowledge about the conceptual roots 
of yul in the context of the fourth case, the use of yul in these quotations appears loose and 
unsystematic, nothing but a general characterization which lacks any theoretical foundation 
such as that encountered in the context of the Tibetan second case in terms of yul du byas pa 
and gzhir byas pa. 
10.1.4 Résumé of the Tibetan Fourth Case pre-Si tu 
The Tibetan fourth case is commonly known as dgos ched or ched du bya ba and represents a 
purpose of the action. It is another case next to the second case which is marked by the 
morphological category la don. Although the category of purpose has a multifaceted 
                                                          
766 Cf. supra 287. 
767 I read badzrā. 
768 CT 115 – 455. 
769 Cf. Subba Rao 1969, 43. 
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significance in WT as well as in modern linguistics, the classification of grammatical 
constructions as a fourth case in WT was more based on the adoption of selected instances from 
Sanskritic role models that were deemed purposive. As a result, many of the examples classified 
as fourth cases – particularly the major ones – are not unproblematic and were more likely 
classified as purposive instances due to the application of unrepresentative semantic construals 
of the underlying scenarios to the grammatical constructions. This is a clear indication for the 
fact that Tibetan grammarians in their analyses did not primarily focus on Tibetan 
morphosyntax but rather on the different instances, situations or scenarios as such in their 
analysis. 
The Tibetan fourth case function ched du bya ba has clear and distinct purposive meaning and 
is not directly adopted from the Sanskritic prototypical fourth case function, i.e. sampradāna 
(yang dag par rab tu sbyin pa). Etymologically, it is more closely connected to the secondary 
trigger of the fourth case suffix named tādarthya in Cāndra and Kātantra. The above survey 
has discussed the fourth case suffix’s purposive uses in P 2.1.36 and 2.3.14-15, the 
supplementation of the tādarthya function in Cāndra and Kātantra, the existence of a Sanskritic 
discourse on the relation of sampradāna and tādarthya, the traces of a more purposive reading 
of sampradāna in the Sārasvatavyākaraṇa as well as Smra ba kun’s conception of an 
overarching purposive fourth case. Although the grammars of Pāṇini, Cāndra or Kātantra did 
not suggest any direct relation between the two categories, the discussion of the various theories 
surrounding sampradāna and tādarthya revealed that the Tibetan purposive reinterpretation of 
the category sampradāna was probably not an exclusively Tibetan development but has already 
been prepared in the Sanskritic grammar tradition. Additionally, NGg and GNT make clear that 
early Tibetan grammarians have focused on a small selection of meanings and uses of the 
Sanskrit fourth case suffix and combined them with the idea of a purpose prevailing throughout 
them. That the purposive aspect of the fourth case has surfaced already early in Tibetan 
grammar is further corroborated by the fact that the authors of MVY and the ’Jug pa’i sgra 
brgyad bstan pa tshig le’ur byas pa have decided to focus on phyir as the fourth case form.770  
Turning to the major conceptual framework of the fourth case adopted by Tibetan grammarians, 
the examples in GNT give a fairly representative account: 
 (1) bram ze la zan byin ‘food was given to the brahmin’ 
 (2) zhing/shing la chu drongs ‘Pull/Bring water on the fields/to the tree!’ 
                                                          
770 Cf. supra 265. 
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 (3) sangs rgyas la phyag ’thsal lo ‘[S/he] pays homage/prostrates to the Buddha.’ 
These three verb frames are the most dominant and thus the prototypical instantiations of the 
fourth case in the Tibetan tradition. All three can be traced back to the fourth case suffix in the 
Sanskritic tradition: (1) as a generic instance of sampradāna, (2) as an example for sampradāna 
in sources like the NV,771 and (3) as an instance of P 2.3.16, K 2.4.26 and C 2.1.78. An 
overarching purposive interpretation can only be maintained on an objectivist basis at least with 
regard to Tibetan syntax, treating these sentences as direct representations of phenomenal 
situations as understood by the author through Sanskritic role models. None of these 
grammatical constructions encode any purposive meaning, with the only exception of those 
versions that substitute ched or phyir for la. This list of major meanings and uses adopted from 
Sanskrit also clarifies why many grammars chose to focus on either phyir, ched or la as fourth 
case marker; while the former two are a direct indication of a purposive meaning as the 
overarching interpretation of the case’s meaning in Tibetan sources, la is the generic marker in 
the Tibetan grammatical constructions of the adopted uses of the Sanskrit fourth case suffix. 
10.2 The Fourth Case in the Great Commentary 
During Si tu’s times, dgos ches and ched du bya ba were the established designations of the 
fourth case, although sbyin pa survived at least in the Sum rtags commentarial literature on TKJ 
22.4 and thus still figured as a secondary label. Without considering the continuities and 
discontinuities of the two nomenclatures, both versions were fixed technical terms that could 
be used interchangeably.772 Si tu paraphrases TKJ 22.4 in the following way: 
 […] dang/     bzhi pa sbyin pa’i yul gyis mtshon nas ched du bya ba dang […] 
 “[…] and the fourth [case], being represented by the help of the domain/locus of giving 
 (sbyin  pa’i yul) [in this verse of the root text, is] the purpose (ched du bya ba) […].”773 
                                                          
771 Cf. ft. 678. 
772 Note that TKJ refers to the fourth case function twice, first in 22.4 as sbyin and secondly in 25.1 as ched byed 
(‘a purposive doing,’ i.e. an action with a purposive meaning involved) in the context of semantic or syntactic 
conditions that trigger the syntactic links. TKJ itself therefore has already suggested the interchangeable use of 
sbyin pa and dgos ched in the Sum rtags literature. 
773 GC 590.5. Note that TKJ 22.3-23.1 is a mere enumeration of the eight case functions in their common order: 
chos dngos las dang byed pa dang/ 
sbyin dang ’byung khungs ’brel ba dang/ 
gnas dang bod pa’i sgra yang drang/ 
Further, note that Rnam gling and Pra ti have applied a very similar strategy to comment on the term sbyin pa in 
TKJ 22.4 and simply equated (yang dag par rab tu) sbyin pa with (dgos) ched (cf. Rnam gling 2013, 152; Prat i 
2013, 245). 
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The locus classicus for the treatment of the fourth case is the section on la sgra in SCP 9.3-
11.4. Si tu provides a first, concise definition in his gloss of the section of the root text: 
 […] dbul phongs la sbyin pa gtong lta bu ched du bya ba’i don can yin na/     dgos ched 
 kyi sgra […] 
 “[…] if [these seven la don morphemes] have the meaning of the purpose (ched du bya 
 ba), like ‘to give alms to the poor’ (dbul phongs la sbyin pa gtong), [they] are the 
 purposive morpheme (dgos ched kyi sgra) [...].”774 
In his explanation of the semantic application (don gyi sbyor tshul) of the la don link, he 
specifies how to interpret the purposive meaning of the fourth case and provides a variety of 
illustrations: 
 de bzhin du bya ba gang zhig gis bya ba’i yul de’am/     de dang ’brel ba’i las la phan 
 ’dogs par ’gyur ba’i don gyis ched du bya ba’i yul la ’jug pa rnam dbye bzhi pa ni/     
 chos phyogs su dka’ ba spyad/     dman par brtse/     bdud rtsi ru bsgrub/     shing gcod 
 du sta re dgos/     grub tu re/     gar lta ba la sgron me thogs/     shing la chu ’dren/     
 tshogs na nor ’gyed/     la sogs pa rgya cher sbyar bar bya ste/     de’i ched du/     de’i 
 ched la/     de’i don du/     de’i don la/     de’i phyir du lta bu dgos ched gsal byed kyi 
 sgra dang ldan pa rnams ni ched kyi don yin pa smos ma dgos so/ 
 “Likewise, a fourth case joins to the locus of purpose (ched du bya ba’i yul la ’jug pa), 
 because of the meaning that, due to some action, a benefit (phan ’dogs pa) follows for 
 the locus of that action or [for] some action related to that [locus]. [It] is to be abundantly 
 applied, as in (1) ‘hardships have been undertaken for the Dharma’ (chos phyogs su dka’ 
 ba spyad), (2) ‘to feel affection for the inferior’ (dman par brtse), (3) ‘to be 
 accomplished for the nectar’ (bdud rtsi ru bsgrub ?), (4) ‘an axe is needed for cutting 
 the wood’ (shing gcod du sta re dgos), (5) ‘to hope for the realization [of something or 
 an event]’ (grub tu re ?), (6) ‘to take a lamp in order to look there/somewhere’ (gar lta 
 ba la sgron me thogs), (7) ‘to pull/bring water onto the fields’ (= irrigate the fields) 
 (shing la chu ’dren), (8) ‘to provide/distribute riches in/among the community’ (tshogs 
 na nor ’gyed). There is no need to stress that de’i ched du (‘for the sake of that’), de’i 
 ched la (‘id.’), de’i don du (‘id.’), de’i don la (‘id.’) and de’i phyir du (‘id.’), etc., which 
                                                          
774 GC 472.2. 
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 are endowed with morphemes that clarify/emphasize [the meaning of] purpose (dgos 
 ched gsal byed kyi sgra), have purposive meaning.”775 
Si tu understands ched du bya ba in terms of a benefit (phan ’dogs pa) for the marked argument. 
The beneficiary may either be the locus of the action (bya ba’i yul, e.g. example 7) or an action 
which is connected to the locus (e.g. example 4). Si tu’s specification of phan ’dogs (‘benefit’) 
fits well to the purposive category in general and the idea of a need to be served (~ dgos pa) in 
particular. A possible inspiration for Si tu’s version may have been the fact that phan pa was 
used as a translation for Sanskrit artha in certain purposive contexts,776 or perhaps also that in 
Kātyāyana’s fourth Vārttika on P 2.3.13, Kātyāyana – and with him Patañjali in Bhāṣya 17 on 
the same rule – prescribe the fourth case ending in connection with the word hita (phan pa, 
‘beneficial,’ ‘advantegous’), an addition which is missing in Pāṇini, Cāndra and Kātantra. 
Patañjali gives the example hitam āmayāvine (‘beneficial for somebody suffering from 
indigestion’)777 and the Kāśikāvr̥tti also quotes gobhyo hitam (‘what is beneficial for cows’).778 
The addition of this Vārttika is noteworthy insofar as it demonstrates that hita was regarded as 
a separate, more exceptional use of the fourth case that was part of neither sampradāna nor 
tādarthya. If indeed Si tu was inspired by it, then he must have generalized and applied it to the 
Tibetan purposive understanding of the fourth case. The idea of phan ’dogs pa is further 
elaborated in his summary of the fourth case under TKJ 25.4-28.3: 
 rnam dbye bzhi pa ched du bya ba’i don la ’jug pa ni/     lo tog la chu ’dren/     nor 
 ’tshong du ’gro/     slong mo pa la zan sbyin/     lta bu/     chu ’dren pa dang/     ’gro ba 
 dang/     zan sbyin pa rnams bya ba yin zhing/     de gang gi don nam ched du bya ba’i 
 yul/     lo tog     nor ’tshong/     slongs mo pa rnams la bzhi pa dgos ched kyi rnam dbye 
 ’jug pa yin no/     des na bya ba gang zhig bya ba’i don gyi yul de la phan gdags pa’i 
 ched du ’jug pa’i la don drug po rnams ni rnam dbye bzhi pa zhes bya ba yin la/     dper 
 na/     sha’i ched du phyugs gsod par byed/     lta bu la mthson na/     gsod pa bya ba/     
 phyugs ni las/     sha ni bya ba’i don gyi yul yin pas gsod pa’i bya bas sha thob pa la 
 phan ’dogs par byed pa dang/     slong mo par zan sbyin zer ba la/     sbyin pa ni bya 
 ba/     zan ni las/     slong mo pa bya ba’i don gyi yul yin pa’i phyir sbyin pas slong mo 
 par phan ’dogs pa sogs go dgos […] 
                                                          
775 GC 473.6. 
776 Cf. Negi 2002, 3482f. 
777 Joshi and Roodbergen 1976, 115. 
778 Joshi and Roodbergen 1998, 28. 
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 […] yang gsod pa’i phyir du mtshon bsnun/     zhes pa lta bur mtshon bsnun pas gsad 
 bya la phan gdags zer ba’i don ma yin gyi/     mtshon bsnun pa’i bya bas bya ba’i don 
 gyi yul gsod pa la phan ’dogs par byed pa yin no/ 
“As regards [how] the fourth case takes on the meaning of purpose (ched du bya ba), it 
 is like (9) ‘to pull/bring water to/for the crops’ (lo tog la chu ’dren), (10) ‘to go selling 
 jewels/goods’ (nor ’tshong du ’gro), (11) ‘to give food to the beggar’ (slong mo pa la 
 zan sbyin), where pulling/bringing water (chu ’dren pa), going (’gro ba) and giving food 
(zan sbyin pa) are actions and the loci (yul) – for the purpose (don) of which or for the 
sake (ched) of which these [actions] are to be done – are the crops (lo tog), the selling 
of jewels/goods (nor ’tshong) [and] the beggar, to which the fourth case of purpose 
(dgos ched) joins. Therefore, the six la don [morphemes],779 which join for the sake of 
[expressing] that some action is to benefit (phan gdags pa) that locus, which is the 
reason/purpose (don) of the action, are called ‘fourth case.’ For example, if it is 
illustrated on the basis of (12) ‘to kill cattle for meat’ (sha’i ched du phyugs gsod par 
byed), to kill (gsod pa) is the action, cattle (phyugs) is the karman [and] the meat is the 
 locus which is the purpose of the action. Thus, the action of killing benefits the 
 attainment of meat. In ‘to give food to the beggar’ (slong mo pa la zan sbyin), it  has to 
be understood that the giving benefits the beggar, since to give (sbyin pa) is the action, 
food (zan) is the karman [and] the beggar (slong mo pa) is the locus which is the purpose 
of the action. […] 
 […] Furthermore, in ‘to stab in order to kill’ (gsod pa’i phyir du mtshon bsnun), the 
 meaning does not state that the stabbing (mtshon bsnun pa) is to benefit that which is to 
 be killed, but [it says] that the action of stabbing benefits the locus which is the purpose 
 of the action, [in this case] the killing.”780 
Si tu’s definition amounts to the idea that the argument which instantiates the fourth case 
function represents the meaning (don) of the main action, that is to say the purpose or reason 
for which the action is intended. In this sense, Si tu claims that there must be a benefit for the 
argument in the fourth case form. It will be demonstrated below781 that this contrasts with NGg 
and also signifies that Si tu’s conception of the fourth case does not allow for any other purposes 
                                                          
779 Note that it remains unclear why Si tu refers to six and not seven forms of la don in this passage. Perhaps he 
referred to the six morphemes as they are explicitly mentioned in SCP according to his interpretation and thus 
omitted tu which goes unmentioned? 
780 GC 600.1 and GC 601.2. 
781 Cf. infra 312f. 
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or beneficiaries than the marked arguments themselves. However, Si tu adds the provision that 
the main action is not necessarily required to benefit the marked argument directly, but 
optionally an implicit or explicit action connected to it. This allows him to account for instances 
such as sha’i ched du phyugs gsod par byed or nor ’tshong du ’gro that exhibit clear purposive 
meaning, but in which there is no obvious benefit or purpose for the marked argument itself. 
While NGg’s theory achieves to explain the purposive marking of such instances through the 
recourse to the agent’s purpose, Si tu’s strategy represents the semantic relations underlying the 
sentence more accurately. It may only be indirectly inferred through further pondering the 
scenario at hand that it is ultimately the agent who uses and thus benefits from the meat, 
although depending on the context this even might not be necessarily the case. In fact, the 
morphosyntax of the sentence does not connect to such an event construal, but it rather alludes 
to the meat itself as the purpose or meaning of the main action. Yet, as Si tu has clearly 
indicated, the meat is the purpose not in the sense of being the beneficiary but in the sense of 
that which is to be attained, and thus it is this implicit secondary action of attainment which is 
benefitted according to Si tu’s theory.  
In Tibetan grammar, the theorization of implicit or explicit secondary actions intended by the 
main action of a sentence in the conception of the fourth case seems to be uncommon. Si tu’s 
theory is, however, well-attested in Sanskrit grammar, namely in the already quoted P 2.3.14 
and 15.782 A closer comparison of Si tu’s examples with the Pāṇinian model nonetheless reveals 
at least one noticeable morphosyntactic difference: 
 (a) edhebhyo vrajati ‘he is going in order to [bring] firewood’ (P 2.3.14) 
 (b) pākāya vrajati ‘he is going to do the cooking’ (P 2.3.15) 
 (c) shing gcod du sta re dgos ‘an axe is needed for cutting the wood’   
 (Si tu’s example 4) 
Despite the focus on action in the Pāṇinian rules, both Sanskrit fourth case suffixes are affixed 
to noun phrases. In contrast, Si tu directly and correctly applies the syntactic link la don after 
the verb. The difference between verbs and nouns has therefore once again been suspended in 
GC’s case model, and Si tu focuses primarily on the semantic aspects of the Sanskritic rules 
according to which also secondary actions – either explicit or implicit – may represent the 
intended purpose of the main action. Si tu’s decision is understandable from the point of view 
                                                          
782 Cf. supra 275. 
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that the Tibetan example may be rephrased unproblematically and without a change in meaning 
through the nominalization of gcod: 
 (a) shing gcod du sta re dgos 
 (b) shing gcod par sta re dgos 
Strictly speaking, there is a morphosyntactic difference between the two versions of this 
example, since gcod is nominalized in (b) but a proper verb in (a), and only a detailed scrutiny 
of their respective distributional behaviors across different syntactic-semantic environments in 
WT could evaluate their precise continuities and discontinuities. However, generally speaking, 
the two constructions may certainly be used interchangeably. Si tu’s inclusion of this type of 
verbal use in the fourth case therefore has a linguistic basis at least on such a general level, 
although it cannot be further addressed here whether it also remains fully accurate from a 
linguistic perspective.783 
In his summary of the fourth case under TKJ 25.4-28.3, directly following the final quotation, 
Si tu deviates from the former Tibetan grammarians and introduces a morphological adaptation 
of the case: 
 skabs ’dir ’ga’ zhig gis don dang ched dang phyir zhes pa’i sgra rnams rnam dbye bzhi 
 par byas pa mi ’thad de/     de rnams rnam dbye ’jug yul gyi ming tsam yin pa’i phyir te 
 de dag la rnam dbye zhugs pas/     don du/     don gyi/     don gyis/     lta bur ’gyur ba’i 
 phyir/     dper na/     legs sbyar la de’i ched du zhes par/     ta da rthā ya/     zhes ’byung 
 ba’i artha’i sgra de rnam dbye ma yin pa bzhin no/ 
 “In this context, the statement of some that the terms ‘don,’ ‘ched’ and ‘phyir’ are fourth 
 cases is incorrect, because these are only free lexical word forms (mings) that are the 
 entity to which the case joins (rnam dbye ’jug yul), since the joining of the case (rnam 
 dbye zhugs pa) results, for example, in don du, don gyi [or] don gyis. [It is], for example, 
 like in  Sanskrit, [where] the term artha in tadarthāya, [meaning] ‘for the sake of that,’ 
 is not a case.”784 
The term rnam dbye in this quotation seems to refer more specifically to the meaning ‘case 
marker,’ unlike in many of the passages above in which the term refers more to case meanings 
                                                          
783 Such examples may point towards that the distinction between nominalized and verbal forms is much less 
rigid in WT. The same phenomenon can be observed with the verbal use of byed sgra to express a causal relation 
between two clauses, where byed sgra may be applied more or less interchangeably after proper and nominalized 
verb forms. 
784 GC 601.3. 
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or functions. If it would not refer to ‘case marker,’ Si tu’s statement would deny the purposive 
meaning of phyir, ched and don.  
Si tu restricts the fourth case markers to the la don morphemes and excludes don, ched and 
phyir. His argument implies that, unlike case markers, these latter word forms are not syntactic 
links (tshig phrad) that join to lexical word forms (ming) to form a syntactically complete and 
functioning word form (tshig) in his derivational model. Rather, they are lexical word forms to 
be affixed with syntactic links. Thus, this is how his statement in SCP 9.3-11.4 should be 
understood that constructions such as de’i ched du and others are endowed with terms that 
clarify dgos ched (dgos ched gsal byed kyi sgra dang ldan pa rnams).785 The fourth case marker 
in phyir du, don du and ched du is only the morpheme du, since phyir and the others are lexical 
items that clarify or highlight the purposive meaning, but which also require case marking as a 
functioning word form in the sentence. The example of don and the comparison with Sanskrit 
tadartha has strong explanatory power in this context, first of all because don and artha indeed 
are lexical items that may take on different grammatical markers to change their participation 
in the sentence, as Si tu has demonstrated through contrasting don du, don gyi and don gyis. 
However, whether the status as lexical stem forms for ched and phyir would withstand closer 
linguistic analysis is a more difficult question.  
Although it will have no further impact on his conception of the fourth case, it is important to 
note that Si tu’s exclusion of the auxiliary word forms phyir du and others from the fourth case 
once again reflects his inconsistent use of the category ‘case’ (rnam dbye). While the Tibetan 
case model – including Si tu’s version – is strongly based on the distinction of seven or eight 
basic case functions786 rather than morphology, the morphological-derivational constitution of 
the auxiliary forms is the reason for Si tu’s exclusion of them from the fourth case. From a 
functional perspective, they fully qualify as fourth cases since they encode the information of 
purpose or beneficiary. Thus, Si tu’s understanding of rnam dbye is not restricted to ‘case 
function,’ i.e. the meaning of cases and the distinction of these meanings, but it is mixed with 
morphological-derivational considerations as well.787  
In total, Si tu’s basic definitions of dgos ched under SCP 9.3-11.4 and TKJ 25.4-28.3 provide a 
simple and distinct parameter – namely the benefit (phan ’dogs) of the main action for the 
marked argument or an action connected to it – for establishing the fourth case and 
                                                          
785 Cf. supra 294f. 
786 On the issue of seven or eight cases, cf. chapter 14. 
787 On this issue, cf. also infra 420f. and Si tu’s conception of the eighth case, chapter 14.2. Moreover, it should 
be remembered that he did not include the causal use (rgyu mtshan) of na in the causal subcategory of the third 
case (cf. supra 258), presumably because the third case is restricted to the morphological category byed sgra. 
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distinguishing it from the remaining ones, especially the second and seventh that are marked 
identically. Thus far, the only deviation from the former tradition is his exclusion of the 
auxiliary or periphrastic constructions don du, ched du and phyir (du) from the fourth case 
markers, since in Si tu’s view they represent a derivation in the form of ming + rnam dbye.  
Unlike Si tu’s conception of the second case, which raised a whole complex of questions 
regarding the understanding his definitions, the fourth case has much fewer philological issues 
in this regard. What remains to be achieved is a closer investigation of Si tu’s selection of 
examples, in order to gain a better understanding of the way in which he argues for the 
homogeneity of the fourth case in terms of a purpose to be benefitted by the action across the 
seven la don morphemes. Thus, what may be said about Si tu’s sensitivity regarding the 
Tibetan-specific morphosyntax in his selection of sample phrases?788 
10.2.1 Analysis of Si tu’s Examples 
Although Si tu defined the fourth case homogeneously in terms of a beneficiary or benefitted 
action, his examples exhibit various grammatical constructions and cover a heterogeneous array 
of semantic scenarios. As part of his definition of the fourth case in SCP 9.3-11.4,789 Si tu 
provided the following eight examples: 
 (1) chos phyogs su dka’ ba spyad ‘hardships have been undertaken for the Dharma’ 
 (2) dman par brtse ‘to feel affection for the inferior’  
 (3) bdud rtsi ru bsgrub ‘to be accomplished for/as the nectar’ (?) 
 (4) shing gcod du sta re dgos ‘an axe is needed for cutting the wood’  
 (5) grub tu re ‘to hope for the realization [of something or an event]’ (?) 
 (6) gar lta ba la sgron me thogs ‘to take a lamp in order to look there/somewhere’  
 (7) shing la chu ’dren ‘to pull water onto the fields’ (= irrigate the fields) 
 (8) tshogs na nor ’gyed ‘to provide/distribute the riches in/among the community’ 
Si tu dedicates one example to each of the seven morphemes. Only the case’s prototypical 
marker la figures twice, once with a nominalized verb in phrase (6) and once with a proper 
                                                          
788 Since the basic theoretical conception of the fourth case in the GC is clear and does not require to be inferred 
statistically from the distribution of Si tu’s sample phrases, the following analysis focuses exclusively on Si tu’s 
main selections of sample phrases that were already quoted, while single classifications appearing in other 
passages have not been further considered. In the following, twelve examples are discussed. 
789 Cf. supra 294. 
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noun in (7). Si tu employed eight different verb frames, five tha dad pa verbs that require 
agentive marking (1, 3, 6, 7, 8) and three tha mi dad pa verbs (2, 4, 5). The distribution of the 
arguments marked by the syntactic link la don is as follows: 
 (7):  noun + la 
 (6):  nominalized verb + la 
 (1):  noun + du 
 (4), (5): verb + du 
 (2), (3): noun + -r/ru 
 (8):  noun + na 
Supplementing the missing participants of the verb frame’s default grammatical construction 
in square brackets, we arrive at the following morphosyntactic patterns for the eight selected 
phrases by Si tu: 
 (7): [byed sgra] + la (noun) + unmarked 
 (6): [byed sgra] + la (nominalized phrase) + unmarked 
 (2): [unmarked] + -r (= la) (noun) 
 (1): [byed sgra] + du (noun) + unmarked 
 (3): [byed sgra] + ru (= du) (noun) + unmarked 
 (4): [la] + du (verb) + unmarked  
 (5): [unmarked] + du (verb)/la (noun) (?)   
 (8): [byed sgra] + na (noun) [substituted for la] + unmarked 
If we subsume morpheme -ru in (3) under du in (1), an unproblematic classification, then the 
eight examples exhibit a total of seven different morphosyntactic patterns. The main 
distinguishers of the above classification are first the three morphemes la, na and du, second 
the marked argument (noun, verb, nominalized verb) and finally any missing arguments of the 
verbs’ default constructions (byed sgra, la or unmarked). Despite this variety in these examples, 
Si tu claims a beneficiary meaning for all arguments marked by one of the la don morphemes. 
The following questions therefore arise: does the precise information of the la don morphemes 
vary throughout these different syntactic and semantic environments; and to which extent does 
the morphosyntactic variety impact on the information expressed by la don?  
To start with phrase (1), the action of performing or undertaking hardships (dka’ ba spyad) 
according to Si tu is intended for the goal of the Dharma. It may only be speculated whether he 
saw the indicated benefit in the preservation of the Dharma, the accomplishment of the Dharma 
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by the agent or another outcome of practicing hardships that is related to the Dharma. The theme 
of Buddhist practice is likely inspired by Rnam gling’s sangs rgyas bsgrub tu chos byed (‘to 
practice Dharma in order to accomplish enlightenment’),790 or one of the several other examples 
in the grammars of Rnam gling and Pra ti that are related to the attainment of spiritual realization 
through practice.791 It may further be interpreted as a direct correspondent to P 2.3.14, according 
to which a fourth case suffix is used to indicate that the main action aims at a secondary action 
not explicitly mentioned but implicitly connected to the marked noun phrase, since a direct 
purpose or benefit for the Dharma itself is not perceived.792  
I have not been able to precisely discern whether phrase (1) chos phyogs su dka’ ba spyad could 
more literally mean ‘to undertake hardships into the direction of the Dharma,’ which does not 
necessarily result in a purposive encoding by su, but rather a specification what kind of 
hardships have been undertaken. Morpheme su would then qualify for either the allative 
function or perhaps also the transformative function in Tournadre’s recent taxonomy.793 For the 
time being, a purposive structure will be favored as the more intuitive reading and in analogy 
to rong bas lto gos su zhing btab (‘the farmer ploughs the field for his subsistence’) which 
Tournadre provides as an example of the purposive function of du.794 If this reading is correct, 
Si tu’s classification is able to withstand modern linguistic scrutiny. 
Sample phrase (2), with the meaning of feeling affectionate or being compassionate towards an 
inferior being, must be interpreted against the backdrop of the Buddhist doctrine and its central 
ideal of loving kindness towards all sentient beings, especially those of the lower realms of 
existence. The benefit for the inferior beings thus is the result of our compassion or affection 
towards them. The example employs a verb of affection that prototypically triggers an 
unmarked experiencer and an object marked by la. Since this is a rather distinctive and 
exclusive use of the morpheme la, it is clear that -r in (2) must be classified as an allomorph of 
the former rather than of du. It has already been elaborated that verbs of affection form a 
distinctive group with regard to their syntactic pattern which Si tu does not take into account. 
Thus, altogether the beneficiary or purposive meaning in sample phrase (2) only results from 
Si tu’s interpretation of the scenario of loving kindness against the backdrop of the category of 
purpose, but it does not result from distributional considerations. The beneficiary meaning of 
the phrase may be conceived through the argument that loving kindness, compassion and the 
                                                          
790 Cf. Rnam gling 2013, 70. 
791 For Pra ti’s list of examples, cf. supra 269; Also cf. Rnam gling 2013, 70. 
792 Cf. supra 275. 
793 Cf. Tournadre 2010, 108f. 
794 Cf. ibid., 108. 
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like result in a benefit for an inferior being, yet the functioning of -r in this clause is more 
homogeneously explained in accordance with the other verbs of affection as 
INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT. However, Si tu was neither the first to classify verbs of 
affection as a fourth case, nor the first to classify the verb frame brtse ba as a semantic field of 
the fourth case. We have seen that Zha lu provided zas la sred (‘to crave for food’), likely based 
on the Sanskritic fourth case trigger ruc, as well as bdag la thugs brtse bar mdzod (lit. ‘Act 
compassionately to/towards me!’ ~ ‘Show compassion for me!’).795 Rnam gling provided ltas 
mo’i don du brtses (‘to show loving kindness for the sake of the play’ ?), although the phrase’s 
precise meaning remains unclear to me. In view of the former tradition, Si tu’s classification of 
(2) clearly goes against the syntactic case marking patterns of WT, but it is clearly in line with 
the tradition. 
Phrase (3) poses the hermeneutical problem that its minimalistic form lacks clarity regarding 
the intended meaning. From my understanding, the nectar (bdud rtsi) must be the result of the 
action of accomplishment (sgrub pa). Yet, in a default construction, the verb sgrub pa triggers 
an agent marked by byed sgra and an unmarked argument as the accomplished one. Thus, bdud 
rtsi marked by du appears to be only the third argument, therefore it qualifies first of all as an 
instance of the transformative function or de nyid. On the other hand, bdud rtsi as the result of 
the accomplishment not only qualifies as the transformed object, but also as the purpose of the 
action, which would justify Si tu’s classification as a fourth case. Since this type of phrase has 
not been encountered in the Tibetan literature investigated for this research, it is impossible to 
be more specific about the use of du in phrase (3). However, the interface between the 
transformative and purposive function of du remains important for the other examples as well.  
Phrase (4) may be regarded as a prototypical use of the traditional Tibetan fourth case due to 
the verb dgos pa (‘to need,’ ‘purpose’), although this phrase lacks mention of the one who 
needs, usually marked by la. This is the first example in this list in which la don marks a proper 
verb. The morpheme du clearly expresses that the axe is intended for the action of cutting a tree 
and thus a purposive meaning, however the question remains whether the difference of marked 
noun vs. marked verb is significant regarding the intrasentential information expressed by the 
marker and thus needs to be accounted for. Tournadre distinguishes between a purposive case 
function of du and a (non-case) connective function in terms of a final clause marker, the latter 
which covers also verbal usages. If we compare Tournadre’s examples for the two respective 
functions, namely rong bas lto gos su zhing btab (‘the farmer ploughs the field for his 
                                                          
795 Cf. supra 269f.. 
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subsistence’) and rin po che len du song (‘[X] went to fetch precious [stones]’), the purposive 
value is clearly perceived in both.796 From this perspective, Si tu did not take into account the 
distinction between an intra-clausal and interclausal purposive use of du, but his taxonomy 
remains significant at least insofar as the intrasentential value of du in (4) covers the information 
of a purpose or goal.  
In phrase (5), grub tu re (‘to hope for the realization [of something or an event]’ ?), la don once 
again marks a verb. Although the lexical value of the verb re ba (‘to hope’) would fit well into 
the semantic field of affections, especially in verbal constructions it triggers the morpheme du. 
Si tu’s underlying rationale for the classification of this example as a fourth case could have 
been multifaceted. Generally speaking, that the lexical value of hope is affiliated to the idea of 
a purpose is easily understood from the fact that hope in general has a strong intentional aspect 
of aiming at someone/thing, which may even be witnessed in English grammar in the expression 
‘to hope for.’ According to Si tu’s definition of the fourth case, there must be a benefit for the 
marked object itself or an action connected to it. From this perspective, Si tu has perhaps 
focused on the option that the action of hoping benefits, for example, the realization or 
establishment (grub pa) of Dharma or any other entity, or perhaps he has followed his intuitive 
understanding of the phrase as a native speaker. Although the morpheme du and its allomorphs 
are associated with a purposive function also in recent academic approaches to Tibetan case 
grammar, this particular instance (5) allows for an alternative classification as well. Compare 
the following two translations of the example: 
 (a) grub tu re ‘to hope for the realization [of something or an event]’ 
 (b) grub tu re ‘to hope that [something or an event] is realized’ 
The second translation attempts to emphasize the value of being the object of hope, in the sense 
of the content of hope, rather than the intended object. It remains neutral with regard to the 
question of any involved intention, purpose, benefit or need. The second rendition of the phrase 
therefore interprets the marker tu more in sense of de nyid or Tournadre’s transformative 
function. In the examples of Zha lu et al., there are equivalent constructions with the verb gsol 
ba (‘to ask for, request, pray for’), which belongs to a similar semantic field like re ba (‘to hope 
for’). Yet, the respective authors list these examples under the second case: 
 
                                                          
796 Transl. by Tournadre 2010, 109. 
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 Zha lu:  dbugs dbyung du gsol ‘to pray/ask/request for relief’  
   bshad du gsol ‘to ask/request to explain’797 
 Rnam gling:  dbang bskur du gsol ‘to ask/request for an initiation’798 
Similar to the object of hope, that which is asked for is intended as well as favored by the agent 
of asking. Obviously, neither author regarded such instances as exhibiting primarily a 
beneficiary or purposive meaning. Si tu did not employ the verb gsol ba in his list of his 
examples for the second case, the fourth case or for the category of de nyid. However, a 
comparison of Si tu’s, Zha lu’s and Rnam gling’s examples together with their English 
translations indicates that their classification is more intricate. However, this is less an issue of 
the traditional taxonomy, since the traditional model does offer categories which are 
representative for the quoted instances, and more a question of the precise methodology for 
discerning which of the categories is the most accurate one in this context. 
Whether a purposive or rather a transformative reading is to be favored for (5) requires further 
synchronic as well as diachronic linguistic analysis. An etymological relation between these 
two uses would offer one possibility for both of the functions being marked by du. As for Si 
tu’s classification of (5), it is difficult to evaluate to which extent he based it on semantic 
considerations of the lexical value of the action of re ba, on the morphosyntactic functioning of 
du or simply on his intuitive understanding of the phrase as a native speaker. Since du has a 
purposive function also according to contemporary academic linguistics, the Tibetan-specific 
linguistic relevance of his classification at this point should not be ruled out and may have been 
an important factor for the selection of this phrase as an instance of the Tibetan fourth case dgos 
ched.799 Zha lu and Rnam gling’s examples at least demonstrated that phrase (5) may be 
confronted with opposing classifications of similar instances by Si tu’s predecessors, which 
reveals that any possible intuition of native speakers regarding this type of construction was not 
necessarily restricted only to a purposive understanding. 
Phrase (6), gar lta ba la sgron me thogs (‘to take a lamp in order to look there/somewhere’), 
demonstrates the use of la in the meaning of the fourth case. The morpheme is applied to the 
                                                          
797 Cf. Zha lu 2013A, 8. 
798 Cf. Rnam gling 2013, 70. 
799 Or was Si tu’s decision influenced by P 1.4.36 which classifies the desired objects of verbs spr̥hĀ ‘to yearn 
for’ as sampradāna? However, the lexical meaning of re ba is only loosely related to the Sanskrit term and this 
rule is also omitted in Cāndra and Kātantra. 
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nominalized verb (lta ba ‘to look at’) that is part of the secondary or subordinate clause gar lta 
ba (‘to look somewhere’). I do not see any noteworthy possibility other than that the main and 
subordinate clause are in a final relationship, that is to say the morpheme la represents a final 
clause marker with purposive meaning. Si tu’s decision to employ the marker la in this phrase 
is interesting insofar as the typical construction would rather be that of lta bar. However, in 
view of Hahn’s “Lokativ des Ziels,”800 the phrase does not seem to be artificially construed by 
Si tu. In fact, this instance is a clear indication that la – in an exceptional or perhaps even in 
common use – may have a purposive meaning in specific syntactic-semantic environments. 
Although no corresponding samples were encountered in earlier grammars, this example does 
not seem to represent any noticeable deviation from the former tradition, since the semantic 
content is clearly purposive and final clause-markers have already been identified as fourth 
cases before Si tu.801 
Phrase (7) is the second instance in Si tu’s list of examples for the fourth case under SCP 9.3-
11.4 that employs the morpheme la, this time in the well-known example shing la chu ’dren 
(lit. ‘to bring water to the tree,’ in the meaning of ‘to water the tree’). As already discussed 
above, the functioning of la in this clause is more likely that of either an INDIRECT or 
SECONDARY OBJECT or in Tournadre’s nomenclature the BENEFICIARY.802 It was also 
already mentioned in the historical survey how the classification of (7) as a fourth case is the 
result of Si tu’s recurrent objectivist approach.  
Phrase (8) is the final example of the fourth case in Si tu’s commentary on SCP’s la’i sgra and 
the only example Si tu provides for the use of the morpheme na as a fourth case. The 
problematic status of na has already been outline above and is basically rooted in its clear static-
locative meaning without any purposive connotation. While most of the quoted early 
grammarians have remained silent on the question whether na qualifies as a fourth case marker, 
by the latest from Smra sgo onwards authors have proposed different grammatical constructions 
to demonstrate the application of na in the meaning of dgos ched or ched du bya ba.803 Si tu’s 
tshogs na nor ’gyed (‘to provide/distribute the riches in/within/among the community’), directly 
                                                          
800 Cf. supra 268. 
801 For Pra ti’s list of examples, cf. supra 269; also cf. Rnam gling 2013, 70. 
802 Cf. supra 267. It should be kept in mind, however, that Tournadre’s beneficiary function is not constituted by 
the category of benefit, but appears to refer to the INDIRECT OBJECT, if my understanding is correct (cf. 
Tournadre 2010, 97).  
803 Smra sgo is the earliest source encountered so far that provides an example for na as a fourth case:  
 ched ni shing gi phyir na chu ’dren zhes pa lta bu’o 
 “Regarding [the use of na in the meaning of] ched, [it is] as in ‘to drag water for/because of the tree’ 
 (shing gi phyir na chu ’dren).” (Smr̥ti 2002, 79) 
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inspired or not, clearly resonates with Pra ti’s only example of na, i.e. tshogs na mang ja bskol 
(‘offering tea is to be cooked in/among the community’). Si tu also chose the scenario of a 
gathered community (tshogs) in which an action takes place, this time the provision of riches. 
The syntactic information encoded by the morpheme na is clearly that of the LOCATION in 
which the riches are distributed, thus my translation ‘among’ instead of ‘for.’ Yet, it may be 
inferred from the scenario at hand that the community is not merely the LOCATION but of 
course the RECIPIENT of the riches and thus a BENEFICIARY. However, from among all 
these semantic construals, the sentence only encodes the locative option and any other construal 
remains an objectivist imposition.  
If it is asked how this misclassification occurred in the GC, two components may be 
distinguished. First, Si tu started from the Tibetan-specific generic case marking pattern of the 
verb frame ’gyed pa (‘to provide,’ ‘give,’ ‘distribute’) which usually triggers la to mark the 
INDIRECT OBJECT or RECIPIENT. Yet, he substituted na for la and imposed the generic 
valency of the verb frame on na. Secondly, as an instance of the larger field of giving, Si tu also 
applied the typical purposive interpretation of the scenario of giving that was adopted from 
Sanskritic role models to the verb frame ’gyed pa and its case marking pattern.  
In his summary of the cases under TKJ 25.4-28.3, Si tu gives the following four examples in 
his definition of the fourth case dgos ches or ched du bya ba: 
  (9) lo tog la chu ’dren ‘to pull/bring water to/for the crops’ 
 (10) nor ’tshong du ’gro ‘to go selling jewels/goods’ 
 (11) slong mo pa la zan sbyin ‘to give food to the beggar’ 
 (12) sha’i ched du phyugs gsod par byed ‘to kill cattle for meat’ 
From the four examples provided by Si tu, only phrase (9), namely lo tog la chu ’dren (‘to 
pull/bring water on/for the crops’), deserves a closer look. The grammatical construction as 
well as the underlying semantic structure of the phrase directly corresponds to (7), the only 
difference being the lexical value of the argument marked by la. From what was already stated 
for phrase (7), the grammatical construction refers to the scenario that water is brought to the 
crops, i.e. the crops are irrigated, with la indicating the INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT 
without any purposive connotation. Yet, the Tibetan term lo tog (‘crops’) usually refers to the 
harvested grain from the fields and thus represents the result of farming, including the action of 
irrigation. From that perspective, Tibetan lo tog la chu ’dren comes much closer to lo tog gi 
ched du chu ’dren (‘to irrigate for the sake of [attaining] crops’), and the morpheme la would 
308 
 
thus encode purposive meaning. While the grammatical marker suggests one reading, the 
lexical value of the marked argument suggests another understanding. Through the change of 
the lexical meaning of the marked argument to lo tog, Si tu intentionally or intuitively achieved 
to strengthen the purposive value of la due to the reader’s intuitive understanding of the scenario 
at hand.  
As for the remaining examples, phrase (10) is another clear instance of du as a final clause 
marker and corresponds to (4), whereas phrase (11) is Si tu’s appreciation of the time-honored 
example sbyin pa (‘to give’), which grammatically corresponds to (7) and poses similar 
taxonomical questions. Finally, phrase (12), sha’i ched du phyugs gsod par byed (‘to kill cattle 
for meat’), is a typical instance of the purposive function, for which Si tu has used the form 
ched + du. Since the phrase corresponds to Tournadre’s rong bas lto gos su zhing btab, it may 
be assumed that the morpheme du could be substituted for ched du in (12), but the question 
remains whether la may be used interchangeably as well. 
Si tu’s selection of examples include various kinds of scenarios and semantic-syntactic 
constructions. Several phrases are clear purposive instances also according to modern 
taxonomies, but the above investigation has exhibited several examples in which Si tu has gone 
against the sentence-specific structures. If we add together the clearly non-purposive instances 
such as (2) or (8), the clear non-purposive instances such as (11) that are more difficult to 
exclude from the fourth case due to their established status, as well as the more ambiguous 
instances such as (5), the result demonstrates that the overall homogeneity of the fourth case 
throughout the diverse purposive and non-purposive sample phrases was maintained through 
an objectivist focus. However, is Si tu’s objectivist focus an occasional error to drift away from 
morphosyntax to the underlying scenarios as such? Is it an occasional strategy to maintain the 
authoritative taxonomy of the case model? Or is it a systematic approach to case grammar 
similar to what is encountered in GNT?804 Although several instances of Si tu’s objectivist focus 
have been encountered – clearer ones such as some of his examples for the fourth case and less 
clear ones such as his definitions of the second case805 –, the material thus far encountered 
remains too diverse and inconclusive for a thorough decision on this matter.  
Apart from phrase (5) which contrasts with the classifications of Zha lu and Rnam gling, Si tu’s 
selection does not significantly deviate from former classifications. His two presentations in 
SCP and TKJ adhere to the traditional purposive interpretation of the fourth case, leaving alone 
                                                          
804 Cf. supra 193ff. 
805 Cf. especially example (8), supra 306f. Regarding the second case’s definitions, cf. supra 237f. and 243. 
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the morphological adaptation that ched du and the others no longer are fourth case markers in 
his view. However, Si tu has also expressed his strong critique against the classification of 
phyag ’tshal ba as a fourth case, which results from his unequivocal and consistent application 
of the parameter phan ’dogs pa (‘benefit’). The same critique rejects NGg’s theory of an 
agentive purpose and further specifies the notion of yul as a fourth case category together with 
its relation to the second case. Even more importantly, it sheds light on Si tu’s objectivist focus 
as well as his claim of the multilingual validity of the cases. 
10.2.2 Si tu’s Exclusion of phyag ’tshal ba from the Fourth Case 
Si tu’s critique of the classification of phyag ’tshal ba as a fourth case is not part of the case’s 
presentation under SCP 9.3-11.4 and TKJ 25.4-28.3, but it is explicated in his commentary on 
SCP’s first homage: 
 gang la yon tan mchog mnga’ ba’i/     dkon mchog de la phyag ’tshal lo/ 
 “I prostrate to those jewels, which possess the highest virtue.”806 
Homage and prostration to the three jewels of Buddha, Dharma and the community of monks 
(saṅgha) is an all-pervasive theme in Tibetan literature. Rnam gling Paṇchen provides two 
different versions of the verse’s interpretation, one of which classifies the la don in “de la” as 
dgos ched.807 This classification has been followed in an unquestioned fashion by Pra ti Dge 
bshes Rin chen Don grub in his commentary to SCP808 and even goes back to NGg and GNT, 
both which included phyag ’tshal ba (‘to pay homage,’ ‘prostrate’) as a semantic field of the 
fourth case based on Sanskritic grammar (e.g. P 2.3.16, C 2.1.78 or K 2.4.26).809 Despite the 
established character of phyag ’tshal ba as a semantic field of the Tibetan fourth case that was 
backed by the Sanskritic tradition, Si tu’s assessment of the former Sum rtags commentators is 
very critical: 
                                                          
806 SCP 1.1-2. 
807  de zhes pa don dgu la ’jug pa las nges bzung gi tshig dang/     la zhes pa don lnga la ’jug pa las ’dir 
 dgos ched/ 
 “[...] from the nine meanings de [may] take on, [this] is the syntactic form of determination (nges bzung 
 gi tshig), and from the five meanings la [may] take on, here [it] is purpose (dgos ched), [...].” (Rnam 
 gling 2013, 55).  
Rnam gling’s second interpretation of the verse attributes the function of yul to the phrase dkon cog de la and 
thus leaves open whether it should be understood as a second or fourth case. 
808 de zhes bya ba ni/     nges bzung gi sgra’o/     la zhes bya ba ni/     bzhi pa dgos ches kyi sgra’o/ 
“As for the de, [this] is the morpheme of determination. As for the la, [this] is the fourth [case], the purposive 
morpheme (dgos ched kyi sgra).” (Pra ti 2013A, 182) 
809 Cf. supra 285f. 
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 kha cig gis/     skabs ’dir gang la zhes pa’i la yig logs su bkar nas ngos gzung ba’i don 
 dang de la zhes pa’i la yig ched du bya ba’i don du bshad mod/     snga ma ni gzhung 
 ’di’i la don ’chad pa’i skabs su de ’dra la ’jug par ma bshad par ma zad don gyis kyang 
 de ’drar ’jug mi srid pas mi ’thad cing/     gang zhig la yon tan mchog mnga’ ba’am 
 ldan pa zhes sbrel dgos pas rnam dbye bdun pa gnas gzhi’i don nyid do/     phyi ma ni 
 legs sbyar she rlom gyis zhwa dpe lham la bkab par sad de/     ci’i phyir na/     ka lā par/     
 na mas/     swasti/     swāhā/     swadhā/     alaṃ/     baṣaṭ/     sbyor ba la bzhi pa’o zhe 
 ’byung bar na mas kyi yul la spyir btang don ’thob kyi sgo nas gnyis pa ’jug kyang grags 
 pa dmigs bsal gyi sgo nas bzhi pa sbyor bar mkhas pa rnams gyis bkral mod gyi/     de 
 ’dra’i bye brag ma phyed par/     na mas kyi yul la bzhi pa ’jug par bshad do snyam nas 
 phyag ’tshal ba’i don can gyi sgra’i yul thams cad la bzhi pa ’jugs par bsam zhing smra 
 ba’i phyir ro/     des na spyir btang gi sgrub pa’i dbang gis/     pra ṇa myaṃ sogs krīt 
 rkyen gzhan gyis bsgrubs pa dang/     na mā mi sogs ting mtha’ rnams dang/     byings 
 gzhan las byung ba’i bande/     banda naṃ lta bu rnams kyang ’dud cing phyag ’tshal 
 ba’i don can du mtshungs kyang de dag gi yul la rnam du’ang gnyis pa las gzhan pa’i 
 rnam dbye ’jug pa ma yin pa ’di kun gyis shes par bya’o/     rgyu mtshan des na bod du 
 de lta’i grags pa dmigs bsal med pa’i phyir don thob gtso bas/     bzhi pa’i spyir bdang 
 gi don sbyin pa’i snod la sogs pa bya ba gang yin yang bya yul de’am de dang ’brel ba’i 
 don du song ba zhi dgos pa las/     yul khyad par can la phyag byed pa ni phyag byed 
 po nyid dam de dang ’brel ba’i don las phyag yul de’i ched du min pa ni gnag rdzis 
 kyang rtogs par sla ba’i phyir phyag gi yul rnam dbye gnyis pa ’jug pa las ’os med do/ 
“Although some [commentators] explained the letter la of gang la in this passage in the 
 sense of identification through separation/isolation (logs su bkar) and the letter la of 
 de la in the sense of the purpose (ched du bya ba), the first [point] is incorrect, since 
 it is not mentioned during the exposition of la don in this treatise that [la] can take on 
 such a [meaning], nor is it actually possible that [it] takes on such a meaning. Moreover, 
 [the root text] should be glossed as ‘that which possesses or is endowed with the highest 
 virtue’ [and] thus [this la] has precisely the meaning of the seventh case, 
 abode/substratum (gnas gzhi). As for the second [point, de la,] it is nothing but putting 
 on a hat onto the feet due to conceit. Why? The learned scholars teach that, although in 
 general [and] in accordance to the actual meaning (spyir btang don ’thob kyi sgo nas), 
 a second case [should] join to the locus/domain of [Sanskrit] namas, a fourth is applied 
 due to a special worldly convention (grags pa dmigs gsal) as it is mentioned in Kalāpa 
 [2.4.26]: ‘In connection to namas, svasti, svāhā, svadhā, alaṃ [and] vaṣaṭ a fourth [case
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 suffix occurs].’ Yet, thinking that a fourth [case] joins to the object of namas without 
 differentiating such peculiarities, [the commentators] think and say that a fourth [case] 
joins to all loci of terms which have the meaning of prostration/homage.  
 Therefore, everyone should understand that from the perspective of the general 
 grammatical construction (spyir btang gi sgrub pa), praṇamyam, etc., which is 
 completed by a different kr̥t-suffix, namāmi, etc., which ends in tiṅ, and vande, 
 vandanam etc., which originate from different verbal roots, are also equivalent in the 
 sense of bowing or prostration, but no other case than the second joins to the [action’s] 
 locus/domain of these [Sanskrit forms]. Such special worldly conventions [like Sanskrit 
 namas] do not exist in Tibet [and] thus the actual meaning prevails. Therefore, the 
 general meaning of the fourth case requires some purpose (don du song ba) for a 
 recipient of giving (sbyin pa’i snod), etc., [or] whatever the action is, [i.e. for] the 
 locus/domain  of the action or [for something] connected to it. In contrast, that the 
 prostration to a supreme locus/domain is for the sake of the prostrator himself or 
 something connected to [him], rather than for the sake of the locus/domain of 
 prostration, is easily realized even by the shepherd. It is due to these reasons that there 
 is no valid [mode of application] other than [that] a second case joins to the 
 locus/domain of prostration.”810 
Si tu dismisses two interpretations of la don in SCP’s first homage, the first of which relates to 
the form gang la of the root text and the second to de la. Since the focus here is on the fourth 
case, the following analysis will be restricted to the second point. Si tu’s main critique charges 
former commentators with an exaggerated, undifferentiated application of Sanskritic 
grammatical knowledge to WT, noting that they failed to differentiate between Sanskrit-specific 
exceptional uses and the general grammatical construction (spyir btang gi sgrub pa) of the 
semantic field homage or prostration, the latter which he apparently regards as valid across both 
languages. The Sanskrit-specific feature in question which Si tu demonstrates by help of Kalāpa 
2.4.26 according to him is the result of a special convention (grags pa dmigs bsal) among the 
speakers of Sanskrit and thus not a genuine use of the fourth case suffix. The exceptional 
character of K 2.4.26 is made evident through an examination of other words of various 
grammatical constructions, all belonging to the same lexical field of prostration or homage and 
triggering a second case suffix. Si tu’s observation in this context is very accurate, insofar as 
Kalāpa 2.4.26 (as well as P 2.3.16 and C 2.1.78) belongs to the domain of upapadavibhakti (‘a 
                                                          
810 GC 456.1. 
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case suffix [triggered by] an accompanying word form [in the sentence]’) that is restricted only 
to namas and the other word forms listed in the rule. Thus, it is an exceptional and not a 
prototypical use of the caturthī. Consequently, Si tu concludes that such exceptions do not exist 
in Tibetan, and therefore the morpheme la in dkon mchog de la phyag ’tshal lo must be 
interpreted according to the common grammatical construction that requires a second case in 
its prototypical meaning karman. 
The possible objection that NGg classifies phyag ’tshal ba as a fourth case and this 
classification could be retained through the treatise’s theory of a purpose for the agent is 
immediately rejected by Si tu: 
 gnas brgyad rtsa ’grel gyi don ’ga’ zhig bsgrub bya las sgrub byed du mi ’gro ba yod 
 cing rnam dbye bzhi pa ’jug tshul ’di’ang brtag dgos te/     chu ’dren pa’i byed pa po’i 
 ched yin pa’i rgyu mtshan gyis shing la bzhi pa ’jug pa dang/     phyag ’tshal ba’i bya 
 ba’i ched yin pa’i rgyu mtshan gyis mchod rten la bzhi pa ’jug par ’dod pa de lta na/     
 shan pas phyugs gsod/     tshong pas nor sgrub/     kha zas la longs spyod/     lta bu 
 rnams la’ang rim par gsod pa po dang sgrub pa po’i ched yin pas phyugs dang nor la 
 bzhi pa ’jug par thal ba dang/     longs spyod pa’i bya ba’i ched yin pas kha zas la bzhi 
 pa ’jug par thal ba sogs dang/     sprang po la zan sbyin lta bur sbyin bya’am sbyin byed 
 kyi ched du ma yin pas sbyin yul la bzhi pa mi ’jug par thal ba sogs skyon mtha’ yas 
 shing/     brda sprod pa’i bstan bcos tshad ldan gang du’ang de ’dra’i rnam gzhag bshad 
 pa ma mthong bas so/ 
“There is some content (don) of the Eight Linguistic Topics’ root and commentary that 
 cannot  be reasoned/evidenced (bsgrub bya las sgrub byed du mi ’gro ba)811 and also 
 this mode of application (~ ’jug tshul)812 of the fourth case here requires investigation. 
 If it is like it is claimed that the fourth [case] joins to the tree because there is a purpose 
 (ched) for the agent of the watering (chu ’dren pa), or the fourth [case] joins to the stupa 
 because there is a purpose (ched) of the action of prostration (phyag ’tshal ba’i bya ba), 
 then it follows that also in ‘the butcher kills cattle’ (shan pa phyugs gsod), ‘the merchant 
 acquires wealth’ (tshong bas nor sgrub) [or] ‘to enjoy the food’ (kha zas la longs 
 spyod), a fourth [case] joins to the cattle and the wealth respectively because it is for the 
                                                          
811 Or more literally: “which do not go from [the stage of] a probandum to [the stage of] 
proof/reasoning/evidence.”  
812 Since ’jug pa is used in its tha mi dad form (‘to engage,’ ‘enter,’ etc.), the technical term ’jug tshul would be 
more accurately ‘the mode of how [the fourth case, etc.] joins.’ The equally used sbyor tshul would then be the 
tha dad pa pendant (‘mode of application’). With regard to the current investigation, this difference may be 
neglected. 
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 sake (ched) of the killer and the acquirer, and to the food because it is for the sake of the 
 action of enjoying. And as regards ‘to give food to the beggar,’ it follows that a fourth 
 [case] does not join to the recipient (sbyin yul), since it is not for the sake of either the 
 action of giving (sbyin bya) or the agent of giving (sbyin byed). [There would be] 
countless mistakes and [moreover] explanations of such a taxonomy (rnam 
 gzhag) do not appear in any authoritative/reliable (tshad ldan) Sanskrit (?) grammatical 
 treatise (brda sprod pa’i bstan bcos).”813 
Si tu’s argument against the theory of NGg is a typical example of a reductio ad absurdum. He 
demonstrates the arbitrariness of this theory by providing a number of additional sample phrases 
that would either require or reject fourth case marking under the provision of NGg’s model. If 
the fourth case does not necessarily indicate a purpose or – in Si tu’s conception – a benefit for 
the marked argument itself, it would no longer be possible to distinguish the syntactic or 
semantic circumstances under which an argument of a sentence takes fourth case marking. A 
purpose for the agent may be inferred in many of Si tu’s provided counterexamples, the 
grammatical construction of which does not and cannot exhibit a fourth case marking. On the 
other hand, instances typically classified as fourth cases in the tradition may be required to drop 
their status because they no longer fulfill NGg’s parameter of an agentive purpose. 
It may be agreed that Si tu’s observations are linguistically relevant insofar as the information 
encoded by a grammatical marker needs to be related to the marked argument itself rather than 
another argument in the sentence. As already discussed in the presentation of Si tu’s own 
conception of the fourth case, his addition of an implied action connected to the marked 
argument is able to account for clear purposive instances, such as sha’i ched du phyugs gsod 
(‘to kill cattle for meat’), in which there is no benefit for the marked argument itself, and it may 
be assumed that this refinement is more accurate with regard to WT. 
Si tu’s reductio ad absurdum by means of counterexamples also highlights the objectivist status 
of NGg’s theory, since it mainly considers possible purposes of the entities involved in a 
scenario regardless of any grammatical construction and its encoded relations. This does not, 
however, necessarily imply that Si tu himself would not have followed a strongly objectivist 
                                                          
813 GC 455.2. Note that in the GC this quotation is situated shortly following the previous one, despite the fact 
that the page numbering indicates that it comes first. In volume 6 of Sherab Gyaltsen’s edition of Si tu’s 
collected works (1990), pages 455 and 456 are interchanged. 
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approach in his classification of la don with phyag ’tshal ba, as demonstrated by his own 
argumentation for a second case las/las su bya ba.814 
The initial issue of the correct classification of the la-morpheme in SCP 1.2 is primarily caused 
by the simple fact that according to the traditional case model the morpheme la encodes both 
the information of las su bya ba and dgos ched. Any argumentation for or against a certain 
classification may be based on different methodologies, rationales and approaches, and the 
former grammarians have basically adhered to the Sanskritic classification of phyag ’tshal ba’s 
translational equivalent namas. Conversely, Si tu has argued that the classification of the 
category phyag ’tshal ba as a fourth case has resulted from a direct adoption of Sanskritic 
grammatical knowledge already in the early Tibetan tradition, however with the lack of a 
sufficient linguistic basis. Thus, what is Si tu’s linguistic basis to argue for the second case? 
The interesting point in this context is that Si tu’s argumentation did not and could not dispense 
with the old classification merely based on the grammatical features of the Tibetan phrase, 
instead he argued for his counter-classification first of all with recourse to Sanskritic grammar. 
Si tu’s argument required Sanskritic support, since the best known grammatical construction to 
express the homage to a deity in Sanskrit was that of namas plus a fourth case suffix, and Si tu 
therefore needed to explain this discrepancy; and his demonstration that also in Sanskrit the 
majority of case affixations with verbs of homage or prostration are that of second case suffixes 
certainly supported his reclassification through recourse to the general authority of the 
Sanskritic role model. 
Yet, Si tu’s argument went much further than to merely demonstrate that there are different case 
marking patterns within the semantic field of homage or prostration in Sanskrit, since he did so 
by distinguishing between a generic and an exceptional pattern (spyir btang gi sgrub pa vs. 
grags pa dmigs bsal). This distinction, in turn, was not only based on a quantitative assessment 
of all the different case marking patterns throughout the listed Sanskrit grammatical 
constructions, but Si tu connects it to the actual meaning or constitution of the action of homage 
(don thob/don ’thob) that he provides at the end of the second last quotation: according to his 
theory, the fourth case is that of the beneficiary, and since the deity is not benefitted by the 
action of homage – a fact even known by the unlearned shepherd – a second case must be the 
generic case application. This interpretation of the action of prostration is the one ‘acquired 
                                                          
814 We are now returning to the second last quotation that presents his main argument against the fourth and for 
the second case (cf. supra 310f.). 
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through the meaning/content’ (don thob = don gyis thob pa),815 in other words, it represents the 
actual meaning of the action as such, i.e. the scenario of prostration in contrast to the worldly 
exceptional convention of namas + fourth case suffix. Consequently, the proposed Tibetan 
second case marking, as much as the Sanskrit second case marking pattern, is not just connected 
to their respective underlying semantic structures that may vary across languages but are also 
connected to the actual meaning of the scenario. 
It is this actual meaning through which Si tu has decided how to classify phyag ’tshal ba and 
which of the case categories are at hand. If Sanskrit were to not employ any form of second 
case marking for the scenario of prostration in the various constructions presented by Si tu, this 
might be a sign that Si tu’s semantic construal of prostration is not the actual meaning of the 
scenario, which could further undermine his classification in Tibetan that according to his views 
only follows the actual meaning in this case. If my understanding is correct, it is most likely 
due to this reason that Si tu has demonstrated different Sanskrit-specific case marking patterns 
for the scenario of prostration, since through demonstrating that Sanskrit shares the same pattern 
even more often than the fourth case suffix, there is no competing construal to be considered 
and Si tu is free to apply his modifications. 
This argument of Si tu is one of the few clear instances in his work that the linguistic basis of 
case grammar and the classification of cases in general was deeply rooted in a focus on actions 
in the phenomenal world and their actual or objective meaning. Thus, Si tu did not simply 
occasionally fall victim to the objectivist error, in fact he systematically and intentionally 
followed an objectivist approach.816 With the focus on actual meanings of actions that persist 
across languages, classifications such as his tshogs na nor ’gyed or shing la chu ’dren are only 
a matter of time – may they be inspired through comparison with Sanskrit case marking 
patterns, metalinguistic-philosophical or intuitively governed investigations into the nature of 
an action, or the established taxonomical framework of the case model.  
Interestingly, Si tu’s proposed taxonomy for Tibetan phyag ’tshal ba is indeed linguistically 
preferable, and perhaps it was even inspired by his intuitive understanding of Tibetan language, 
but he nonetheless took recourse to the idea of an actual meaning of the instance of prostration 
as such. The Tibetan-specific case marking pattern is determined not by simply asking how the 
Tibetan verb frame encodes this scenario, and thus Si tu needed to take a detour through the 
actual meaning of the verb frame. First, by help of Sanskrit he determined a generic case 
                                                          
815 Si tu uses don thob twice in his argument against the fourth case (cf. supra 310f.). 
816 For the perhaps strongest evidence of the systematic character of this approach, cf. chapter 16. 
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marking-pattern that he regarded as connected to an actual meaning of the scenario. Then he 
argues that Tibetan follows the actual meaning and thus applies his understanding of the 
scenario to the Tibetan case marker la. This last point, however, implies that Si tu allowed for 
a difference between linguistic expression and the phenomenal world as its content. As revealed 
through his distinction between the generic patterns which follow the actual meaning and the 
exceptional or special uses of the cases, he accepts that languages not necessarily directly 
encode this actual meaning. He merely argues that Tibetan lacks such exceptional uses of the 
fourth case and that the Tibetan construction thus is a direct representation of the actual 
meaning. In his argument, Si tu has not elaborated how he has reached his conclusion that 
Tibetan follows the actual meaning and not an exceptional convention that would allow for a 
fourth case. 
What can we say about Si tu’s theoretical foundation of the case model if we connect the idea 
of an actual meaning of actions with his claim of the universality of the cases as necessarily 
existing in all meaningful languages? Si tu utilizes the proposed semantic case categories as a 
representative account of actions as such and their actual constitution. He frequently focuses on 
the understanding of a sentence’s underlying phenomenal scenario in his linguistic analysis, 
and since such scenarios are shared by speakers across languages, this focus explains instantly 
why to him the cases exist in all languages.  
This brings back the question already raised during the presentation of GNT’s objectivist 
approach,817 namely form and extent to which Si tu conceived the eight cases as linguistic 
universals, as well as what the ontological status of such universals may be. Although Si tu is 
very explicit in his claim of the universality of the cases and that it is related to the actual 
constitution of actions as such, he omits any further elaboration of the philosophical-linguistic 
foundation of this approach, nor does he provide a systematic methodology how to arrive at the 
actual meaning of an action. As mentioned above, Si tu seemingly followed more a 
commonsense approach by comparing and reconciling Sanskrit and Tibetan grammatical 
structures, meta-linguistic philosophical investigations and intuitive understandings of sample 
phrases for his interpretation of an action such as the prostration to a deity.818 Similar to the 
GNT, Si tu’s objectivist approach to the cases was likely inherited from or informed by more 
linguistic-philosophical conceptualizations of language and the case functions, perhaps coming 
from Sanskritic kāraka-theories, discourses in the larger context of śābdabodha (‘verbal 
                                                          
817 Cf. supra 193ff. 
818 Cf. supra 315. 
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cognition’), or even Buddhist linguistic-philosophical discourses in the context of 
Madhyamaka, Yogācāra or Pramāṇa. However, as this was not further commented or 
problematized, any such foundation survived in Si tu’s GC only indirectly in the form of 
remnants as presented in this dissertation. In Si tu’s context, it may also be repeated that he 
himself did not author any work on the mentioned Buddhist philosophical schools, perhaps a 
counterindication at least against the possibility that he may himself actively rooted his 
objectivist approach in one of these schools.819 
While the representative character of the cases for an explanation of the world of phenomena 
explains immediately the supposed universal validity of the cases, why should they necessarily 
exist in all languages? Is a language with syntactic and semantic structures that do not follow 
the actual meaning of actions impossible? Through his distinction into generic and 
special/exceptional case marking patterns, Si tu seems to accept that languages may deviate 
from the actual meaning of a scenario, yet he apparently also seems to claim or believe that all 
languages must have some form to directly represent these case categories. Probably he 
regarded Sanskrit and Tibetan as two such templates that prove his point. 
If this proposed interpretation of Si tu’s argument and consequently of his objectivist approach 
to case grammar in general proves to be consistent, the following four noteworthy addendums 
to features of Si tu’s case model discussed thus far must be considered.  
1) Now that it can be ascertained that Si tu systematically followed an objectivist approach that 
focuses first of all on the actual meaning of actions, it is better understood how obvious 
misclassifications have arisen, such as na as a fourth case marker in tshogs na nor ’gyed, and 
that they were not simply his intentional attempt at reconciling an incorrect taxonomy with 
Tibetan morphosyntax. If an authoritative source such as SCP classifies na as a purposive 
marker, it is reasonable to test this assumption through finding representative instances that 
prove or disprove this classification. Si tu as well as Pra ti and others presumably struggled to 
find representative examples because of the distinct locative functioning of na in Tibetan. 
However, as already stated in the examination of Si tu’s tshogs na nor ’gyed, there were two 
active components in his objectivist misclassification, one to impose the Tibetan-specific 
generic valency of ’gyed pa on the case marker na, and another one to impose a purposive 
construal on this Tibetan-specific generic valency of ’gyed pa. Both impositions come together 
in his focus on the actual meaning of the action ’gyed pa. Si tu’s more systematic focus on the 
                                                          
819 Cf. supra 52. For more information on the theoretical foundation of the objectivist approach in Tibetan 
grammar, cf. also point 5 of chapter 15, in particular infra 427ff. 
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actual meaning of actions, and in this case of ’gyed pa, must have led him to the impression 
that at least in such instances na has a purposive meaning in the language. The problem is a 
methodological one: If the focus is deflected away from the distributional behavior of 
morphemes across syntactic-semantic language environments to the actual meaning of the 
action as understood by Si tu, then this indeed suggests a purposive meaning of na. The same 
applies to the other incorrect classifications, such as shing la chu ’dren. If an actual meaning of 
chu ’dren pa is taken as the basis, and it is seen as connected to a purposive meaning due to the 
established Sanskritic interpretations of this instance, then this indeed gives the impression that 
one of the functions of la is purpose. To circumvent this issue and test whether a particular case 
marker has this or that function, a more systematic and distributional approach with a special 
focus on the morphemes’ behavior rather than the meaning of the verb’s action would have 
been required. On its own, a sample phrase does not provide sufficient information about the 
meaning of a morpheme, and a focus on the actual meaning of the action may then suggest all 
kinds of meanings encoded by the case markers, even more strongly if this meaning is accepted 
as persisting across languages. This is a decisive feature of the process in which an objectivist 
focus confirms the established taxonomy in a grammatical work such as Si tu’s GC. 
2) Another point regards what was referred to above as the interpretative approach in Si tu’s 
general definition of the second case karman that covers the Tibetan-specific instances of 
ALLATIVE, INDIRECT OBJECT and even PATIENT. In this context, it was asked and not 
conclusively answered whether Si tu’s interpretative approach to subsume the Tibetan-specific 
uses of la don under karman is connected to an objectivist approach. From what was just said 
above, it may be added that an action’s engagement in its locus (~ bya ba ’jug pa’i yul) is part 
of the actual meaning of certain actions, and thus a relevant linguistic category particularly for 
generic case marking patterns. Tibetan-specific case categories such as ALLATIVE, etc. are 
then to be subsumed under this category, since they are covered by the category of karman and 
appear only as secondary, minor variations or perhaps even a type of language-specific 
convention, although a convention that remains covered by karman, the latter being constitutive 
or representative for the actual meaning. In this way, Si tu’s interpretative account of la, na and 
du as markers of karman is deeply embedded in his objectivist approach.  
3) Likewise, the proposed double classification of bum par in bum par chu blugs in the context 
of the second case seems to be indeed based on Si tu’s objectivist construal of the scenario of 
pouring water.820 Does this mean that he allowed one and the same marker in a single clause to 
                                                          
820 Cf. supra 233f. 
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have two meanings, as long as the action as such conveys two participations for one and the 
same participant in that semantic construal which is deemed representative for the actual 
meaning of the action? The passage does give this impression, if Si tu’s interpretation of bum 
par chu blugs is read as it is contained in his work and without contextualizing it in Sanskrit 
case marking patterns. The idea seems then to be that la in this clause may have both meanings 
due to the actual meaning of the action of pouring, and yet, while they are not expressed 
simultaneously, whichever of the two meanings surfaces depends perhaps either on the context, 
the speaker’s intention or the audience’s understanding. 
4) Without the need to provide definite answers and in view of the double classification of bum 
par chu blugs, it may further be asked whether in Si tu’s view samples such as tshogs na nor 
’gyed would allow for a double classification as a fourth and seventh case, depending on how 
he envisaged the action as such? 
 
On a final note, Si tu’s argument for the exclusion of phyag ’tshal ba from the fourth case also 
contains a clarification about the semantic difference between the second and fourth case in 
terms of an action’s locus/domain (bya yul) that is either benefitted (= fourth case) or not 
benefitted (= second case). It was already demonstrated in the historical survey of the fourth 
case that NGg and GNT, although they use the term yul (‘locus,’ ‘focus,’ ‘domain,’ object’), do 
not feature any clear indication of an underlying theory. In contrast, Si tu’s use of the term 
seems to be more systematic. Both his renditions of the fourth case under SCP 9.3-11.4 as well 
as SCP 1.1-2 explicitly identify the bya (ba’i) yul as the beneficiary in case of a fourth case. As 
he states in his remarks on phyag ’tshal ba, the item marked by the syntactic link la don is a 
domain or locus of the action in both cases, yet in one instance it is the benefitted one, resulting 
in a fourth case marking. However, it has not been specified whether this means that both the 
arguments in the second and the fourth cases are an action’s locus in the sense that an action 
engages (bya ba ’jug pa’i yul), or whether Si tu wished to distinguish between that locus of the 
action in which the action engages (= second case) and that locus of the action which is 
benefitted from that action (= fourth case). In other words, is bya ba ’jug pa’i yul the 
overarching category for both cases or is bya ba’i yul the overarching category in his model 
that may be subdivided into bya ba ’jug pa’i yul and ched du bya ba’i yul? In any event, it may 
only be speculated whether Si tu’s use of the term bya ba’i yul in both contexts was meant to 
acknowledge the Tibetan-specific structural affinity of constructions such as bram zas la zan 
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byin (‘food was given to the brahmin;’ fourth case) and bum pa la chu blugs (‘water was poured 
into the pot;’ second case).  
In total, Si tu’s exclusion of phyag ’tshal ba represents an important refinement in line with the 
structures of Tibetan language, since phyag ’tshal ba indeed does not exhibit any purposive 
meaning in its syntax, although many aspects of his reclassification are not based on Tibetan-
specific considerations but include Sanskrit grammatical as well as objectivist arguments. 
10.2.3 Résumé on the Fourth Case in the Great Commentary 
In the GC, the fourth case dgos ched or ched du bya ba follows the established purposive 
function of the former tradition. However, Si tu’s conception has also added important 
morphological and functional refinements. On the level of morphology, he excluded 
periphrastic constructions such as ched du, phyir du and others, which encode purposive 
information but are only constructions endowed with clarifying terms (gsal bar byed pa’i sgra 
dang ldan pa) and thus not case markers as such. It was stated above that this represents a clear 
instance which demonstrates Si tu’s multilayered understanding of rnam dbye which also 
included morphological-derivational parameters despite its strong focus on the functions in 
general. 
Regarding the meaning of the fourth case, Si tu has first specified the category dgos ched in 
terms of phan ’dogs (‘benefit’), more specifically a benefit of the action either for the marked 
argument or an action connected to it. This adaptation was perhaps inspired to some extent by 
Sanskritic grammar, the notion of benefit possibly by Vārttika 4 on P 2.3.13 and the inclusion 
of (implicit) actions that are benefitted presumably by P 2.3.14-15 or K 2.4.28. The restriction 
of the purpose or benefit to exclusively the marked argument or a connected action also went 
hand in hand with the rejection of NGg’s theory of an agentive purpose that Si tu charged with 
the fault of arbitrariness. A second adaptation is the exclusion of phyag ’tshal ba from the fourth 
case, a classification that was previously accepted in the Tibetan tradition mostly due to its 
relation to the Sanskrit equivalent namas. Si tu, in contrast, classifies phyag ’tshal ba as a 
second case by help of his Sanskrit expertise and a recourse to the idea of an actual semantic 
constitution of the action at hand that in his theory does not exhibit any benefit for the marked 
argument.  
It is of utmost importance for a proper understanding of Si tu’s case grammar that he 
presupposes the existence of an actual meaning of the action that ultimately decides between 
actual and exceptional case marking patterns. This provides a pivotal insight in the conceptual 
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foundation of his claim to the multilingual validity of the cases, and it also improves our 
understanding of the frequent objectivist classifications such as tshogs na nor ’gyed (‘to 
distribute wealth among the community,’ example 8 in Si tu’s fourth case). The case functions 
as basic semantic categories that are valid and manifest in any meaningful language are 
established through the supposition of an actual semantic constitution of phenomenal actions 
that persists across languages. 
Through his indeed accurate observation that in Sanskrit grammars namas is a non-kāraka 
trigger of the fourth case suffix, Si tu was able to adapt established taxonomies and account 
more accurately for the Tibetan-specific structure of the verb frame phyag ’tshal ba. Although 
based on objectivist grounds, he therefore achieved a reconciliation of established Sanskritic 
taxonomies and Tibetan language without violating the significance of the fourth case suffix in 
the Sanskrit context.  
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11 Rnam dbye lnga pa ’byung khungs 
11.1 Historical Survey 
The standard designation for the fifth case is ’byung khungs (‘source,’ ‘origin’), a function 
expressed in the Tibetan grammatical system by the two morphemes las and nas. Some sources 
do not mention both morphemes but focus exclusively on las.821  In Sum rtags, these two 
morphemes including their function as ’byung khungs are treated in SCP 16.2-4: 
 rjes ’jug yi ge bcu po yi/     
 bzhi pa dgu pa la bcu pa/      
 sbyar ba ’byung khungs sa yin te/ 
 “Of the ten postscript letters,  
 the tenth [sa] to the fourth [na] and ninth [la respectively]  
 applied is the semantic domain of source/origin.” 
In his Mkhas ’jug (KhJ), Sakya Paṇḍita gives the following concise definition of the fifth case: 
 shing las ’bras bu ’byung zhes bya ba lta bu lnga pa ’byung khungs […] 
 “As in ‘the fruit originates/comes from the tree’ (shing las ’bras bu ’byung), the fifth 
 [case is] source/origin (’byung khungs).”822 
In this definition, the technical term ’byung khungs is treated as more or less self-explanatory 
and is merely defined by the use of the case’s prototypical verb frame ’byung ba (‘to come 
forth,’ ‘originate,’ ‘appear,’ ‘occur’) that is part of the technical term itself. The verb ’byung ba 
usually triggers the morpheme las to indicate the origin or source from which the unmarked 
argument arises from. Depending on the context, ’byung ba may involve a causal dimension in 
the sense of an actual origination from the item marked by las (as in sa bon las myu gu ’byung 
‘a sprout originates from the seed’), or it more generally indicates only the appearance or 
occurrence at/from the item marked by the morpheme las (as in gzhung ’di las ’byung ‘[this 
quotation/point/argument] occurs in this text’). For the sake of clarity, in the following the 
category ‘origination/origin’ will be taken to refer to the narrower, causal understanding of 
’byung ba and ’byung khungs, whereas ‘appearance/source’ will refer to its broader, non-causal 
understanding. As this historical survey is designed to demonstrate, these two categories are 
                                                          
821 MVY (4742) only lists shing las (cf. HSGLT 2, 26) and Facheng only ljon shing las (cf. ibid., 362). Similarly, 
NGg and GNT both only employ las (cf. CT 115 – 433; CT 115 – 456ff.).  
822 KhJ 2009, 25. 
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crucial in the context of the Tibetan fifth case ’byung khungs, not only because ’byung ba as 
the core of the fifth case’s conception can have both meanings in WT, but even more so because 
both categories have already figured in Sanskritic conceptions of the prototypical fifth case 
function apādāna and in this form have shaped the Tibetan adoption and adaptation of this case. 
Moreover, it must be noted that these two uses of ’byung ba may also impede a precise 
understanding of the fifth case ’byung khungs in grammatical sources, whether it refers to a 
causal origin or a more general source.  
As for Sakya Paṇḍita’s definition of the fifth case in the KhJ, his condensed presentation does 
not explicate the precise understanding of ’byung khungs in terms of causal origin vs. general 
source. Judging from his only example of fruits coming from the tree, a causal origination seems 
to be indeed emphasized, however a reading of the phrase in terms of ‘fruits appear/occur at or 
come from the tree’ cannot be ruled out without more detailed information.  
Many Sum rtags commentators have provided more extensive lists of examples, for example 
that of Pra ti in his SCP commentary Kun bzang dgongs rgyan: 
 de yang rnam dbye lnga pa la ’jug pa ni/     dper na/     ri nas chu byung/     gnam las 
 char babs/     sa las myu gu smin/     rta las lhungs/     chos nas bshad lta bu ’byung 
 khungs gang nas byung ba ston pa’o/ 
 “Likewise, as for [how the morphemes derived in SCP 16.2-3] take on the fifth case, it 
 indicates the origination/appearance (byung ba) from some origin/source (’byung 
 khungs), as in ‘water has come from the mountain’ (ri nas chu byung), ‘water has fallen 
 from the sky’ (gnam las char babs), ‘sprouts ripen out of the soil’ (sa las myu gu smin), 
 ‘fallen from the horse’ (rta las lhungs), ‘explained from the Dharma’ (chos nas bshad 
 ?).”823 
Following SCP, Pra ti provides examples which employ both the morphemes las as well as nas, 
with nas being used twice in ri nas chu byung (‘water has come from the mountain’) and chos 
nas bshad (‘explained from the Dharma’?). The fact that the verb frame ’byung ba as part of 
the fifth case’s designation usually triggers the morpheme las and not nas raises the question 
regarding Pra ti’s grammar whether his example ri nas chu byung is actually grammatical, or if 
it is rather the attempt to find a representative instance of origin/source with the morpheme nas. 
                                                          
823 Pra ti 2013A, 212. 
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A perhaps more genuine use of the morpheme nas would be Zha lu’s example shar nas nyid 
ma ’char (‘the sun rises from the east’).824  
The fact that ’byung ba triggers las rather than nas points towards the direction that the two 
morphemes are not interchangeable, and even if Pra ti’s use of nas is thus grammatical, this 
does not necessarily indicate that nas in this phrase encodes precisely the same type of 
information as las. Tournadre distinguishes between an ABLATIVE (= las) and an ELATIVE 
(= nas), stating that “the meaning of the ablative is rather specific and much more restricted 
semantically than the elative nas.”825 According to him, the two morphemes are “practically 
equivalent”826 in phrases such as rta las/nas babs (‘(X) dismounted the horse’), in which both 
markers indicate a mere spatial origin in Tournadre’s terminology.827 Additionally, las may also 
express more specific information which Tournadre explains in terms of an “origin of a 
transformation.” 828  This type of las’s use indicates from where something is extracted, 
generated or produced, such as in ba las ’o ma byung (‘the milk comes from the cow’) or ma 
las bu skyes (lit. ‘from the mother a son was born,’ i.e. ‘the mother gave birth to a son’). As 
Tournadre further notes, “for this function, the replacement of las by nas is really problematic: 
 ? ba+nas ’oma+O byung ‘The milk comes from the cow.’, 
 ? ’oma+nas mar+O blangs ‘One take (extract) butter from milk.’, 
 ? ma+nas bu+O skyes ‘A son was born to (litt. from) the mother.’, 
 ? sabon+nas myugu skyes ‘A sprout was born from the seed.’. 
The use of nas in the above sentences would be acceptable only if one wants to indicate only a 
spatial origin.”829 Although not all recent academic accounts make such a distinction between 
the prototypical functions of nas and las,830 the distinction of the two morphemes such as it is 
found in Tournadre’s study is significant. His examples demonstrate an important indication of 
these morphemes’ difference, in the sense that verb frames which possibly or necessarily take 
on causal meanings usually prefer las over nas, such as ’byung ba (‘to originate’) or skye pa 
(‘to come forth,’ ‘being born’), both of which are tha mi dad pa verbs. If we return to Pra ti’s 
                                                          
824 Zha lu 2013A, 13. 
825 Tournadre 2010, 111. On the difference between las and nas in terms of ABLATIVE and ELATIVE, cf. also 
DeLancey 2003; Hill 2012; Hahn 2005, 372f. 
826 Tournadre 2010, 111. 
827 Note that Tournadre specifies that the originated entity in this spatial origin is on the surface of the entity 
from where it departs and not inside (cf. Tournadre 2010, 111). 
828 Tournadre 2010, 111. 
829 Ibid. 
830 Cf. e.g. Schwieger 2006, 281 and 314. 
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example ri nas chu byung, Tournadre allows for such a construction, however its meaning 
would be more that of water occurring at or coming from the mountain, without any other 
relation between the mountain and the water than the mountain being the location of the water’s 
appearance (= general source).  
The outlined syntactic difference between nas and las has not been distinguished in Tibetan 
grammatical sources, in which both are equally treated as the marker of the fifth case, at least 
in those sources that list both morphemes. It was already quoted that Pra ti, for example, states 
that all the different semantic as well as syntactic constructions in his examples fall under the 
domain of the origination or appearance from or out of some origin/source (’byung khungs gang 
nas byung ba), a definition in which he also prefers the morpheme nas over las. How should 
his definition of ’byung khungs gang nas byung ba (‘the origination/appearance from some 
origin/source’) be understood: do ’byung khungs and ’byung ba refer to its narrower, i.e. causal 
understanding in the meaning of ‘to originate from’? Or does Pra ti use it more generally in the 
meaning of ‘something appears/occurs (from) somewhere’? While this is a difficult question 
that requires a separate study, the use of nas instead of las in the definition may have served the 
purpose – either intentionally or intuitively – to emphasize the more general meaning of source 
for ’byung khungs. This would allow him to cover all the different semantic-syntactic 
constructions regardless of which of the morphemes is used or whether the sentence involves a 
causal dimension or not, since also the causal origin may be brought under the category of the 
source from which something appears. In the context of a critique of Smra sgo to separate a 
causal function (rgyu) from ’byung khungs, Pra ti even states that “it is incorrect to separate 
(logs su byed) the meaning of cause (~ rgyu’i ’jug pa) from the meaning of source (’byung 
khungs), and in general it is correct to distinguish between the two mere source (’byung khungs 
tsam) and taking on the meaning of cause (rgyu’i don la ’jug pa) [as] a particular instance 
(khyad par) of that [mere source] […].”831 A broader understanding of the fifth case in Pra ti’s 
grammar in terms of a general source is also corroborated by the example ri nas chu byung, 
which in terms of syntax through its use of nas as well as in terms of content does not necessarily 
indicate a causal relation between the mountain and the water/river.832 
                                                          
831 [...] rgyu’i ’jug pa ’byung khungs kyi don las logs su byed na mi ’thad la/      spyir ’byung khungs tsam dang/     
de’i khyad par rgyu’i don la ’jug pa gnyis kyi dbye bar byed na […] ’thad do/ (Pra ti 2013A, 214).  
For the category of rgyu (‘cause’), which already figures in early Tibetan sources and is derived from a 
secondary meaning of apādāna in P 1.4.30 that covers causal origins such as the material cause, cf. also infra 
327f. and 329ff. On Si tu’s critique of Pra ti’s suggestion to not separate between source and cause, cf. infra 
341f. 
832 In fact, Sanskritic grammars such as the Kāśikāvr̥tti classify precisely this type of example as an instance of 
mere source of appearance or first sight, but not as an example of a causal origination (cf. P 1.4.31; infra 331). 
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If the proposed reading of Pra ti’s account proves consistent, his strategy to base the 
homogeneity of the fifth case on a very broad understanding of ’byung ba and to not account 
for differences between the two morphemes las and nas was certainly motivated by his 
adherence to the established taxonomy of the fifth case in SCP. However, it will be 
demonstrated below that despite the unequivocal adherence to the equivalence of nas and las 
in the context of the fifth case function ’byung khungs, the precise understanding of this 
category still varies. Ultimately, an understanding of the Tibetan grammatical term as well as 
the strategy for bringing together nas and las under the fifth case will have to be investigated 
separately for each author. In general, silence regarding this issue represents a common strategy 
and the exclusive point of reference is often the selection of examples. 
However, Pra ti’s critique of Smr̥tijñānakīrti’s Smra sgo reveals that there were accounts in 
Tibetan grammaticography which distinguished between the categories causal origin and 
spatial source. Smra sgo’s autocommentary states the following on nas and las: 
 rgyu’i don ni sa bon las myu gu zhes pa lta bu’o/     ’byung khungs kyi don ni ri las gser 
 zhes pa lta bu’o/     dgar ba’i don ni khyim pa las dge bsnyen zhe pa lta bu’o/     nas kyi 
 don ni las dang mthun no/ 
 “Regarding the meaning of cause (rgyu), [it is] as in ‘the sprout from the seed.’ As for 
 the meaning of source (’byung khungs), [it is] as in ‘gold from the mountain.’ As for the 
 meaning of distinction (dgar ba), ‘the lay devotee from the householder.’ As for the 
 meaning of [morpheme] nas, it agrees with [morpheme] las [in these three 
 meanings].”833 
This quotation fully explicates the distinction of a causal origination, in examples such as the 
sprout originating from the seed, from a spatial appearance, in instances such as gold appearing 
at the mountain (without the gold and the mountain being causally related). However, Smr̥ti’s 
exposition also makes clear that such a distinction was unlikely inspired by Tibetan-specific 
morphosyntax and the difference between las and nas, emphasizing that both may take on both 
meanings.834 As a Sanskritic scholar, he rather adopted this distinction from the prevalent 
Sanskritic grammatical taxonomies.835 
The question remains to which extent an understanding of ’byung khungs that brings together 
nas and las is a representative account of the structures of WT. This is a rather intricate question 
                                                          
833 Smr̥ti 2002, 91. 
834 On the third mentioned function, dgar ba, cf. infra 334f. and chapter 11.2.1. 
835 Cf. infra 331f. 
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in which different foci will result in different taxonomies. On the one hand, Tournadre states in 
his account that las and nas overlap in their uses as markers of a spatial origin (= source), and 
to my knowledge only few or even none of the verb frames are fully restricted to one of the two 
morphemes. On the other hand, although the category of ’byung khungs in general correctly 
covers the information expressed by both morphemes, their use across different semantic-
syntactic environments reveal that the two are anything but fully interchangeable and they may 
be more accurately differentiated regarding the precise information encoded by them. 
From what was said thus far, it is evident that the precise use of the fifth case markers nas and 
las throughout WT was not the primary focus of the conception of ’byung khungs. 
Consequently, this category loses some of its explanatory power, since the overarching 
understanding of ’byung khungs above nas and las blurs certain aspects of the morphemes’ 
precise distribution. This issue is rooted in the fact that the Tibetan conception of ’byung khungs 
is not only based on the fifth case markers’ language-specific uses, but it also involves the 
adoption of a selected conceptual-terminological framework from Sanskritic grammar that 
needs to be investigated in the context of the early Tibetan grammatical tradition and Sanskritic 
grammatical sources. 
11.1.1 The Development of the Category ’byung khungs out of Sanskritic Grammar 
Based on the kāraka-scheme, the Sanskritic prototypical fifth case function is known as 
apādāna.836 According to the Cāndra model, which has simplified the Pāṇinian model by 
providing self-explanatory notions without any definitions, it is known as avadhi (‘limiting 
point,’ C 2.1.81).837 Pāṇini dedicated a total of eight rules in P 1.4.24-31 to the specification of 
apādāna, with the prototypical definition of P 1.4.24: 
 dhruvam apāye ’pādānam “The fixed point in relation to moving away (is called) 
 apādāna.”838 
Classic examplifications of this definition are grāmād āgacchati (‘s/he comes from the village’) 
or rathāt patitaḥ (‘fallen from the chariot’).839 Evidently, the prototypical definition of the 
prototypical fifth case function in Pāṇini focuses on the idea of a spatial separation or departure. 
The remaining Pāṇinian rules specify apādāna as various intrasentential arguments in 
connection with either clearly defined verbal roots or more general semantic fields: the semantic 
                                                          
836 Cf. P 2.3.28 apādāne pañjamī “If apādāna, then a fifth [vibhakti occurs].” Also cf. K 2.4.19; C 2.1.81. 
837 Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1975, xvii. 
838 Transl. by Joshi and Roodbergen 1995, 90. 
839 Cf. Sharma 1990, 234. 
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fields of bhī (‘to fear’) and trā (‘to protect,’ P 1.4.25), the verb parāji (‘to be overcome (by),’ 
P 1.4.26), the semantic field vāraṇa (‘warding off,’ 1.4.27), the word form antarddhi (‘to hide 
(from),’ P 1.4.28), the conveyer of knowledge in the act of teaching somebody (ākhyātopayoge, 
P 1.4.29), the material cause or origin (prakr̥ti) out of which something comes into being (P 
1.4.30), the source of appearance (prabhava) in connection with bhū (‘to be (first sighted at),’ 
P 1.4.31).840 Kātantra uses apādāna as well but provides only two rules, comprising a selection 
of four functions from the Pāṇinian model (P 1.4.24, 25, 27 and 29): 
 K 2.4.8 yato ’paiti bhayam ādatte vā tad apādānam “That [kāraka] from which one 
 moves away, for which one fears, or from which one takes [or receives] is [termed] 
 point of departure.”841 
 K 2.4.9 īpsitaṃ ca rakṣārthānām “[With verbal roots] of the meaning ‘protecting,’ also 
 the desired is apādāna (= point of departure).”842 
The semantic fields and word forms thus far quoted from Sanskritic grammar merely define the 
prototypical trigger apādāna of the fifth case suffix, but not its remaining uses defined in P 2.3, 
C 2.1 and K 2.4. Just like the first and fourth case, the Tibetan term ’byung khungs is not a 
direct translational equivalent of apādāna. The Tibetan canonical translations of apādāna in 
Pāṇini and Kātantra have rendered the term more literally as nges par kun sbyin pa.843 
Although Si tu was well aware of this translation, he suggested as a more accurate rendition the 
alternative translation ’bral bar len pa (lit. ‘to separatingly take’ ~ ‘to take away’).844  
It is important to note however that Negi in his Tibetan-Sanskrit dictionary by contrast does list 
’byung khungs as a translation of apādāna.845 Moreover, Cāndra’s alternative label of this 
kāraka-function as avadhi (‘limiting point’) was translated with kun nas ’dzin pa in the Peking 
and Snar thang editions of the canonical translation of Cāndravyākaraṇa (CG 1; 13th/14th 
century) but with ’byung khungs in CG 24 (probably 14th century),846 an alternative translation 
of  the Cāndravyākaraṇa contained only in the Sde dge and Co ne editions of the bstan ’gyur.847 
The translations of both the terms apādāna and avadhi in the Tibetan tradition therefore allow 
for the possibility that ’byung khungs was directly derived from the two Sanskritic terms as 
                                                          
840 Cf. e.g. Sharma 1990, 234ff. 
841 Transl. Verhagen HSGLT 2, 281. 
842 E.g. yavebhyo gāṃ rakṣati ‘(s)he keeps the cow off the grass’ 
843 Cf. HSGLT 2, 356 and 359. 
844 Cf. GC 495.3. 
845 Cf. Negi 2002, 4050. 
846 Cf. HSGLT 2, 109, ft. 2. 
847 Cf. HSGLT 2, 357; HSGLT 1, CG 1 and CG 24. 
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their less literal but general equivalent. Yet, the early Tibetan accounts suggest a more intricate 
and layered transition from the Sanskritic to the Tibetan conception of the prototypical fifth 
case function than that through merely the translation of technical terms.848 
11.1.2 Early Accounts of the Fifth Case and the Transition from Sanskritic apādāna to 
Tibetan ’byung khungs 
Already before Smra sgo, GNT provided a selection of three functions for the fifth case, namely 
rgyu (‘cause/reason’), ’byung ba’i sa (‘semantic domain of origination/appearance’) and dgar 
ba’i sa (‘semantic domain of distinction’), which are all separately explained and illustrated.849 
The causal function is explained as follows: 
 de rnams las rgyu lnga pa ni sa bon las myu gu zhes pa’i [sic!]850 dang/     pha las bu 
 ’byung zhes pa la sogs pa yin la/     de yang gnas gsum pa’i rgyu yis ’bras bu skyed pa 
 thams cad kyang byed pa po’i gsum pa yin pa dang/     don gyi ngo bo gcig la gnas skabs 
 kyi bye brag gis gsum pa ni rgyu yi ’bras bu byas pa’i byed pa po’i ldog pa nas bshad 
 la/      ’dir ni rgyu las ’bras bu ’byung ba’i ’byung gnas ’then pa yin te/     rgyu’i lnga 
 pa’i don to/ 
 “Of these [three semantic domains], the fifth [case] of cause is, for example, ‘a sprout 
 [originates] from a seed’ (sa bon las myu gu) and ‘a son originates from the father’ (pha 
 las bu ’byung). Furthermore, all creations of a result (’bras bu skyed pa) by a cause of 
 the third semantic domain are the third [semantic domain] of the agent. A single 
 instance [of cause] (~ don gyi ngo bo gcig) is explained due to the specific 
 situation/context [either] as a third [case] from the side (~ ldog pa nas) of an agent who 
 made (byas pa) the result of the cause, or here, [in these examples, the semantic domain 
 of] origin (’byung gnas) follows, [according to which] the result originates (’byung ba) 
 from the cause. [This latter is] the meaning of the fifth [case as] cause (rgyu).”851   
The category of rgyu is only briefly illustrated by means of two examples, namely the sprout 
which originates from the seed as well as the son which originates from the father. Of less 
importance to the current context but still noteworthy, the author also distinguishes between the 
causal meaning of the third and the fifth case based on the verbs byed pa (‘to do,’ ‘to make’) 
and ’byung ba, which respectively constitute the semantic foundation of the two cases (byed pa 
                                                          
848 Cf. also HSGLT 2, ft. 421. Here, Verhagen disagrees with a categoric identification of ’byung khungs with 
the term apādāna. 
849 Cf. CT 115 – 456. 
850 I read pa. 
851 Ibid. 
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po vs. ’byung khung).852 As for GNT’s secondary fifth-case function, i.e. ’byung ba’i sa (‘the 
semantic domain of origination/appearance’), the text continues as follows: 
 ’byung khungs kyi lnga pa ni ldog pa’i bye brag mang ste/     nyes dmigs kyi ’byung 
 khungs dang yon tan gyi ’byung khungs dang/     brko zhing blangs pa’i ’byung khungs 
 dang/     ’phel ba’i zhing [sic!]853 mched pa’i ’byung khungs dang rnam par ’gyur ba’i 
 ’byung khungs la sogs ldog pa shin tu mang ste/     de la nyes dmigs ’byung khungs ni 
 ’khor ba’i sems can las skyon nam nyes pa thams cad ’byung ngo/     zhes pa la sogs pa 
 dang/     yon tan gyi ’byung khungs ni ’phags pa las yon tan thams cad ’byung zhes pa 
 lta bu la sogs pa dang/     brko zhing blang ba’i ’byung khungs ni ri ’ka’ zhig las gser 
 ’byung zhes pa dang/     brad ’ga’ zhig las dngul ’byung zhes pa lta bu la sogs pa’o/     
 ’phel zhing mched pa’i ’byung khungs ni/     mar me gcig las stong la sogs pa sbar te 
 zhes pa lta bu la sogs pa’o/     rnam pa gzhan tu ’gyur ba’i ’byung khungs ni snang ba 
 las mi snang bar gyur to/     zhes pa lta bu la sogs pa dang/     snga ma’i gzugs de nyid 
 las gzhan du sprul te/     zhes pa la sogs pa lta bu’o/     lnga pa’i ’byung khungs ’di nyid 
 de nyid las gzhan du brjod du med pa la yang mthong ste/     gzugs las kyang stong pa 
 nyid gzhan ma yin stong pa nyid las kyang gzugs gzhan ma yin no zhes pa la sogs pa lta 
 bu du ma snang ngo/     de lta bu la sogs pa’i ’byung khungs ni spros na bsam gyis mi 
 khyab par zhes par bya’o/ 
 “The fifth [case] of source/origin (ʼbyung khungs) has many different facets (ltog pa’i 
 bye brag mang), viz. lots of facets such as the source/origin of defects (nyes dmigs), the 
 source/origin of qualities (yon tan), the source/origin of digging out and taking (brko 
 zhing blangs), the source/origin of enlargement and increasing (ʼphel zhing mched 
 pa), the source/origin of change (rnam par ʼgyur ba), etc. Thus, the source/origin of 
 defects [would be], for example, ‘all the faults and defects (skyon nam nyes pa) come 
 from (las) samsaric beings (ʼkhor ba’i sems can).’ The source/origin of qualities [would 
 be] ‘all the qualities come from noble beings (ʼphags pa).’ The source/origin of digging 
 out and taking [would be], for example ‘gold comes from some mountains,’ or ‘Silver 
 comes from some rocks.’ The source/origin of enlargement and increasing [would be], 
 for example, ‘From one butter lamp, a thousand and so on are inflamed.’ The 
 source/origin of changing into another aspect (rnam pa gzhan du ʼgyur ba) [would be], 
 for example, ‘From appearance [it] changed into disappearance’ or ‘[he/she] incarnated 
                                                          
852 Note that also NGg relates the two categories of agent and origin in a very condensed manner (cf. infra 337f.). 
853 I read ’phel zhing. 
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 (sprul) from that earlier body/form (gzugs) into another,’ etc. The fifth [case’s] 
 source/origin als occurs for [the indication] that this very entity is not to be differentiated 
 (gzhan du brjod du med pa) from that very entity. [This use] figures frequently such as 
 in ‘neither is emptiness different from form, nor is form different from emptiness’ 
 (gzugs las kyang stong pa nyid gzhan ma yin stong pa nyid las kyang gzugs gzhan ma 
 yin no). [All] these and similar [types of] source/origin are to be known as extendable 
 beyond imagination (de lta bu la sogs paʼi ʼbyung khungs ni spros na bsam gyis mi 
 khyab par shes par byaʼo).”854 
The author introduced a variety of subcategories that are regarded as incomplete but may be 
extended. The provided categories of rgyu and ’byung khungs together with their examples in 
the GNT allow a comparison of these categories with the Pāṇinian definition of apādāna. As 
it was already outlined above,855 from the eight rules that define the kāraka in the Aṣṭādhyāyī, 
the final two are dedicated to the categories prakr̥ti (‘origin, material cause’) and prabhava 
(‘source’): 
 P 1.4.30 janikarttuḥ prakr̥tiḥ “The origin/material cause of the agent of origination [is 
 apādāna].” 
 Example from Kāśikāvr̥tti: śr̥ṅgāc charo jāyate ‘an arrow originates (is made) from 
 horn’ 
 P 1.4.31 bhuvaḥ prabhavaḥ “The source [of the agent of] first appearance [is apādāna].” 
 Example from Kāśikāvr̥tti: himavato gaṅgā prabhavati ‘the Gaṅgā appears in the 
 Himālaya’856 
Following the Kāśikāvr̥tti, the term prakr̥ti should be understood in terms of kāraṇa 
(‘instrument,’ ‘cause’) or hetu (‘cause’). In this sense it represents a genuine causal origin, 
although the commentarial literature seems to disagree whether P 1.4.30 is restricted to material 
causes in terms of upādāna or whether it allows for any type of cause.857 According to the 
Nyāsa commentary, the difference to P 1.4.31 is that the latter covers only those sources in 
which something is first sighted or appears for the first time but without it being the cause. 
                                                          
854 CT 115 – 456f. 
855 Cf. supra 327f.  
856 For the translation of these rules, cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1975, 100 and 106; Sharma 1990, 240ff. 
857 Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1995, 101; Sharma 1990, 241. 
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Thus, the Gaṅgā is regarded as merely springing from the Himālaya, but the latter is not seen 
as its actual causal origin, and therefore this instance cannot be covered by P 1.4.30.858 
On a mere terminological basis, the Tibetan terms rgyu and ’byung khungs directly resonate 
with Sanskrit prabhava as well as prakr̥ti, the latter understood as kāraṇa (‘ cause’) or hetu 
(‘cause’). 859  While rgyu is the common translational equivalent of both kāraṇa and hetu, 
Tibetan ’byung ba has been used as a common translation for the verb prabhavati (‘to appear,’ 
‘come forth’).860 Apart from this terminological congruence, GNT’s category of rgyu (‘cause,’ 
‘reason’) and the two provided examples of sa bon las myu gu (‘the sprout [originates] from 
the seed’) and pha las bu ’byung (‘the son originates from the father’) also directly resonate 
with P 1.4.30 and the category of a (material) cause. In contrast, GNT’s ’byung khungs is more 
intricate, since it poses the question whether all its subcategories and examples are to be 
interpreted as only indicating a non-causal source such as that in P 1.4.31. For example, ‘all the 
faults and defects originate from samsaric beings’ (’khor ba’i sems can las skyon nam nyes pa 
thams cad ’byung ngo) as well as ‘all the qualities originate from noble beings’ (’phags pa las 
yon tan thams cad ’byung) may be – and perhaps even are preferred to be – interpreted in the 
meaning that samsaric beings have brought forth these defects due to their karmic actions, 
whereas noble beings have developed these qualities through practice and realization, in which 
sense they are equivalent to pha las bu ’byung (‘the son originates from the father’). On the 
contrary, the same examples may be interpreted less causally and in the meaning of ‘all the 
faults and defects (skyon nam nyes pa) appear/occur in (las) samsaric beings (ʼkhor ba’i sems 
can)’ as well as ‘all the qualities appear/occur in noble beings (ʼphags pa).’ The same holds 
true for examples such as ri ’ga’ zhig las gser ’byung (‘gold originates from/appears at some 
mountains’), which may be more neutral and must not necessarily involve a causal relationship, 
merely emphasizing the place of appearance in the sense of ‘gold comes from some mountains’ 
or ‘gold occurs at some mountains.’ However, the existence of rgyu (cause) as a separate 
category in GNT might be a strong argument towards the category ’byung khungs as a more 
general source, whereas any causal origin belongs to the causal subcategory. In any case, the 
examples for ’byung khungs are rather ambiguous and thus allow for different understandings 
of the author’s possible interpretations of each of them.  
Whatever was the author’s precise understanding of ’byung khungs, I argue that the 
subcategories and examples of GNT’s ’byung khungs relate much stronger to the idea of source 
                                                          
858 Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1995, 102f. 
859 For the terminological congruence of ’byung khungs and prabhava, cf. also HSGLT 2, 290f. 
860 Cf. Negi 1993, 793 and 2002, 4057. 
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(prabhava) in P 1.4.31 than to the prototypical apādāna that is the movement away or the spatial 
separation from a fixed point of departure (apāya and dhruva) in P 1.4.24. Compare also the 
typical examples of P 1.4.24 and 1.4.31 with those in the GNT: 
P 1.4.24: 
 grāmād āgacchati ‘he is departuring from the village’ 
 parvatād avarohati ‘he is climbing down the mountain’ 
 sārthād hīnaḥ ‘separated from the caravan’ 
 rathāt patitaḥ ‘fallen from the chariot’ 
P 1.4.31: 
 himavato gaṅgā prabhavati ‘Gaṅgā appears in the Himālaya’861 
GNT on ’byung khungs (selection): 
 ’phags pa las yon tan thams cad ’byung ‘all the qualities come from noble beings’  
 ri ’ga’ zhig las gser ’byung ‘gold comes from some mountains’  
 brag ’ga’ zhig las dngul ’byung ‘silver comes from some rocks’  
 mar me gcig las stong la sogs pa sbar ‘from one butter lamp, a thousand and so on are 
 inflamed’  
Although the examples of GNT do not directly relate to any of the two Pāṇinian rules, they do 
exhibit a much stronger affinity to the example in P 1.4.31, since due to the employed verb 
frames in the Tibetan phrases, the idea of a source of appearance or causal origin prevails over 
that of separation or departure.  
In sum, it is proposed that the Pāṇinian categories of prakr̥ti and prabhava are indeed the 
conceptual-terminological antecedents of the Tibetan terminology that have found their way 
into the Tibetan tradition, either directly or mediated by other sources and conceptions. 
However, future research is necessary to determine whether the distinction between the two 
notions has followed different and perhaps less clear-cut parameters in sources such as the 
GNT. Since this question cannot be decided here, a more neutral rendition of ’byung ba as ‘to 
come from’ was preferred throughout the translation of the entire passage on ’byung khungs in 
the GNT, since the demarcation between causal origin and a mere spatial source within the 
category of ’byung khungs as well as the distinction of ’byung khungs and rgyu is not 
                                                          
861 The examples for P 1.4.24 and 31, which are from the Kāśikāvr̥tti, are quoted with their translation from 
Sharma 1990, 234. 
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sufficiently clear to me and a matter of further interpretation that has not been provided by GNT 
itself. 
GNT’s third category which is subsumed under the fifth case is that of dgar ba (‘distinction, 
separation’), which also figures in NGg, Smra ba kun la ’jug pa’i sgra’i bstan bcos,862 Smra 
sgo863 as well as SCP 17.1. GNT distinguishes two types of dgar ba, namely rigs mi ’thun pa 
(‘discordant class’) and rigs ’thun pa (‘accordant class’): 
 de la dang po ni mi las lha’i ’gro ba zhes pa’am/     dmyal ba las yi dwags zhes pa’am/     
 dud ’gro las ni mi zhes pa lta bu’o/     rigs ’thun pa las dgar ba ni mi nyid las kyang 
 skyes pa las bud med ces pa’am/     khyim pa las rab tu byung ba zhes pa’am/     bram 
 ze las rgyal rigs zhes pa la sogs par blta’o/ 
 “Regarding the first [of these two types of separation, the distinction from a discordant 
 class would be], for example, ‘divine beings from humans’ (mi las lha’i ’gro ba), ‘pretas 
 from hell beings’ (dmyal ba las yi dwags) or ‘humans from animals’ (dud ’dro las ni 
 mi). The distinction from an accordant class (rigs ’thun pa las dgar ba) has to be 
 regarded as within the [class of] human itself (mi nyid las), ‘a woman from a man’ (skyes 
 pa las bud med), ‘an ordained person from a house-holder’ (khyim pa las rab tu byung 
 ba) or ‘the royal class from the brahmins’ (bram ze las rgyal rigs).”864 
Although GNT’s subdivision into rigs ’thun and rigs mi ’thun as well as the respective examples 
are rather unusual, the category of dgar ba is to be traced to either P 2.3.41 or 42 and the 
grammatical terms nirdhāraṇa (‘separation,’ ‘specification,’ ‘singling out’) or vibhakta (lit. 
‘divided;’ ‘distinctiveness,’ ‘separateness’). In most general terms, these Sanskrit grammatical 
rules define the case marking patterns for the comparison of two entities and do not belong to 
any kāraka function: 
 P 2.3.41 yataś ca nirdhāraṇam ‘[A sixth or seventh vibhakti] also [occurs after that item] 
 from amongst which [one] is singled out.’  
 Example: gavāṃ kr̥ṣṇā saṃpannakṣīratamā ‘the black among cows is richest in milk’865 
                                                          
862 Cf. infra 336f. 
863 Cf. supra 326. 
864 GNT CT 115 – 457. 
865 Example transl. by Sharma 1995, 146. 
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 P 2.3.42 pañjamī vibhakte ‘The fifth [vibhakti occurs], if [there is] distinctiveness/ 
 separateness.’866 
 Example: māthurāḥ pāṭaliputrakebhyaḥ sukumāratarāḥ ‘the people of Mathurā are 
 more youthful than the people of Pāṭaliputra’867 
These rules cover two types of comparison: one in terms of a relation of a part to the whole, i.e. 
a part of a whole is distinguished from the rest by means of a certain parameter (nirdhāraṇa; P 
2.3.41), and a second one in terms of two distinct entities that are distinguished by means of 
another certain parameter (vibhakta; P 2.3.42). Most importantly, these two types follow 
different case marking patterns, namely a sixth or seventh case suffix for nirdhāraṇa and a fifth 
case suffix for vibhakta. 
Unfortunately, GNT omits any comparing parameters in its exemplification of dgar ba. Reading 
GNT’s phrases on their own, for example mi las lha’i ’gro ba (‘divine beings from humans’), 
there is even the question whether this category in fact aims at a comparison in terms of a 
distinction by means of a parameter. The phrase may equally be understood as ‘divine beings 
are distinct (dgar ba) from humans,’ and the author may have understood this as the entire and 
thus exclusive use of this function. Nonetheless, it can be safely assumed that the category as 
such goes back to the concepts of nirdhāraṇa or vibhakta. Verhagen proposes nirdhāraṇa as 
the Sanskritic antecedent of Tibetan dgar ba,868 which is likely since nges par bkar ba is found 
as the Tibetan translation of this term in K 2.4.36 of the Kalāpaśiṣyahitā (CG 14).869 Moreover, 
the Vr̥tti on C 2.1.92 discusses both Sanskritic types of comparison (nirdhāraṇa and vibhakta) 
under the category of nirdhāraṇa, thus allowing for the use of this term for the fifth case.870 
Furthermore, the distinction of dgar ba into rigs ’thun pa  and mi ’thun pa may be expected to 
correspond to P 2.3.41 and P 2.3.42 respectively, but GNT seems to aim at a different distinction 
and gives an illustration of it based on the Buddhist concept of the six realms of rebirth: across 
the realms (= rigs mi ’thun), divine beings are different from humans, whereas within one realm 
(= rigs ’thun), e.g. the realm of humans, women are different from men. If GNT’s category of 
dgar ba is indeed aimed at a comparison, then both proposed types belong to P 2.3.42, since 
neither the type of rigs ’thun nor the one of rigs mi ’thun singles out a part within a whole. This 
unusual subcategorization did not survive in the later grammatical tradition, however the 
                                                          
866 On the translation of these rules, cf. Sharma 1995, 145f.; Joshi and Roodbergen 1980, 74f. 
867 Example transl. by Sharma 1995, 146. 
868 HSGLT 2, 219. 
869 Cf. CT 109 – 367. 
870 Cf. Liebich 1918, 112. 
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category of dgar ba (‘distinction’) remained an important category – albeit more in the 
comparative value of the Pāṇinian rules – mainly because it figures in SCP 17.1 as an additional 
function of nas and las.  
In GNT’s final summary of the fifth case, ’byung khungs is explicated as the category which 
prevails over the remaining two functions: 
 de ltar na lnga pa’i don ni rgyu dang/     ’byung ba’i las/     dgar ba’i sa rnams las ’dir 
 ni ’byung khungs gtsor byas nas/     tshigs su bcad pa las kyang/     me tog ldan pa’i 
 shing las yal ga’o/     zhes pa lta bu’i don to/ 
 “Accordingly, regarding the meaning of the fifth [case, it is] cause and the semantic 
 domain of origination/appearance871 [as well as] the semantic domain of distinction 
 (dgar ba). Making here origin/source (’byung khungs) the main [semantic domain] out 
 of these [three], the meaning is like in the [initially provided] verse ‘branches [originate] 
 from the flowering tree’ (me tog ldan pa’i shing las yal ga’o).”872 
Apart from the GNT, the most direct link between the Tibetan focus on ’byung khungs and the 
Sanskritic tradition is the canonical Smra ba kun (HSGLT 1, CG 16) and its autocommentary 
(HSGLT 1, CG 17), in case their Sanskritic origin may be assumed as fact. The commentary 
explains ’byung khungs as follows: 
 ’byung khungs sam rgyu’i don ni gang la gang yod pa las de de las bral ba dang skyes 
 pa dang dgar zhing khyad par du byas na don der ’gyur de/     bdun pa’i don la rag las 
 pas de’i don la shes par bya’o/ 
 “Regarding the meaning of origin/source or cause (’byung khungs sam rgyu’i don), 
 this meaning results from [the relation that] something exists somewhere (gang la gang 
 yod pa las), if something is separated from something (bral ba), comes into being [from 
 something] (skyes pa) or is distinguished (dgar ba) and specified/singled out 
 (khyad par du byas). Since it depends on the meaning of the seventh [case], it is to be 
 understood from that [case’s] meaning.”873 
In this source, the categories of rgyu and ’byung khungs seem to be alternative labels, and thus 
any distinction between origin and source is blurred. In addition to the categories that have 
already figured in the GNT, the commentary’s definition adds the notions of bral ba 
                                                          
871 I read ’byung ba’i sa instead of ’byung ba’i las. 
872 GNT CT 115 – 458. 
873 CT 109 – 1712f. 
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(‘separation’), skyes pa (‘coming into being,’ ‘being brought forth’) and khyad par du byas pa 
(‘specification,’ ‘particularization,’ ‘singling out’) to specify this kāraka. The definition at hand 
do not need to be detailed, it suffices to note that the shift of focus away from the prototypical 
apādāna (P 1.4.24) towards ’byung khungs and – in this source – also rgyu has been already 
executed. The away movement or spatial separation from a fixed point of departure (apāya and 
dhruva) of P 1.4.24 does figure in the text in the form of bral ba (‘separation’),874 but only as 
one category among many that specify the pair ’byung khungs and rgyu. However, nothing is 
known about the Sanskritic version of CG 16 and CG 17 or possible Sanskrit terms that these 
two sources have translated with ’byung khungs, therefore any further conclusions at this point 
are mere speculations. 
The quoted definition of ’byung khungs in the autocommentary of Smra ba kun directly 
resonates with NGg: 
 lnga pa’i don ni gang zhig la/     gang gis yod pa las/     de gzhi de las byung ba dang/     
 bral ba dang/     dgar ba dang/     khyad par du byed na/     gang las zhes bya ba’i sgra 
 yod de/     de ci’i phyir lnga pa gang las zhes bya bas rgyu dang ’byung khungs kyi sa 
 zhes bya’o/ 
 “As for the meaning of the fifth [case], from [the combination of the two relations], 
 where something exists [as well as] by which it exists (gang zhig la gang gis yod pa 
 las),875 [the meaning results that] something appears/originates from some substratum 
 (gzhi), or becomes separated (bral ba), or distinguished (dgar ba), or singled out (khyad 
 par du byed). [For such instances], there is the term (sgra) ‘gang las,’ and for the reason 
 (ci’i phyir ?) that it is the fifth [case in the form of] ‘gang las,’ it is called the ‘semantic 
 domain of cause and source/origin.’”876 
The exact interpretation of this passage poses a challenge since the Tibetan is very condensed 
and cryptic. The most problematic part is the phrase gang zhig la gang gis yod pa las, where I 
                                                          
874 According to Negi (2002, 4074) the term ’bral ba is used as a translation for Sanskrit viśleṣa (‘separation,’ 
‘disjunction’), a term which was used in Sanskritic grammatical literature for the definition of apādāna/avadhi, 
although thus far I have only encountered it in the Sārasvata school that commonly is dated much later (cf. M.S. 
Joshi 2011, 313). Moreover, also Si tu in his alternative rendition of Sanskrit apādāna provided ’bral ba as his 
translation for Sanskrit apa (cf. supra 328). 
875 Verhagen (HSGLT 2, 401) notes in his tentative translation of this phrase that there are noteworthy 
differences in the different editions: the Peking edition reads gang gi yod pa las, whereas the versions in Sde dge 
and Co ne are unclear on the point whether the phrase reads gang gi sa yod pa las or gang gis yod pa las. I 
follow the Sde dge edition as it is contained in the CT, which is identical with the version of this passage quoted 
in Si tu’s GC (cf. GC 496.2). Moreover, my decision is based on the reading of this passage against the 
background of the Smra ba kun la ’jug pa’i sgra’i bstan bcos. 
876 CT 115 – 433.  
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have read the syntactic link las in its meaning as source/origin, i.e. ‘from (lit. ‘out of’) gang 
zhig la and gang gis yod pa results that something originates, etc.’. Alternatively, this syntactic 
link may also be read as an adversative connection in the meaning of ‘instead of gang zhig la 
and gang gis yod pa, something originates from some basis, becomes separated, etc.’ My 
translation is based on a comparison with the phrase gang la gang yod pa las in Smra ba kun’s 
commentary (CG 17).877  The two are conceptually close insofar as they both connect the 
category of ’byung khungs/rgyu to a locative aspect. In other words, source/origin (’byung 
khungs) and cause (rgyu) are to be regarded as the place or location from where something 
emerges, comes from, originates, etc. In addition, NGg brings in a causal-agentive aspect 
through gang gis, if my interpretation is correct, making the fifth case a combination of a 
locative and agentive dimension. Whether this addition was meant to better account for the fifth 
case’s function of rgyu or perhaps to even represent a Tibetan-specific adaptation in line with 
the prototypical marker las requires further scrutiny elsewhere. 
A second philological question regards the phrase ci’i phyir in the final quotation, and whether 
it is either part of the syntactic structure of the sentence as a causal connector or an additional 
rendition of the fifth case’s causal function in terms of ‘because of something.’ It was preferred 
above to read ci’i phyir as part of the syntactic structure of the sentence, for the simple reason 
that in this treatise the syntactic link phyir is already used as the prototypical case form of the 
fourth case, and no classification of phyir as a fifth case has been identified.  
Concerning the focus on ’byung khungs/prabhava, it is clear that also in NGg the category of 
’byung khungs together with that of rgyu have prevailed over apādāna’s prototypical category 
of a departure or separation from some fixed point, while the latter survived in terms of bral ba 
as a specification or subcategory of the fifth case’s main labels ’byung khungs and/or rgyu. In 
comparison, GNT has fully omitted bral ba, whereas SCP 16.2-17.1 has even excluded rgyu 
and mentiones only ’byung khungs as well as dgar ba and sdud pa (‘collection’) as functions 
of las and nas.878  
If the proposed hypothesis is correct that ’byung khungs was derived from prabhava in P 1.4.31 
rather than from the prototypical conception of the kāraka apādāna in P 1.4.24, K 2.4.8 or 
                                                          
877 The two sources must be in some historical relation in this particular context: not only that these two phrases 
directly resonate with each other except for NGg’s addition of gang gis, but also the entire definition of the fifth 
case in the NGg appears to be a free rendition of the definition of ’byung khungs in CG 17, to the extent that 
even the phrasing of the two passages are very close to each other. Both mention almost the same selection of 
technical terms, namely ’byung khungs, rgyu, bral ba, dgar ba and khyad par du byed pa, the only deviation 
being the additional skyes pa in the Smra ba kun, whereas NGg uses byung ba that is obviously related to ’byung 
khungs. 
878 On sdud pa, cf. infra 349f. and 352. 
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Cāndra’s avadhi in C 2.1.81, then the question still remains how prabhava has become the 
dominant category for the fifth case in the Tibetan tradition. The prabhava rule P 1.4.30 belongs 
to the domain of apādāna and thus is part of the kāraka. The prototypical definition in Pāṇini, 
however, has focused on the idea of a movement away (apāya) from some point of departure 
(dhruva) and not on any type of source of appearance. This definition has remained the 
dominant one in the Sanskritic tradition, and I did not find any noteworthy traces of a shift of 
focus to the category of prabhava. Moreover, I could not identify further noteworthy material 
on the relation of prabhava to apāya, apart from the discussion in Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya, 
according to which both the categories prakr̥ti (P 1.4.30) and prabhava (P 1.4.31) are rejected 
since they can be subsumed under P 1.4.24.879 While this is in direct opposition to the Tibetan 
focus on ’byung khungs, Patañjali’s subsumption of P 1.4.30 and 31 under the single rule P 
1.4.24 as well as Cāndra’s identical strategy in C 2.1.81 at least reveal that the categories of 
movement away from some point of departure (P 1.4.24), causal origin (P 1.4.30) and non-
causal source (P 1.4.31) can and have been related to each other in one way or another; and it 
is to be assumed that it is ultimately a matter of metalinguistic-semantic interpretation whether 
the point of departure or the source of appearance is chosen as the prevailing one.  At this point, 
however, the factors which have governed this interpretation in the Tibetan context may only 
be speculated about. 
The category ’byung khungs – especially in its interpretation as a source of appearance – was 
apparently regarded as the most inclusive one under which the remaining uses (bral ba, dgar 
ba, etc.) are best subsumed. The focus on case functions with the tendency to choose one major 
function per case in the Tibetan case model has perhaps urged towards the selection of a single 
category. There also remains the possibility that the Tibetan fifth case markers las and nas 
suggest a shift of focus within apādāna towards prabhava, since especially the Tibetan-specific 
usage of las as the prototypical and more inclusive marker of the fifth case compared to nas has 
a strong function of source and origin, which in the eyes of Tibetan grammarians may have 
been more representative than a mere spatial departure or separation.  
Moreover, although ’byung khungs and rgyu seem to be equal and perhaps even interchangeable 
categories in NGg and Smra ba kun, the dominance of ’byung khungs over the narrower 
category rgyu in GNT as well as the omission of rgyu in SCP probably was due to its 
subsumption under’byung khungs, since the broader category of a general source may cover 
instances of causal origination without much additional effort once the distinction between P 
                                                          
879 Cf. Bhāṣya 1ff. on P 1.4.30 and P 1.4.31 respectively in Joshi and Roodbergen 1975, 101ff. 
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1.4.30 and 31 is no longer effected.880 Such a subsumption of rgyu under ’byung khungs may 
have happened due to the ambiguity of different semantic instances regarding causal origination 
vs. non-causal source such as encountered it in the GNT, which may have fostered the 
conflation of origin and source. It is assumed that there must be numerous semantic fields that 
do not allow for a clear-cut classification in terms of causal vs. non-causal which have thus 
compromised the originally Pāṇinian distinction to an extent that it might have become 
obsolete; and although the precise distribution of las and nas has been blurred in Tibetan, this 
subsumption may even have been supported by the Tibetan-specific morphosyntax, at least 
insofar as las indeed covers both uses. However, as mentioned at the very beginning of this 
survey, the precise understanding of ’byung khungs, whether origin or source prevail and the 
ways they are subsumed under the fifth case ’byung khungs will have to be investigated 
separately for each grammatical source. 
11.1.3 Résumé on the Fifth Case pre-Si tu 
Following traditional accounts of Tibetan case grammar, the fifth case ’byung khungs 
(‘source/origin’) marked by the two morphemes nas and las was not a direct adoption of the 
Sanskritic prototypical fifth case function apādāna. Already early sources decided on a 
selection of kāraka as well as non-kāraka functions that they have subsumed under the fifth 
case, the most dominant one being the three domains of ’byung ba (‘origination/appearance’), 
rgyu (‘cause’) and dgar ba (‘separation,’ ‘distinction’). It was proposed in this survey that the 
Tibetan nomenclature goes back to the Sanskritic categories of prabhava, prakr̥ti and 
nirdhāraṇa. While in NGg and Smra ba kun both’byung khungs and rgyu equally figure as 
major labels above the other categories, ’byung khungs has prevailed in the concluding passages 
of GNT. The prototypical characteristic of apādāna in Sanskritic grammatical sources, i.e. 
departure or spatial separation (apāya), has survived in sources such as the NGg or the Smra 
ba kun, but it has noticeably lost its prototypical status.  
Apart from these observations, at this point the precise transition from Sanskritic apāya to 
Tibetan ’byung khungs remains unclear. Sanskritic discussions such as in Patañjali’s 
Mahābhāṣya only reveal that the difference between apāya, prabhava and prakr̥ti was regarded 
as fluid and even superfluous, which may have facilitated the shift of focus towards prabhava 
in the Tibetan context. Further, sources like Cāndra or Kātantra do not distinguish between P 
1.4.24, 30 and 31, even omitting the latter two. This survey has not addressed whether any 
                                                          
880 We have seen in the account of Pra ti that this line of thought was indeed followed at least in later Sum rtags 
commentarial literature (cf. supra 325). 
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theoretical or perhaps also Tibetan language-specific factors, e.g. a stronger linguistic 
significance of the markers las and nas, has been involved in the reintpretation of the fifth case 
function. However, at least the presentations of the fifth case in Smra sgo’s autocommentary as 
well as in NGg make clear that these sources do not relate the distinction of rgyu and ’byung 
khungs to the distributional difference of las and nas. Moreover, the Tibetan sources considered 
in this survey do not feature any noteworthy signs of an awareness that the Tibetan conceptions 
of this case differ from those in the Sanskritic grammars. 
As for the main function of the Tibetan case, i.e. ’byung khungs, the question was raised whether 
it refers to a causal origination or more generally to a source of appearance. The relation of 
’byung khungs to prabhava as well as the existence of rgyu (‘cause’) as a distinct category 
would suggest the latter option. However, the Tibetan sources in their conceptions of the fifth 
case have not further problematized the issue to which extent these categories should be 
consistently distinguished. Although I would intuitively adhere to the option that ’byung khungs 
represents a general source of appearance in most grammars, either exclusively or in a more 
inclusive way that includes instances of cause or causal origination, this has intentionally 
remained undecided in the translation of most passages. 
Overall, the fifth case appears to be a condensed or comprised version of Sanskritic conceptions 
of the fifth case suffix’s functions that was based on a selection of several of these functions. 
Further research will hopefully shed more light on the question of how and to which extent 
Tibetan language or additional conceptions not considered in this survey have influenced this 
selection. 
11.2 The Fifth Case in the Great Commentary 
Si tu’s GC on SCP 16.2-4 gives a concise definition of the notion of ’byung khungs sa 
(‘semantic domain of origin’): 
 rjes ’jugs yi ge bcu po de’i bzhi pa na dang dgu pa la gnyis la so sor bcu pa sa yig sbyar 
 bas/     nas/     las/     zhes grub pa ni chos gang las gang zhig bral ba’am byung ba ston 
 pa’i don du mtshungs par ’jug pas gzhung gzhan du rnam dbye lnga pa zhes bshad pa 
 ’byung khungs kyi sa yin no/     zhes so/ 
“[The root text 16.2-4] says that if from the ten postscript letters the tenth, the letter sa, 
is applied to the fourth na and the ninth la respectively, nas and las form. Since they 
 equally join in the meaning that indicates that from some phenomenon something is 
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 separated (bral ba) or came into being (byung ba), [they] are the semantic domain of 
 source, which in other treatises is explained as the fifth case.”881  
After explaining the morphological derivation of the two morphemes nas and las from the ten 
postscript letters, GC identified the category of ’byung khungs as the fifth case and gives its 
definition by help of the two specifications bral ba (‘being separated’) and byung ba (‘came 
into being,’ ‘originated,’ ‘appeared’). While the latter is obviously connected to the technical 
term ’byung khungs itself, Si tu also emphasizes the category of a spatial separation (bral 
ba/’bral ba), which is the primary defining category of apādāna in the Sanskritic tradition. 
Despite his adoption of the established Tibetan nomenclature, Si tu therefore has attempted to 
follow Sanskritic grammar and to model his conception of the fifth case function in close 
connection with the classical definition of apādāna. However, in his demonstration of the uses 
of the two morphemes in the meaning of ’byung khungs, a first important deviation also 
becomes apparent: 
 ’byung khungs kyi don la ji ltar ’jug pa ni dper na/     sangs rgyas las chos chos las 
 ’phags pa’i tshogs/     tshogs las snying po ye shes khams thob mthar/     zhes dang/     
 gser kha nas gser/     rgya mtsho nas nor bu/     ba las ’o ma/     mkhas pa las rig pa/     
 lta bu dang/     ’byung khungs dngos ma yin yang skabs der de las byung bas ’byung 
 khungs dang ’dra ba/     rta las lhung/     ri las lhung/     skas nas babs/     shar phyogs 
 nas ’od snang lta bu rnams su shes par bya’o/   
  “Regarding the way in which [these two morphemes] take on the meaning of source, it 
 is to be known as in, for example, (1) ‘from the Buddha the Dharma, from the Dharma 
 the noble saṅgha [and] from the saṅgha the attainment of the realm of the wisdom 
 nature. At the end […]’ (sangs rgyas las chos chos las ’phags pa’i tshogs/ tshogs las 
 snying  po ye shes khams thob mthar),882 (2) ‘from the gold mine gold’ (gser kha nas 
 gser), (3) ‘from the ocean jewels’ (rgya mtsho nas nor bu) and (4) ‘from the cow milk’ 
 (ba las ’o ma), (5) ‘from the scholar knowledge’ (mkhas pa las rig pa). Not actual 
 sources, but, since on that particular occasion (skabs) something came from (~ byung 
 ba) it, quasi-sources (’byung khungs dang ’dra ba) are to be understood as in (6) ‘to fall 
 off the horse’  (rta las lhung), (7) ‘to fall off the rock/mountain’ (ri las lhung), (8) ‘to 
                                                          
881 GC 492.5. 
882 This verse has already been quoted before Si tu as an example for ’byung khungs by Rnam gling (2013, 77) 
on SCP 16.2- 17.1, and it is taken from the very beginning of the Mahāyānottratantraśāstra (Theg pa chen po 
rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos). 
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 fall from the ladder’ (skas nas babs) [and] (9) ‘light shines from the east’ (shar phyogs 
 nas ’od snang).”883 
Here, Si tu introduces a subdivision between actual sources (’byung khungs dngos) and quasi-
sources (’byung khungs dang ’dra ba), i.e. locations that on certain occasions (skabs) serve as 
the point from where something arises. Thus, these are only similar to the actual sources (’byung 
khungs dang ’dra ba). The distinguishing parameter is that of skabs (‘occasion’), which means 
that actual sources are defined by the fact that the appearing entity always, usually or typically 
comes from that source. Judged from the examples, the category of actual source (’byung 
khungs dngos) is restricted to the proper or genuine source (from) where an item comes into 
being, whereas skabs only represents a temporally or occasionally limited source. However, the 
question arises whether Si tu saw the category of a non-occasional genuine source connected to 
the causal relation between origin and the originated item. This is ultimately a matter of 
interpretation, as the underlying scenarios of sample phrases such as (1), (4) or (5) may suggest 
a causal origination, whereas the underlying instance in (3) also allows for a more non-causal 
interpretation in terms of the common or typical place of origination, without being the causing 
originator itself. It seems that Si tu did not provide conclusive information on this matter. Yet, 
since Si tu focused on the parameter of skabs and did not explicitly refer to a causal relation 
involved in actual sources, the option will be tentatively favored that ’byung khungs dngos 
(‘actual source’) is only defined through the parameter of being the actual or genuine source 
(from) where an item normally comes into being, which possibly but not necessarily is a 
causally related origin(ator). GC’s actual type of source then covers places where something 
comes into being, and that place may be the actual originator, such as the cow of the milk, or 
only the place of origin without being the actual originator, such as the ocean for jewels. 
Therefore, the term ’byung khungs in Si tu’s context is translated with ‘source’ in this thesis. In 
freer terms, the difference between actual and quasi-sources is that in the latter case something 
may come from that quasi-source, yet it does not come into being from that source. 
Si tu’s subdivision of ’byung khungs makes clear that the fifth case function is not only defined 
by the parameter of ’bral ba (‘separation’), since instances such as ‘to fall off the horse’ (rta 
las lhung), which fully meet the parameter of spatial separation, are not actual sources in Si tu’s 
taxonomy. He therefore significantly deviates from the prototypical definition of the Sanskritic 
prototypical fifth case function apādāna/avadhi (P 1.4.24, C 2.1.81), since the latter is only 
defined through spatial separation or departure, and instances such as rathāt patitaḥ (‘fallen off 
                                                          
883 GC 492.6. 
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the chariot’) are classified as prototypical examples of apādāna according to the Pāṇinian 
tradition.884  
Si tu then continues by introducing the additional use of las as a variation of ’byung khungs, 
which he identifies as another instance of ’byung khungs dang ’dra ba: 
 yang du ba las mer shes/     chu skyar las chur shes/     skye zhing ’jig pa las dngos por 
 rtogs/     lta bu las kyi sgra kho na rgyu mtshan la ’jug pa yod kyang/     mer shes pa 
 sogs rgyu mtshan can de du ba mthong ba sogs kyi rgyu mtshan las byung ba’i phyir 
 ’byung khungs dang ’dra ba’i rnam dbye lnga pa nyid do/ 
 “Furthermore, as in (10) ‘to know from smoke [that there is] fire’ (du ba las mer shes), 
 (11) ‘to know from the spoonbill [that there is] water’ (chu skyar las chur shes)885 [and] 
 (12) ‘to recognize [something] as a thing from birth and destruction’ (skye zhing ’jig pa 
 las dngos por rtogs), only the morpheme las takes on [the meaning of] reason (rgyu 
 mtshan). Yet, since that which has a reason, [i.e.] the knowledge about the fire, etc. 
 comes (byung ba) from the reason of seeing the smoke, etc., it is nothing but the fifth 
 case of quasi-origin (’byung khungs dang ’dra ba).”886 
Si tu’s rgyu mtshan (‘reason’) should not be misunderstood as the Tibetan fifth case function 
of rgyu (‘cause’), which he will in fact address in his discussion of other sources. Si tu’s sample 
phrases clearly reveal that rgyu mtshan refers to a genuine reason in sentences expressing an 
inference rather than a causal relation in terms of originator and origin. This reasoning function 
is furthermore restricted to the morpheme las and classified only as ’byung khungs dang ’dra 
ba. Thus, if the reason in an inference is marked by las, the knowledge about some fact arises 
out of that reason, in which sense the latter is a source and even a causally related origin(ator). 
However, it is more intricate to answer why these instances are not classified as actual ’byung 
khungs. Judging only from the above quotation itself, one option may be that the reason only 
serves as the source of knowledge, i.e. the action of the sentence, yet the reason is not the 
genuine source of the inferred entity itself. Compare, for example, phrase (11), in which the 
perception of a water bird brings forth the knowledge that there must be water, but neither the 
bird nor its perception is the genuine source of the water as such, which would rather be 
                                                          
884 Cf. Sharma 1990, 234. 
885 Chu skyar refers to a type of water bird. Rangjung Yeshe’s online dictionary identifies different species with 
the Tibetan term, e.g. spoonbill, bittern, etc. (cf. rywiki.tsadra.org/index.php/chu_skyar, accessed April 25th, 
2017). The Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo describes it as a ‘fish-eating water bird’ and lists as synonyms rkgang 
gcig pa, chu can, nya ’bigs byed and mdza’ mo bcas (cf. Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo 2006, 796). 
886 GC 493.2. 
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represented by the rain and so on. It may even further be said that the perception of the water is 
only the temporal source of the water’s appearance/occurrence (’byung ba) during the occasion 
of this inference, in which sense it then indeed comes closer to Si tu’s occasional sources, such 
as in rta las lhung (‘to fall off the horse’). A second option may be that the reason only serves 
as the occasional source of a particular knowledge, while the genuine source of knowledge is 
the mind; and a third option would be the missing parameter of separation (’bral ba) in the rgyu 
mtshan type of ’byung khungs, which Si tu has already mentioned but which he will also repeat 
as constitutive for ’byung khungs dngos in the following. 
Although he did not mention it in his own definition of the fifth case ’byung khungs, Si tu was 
well aware of the function of rgyu that was implemented in the Tibetan case model as early as 
in NGg and GNT. He discusses it in the context of Smra sgo: 
 smra sgo las/     las ni rgyu dang ’byung khungs dang/     dgar ba yin te nas de bzhin/     
 zhes las nas kyi sgra dag rgyu la ’jug par bshad cing/     ’grel par/     rgyu’i don ni sa 
 bon las myu gu zhes pa lta bu’o/     zhes ’byung ba/     kha cig gis de ’dra de ’byung 
 khungs dngos yin par byas nas/     ’byung khungs las logs su dbye ba mi ’thad ces smras 
 kyang/     de ’byung khungs ndgos ni ma yin te/ 
 “In Smra sgo, it is said ‘Regarding las, it is cause (rgyu) and source/origin (’byung 
 khungs), and distinction (dgar ba), just as nas.’, explaining that the morphemes las and 
 nas take on [the meaning of] cause (rgyu). In the commentary, it is stated ‘Regarding 
 the meaning of cause, it is as in ‘sprouts from the seed’ (sa bon las myu gu).’ Some have 
 said that such [causes] are actual sources (’byung khungs dngos) and then stated that 
 ‘the distinction [of cause] from source is incorrect.’ However, this [meaning of cause] 
 is not an actual source.”887 
Si tu’s critique in this passage is directed towards his older contemporary Pra ti Dge bshes Rin 
chen don grub.888 As already discussed in the historical survey of this case, Pra ti’s conception 
of ’byung khungs and his provided examples suggest a very broad understanding in terms of a 
source that can also cover causal origination, the latter which therefore does not need a separate 
categorization. However, Si tu’s critique may not be fully accurate, because Pra ti indeed 
                                                          
887 GC 494.6. 
888 The whole passage in Pra ti’s SCP commentary Rnam bshad kun bzang dgongs rgyan reads as follows (with 
Si tu’s quotation in bold type):  
 [...] rgyu’i ’jug pa ’byung khungs kyi don las logs su byed na mi ’thad la/      spyir ’byung khungs tsam 
 dang/     de’i khyad par rgyu’i don la ’jug pa gnyis kyi dbye bar byed na rig pa’i sgo ’phel ba’i thabs su 
 ’gro zhing don la’ang gnas pas ’thad do/ (Pra ti 2013A, 214)  
On this passage, cf. also supra 325. 
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explicated that ’byung khungs and rgyu are not to be separated, but nonetheless he distinguished 
between ‘mere source’ (’byung khungs tsam) and ‘cause as a particular [instance] of it’ (de’i 
khyad par rgyu). 
In any event, Si tu was unsatisfied with Pra ti’s taxonomy, and he made efforts at explaining 
why cause (rgyu) is not a genuine form of source. This argumentation contains further 
information about his understanding of the fifth case and the prototypical function ’byung 
khungs: 
 ’byung khungs kyi don gong smos ltar/     rgya mthso nas nor bu lta bu nor bu’i ’byung 
 khungs rgya mtsho yin zhing nor bu mi’i lag tu byung ba’i tshe rgya mtsho las bye dgos 
 pa dang/     dngos su ’brel ba bye mi dgos kyang rig pa’i ’byung khungs mkhas pa yin 
 zhing de las slob mas rig pa lob pa na rgyud tha dad du gyur pas bye bar snang ba lta 
 bu zhig ste/     brda sprod pa’i gzhung rnams su ’byung khungs kyi don ’chad pa na/     
 gang las ’bral ba’am/     len pa’am/     zhes dang/     bye zhing lhung ba/     zhes dang/     
 a pā da [sic!]889 na nges par sbyin pa zhes bsgyur kyang a pa’ [sic!]890 bral ba ā da 
 [sic!]891 na tshur len pa yin pas ’bral bar len pa zhes sogs rgyas par byung la/     myu 
 gu ni sa bon dang med na mi ’byung gi ’brel par grub kyang sa bon nyid myu gur ’gyur 
 bas sa bon gyi skabs na myu gu med cing myu gu’i gnas skabs na sa bon gyi gnas skabs 
 gtong ba’i phyir de ’dra’i ’byung khungs kyi don med pas so/     des na de ’dra de ’byung 
 khungs dngos ma yin yang de las de skye ba’am ’byung ba yin pa’i phyir ’byung khungs 
 dang ’dra bar rigs pas/     gong smos shar phyogs nas ’od snang sogs dang phyogs 
 mthsungs par shes par bya’o/ 
“The meaning of source (’byung khungs) is like it was said above; for example, in 
 ‘jewels from the ocean,’ the ocean is the source of jewels, and at the time when the jewel 
 appears (byung ba) in the hands of the person, it has to be separated (bye) from the 
 ocean. And although not necessarily really disconnected (’brel ba bye), the scholar is 
 the source of knowledge, which, after the student is learned in it, transfers into another 
 mental continuum and thus appears to have been separated from that [scholar as the 
 source]. In the (Sanskrit ?) grammatical treatises (brda sprod pa’i gzhung rnams su), it 
 is said in the exposition of the meaning of source (’byung khungs) [that it is] ‘becoming 
 separated (’bral ba) or taking (len pa) from something’ and ‘dividing (bye) and falling 
                                                          
889 I read dā. 
890 I read pā. 
891 I read dā. 
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 [from something];’ and although apādāna has been translated as ‘nges par sbyin pa’ 
 (‘to give definitely’ ?), it is widespread that apa is ‘separation’ (’bral ba) and ādāna is 
 ‘to take close/receive’ (tshur len pa), thus the term meaning ‘to separatingly take’ (’bral 
bar len pa). As for the sprout, a relation is established that it does not appear if without 
the seed (myu gu ni sa bon dang med na mi ’byung gi ’brel bar grub). Yet, since the 
seed itself becomes the sprout, there exists no sprout when there is a seed, and during 
the timespan of the sprout, the timespan of the seed is discarded (gtong). Therefore, such 
[instances] do not have the meaning of source (de ’dra’i ’byung khungs kyi don med). 
Consequently, although these [instances] are no actual sources, it is reasonable that they 
are quasi-sources (’byung khungs dang ’dra ba), since something is born or appears 
(skye’am ’byung ba) from something. Thus, [the causal meaning] is to be similarly 
understood (pyhogs mthsungs par) like the above mentioned ‘light shines from the east’, 
etc.”892 
Si tu’s initial introduction of the distinction of actual from quasi-sources is based on the 
criterion of a genuine, non-occasional source. In examples like ‘to fall of a horse,’ the source 
and appearing entity are in this relation only on this particular occasion or due to temporal 
circumstances (skabs). In contrast, Si tu now stresses the parameter that in order to qualify for 
an actual source there needs to be spatial separation (bye ba, bral ba). A separation from the 
source is obviously lacking in instances such as ‘the sprout [originates] from the seed,’ since it 
is the seed itself which turns into the sprout. Si tu, who bases his investigation on the Smra sgo, 
only accounted for the example sa bon las myu gu, and it would be interesting to know how he 
would have classified the instance ba las bu ’byung, which the GNT provides as a second 
example for rgyu (‘cause’). This latter phrase involves a spatial separation between father and 
son who both exist simultaneously. Since it is therefore equivalent to Si tu’s example (4) ba las 
’o ma (‘milk from the cow’), it may be assumed that Si tu would have classified it as an actual 
source.  
The question arises whether Si tu’s argument should be understood in the sense that the causal 
dimension is not a sufficient but still necessary and constitutive criterion for the category ’byung 
                                                          
892 GC 495.2. Note that I have been unable to unanimously identify the quoted Sanskritic grammatical sources. 
The quotation “gang las ’bral ba’am/     len pa’am” is partially reminiscent of K 2.4.8, although the latter 
provides more functions than those quoted by Si tu (cf. HSGLT 2, 359). As for the second quotation, “bye zhing 
lhung ba,” the Tibetan translation of the Sārasvataprakriyā (CG 44) translates Sanskrit viśleṣāvadhau 
(‘separation and avadhi’) of sūtra 17.4 with bye zhing lhung ba (cf. CT 110 – 125). I assume that Si tu quoted 
these two very short passages for the terms len pa (‘to take’) and bye ba (‘separation’) respectively, in order to 
derive his etymological translation of apādāna as ’bral bar len pa (‘to take separatingly’). This would also 
explain why he did not fully quote K 2.4.8, presuming that this is the source of this quotation. 
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khungs dngos (‘actual source’), or whether this causal dimension is a different parameter and 
not constitutive of ’byung khungs dngos. Since Si tu’s conception of the fifth case is preferably 
understood in this thesis as a general source function rather than a causal origin,893 it is also to 
be assumed that Si tu’s discussion amounts to the second option, i.e. that the causal aspect is to 
be separated from the category source and rather not a constitutive component to be fulfilled 
by actual sources (’byung khungs). Causes only qualify as quasi-sources because something 
comes non-occasionally into being (‘skye ba’am ’byung ba’) from/out of the cause marked by 
las or nas.894 However, since the defining parameter’bral ba (‘(spatial) separation’) of ’byung 
khungs dngos is not a characteristic of rgyu (‘cause’), in Si tu’s taxonomy it does not qualify as 
an actual source. Yet, it should also be kept in mind that ’bral ba as such does not serve as a 
sufficient parameter for ’byung khungs, since actual sources are only those sources from where 
the appearing entity comes into being or in other words becomes non-occasionally separated 
from. Separation (’bral ba) and coming (non-occasionally) into being (’byung ba) represent the 
two necessary parameters which in Si tu’s taxonomy define ’byung khungs dngos and together 
result in a non-occasional separation. 
Thus far, Si tu has established two types of ’byung khungs, i.e. actual (’byung khungs dngos) 
and quasi-sources (’byung khungs dang ’dra ba). The latter consists of three uses: (1) sources 
with a clear separative meaning that are only occasionally the source of the separated entity, 
such as rta las lhung (‘to fall off the horse’); (2) the reasoning function (rgyu mtshan) of the 
morpheme las, such as in du ba las mer shes (‘to know from the smoke that there is fire’); and 
(3) the causal function in which the cause may appropriately be called genuine and not only 
occasional source, but the category cause alone lacks the parameter of separation, such as in sa 
bon las myu sgu (‘from the sprout the seed’). The resulting picture demonstrates that Si tu has 
attempted to handle the main categories of the fifth case defined in the Sanskritic and Tibetan 
grammatical traditions, i.e. ’bral ba (‘(spatial) separation’), rgyu (from prakr̥ti/hetu/kāraṇa, 
‘(material) cause’) as well as ’byung ba (prabhava, ‘appearance,’ ‘being first sight at’), and to 
systematize the fifth case by distinguishing these as different types within the category of 
’byung khungs. While the Sanskritic tradition has had its own discourses on the relations and 
requirements of these different categories, the Tibetan tradition has adopted them but mostly 
abstained from the attempt to relate or distinguish them in more detail. In sources such as the 
Smra ba kun, the NGg and also the GNT, it is evident that these notions coexist without any 
                                                          
893 Cf. supra 343. 
894 Note that in contrast to the function of rgyu mtshan, Si tu did not specify whether or not the function of rgyu 
is restricted to las, although the single example he quoted uses las. 
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systematic understanding of their relation. In contrast, many other Tibetan grammarians have 
not considered any other category than ’byung khungs. From this perspective, Si tu has therefore 
certainly advanced the existing Tibetan conceptions of the fifth case by bringing them together 
under one category and homogenizing this case. 
11.2.1 Two Additional Functions of the Fifth Case in the Great Commentary 
Directly following ’byung khungs, SCP in 17.1 also provides two additional functions of the 
morphemes las and nas that must be considered in order to arrive at a more complete picture of 
the fifth case in Si tu’s GC: 
 dgar dang sdud pa’ang de bzhin yin/ 
 “[Las and nas] are likewise distinction (dgar) and collection (sdud pa).”895 
While this verse line has not been separated from SCP 16.2-4 but is treated within the context 
of ’byung khungs itself in the topical outline (sa bcad) of the commentaries of Rnam gling and 
Pra ti, Zha lu treated the functions dgar ba (‘distinction, separation’) and sdud pa (‘collection’) 
under the separate theme zhar byung (~ ‘addendum,’ ‘extra [teaching]’).896 In Si tu’s topical 
outline, a separate section is dedicated to SCP 17.1 in which he commented on dgar sdud as 
follows: 
 bshad ma thag pa’i las nas kyi sgra de dag ’byung khungs kho nar ma zad/     rnam dbye 
 sbyar gzhi de las rigs dang bya ba yon tan rnams kyi khyad par gang yang rung ba logs 
 su dgar ba’i don la’ang ’jug cing/     de las nas kyi sgra gcig  pu ni yul dang dus dang 
 dngos po la sogs pa mtshams ’dzin cing sdud pa’i don du’ang de bzhin du ’jug pa yin 
 no/     zhes pa’o/    de dag dbye ba dang bcas te dper brjod na/     rigs dang bya ba yon 
 tan rnams kyi khyad par gyis gzhi gcig las dgar ba ni/     mi’am ci las dri za tha dad do/     
 bshes gnyen ngan pa la bkur sti byed pa las lha mchod pa niyd legs/     yang sos las thig 
 nag pa sdug bsngal che/     lha chen po las bde bar gshegs pa yon tan du mas ’phags so/     
 zhes pa lta bu ste ’di ’dra’i  rigs la las kyi sgra nyid ’jug go/ 
  “[The root text] says that the two just elaborated morphemes nas [and] las take on not 
 only the meaning of source (’byung khungs) but also [that of] the distinction (logs su 
 dgar ba) of any specific class (rigs), quality (yon tan) [or] action (bya ba) from that 
 basis where the case is to be applied (rnam dbye sbyar gzhi). And of these [two 
                                                          
895 SCP 17.1 
896 cf. Rnam gling 2013, 77; Pra ti 2013A, 212; Zha lu 2013A, 13. 
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 morphemes], only nas likewise takes on the meaning of a limitation (mtshams ’dzin) 
 and collection  (sdud pa) of space (yul), time (dus) or things (dngos po).  
 If [we] exemplify these [uses] together with the [mentioned sub-]divisions (dbye ba), 
 distinction (dgar ba) from one basis through a difference in class, quality [or] action 
 [would be] (13) ‘gandharvas are different from humans or whatever else’ (mi’am ci las 
 dri za tha dad), (14) ‘the offering to gods is better than paying respect to an evil spiritual 
 guide’ (bshes gnyen ngan pa la bkur sti byed pa las lha mchod pa nyid legs), (15) ‘the 
 hell of thig nag is more painful than the hell of yang sos’ (yang sos las thig nag pa sdug 
 bsngal che),897 ‘(16) ‘The Sugata surpasses the Mahādevas by many qualities.’ (lha chen 
 po las bde bar gshegs pa yon tan du mas ’phags so). Only (nyid) the morpheme las 
 joins for this type [of use].”898 
Si tu has further subdivided the first of the two functions, dgar ba (‘distinction’), which was 
already encountered in NGg and GNT, into the three types of rigs (‘class’), yon tan (‘quality’) 
and bya ba (‘action’). However, this subdivision was already well-known and referenced in the 
context of SCP 17.1 already before Si tu’s times. Rnam gling, who had introduced the same 
threefold typology, refers it to the Kalāpaśiṣyahitā commentary (CG 12 or CG 14). 899 
Interestingly, the Kalāpaśiṣyahitā introduces the quoted threefold subdivision in the context of 
K 2.4.36 and the technical term nirdhāraṇa,900 that is to say not as a trigger of the fifth case 
suffix but of the sixth and seventh case suffixes. The same distinction into class, quality and 
action already occurs in the Cāndravr̥tti under C 2.1.92, which discusses both types of 
comparison distinguished in P 2.3.41 (nirdhāraṇa for sixth and seventh case suffixes) and P 
2.3.42 (vibhakta for fifth case suffix) under the label of nirdhāraṇa.901  Moreover, Si tu’s 
subdivision of dgar ba into rigs, yon tan and bya ba, either in the same form or with slight 
                                                          
897 Thig nag, lit. ‘black line,’ ‘black thread;’ yang sos, lit. ‘revival,’ ‘continuous revival.’ According to Buddhist 
cosmology, both belong to the eight hot hells of the hell realm. The hell realm is usually explained to gradually 
cause increased suffering to beings throughout its different sub-realms. 
898 GC 493.3. 
899 Cf. Rnam gling 2013, 78. 
900 K 2.4.36 nirdhāraṇe ca “[A sixth and seventh vibhakti occurs] also if [there is] distinction;” cf. 
Kalāpaśiṣyahitā (CG 14), CT 109 – 367. On nirdhāraṇa, cf. also supra 334f. 
901 C 2.1.92 (~ P 2.3.41):  
 yato nirdhāraṇam  
Vr̥tti:  
 jātiguṇakriyābhiḥ samudāyād ekadeśasya pr̥thakkaraṇaṃ nirdhāraṇam. yatas tat kriyate tataḥ 
 ṣaśṭhīsaptamyau bhavataḥ. [...] Māthurāḥ Pāṭaliputrakebhyaḥ sukumāratarā ity avadher eva pañjamī.  
 “Distinction (nirdhāraṇa) [is] the splitting off of one part from a collection by [a difference in] class, 
 quality [or] action. From where this [distinction] is effected, there the sixth or seventh [case suffix] 
 occurs. [...] A fifth [case suffix occurs], if [it is] like a limiting point, as in ‘the people of Mathurā 
 are more youthful than the people of Pāṭaliputra.” (Sanskrit quoted from Liebich 1918, 112) 
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variations, also figures in Zha lu and Pra ti and appears as well in the Sārasvataprakriyā (CG 
44).902  
All the four provided examples of (13) to (16) are instances of the vibhakta type of comparison 
(P 2.3.42), that is to say two distinct entities which are distinguished by means of a certain 
parameter. This type of comparison in WT is restricted only to the morpheme las, whereas the 
nirdhāraṇa type (P 2.3.41), i.e. the singling out of one entity within a group indicated by a sixth 
or seventh case suffix in Sanskrit, according to the GC in Tibetan is restricted to nas: 
 rigs sogs kyi khyad par gyis tshogs kyi nang nas ’byin pa lta bur dgar ba ni/     mi rnams 
 kyi nang nas rgyal rigs dpa’/     gser dngul gniys kyi nang nas gser gong che/     rigs 
 bzhi’i nang nas dmangs rigs dman/     ba rnams kyi dkyil nas nag mo ’o ma mang/     bya 
 ba rnams kyi nang nas sangs rgyas bcom ldan ’das la mchod pa ni phul du byung ba’o/     
 lta bu ste ’di ’dra la nas nyid ’jug go 
 “As for the distinction (dgar ba) similar to the singling out (’byin pa) from a group 
 (tshogs) by a difference of class, etc., [this would be] as in (17) ‘among humans, the 
 royal class is the bravest’ (mi rnams kyi nang nas rgyal rigs dpa’), (18) ‘among the two, 
 silver [and] gold, gold is more precious’ (gser dngul gnyis kyi nang nas gser gong che), 
 (19) ‘among the four castes, the śūdras are the most inferior’ (rigs bzhi’i nang nas 
 dmangs rigs dman), (20) ‘within the cows, the black one has the most milk’ (ba rnams 
 kyi dkyil nas nag mo ’o ma mang), (21) ‘Among actions, the offering to the Buddha 
 is [the most] outstanding.’ (bya ba rnams kyi nang nas sangs rgyas bcom ldan ’das la 
 mchod pa ni phul du byung ba’o). Only (nyid) nas joins for such [uses].”903 
Commentators such as Zha lu have already provided examples for both types of distinction or 
comparison (P 2.3.41 and 42), however the theoretical explication of their difference might be 
Si tu’s addition which has not been encountered in any other Tibetan grammatical source in this 
research. His idea of rigs sogs kyi khyad par gyis tshogs kyi nang nas ’byin pa lta bur dgar ba 
(‘distinction similar to the singling out of a collection by a difference of class, etc.’) was perhaps 
directly inspired by the Cāndravr̥tti.904 Si tu’s restriction of the whole-part comparison to the 
morpheme nas was apparently not shared by all grammarians, at least examples such as las 
thams cad las yi ge ’bri ba khyad par du ’phags pa’o (‘Out of all actions, writing is the most 
                                                          
902 Cf. Zha lu 2013A, 13; Pra ti 2013A, 212; CT 110 – 131. 
903 GC 494.1. 
904 Cāndravr̥tti on 2.1.92:  
 jātiguṇakriyābhiḥ samudāyād ekadeśasya pr̥thakkaraṇaṃ nirdhāraṇam  
 “The singling out of one part from a group by [a difference in] class, quality [or] action is nirdhāraṇa.” 
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outstanding.’) in Pra ti’s commentary to SCP demonstrate the existence of alternative 
taxonomies.905 
In order to complete the picture, the second function in SCP 17.1, namely collection (sdud pa), 
is explained by Si tu in terms of limitation (mtshams ’dzin pa), providing examples such as lha 
sa nas gzhis ka rtse’i bar (‘from Lhasa to Shigatse’) or gcig nas brgya’i bar (‘from one to 
hundred’), in which a range of items is collected together or demarcated and the argument 
marked by nas represents the first item.906 
It should be noted that the Tibetan term ’byin pa (‘to take out,’ ‘single out,’ ‘to root out,’ ‘split 
off’) in Si tu’s definition of the whole-part comparison is the tha dad pa counterpart to the 
Tibetan fifth case’s prototypical verb frame ’byung ba (‘to come forth,’ ‘appear,’ ‘occur,’ 
‘originate’). This may be read as a very careful use of terminology in the GC, in order to relate 
this function of nas to the semantic domain of the fifth case ’byung khungs. Although in the 
topical outline of his commentary Si tu has separated the fifth case ’byung khungs from the 
additional functions dgar ba and sdud pa, he nonetheless elaborates in some detail how dgar 
ba and sdud pa are to be related to the category of ’byung khungs: 
 de ltar dgar sdud la ’jug pa’i sgra ’di rnams kyang ’phrad gzhan ma yin par rnam dbye 
 lnga pa’i yan lag nyid du shes dgos te/     dgar ba ni gang las dgar ba’i gzhi de las khyad 
 par du byung ba ltar snang ba dang/     sdud pa ni thog ma gang nas brtsams pa de las 
 bsdu rgyu’i gnas skabs thams cad byung ba dang ’dra ba’i phyir ’byung khungs kyi 
 rnam dbye sbyar bar snang ba’i phyir ro/ 
 “In addition, it must be known that also these morphemes [nas and las] that take on 
 [the meaning of] distinction [and] collection (dgar sdud), not being a different syntactic 
 link, are only a branch of the fifth [case] (lnga pa’i yan lag). Regarding distinction (dgar 
 ba), [something] seems like (ltar snang) coming forth as differentiated (khyad par du 
 byung ba) from that basis from which [it] is separated. And regarding collection (sdud 
 pa), it is like all instances (gnas skabs) to be collected come forth from that beginning 
 from where [the collection] starts. Therefore, [distinction and collection] appear as 
 applications of the source-case.”907 
                                                          
905 Cf. Pra ti 2013A, 212. 
906 Cf. GC 494.2. Since this category is intuitively comprehensible, its further elaboration has been omitted in 
this thesis.  
907 GC 494.3. 
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Si tu obviously makes use of his eloquence and mastery of WT in order to relate the functions 
of dgar sdud to ’byung khung, simply repeating an explanation of their meaning by help of 
expressions of the type las plus ’byung ba. Distinction (dgar ba) thus becomes that function in 
which khyad par du byung ba (‘to appear distinctively’ or ‘appear as distinct’) takes place, and 
collection (sdud pa) becomes ’byung ba in terms of the collected parts which come forth from 
the first part from which the collection starts. In this sense, the arguments marked by las and 
nas retain their meaning as a source. Yet, the terms snang ba (‘to appear,’ ‘to seem’) and ’gra 
ba (‘to be similar’), which are consistently employed by Si tu throughout this passage to specify 
the dgar sdud type of ’byung ba, have to be taken seriously since Si tu adds: 
 ’o na ’byung khungs nyid smos pas chog go snyam na/     ’byung khungs la ’jug par 
 bstan pa ni ’byung khungs dngos dang/     de dang cha ’dra ba gtso bo rnams sdud pa’i 
 don dang/   dgar sdud gsungs pa ni ’byung khungs dngos dang cha mthun pa gnyis ka 
 ma yin yang tshig sbyor tsam gyis cha mthun dang ’dra rung du yod pa’i phyir lnga pa’i 
 yan lag phal par gyur pa rnams sdud pa’i don yin pas skyon med do/ 
 “But if one thinks ‘would it then not suffice to say they are source (’byung 
 khungs) itself,’ the exposition that [las and nas] take on source is the content (don) 
 encompassing the main [functions of] actual and quasi-source (= SCP 16.4), whereas 
 the teaching of distinction and collection (dgar sdud = SCP 17.1) is the content (don) 
 encompassing the secondary branches of the fifth [case]. Despite them being neither 
 actual nor quasi-source (’byung khungs dngos dang cha mthun gnyis ka ma yin yang), 
 they are partially accordant and appropriately similar by the mere syntactic application 
 [of the case morphemes] (tshig sbyor tsam gyis). Therefore, there is no fault.”908 
Si tu’s reconciliation of dgar sdud with ’byung khungs is based on the introduction of another 
type of source, referred to as the secondary branch of the fifth case (lnga pa’i yan lag phal pa). 
If it is attempted to trace the constitutive features of this third type of source, the first and most 
important pointer may be the phrase tshig sbyor tsam gyis cha mthun dang ’dra rung (‘partially 
accordant and appropriately similar by the mere syntactic application’). Si tu seems to aim at 
the fact that sdgar ba and sdud pa do not really share any aspects of the defining parameters of 
actual and quasi-sources, and thus their similarity is based on the mere ‘syntactic application’ 
(tshig sbyor), which here is understood as the mere application of the syntactic links nas and 
las. Thus, the marked arguments appear as sources only because las and nas are used, yet not 
                                                          
908 GC 494.4. 
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according to their actual meaning. In other words, Si tu argues that the language only encodes 
dgar ba and sdud pa as a source-function, although their actual semantic nature is not that 
something comes from some source by any means. Therefore, such types of sources may be 
rendered more freely as only figurative sources for figurative appearances. 
In the context of the function dgar ba (‘distinction’), Si tu rendered the relation between source 
and the entity that comes from that source in terms of ltar snang (ltar ‘like,’ ‘as,’ snang ba ‘to 
seem,’ ‘to appear as’). After he referred to sdud pa (‘collection’) as similar (’dra ba) to the 
meaning that the collected instances come forth from the starting item, he summarized both 
functions as ‘appearing as applications of the source case’ (’byung khungs kyi rnam dbye sbyar 
bar snang ba), in which he again used the term snang ba (‘to seem,’ ‘to appear as’). The 
technical term ltar snang also occurs in the context of argumentation, where opponents are 
accused of making use of what is referred to as rgyu mtshan ltar snang, i.e. an invalid reason 
unable to withstand a close examination and thus only appearing superficially to be a reason. 
Based on this use of the term ltar snang, I tentatively render this last type of source as ‘pseudo-
source’ (’byung khungs ltar snang), although Si tu did not in fact employ this term in the quoted 
passages.909 
Si tu has defended his subsumption of dgar sdud under the fifth case ’byung khungs and charged 
the preceding tradition with the mistake of missing it: 
 skabs ’dir ’grel byed phal cher gyis dgar sdud la ’jug pa’i las nas kyi sgra dag rnam 
 dbye lnga par mi ’dod par snang yang mi ’thad de/     rgyu mtshan gong du smos pa ltar 
 ’thad pa’i phyir te/     legs sbyar la’ang/      tshogs kyi nang nas dgar ba la/     ga bāṃ 
 krīṣṇā saṃ pannā [sic!]910 kṣī rā/     ba rnams las nag mo ’o ma phun sum tshogs/     lta 
 bu dmigs bsal du drug pa ’jug kyang/     spyir btang dgar ba tsam la/     tasmāt anyasmin/     
 de las gzhan du/     anyo krī hā dbi hā raḥ/     khang pa las gzhan du gtsug lag khang/     
 lta bu lnga pa nyid ’jug pa dang/     mtshams bzung nas sdud pa la’ang/     ā pā ṭa li pu 
 trādbr̥īṣṭo de baḥ/     ’di nas skya nar bu’i yul gyi bar du lhas char ’bebs so/     lta bu 
 rnam dbye sbyor yul snga phyi cung zad mi ’dra ba las/     don gyi mthsungs par lnga 
 pa ’jug pa’i phyir […] 
“In this context, most commentators did not assert that the two morphemes nas and las 
 [are] the fifth case [after] taking on [the meaning of] distinction [and] collection (dgar 
                                                          
909 He only used it once during his summary of the fifth case at the end of his TKJ commentary (cf. infra 360). 
910 I read panna. 
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sdud). However, this is incorrect, because it is correct like it was reasoned above. 
Moreover, also in Sanskrit the sixth [case suffix] joins [only] as an exception (dmigs 
bsal du) for the distinction [of one entity] within a group, as in gavāṃ kr̥ṣṇā 
saṃpannakṣīrā ‘among the cows, the black is outstanding regarding the milk’ (ba rnams 
las nag mo ’o ma phun sum tshogs). Yet, in general the very fifth [case suffix] joins for 
a mere distinction (spyir btang dgar ba tsam la), as in tasmāt anyasmin ‘different from 
that’ (de las gzhan du) [or] anyo gr̥hād vihāraḥ ‘the temple is different from the house.’ 
And also for the limiting collection (mtshams bzung nas sdud pa), for example ā 
pāṭaliputrād vr̥ṣṭo devaḥ ‘the god made it rain from here up to the land of Pāṭaliputra’ 
(’di nas skya nar bu’i yul gyi bar du lhas char ’bebs so), a fifth [case suffix] joins in an 
equivalent meaning, although this last argument to which the [fifth] case[-suffix] is 
applied is slightly different [from] before. […]”911 
Si tu supports his taxonomy by help of Sanskrit grammar and the argument that also in that 
tradition the fifth case suffix is used generically (~ spyir btang) for distinction (dgar ba). It 
should be noted that although Si tu correctly claims that the quoted examples trigger either a 
fifth or sixth case suffix, all the fifth case suffixes in the quoted instances are upapadavibhakti 
since they do not belong to the domain of apādāna in Pāṇini but are additional triggers. While 
tasmāt anyasmin (‘different from that,’ ‘other than that’) and anyo gr̥hād vihāraḥ (‘the temple 
is different from the house’) are probably Si tu’s examples for the typical vibhakta type of 
comparison (P 2.3.42), ā pāṭaliputrād vr̥ṣṭo devaḥ (‘the god made it rain up to the land of 
Pāṭaliputra’) belongs to P 2.3.10, which defines the rule for the fifth case suffix in connection 
with the karmapravacanīya-form ā, as well as others.912 Yet, in his taxonomy Si tu subsumes 
dgar ba not only under the fifth case but also under ’byung khungs. While this amounts to the 
same in the Tibetan case model, it does not in Sanskrit grammar, where it is one thing to say 
that dgar ba belongs to the fifth case suffix, but another to say that it belongs to apādāna. Since 
in Pāṇini all the quoted instances are clearly upapadavibhaktis and thus do not belong to the 
kāraka, Si tu more likely based his argument on Cāndra and its Vr̥tti on C 2.1.82 and 92, 
according to which the example ā pāṭaliputrād vr̥śṭo devaḥ as well as the vibhakta type of 
distinction are not subsumed under avadhi in C 2.1.81, but still related to the kāraka under their 
respective rules.913 
                                                          
911 GC 495.5. 
912 Cf. Sharma 1995, 117; Joshi and Roodbergen 1998, 22; Liebich 1918, 110. 
913 Cf. Liebich 1918, 110 and 112. 
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A closer look at the quoted examples moreover reveals that Si tu’s recourse to Sanskritic 
grammatical knowledge was interpretative in at least one point. One of the most important 
issues regarding the nirdhāraṇa type of comparison (P 2.3.41) is that regardless of any 
taxonomical differences, all three Sanskritic grammatical schools of Pāṇini, Cāndra and 
Kātantra have associated the sixth and optionally the seventh case suffix with this function, 
however not the fifth, obviously because they simply followed the syntactic facts of Sanskrit 
language. The subsumption of the whole-part comparison (nirdhāraṇa) under the morphemes 
las and nas is therefore a genuine Tibetan-specific adaptation, followed by Tibetan 
grammarians such as Si tu in order to account for the altered structures of Tibetan language. In 
order to negotiate this language-specific difference, Si tu has classified the use of the sixth case 
suffix in the context of the nirdhāraṇa type of distinction (P 2.3.41) as an exceptional (dmigs 
gsal) use, as opposed to the general type (spyir btang dgar ba tsam) of distinction that triggers 
the fifth case. This represents a rather interpretative account of P 2.3.41, C 2.1.92 and K 2.4.36, 
since nirdhāraṇa (P 2.3.41, C 2.1.92) and vibhakta (P 2.3.42, C 2.1.92, K ?) are two different 
types of comparison, each with their respective case marking patterns that cannot be said to be 
either exceptional or generic. Moreover, Si tu has left out the fact that Pāṇini, Cāndra and 
Kātantra use not only the sixth but also the seventh case suffix for nirdhāraṇa. Thus, Si tu’s 
distinction into the special or exceptional use of the sixth case and the more general use of the 
fifth case in the context of the different types of dgar ba (‘distinction’) has not been proclaimed 
by any of the three Sanskritic grammatical sources to my knowledge.  
Unlike the fifth case marking of vibhakta that has been related to avadhi, nirdhāraṇa’s sixth 
case marking is unrelated to any kāraka in Cāndra, and perhaps this fact has led Si tu to the 
conclusion that the sixth case suffix for nirdhāraṇa is a special convention which does not 
follow the actual meaning, even more so in view of the fact that in Tibetan both types are 
expressed by markers that encode source-meaning.  
Why did Si tu feel the need in this case to reconcile the Sanskrit with the Tibetan case marking-
pattern and to distinguish a generic from a special pattern in Sanskrit? It is known from his 
discussion of the Tibetan verb phyag ’tshal ba that generic case marking patterns are connected 
to the actual meaning of underlying scenarios as opposed to special conventions that do not 
follow the actual meaning. At least the vibhakta type of comparison was connected to avadhi 
in C 2.1. 92 and thus can be treated as a form of kāraka usage that represents the underlying 
actual meaning. The Tibetan case marking pattern not only confirms this, but it also suggests 
that the nirdhāraṇa type of comparison belongs to the same kāraka. If the sixth case marking 
 357 
 
for nirdhāraṇa were not special or exceptional but a generic use, then the whole-part 
comparison of nirdhāraṇa could no longer be part of ’byung khungs. This would compromise 
Si tu’s proposed theory of how both types – although no real source appears in a comparison – 
are connected to the category of ’byung ba. Then he would have either needed to restrict dgar 
ba only to vibhakta and accept that the Tibetan use of nas for nirdhāraṇa comparisons do not 
follow the actual meaning, or he would have needed to retain dgar ba as comprising both types 
but also to accept that both types no longer are fifth cases. This latter option would certainly go 
against the connection of vibhakta with avadhi as we can find it in Cāndra at least. A perhaps 
more feasible option – yet not exploited by Si tu – would have been to develop a common 
semantic ground for the competing Sanskrit and Tibetan case marking-patterns based on which 
both can be reconciled as representing the actual meaning, a strategy Si tu made use of in his 
explanation of the syntactic difference between Sanskrit and Tibetan verbs of fear.914 In any 
case, any exclusion of one of the two types of comparison from ’byung khungs would have 
probably gone against his intuitive understanding of the types of comparisons he had as a 
Tibetan native speaker. In addition, the Sanskrit sixth case suffix is not as directly related to 
any of the kārakas as the typical kāraka-markers (second, third, fourth, fifth and seventh case 
suffix), a fact which makes any sixth case marking easily appear as exceptional and unrelated 
to the actual meaning of a sentence and its expressed phenomenal scenario. To Si tu the more 
uniform Tibetan case marking-pattern was probably more representative for the actual meaning 
of comparison than the Sanskrit difference of fifth and sixth case marking. 
It is evident form the above that Si tu’s investigation into the meaning of dgar ba in relation to 
’byung ba is intended to represent the actual meaning of dgar ba as such that is valid across 
languages. Similar to Tibetan phyag ’tshal ba vs. Sanskrit namas in the context of the fourth 
case, Si tu states that Sanskrit follows an exceptional use with the sixth case marking pattern 
while typically following the generic pattern with the vibhakta type, whereas Tibetan only 
follows the generic type. However, in contrast to Si tu’s interpretation of namas and its case 
marking pattern, his classification of the sixth case suffix as only special or exceptional in 
relation to the fifth case suffix in the context of comparison is not explicated by Sanskritic 
grammars. This is interesting insofar as it seems to be an instance in which Si tu – either 
intentionally or intuitively – has reinterpreted Sanskritic grammatical knowledge and 
accommodated it to his understanding of comparison that was partially build on taxonomies 
such as those found in Cāndra and partially based on Tibetan language.  
                                                          
914 Cf. infra 402f. 
358 
 
11.2.2 Summary and Résumé of Si tu’s Scaled Fifth Case ’byung khungs 
Si tu developed the fifth case based on the main category ’byung khungs (‘source’) and also 
subsumed under it several other uses of the morphemes las and nas as sometimes closer, 
sometimes more distant forms: 
’byung khungs gtso bo (‘main [use of] source’): 
1) ’byung khungs dngos (‘actual source’):   
  gser ka nas gser (‘gold from the gold mine’) 
  rgya mtsho nas nor bu (‘gemstones from the ocean’) 
  ba las ’o ma (‘milk from the cow’) 
2) ’byung khungs dang ’dra ba/cha mthun (‘quasi-source’): 
 a) occasional ’byung khungs: 
  rta las lhung (‘to fall off the horse’) 
  skas las babs (‘to fall off the ladder’) 
  shar phyogs nas ’od ’char (‘light shines from the east’) 
 b) rgyu mtshan (‘reasoning’): 
  du ba las mer shes (‘to know from the smoke that [there is] fire’) 
 c) rgyu (‘cause’): 
  sa bon las myu gu (‘the sprout from the seed’) 
lnga pa’i yan lag phal par (secondary branch of the fifth case): 
3) ’byung khungs ltar snang (‘pseudo-source’): 
 a) dkar ba (‘distinction’) 
  yang sos las thig nag pa sdug bsngal che (‘the thig nag hell is more painful than 
  the yang sos hell’) 
  mi rnams kyi nang nas rgyal rigs dpa’ (‘among humans, the royal class is the 
  bravest’) 
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 b) sdud pa (‘collection’) 
  lha sa nas gzhis ka rtse’i bar (‘from Lhasa to Shigatse’) 
  gcig nas brgya’i bar (‘from one to hundred’) 
Si tu’s fifth case ’byung khungs is a scaled category of three grades: actual source (’byung 
khungs dngos), quasi-source (’byung khungs dang ’dra ba/cha mthun) and pseudo-source 
(’byung ba ltar snang). The distinguishing criteria are already stated at the very beginning in 
his paraphrase of SCP 16.2-4, where he says that “since they (las and nas) equally join in the 
meaning which indicates that from some phenomenon something is separated (bral ba) or has 
come into being (byung ba), [they] are the semantic domain of source, which in other treatises 
is explained as the fifth case.”915 (1) Actual sources are defined by ’byung ba in its genuine 
sense, i.e. something comes into being at that source, as well as ’bral ba, i.e. a spatial separation 
from that source which must be involved. The question remains whether or not a genuine 
instance of ’byung ba in Si tu’s conception implies that the source must also necessarily be the 
originating cause, and the tentative answer in this study was that it may possibly be but need 
not be so. 
(2) Quasi-sources are those where separation is clearly involved, but they are only occasional 
sources and not those where the appearing entity typically comes into being (2a). Alternatively, 
the reason (rgyu mtshan) of an inference marked by las as well as actual cause (rgyu) marked 
by las are also only quasi-sources. No reasons are specified in the GC for the status of rgyu 
mtshan as merely a quasi-source (2b), and causes (rgyu) are only ’byhungs khungs dang ’dra 
ba, because according to Si tu they lack the parameter of separation (2c). In sum, quasi-sources 
are therefore those which only exhibit one of the two parameters.  
(3) Pseudo-sources are twofold, either in terms of dgar ba (‘distinction,’ 3a) or sdud pa 
(‘collection,’ 3b), the two additional functions of nas and las provided in SCP 17.1. They are 
sources only due to grammatical construction, that is to say the application of las and nas, which 
make them appear as (quasi-)sources in the syntactic structure of Tibetan sentences despite their 
actual lack of any meaning of source. In contrast to (2a), there is no spatial separation involved 
in (3), and in contrast to (2a), (2b) and (2c), nothing comes from or appears at pseudo-sources 
other than in a figurative sense which is encoded by the syntactic structure of Tibetan. In a 
comparison expressed through this syntactic structure, nothing really comes into being from or 
                                                          
915 Cf. supra 341f.; my emphasis. 
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appears occasionally at (~ from) some source. In that sense, (3) completely lacks both defining 
parameters ’byung ba and ’bral ba.  
As was already argued for Si tu’s main functions of the fifth case, the entire conception of this 
case, including the secondary functions dgar ba and sdud pa, was his attempt to systematize 
and organize the different categories that prevailed in the preceding Sanskritic as well as 
Tibetan tradition. However, this threefold categorization should not be exaggerated into a full-
fledged systematic model. Its limits become apparent in Si tu’s summary of the fifth case under 
TKJ 25.4-28.3, where he suddenly changes the nomenclature of (2) and (3). The function of 
rgyu mtshan, classified in his SCP commentary as ’byung khungs dang ’dra ba, is now specified 
with the term ltar snang (‘pseudo’), whereas dgar ba is classified as ’byung khungs dang ’dra 
ba: 
 du ba’i rtags las me yod par rjes su dpag go/     lta bu rgyu mtshan gyi don la’ang rtags 
 de las rjes su dpag pa’i tshad ma skye bas ’byung khungs ltar snang ba’i phyir lnga pa 
 sbyar ba dang/     bud med rnams las sngo bsangs mdzes/     lta bu yon tan sogs kyi sgo 
 nas logs su bkar ba ste bud med rnams kyi nang nas blos khyad par phye nas phyung ba 
 yin pa’i phyir ’byung khungs dang ’dra ba’i don gyi lnga pa sbyar ba […] 
 “A fifth [case] is also applied in the meaning of a reason (rgyu mtshan), as in ‘From the 
 sign/reason (rtags) of smoke it is inferred that there is fire.’ (du ba’i rtags las me yod 
 par rjes su dpag go), since a valid cognition (tshad ma) [in terms] of an inference is 
 born from a certain sign/reason (rtags), which thus is a pseudo-source (’byung khungs 
 ltar snang ba). And as in ‘among girls the pale blue ones are the most beautiful’ (bud 
 med rnams las sngo bsangs mdzes), the singling out (logs su bkar ba) through a quality, 
 etc., is the application of the fifth [case] in the meaning of quasi-source (’byung khungs 
 dang ’dra ba), since [something] has been made to appear (phyung ba) through 
 differentiating [it] with the mind from the [remaining] girls.”916 
Si tu’s use of terminology is not fully consistent, and therefore his threefold graduation should 
not be regarded too strictly. His model may further be challenged by various instances that are 
difficult to classify in his taxonomy. For example, a person’s birthplace is genuine to each 
specific person, yet every person has a different birthplace and thus there is no genuine 
birthplace as such. Thus, in Si tu’s taxonomy, is a person’s birthplace ’byung khungs dngos, 
because it is the actual source from where this particular person has come into being? Or is it 
                                                          
916 GC 601.6. 
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’byung khungs dang ’dra ba, because it is merely the birthplace of that particular person and 
thus an occasional birthplace from the perspective of all people? It is to be assumed that there 
are several such instances that are problematic in view of Si tu’s typology, and therefore it 
remains a question to which extend Si tu himself had intended a clear-cut distinction of the 
different types. He has certainly attempted to render the different categories of the fifth case 
that were established long before him in such a way that they may be brought together under 
the meaning of source. Yet, it is a different question and ultimately a matter of interpretation 
how distinct he himself regarded the different types of main and secondary fifth cases, actual 
sources, quasi- and pseudo-sources. In his GC on TKJ, Si tu summarized his understanding of 
the fifth case in his own words as follows: 
 legs sbyar la ni gang las ’bral ba’i don la lnga pa bshad cing don des lnga pa’i ’jug yul 
 thams cad la  khyab par yang bshad pa mthong bas bod skad la’ang zhib mor brtags 
 na ’chad tshul de ’byor bar sem [sic!] mo/ 
 “In Sanskrit, it is explained [that] the fifth [case is] for the meaning of separation from 
 something, and moreover [we] see the explanation that this meaning covers all 
 arguments to which the fifth [case] joins (lnga pa’i jug yul thams cad). Therefore, I 
 think that this way of explaining [the fifth case] applies (’byor ba) also to Tibetan 
 language, if closely examined.”917  
Thus, upon this investigation of Si tu’s conception of the fifth case, what can be said about his 
examination based on which he has come to this conclusion? 
Despite his claim that ’bral ba (‘(spatial) separation’) covers all the uses of the Tibetan fifth 
case ’byung khungs just like in the Sanskritic grammatical sources, it is in fact not a sufficient 
parameter and in his conception, which consequently differs from Sanskritic sources. In 
Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya or Cāndra, two sources in which apādāna and avadhi in their 
respective prototypical senses of ‘fixed point of departure’ and ‘limiting point’ are understood 
to cover many if not most of Si tu’s categories, these very values of ‘fixed point of departure’ 
and ‘limiting point’ alone define the prototypical meaning of the kāraka. In contrast, Si tu even 
explicitly quotes lhung ba (‘to fall’) as a genuine instance of apādāna in Sanskritic grammatical 
sources, yet he does not feel the need to comment why in his own taxonomy he has classified 
this semantic field only as quasi-source (’byung khungs dang ’dra ba). The criterion of spatial 
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separation is apparently not sufficient and not operative in the distinction of actual sources from 
occasional sources such as rta las lhung. 
It seems that through the systematization of categories, Si tu has not only attempted to 
reorganize and homogenize them, but he has also attempted to retain the prototypical status of 
both traditions’ basic conceptions of the fifth case function, the Sanskritic in terms of spatial 
departure/separation and the Tibetan in terms of a source. Si tu’s strategy to reconcile 
competing notions of the fifth case’s prototypical function was to define ’byung khungs dngos 
through its genuine meaning in terms of a source from where something comes into being, but 
then he has also added separation as another main criterion. Through this compromise, ’bral ba 
has lost its status as a sufficient parameter. Moreover, the function of rgyu (‘cause’) is at least 
one subcategory in Si tu’s typology that lacks the parameter ’bral ba and compromises Si tu’s 
claim that separation persists throughout.918 In any event, when Si tu claims ’bral ba as a 
defining parameter of ’byung khungs that prevails throughout all its uses, this does not result in 
a full conformity with the basic Sanskritic conception.  
Si tu’s entire subdivision is based mainly on investigations into the nature of the category 
’byung khungs, but it is derived neither from Sanskritic nor from Tibetan syntactic features. 
This is also evident from the fact that Si tu’s typology does not take into account any language-
specific difference between the morphemes nas and las, since both figure as examples of actual 
and quasi-sources.  
For example, Si tu’s distinction between actual and occasional source in instances such as gser 
kha nas gser (‘from the gold mine gold;’ ’byung khungs dngos) and shar phyogs nas ’od snang 
(‘the sun shines from the east;’ ’byung khungs dang ’dra ba) is only of little relevance to Tibetan 
language, since it syntactically encodes the two scenarios in the same way. The same critique 
applies to the difference between ba las ’o ma (‘milk from the cow;’ ’byung khungs dngos) and 
sa bon las myu gu (‘from the seed the sprout;’ rgyu or ’byung khungs dang ’dra ba) as well as 
the distinction between actual sources and causes. This type of grammatical analysis lacks 
explanatory power not because it contradicts the structures of Tibetan language by default, but 
because its focus on the constitution of sources and their manifestations in different situations 
easily becomes arbitrary without any language-specific reference and thus has only limited 
significance for WT.  
                                                          
918 Or is this perhaps the reason why he swapped the terminology in TKJ for quasi- and pseudo sources? Is rgyu 
there a pseudo-source, because it lacks separation, whereas dgar ba is a quasi-source, because at least 
figuratively there is included a separation from another entity? 
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In sum, when Si tu closes his discussion of the fifth case in TKJ 25.4-28.3 with the statement 
that a close or detailed examination (zhib mor brtags pa) reveals that apādāna’s prototypical 
criterion of ’bral ba represents the overarching category prevalent in all uses of the fifth case 
not only in Sanskrit but also in Tibetan language, then this validation in his examination of the 
fifth case function is not only derived from Sanskrit and Tibetan language structures; in fact, it 
is much more firmly based on Si tu’s objectivist focus of exploring a few categories and 
parameters and their relation in general by help of different scenarios and sample phrases to 
then apply his taxonomy to the fifth case markers las and nas. The perhaps clearest illustration 
of his objectivist approach in this context is his metalinguistic but syntactically irrelevant 
investigation into the category of cause and its relation to separation by which he reaches the 
conclusion of outsourcing causes from actual sources. Yet, in the context of the fifth case, this 
did only little harm, since in general the category source has remained a significant category of 
the morphemes nas and las in Tibetan. 
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12 Rnam dbye drug pa ’brel ba 
12.1 Historical Survey 
The traditional Tibetan sixth case is labelled ’brel ba/pa919 (‘connection,’ ‘relation’) and is 
marked by the morphological category ’brel sgra (‘connecting morpheme’), which consists of 
the five allomorphs gi, kyi, ’i, yi and gyi. Like the third case and its morphological realization 
byed sgra, the homogeneity of these five morphemes is supported in modern linguistics and, 
generally speaking, also their identification with the function of ’brel ba has strong linguistic 
significance. SCP treats their morphology and function under 12.3-13.3: 
 dang po gnyis la dang po mthun/      
 gsum lnga bcu la kya dang sbyar/      
 bdun pa nyid la bdun pa ste/     
  lhag ma rnams la gya sbyar ba/      
 de dag i sbyar ’brel ba’i sa/ 
 “With the first two [postscripts] the first [postscript] is in accordance, (ga, nga →gi) 
 to the third, fifth and tenth [postscript] kya is to be applied, (da, ba, sa →kyi) 
 the seventh to the seventh [postscript] itself,   (’a →’i) 
 to the remaining [postscripts] gya is to be applied.   (na, ma, ra, la →gyi) 
 [To] these [morphemes the vowel] i applied, [is] the semantic domain of connection.” 
Since the triggering of the allomorphs depends on the final letter of the preceding word form, 
SCP elaborates which postscript letter triggers which allomorph. Postscript ga and nga trigger 
gi, whereas the final letters da, ba and sa trigger the allomorph kyi, and na, ma, ra and la govern 
gyi. The seventh postscript letter ’a triggers ’i (e.g. mtha’ → mtha’i ‘of the end’) as well as yi 
in cases where an additional syllable is needed for the verse metre, but which is not mentioned 
in SCP itself but added by commentators such as Zha lu.920 In Tibetan grammatical sources, the 
term ’brel ba (‘connection,’ ‘relation’) is often treated as self-explanatory, at least in connection 
with examples. Compare the following selection of Rnam gling’s example list of this case:921 
 bdag gi lha (‘deity of myself,’ ‘my deity’), khyod kyi nor (‘wealth of yours,’ ‘your 
 wealth’), dpal gyi bdag po (‘owner/possessor of glory’) 
                                                          
919 Both versions are found in literature. 
920 Cf. Zha lu 2013A, 10. Note that the same morphology applies to the third case marker byed sgra, the only 
difference being the additional letter sa (gyi → gyis, etc.). On the omission of yi and yis, cf. supra 252. 
921 Cf. Rnam gling 2013, 72. 
 365 
 
The sixth case ’brel ba thus establishes a relation or connection between two noun phrases and 
may be – and frequently is – compared to the genitive function of Indo-European languages. In 
fact, the Tibetan sixth case ’brel ba was developed based on the Sanskrit genitive case suffix. 
The historical development of the sixth case function ’brel ba is comparatively unproblematic. 
Sanskritic grammars such Cāndra and Sārasvata define the generic use of the sixth case suffix 
as sambandha (‘relation,’ ‘connection’), thus the direct terminological antecedent of the 
Tibetan term.922 Cāndra established the following rule for the prototypical use of the sixth case 
suffix: 
 C 2.1.95 ṣaṣṭhī sambandhe “A sixth vibhakti if [there is] connection.” 
In comparison, Pāṇini and Kātantra rendered the sixth case function differently: 
 P 2.3.50 ṣaṣthī śeṣe “The sixth vibhakti if there is a remainder.” 
 K 2.4.19 śeṣāḥ karmakaraṇasampradānāpādānasvāmyādyadhikaraṇeṣu “The 
 remaining [case suffixes] if [there is respectively] a karman, an instrument, a 
 sampradāna, an apādāna, an owner, a location, etc.” 
Pāṇini’s definition of the prototypical sixth case function in terms of śeṣa (‘remainder,’ ‘rest’) 
is highly technical. The rule initiates an entire section up to P 2.3.73 that covers a variety of 
uses. The Pāṇinian commentarial tradition usually explains the term śeṣa through the 
distinction of kāraka- and śeṣa-relations, that is to say śeṣa refers to the remaining syntactic 
and/or semantic relations apart from the kārakas. At least generally speaking, this implies first 
of all that kāraka-relations are between nouns and verbs, whereas śeṣa-relations are those 
between two nouns. 923  For the current context, there is no reason to go further into the 
intricacies of P 2.3.50 or the variety of uses of the sixth case suffix that are specified in the 
subsequent rules.924  
Kātantra’s definition of the prototypical sixth case function svāmyādi (‘owner, etc.’) is 
probably inspired by the Pāṇinian tradition, where svāmitva (‘ownership’) already figures as 
an important meaning of the śeṣa-relation in Patañjali’s Bhāṣya 17 on P 2.3.50. In later 
commentaries, such as the Kāśikāvr̥tti, there are also more extensive typologies of the syntactic 
or semantic relations covered by śeṣa, including again what is known as svasvāmisambandha 
                                                          
922 Cf. Liebich 1918, 113; M.S. Joshi 2011, 313. 
923 Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1981, 53; HSGLT 2, 282. 
924 Cf. e.g. P 2.3.50 and the subsequent rules in Joshi and Roodbergen 1998, 87ff. 
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or svasvāmibhāva (‘owner-owned relation’) with the example rājñaḥ puruṣasya gr̥ham (‘the 
house of the king’s officer’).925 
Thus, it is likely that Cāndra’s alternative rendition of the sixth case function as sambandha is 
connected to these typologies – either as a source of inspiration or an inspired source – in which 
the term sambandha figures as a technical term as well. The focus of Cāndra on this notion 
rather than on Pāṇini’s śeṣa itself may be explained through Cāndra’s attempt to provide more 
self-explanatory notions that do not require separate saṃjñā rules (‘defining rules’). 
In the early Tibetan linguistic sources, the Tibetan sixth case ’brel ba figures not as a simple 
adoption but involved processes of selection as well as the concentration on a dominating 
function. NGg and GNT both provide more functions than simply ’brel ba. In the following, 
these will be touched upon only briefly, since they did not have a major role in Si tu’s work. 
The meaning of the sixth case is explained in the vibhakti section of NGg in a single sentence: 
 ’di ni bdag po’i don du tshig snga ma byed cing brten par bya ba’i don du tshig phyi ma 
 byed par ston pas drug pa bdag po dang ’brel pa’i sa zhes pa dang lhag ma’i dbang du 
 byas zhes bya ba’o/ 
 “Regarding these [sixth case forms], since they indicate that the preceding syntactic 
 form (tshig) functions in the meaning of owner (bdag po) and the following syntactic 
 word form functions in the meaning of the dependent (~ owned ?, brten par bya ba), the 
 sixth [case] is termed ‘the semantic domain of owner and connection’ (bdag po dang 
 ’brel pa’i sa) and called ‘the header of the remainder’ (lhag ma’i dbang du byas).”926 
The three listed functions of bdag po (‘owner’), ’brel pa (‘connection’) and lhag ma 
(‘remainder’) all figure in the Sanskritic tradition as the generic functions mentioned in 
Kātantra (K 2.4.19), Cāndra (C 2.1.95) and Pāṇini (P 2.3.50) respectively. Apart from this, it 
is unclear why NGg mentions precisely these three functions and how they relate to each other. 
Judging from the grammatical construction of the Tibetan quotation, the terms bdag po and 
’brel pa may have been understood as interchangeable labels or also as two separate 
subcategories. Either option would not be fully in accordance with the Sanskritic tradition, 
according to which the owner-owned relation is usually just one type of relation (sambandha, 
’brel pa) that falls under śeṣa (‘remainder’), but neither the only nor a separate function apart 
from sambandha. The notion of lhag ma’i dbang du byas (‘the header of remainder’) is 
                                                          
925 Cf. ibid. 87f. 
926 CT 115 – 433. For an additional translation of this passage, cf. HSGLT 2, 288.  
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reminiscent of Chos grub’s ’Jug pa’i sgra brgyad bstan pa tshig le’ur byas pa, in which  the 
sixth case is defined as lhag pa’i dbang du byas (‘header of remainder’).927 The Tibetan term 
dbang du byas pa has been also used as a translation of Sanskrit adhikāra.928 In the context of 
grammar, the Sanskrit term refers to a certain type of topical or heading rules, which apply to a 
defined number of subsequent rules and thus form a domain.929 The Tibetan notion may be 
inspired by P 2.3.50, as Pāṇini’s śeṣa rule indeed initiates a separate section on the sixth case 
suffix, which was interpreted by the Sanskritic commentarial tradition as consisting of several 
subtypes of relations, one of which is the owner-owned. However, compared to Sanskritic 
grammar, the term dbang du byas was used less systematically in the NGg, since it indicates 
the subsumption of bdag po and ’brel pa only in very general terms, but without establishing 
an entire domain that covers a clearly defined set of syntactic or semantic triggers. Other than 
these categories and the short definition of the owner-owned relation in terms of bdag po and 
brten par bya ba, NGg did not provide any examples to demonstrate the sixth case.  
The GNT, in contrast, gives a clearer and more detailed presentation of the sixth case: 
 da ni gnas drug pa ston te/     de yang drug pa gang gi zhes pa ni bdag po dang ’brel 
 pa’i sa bstan pa yin la/     de yang bdag por ’gyur ba’i don ni dbang bya rgyu’i dngos 
 po gang la dbang byed pa’i bdag por ’gyur ba ni drug pa kho nas ’gyur te/     de yang 
 lhas byin gyi rdzas dang longs spyod lhas byin gyi khang pa zhes pa la sogs pa/     dbang 
 byed pa’i bdag po thams cad la yang drug pa kho nas shes par bya’o/     ’brel pa ni 
 gnyis te/     gzhi ’thun gyi drug pa dang/     skyes bu’i drug pa’o/     de la gzhi ’thun gyi 
 drug pa ni chos kyi dngos po gcig ste rdzas su grub pa gnyis med kyi dngos po gcig gi 
 steng du gzhi ’thun pa yin pa la yang drug pas sbyor ba yod de/     de yang utpa la’i 
 sngon po zhes pa lta bu/     utpa la dang sngon po gnyis ka yang rdzas gnyis med kyi 
 gzhi’thun pa kho na yin pa la drug pas sbyor te/     de lta bu’i rigs mang du rgyas par 
 blta’o/     skyes bu’i drug pa ni dngos po’i rdzas tha dad pa gnyis drug pas sbyor ba yin 
 te/     de yang ’di ltar lhas byin gyi zhang po zhes pa lta bu lhas byin rdzas su grub pa 
 dang zhang po rdzas su grub pa gnyis ’brel par ston pa la yang drug pa kho nas sbyor 
 ro/ 
 “Now to the exposition of the sixth semantic domain. The sixth [case] ‘of which’ (gang 
 gi) is the indication of the semantic domains of owner (bdag po) and connection (’brel 
                                                          
927 Cf. HSGLT 2, 288 and 362. 
928 Cf. Negi on 2002, 3947. 
929 Cf. Abhyankar 1986, 14. 
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 pa). The meaning of [something] becoming the owner is that [something] becomes the 
 owner who controls/possesses (dbang byed pa) something to be controlled/possessed. 
 [This] is only the sixth [case]. All controlling owners (dbang byed pa’i bdag po) [as] 
 e.g. [in] ‘the possessions and goods of Devadatta’ (lhas byin gyi rdzas dang longs 
 spyod) [or] ‘the house of Devadatta’ (lhas sbyin gyi khang pa) have to be known only
 as sixth [cases].  
 As for connection (’brel pa), [there are] two types: the sixth [case] of coreferentiality 
 (gzhi ’thun gyi drug pa) and the sixth [case] of person (skyes bu’i drug pa). As for the 
 sixth [case] of coreferentiality, [it is] a single entity with a property (chos kyi dngos 
 po). [That is to say] there is also the application of a sixth case (drug pas sbyor ba) 
 when two [entities] are coreferential (gzhi mthun) with regard to a single entity, whereas 
 they are not established as two substantially [different entities] (rdzas su grub pa gnyis 
 med). For example, in ‘the blue of the lotus’ (utpa la’i sngon po), the two, lotus and 
 blue, do not exist substantially as twofold but only as being coreferential, for which a 
 sixth [case] is applied. Such a type [of connection] appears frequently and 
 widespread. The sixth [case] of person is the application of a sixth [case when there are] 
 two substantially different entities (dngos po’i rdzas tha dad pa gnyis). When [it is] 
 indicated as in ‘the maternal uncle of Devadatta’ (lhas byin gyi zhang po) that the two, 
 Devadatta, who is substantially established, [and] the maternal uncle, who is [equally] 
 substantially established, are connected, also only a sixth [case] is applied.”930 
The two functions of bdag po (‘owner’) and ’brel pa (‘connection’), which are already 
mentioned in NGg, are repeated, but here unmistakably as two separate functions. Pāṇini’s 
śeṣa/lhag ma (‘remainder’), however, has not been retained. The category bdag po is more or 
less self-explanatory, whereas ’brel pa has been further divided into two subcategories, which 
appear rather unconventional. The author apparently focused on the criterion of substantial 
identity/difference (rdzas su grub pa gnyis yod/med) to define different types of connections. 
The first type is that of two terms that specify a single entity and are both instantiated in this 
very same entity. They are therefore substantially identical or coreferential (gzhi ’thun, 
samānādhikaraṇa, lit. ‘common substratum’). In this sense, the blue of the lotus is not different 
from the lotus, since both lotus and blue refer to the same entity. The second type of connection, 
i.e. that of a person (skyes bu), covers those connections of entities that are substantially distinct, 
such as uncle and nephew. This example is somewhat misleading, since it gives the impression 
                                                          
930 CT 115 – 458f. 
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that the skyes bu type of connection indeed only refers to persons. In the context of GNT’s sixth 
case function ’brel pa (‘connection’), the influx of the category gzhi ’thun/mi ’thun appears 
more like an attempt of a metalinguistic investigation into the nature of possible connections 
based on the relata as either the same or separate substances (rdzas). It remains unclear why 
the notion of substantial identity/distinctiveness has become the relevant distinguishing 
criterion and there is no apparent syntactic or semantic significance of it in Sanskrit or Tibetan 
visible to me.  
In this research, no other sources on the sixth case were encountered in which this type of 
subclassification is also figured. Without a further detailed discussion, a general direction for 
future research may be suggested by the employed terminology of gzhi mthun pa 
(samānādhikaraṇa, ‘common substratum,’ ‘coreferential’), skyes bu (puruṣa, ‘person’) as well 
as the example of utpa la’i sngon po (‘blue lotus,’ ‘blue water lily’). Both the terminology and 
the example are reminiscent of compound formations (bsdu ba, samāsa), and more accurately 
GNT’s class of gzhi ’thun pa resonates with karmadhāraya compounds while skyes bu 
resonates with tatpuruṣa compounds. Karmadhāraya is typically a subclass of tatpuruṣa and 
covers descriptive compounds, mostly in which the former part specifies the latter in the form 
of apposition, nīlotpala (‘blue lotus,’ ‘blue water lily’) figuring as a frequent illustration in 
Sanskritic grammatical sources.931 The compound form tatpuruṣa is a larger class, comprising 
e.g. subclasses such as case relations between the two members of a compound (vibhakti-
tatpuruṣa), the mentioned karmadhārayas as well as so-called dvigu compounds.932 However, 
while the conceptual and terminological congruences between GNT’s subclassification of ’brel 
pa and Sanskritic theories on compound formations are strong and a borrowing would be 
comprehensible from the fact that both are concerned with the relation between two word forms, 
the respective contexts are different and it remains unclear how Sanskritic knowledge of samāsa 
may have entered the conception of the sixth case in GNT. Therefore, at this point the suggested 
historical connection still remains speculative. 
In the GNT, the dominance of the category ’brel pa that has become the most important 
meaning of the sixth case in the subsequent Tibetan tradition is already indicated at the end of 
the section on the sixth [case]: 
                                                          
931 Cf. also ft. 614; Tubb and Boose 2007, 102. Cf. also the presentation of karmadhāraya (khyad par gyis mdor 
bsdus pa) in NGg, CT 115 – 421. 
932 Cf. Tubb and Boose 2007, 96ff. 
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 de ltar byas pas drug pa’i sgra ’di bdag po dang ’brel par ’gyur ba yin la/     de yang 
 ’brel pa’i sgra gtsor byas nas shing gi yal ga shin tu ring bar ’dug ces pa lta bu la sogs 
 pa bshad pa yin no/     de rnams kyi gnas drug pa bshad zin to/ 
 “Since it is like this, this sixth case-term (drug pa’i sgra) becomes owner and 
 connection, and having made the notion of connection (~ ’brel pa’i sgra) the main 
 [meaning], it is explained e.g. as in ‘the branches of the tree are very long’ (shing gi yal 
 ga shin tu ring bar ’dug).”933 
How this focus on ’brel ba has precisely arisen in the tradition will have to be evaluated 
elsewhere. However, since already Cāndra has focused mainly on this very function, any 
possible deviations in this context from the Sanskritic tradition are only minor ones. It may be 
imagined that ’brel ba (‘connection’) as the broader notion than the very narrow bdag po 
(‘owner’) but also the clearer and more self-explanatory term than lhag ma (‘remainder’) was 
the simplest solution with the strongest explanatory power within the framework of the 
semantically dominated Tibetan case model. Moreover, the general category of connection 
easily allows for its application to the specifically Tibetan use of ’brel sgra, which is fairly 
representatively covered by it. 
Subsequent sources such as the Smra sgo, Mkhas ’jug or Tshogs gsum gsal ba have all already 
dispensed with any other function than ’brel ba.934 Smra sgo makes the following statement: 
 drug pa’i phrad bstan pa/     kyi ni ’brel ba’i tshig yin te/     zhes bya ba yin te/     lha 
 sbyin gyi rta zhes pa lta bu ste/     phan tshun gyi don ’brel bar sbyor ba’i brda sprod 
 par ’dod pa’o/ 
 “[Regarding the root text’s] teaching of the syntactic link of the sixth case, [it] is ‘kyi is 
 the syntactic form of  connection.’ In the grammatical tradition (brda sprod pa), it is 
 claimed that [a sixth case] is applied as the mutual connection of items (phan tshun gyi 
 don ’brel ba) as in ‘the horse of Devadatta.’”935 
In sum, the general historical development of the Tibetan sixth case ’brel ba is comparatively 
clear. A major reason for this is the fact that the connective function as such has a strong 
linguistic significance in WT, in which a homogeneous and distinctive set of morphemes is 
indeed used in this way. 
                                                          
933 CT 115 – 459. 
934 Cf. KhJ 2009, 25; Dpang Blo gros brtan pa 2004, 250. 
935 Smr̥ti 2002, 90. 
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12.1.1 The Tibetan Sixth Case function in the Rtags kyi ’jug pa 
Before next turning to Si tu’s exposition of the sixth case in the context of his Sum rtags 
commentary, the only noteworthy issue regarding the historical development of the Tibetan 
sixth case is the terminology used in the TKJ. Without any reference to case grammar or the 
notion of case as such, TKJ refers twice to the sixth case function, at least according to the 
commentarial literature. While TKJ 22.4 uses no other term than ’brel pa (‘connection’) itself, 
TKJ 25.2 uses the rather opaque bsgrub par bya: 
TKJ 24.4-25.3: 
 spyi(r) ’jug yod dam byed pa yod/  (= first and third case) 
 de bzhin ched byed rten byed dang/  (= fourth and seventh case) 
 las bya blang bya bsgrub par bya/  (= second and fifth case; sixth case ?) 
 sngon tu ‘os pa gnas pa ’am/   (= eighth case) 
This entire section up to TKJ 28.3 is dedicated to the semantic/syntactic environment that 
triggers the different syntactic links. TKJ 24.4-25.3 treats the triggering of the case-links and 
states, for example, that the existence of an active doing (byed pa) triggers byed sgra or that a 
purposeful action (ched byed) triggers la don, etc. The entire list is unproblematic and may be 
directly associated with the respective case functions, except for the sixth case, which is termed 
bsgrub par bya (‘to be established/accomplished’).936 The use of this term as a designation of 
the sixth case is rather unusual, if not to say confusing. It was untraceable in any Sanskritic 
source so far, however in TKJ 11.4 the same term ‘to be accomplished’ is used in a very 
different sense of a formation or construction of verbs.937 The problematic character of the term 
is reflected in the different solutions offered by the commentators to interpret this term as a 
reference to the sixth case, for example in Zha lu’s commentary: 
 bsgrub par bya ba drug pa ’brel ba ste/     shing gi yal ga zhes par/     yal ga de shing 
 gi yin par bsgrub par bya ba lta bu […] 
                                                          
936 Note that also the first case as spyir ’jug posed problems to commentators such as Zha lu and evoked different 
interpretations (cf. Zha lu 2013B, 36). However, we can at least relate it to GNT’s (khyab pa ?) spyi’i don as a 
first case label (cf. CT 115 – 444). 
937 Cf. TKJ 11.4:  
 pho ni ’das dang gzhan bsgrub spyir  
 “The masculine [letters] in order to form the past [and the category termed] other” (my emphasis). 
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 “’to be accomplished’ (bsgrub par bya) is the sixth [case], connection; such as in ‘the 
 branches of a tree,’ these branches are to be accomplished/established/constructed as 
 being that of the tree […].”938 
I have to admit that I do not see the reason why his interpretation of bsgrub par bya is genuine 
to the sixth case and thus not transferable to any of the other cases. Any entity which takes on 
a case meaning in a sentence may be said to be accomplished as a karman, agent, etc. This 
interpretation comes close to the bsgrub par bya in TKJ 11.4, where it refers to the grammatical 
construction of word forms, which applies to any kind of grammatical construction and not to 
that of the sixth case. Although his rendition is slightly more specific, Rnam gling seems to stay 
in line with Zha lu without offering a more straightforward interpretation: 
 chos kyi sku zhes pa lta bu drug pa’i sgras bsgrub par bya ba’i sgra’am bdag po dang 
 ’brel ba’i sgra ’dren pa dang/ […] 
 “As in ‘the body of Dharma’ (chos kyi sku, dharmakāya), the term to be 
 accomplished/formed/constructed by the sixth [case]’s morpheme, that is to say the term 
 of owner and connection (bdag po dang ’brel ba’i sgra), is derived and […].”939 
If I understand him correctly, he indeed seems to read the term in the very sense of TKJ 11.4. 
Si tu shows the same indirect awareness of this notion’s problematic character, as he feels 
compelled to explain it, despite providing little new information compared to Rnam gling:940 
 rnam dbye drug pa ’brel pa’i don la ’jug pa ni/     phyug po’i nor/     khyim gyi lha/     
 chos kyi sku/     bdag gi don/     shing gi yal ga lta bu/     nor/     lha/     sku/     don/     
 yal ga rnams rim pa bzhin/     phyug po/     khyim/     chos/     bdag     shing rnams dang 
 ’brel pa yin pa’i phyir/     de dag la rnam dbye drug pa ’jug cing ’dir gong du bsgrub 
 bya zhes gsungs pas zhib mor brtags na drug sgra/     ’i/     gyi/     kyi rnams bsgrub bya 
 nor dang/     lha dang/     sku rnams/     bdag po phyug po dang/     rten gnas khyim 
 dang/     zhi ba’i chos rnams dang ’brel pa’i sgrub byed du ’gro ba lta bur go dgos so/ 
 “Regarding [the mode how] the sixth case takes on the meaning of connection, since 
 in ‘the wealth of the rich’ (phyug po’i nor), ‘the god of the house’ (khyim gyi lha), ‘the 
 body of dharma’ (chos kyi sku, dharmkāya), ‘the purpose of oneself’ (bdag gi don) [and] 
 ‘the branches of the tree’ (shing gi yal ga), the wealth, god, body, purpose and branches 
                                                          
938 Zha lu 2013B, 36. 
939 Rnam gling 2013, 154. 
940 Since this terminological issue appears to be minor in the conception of Si tu’s sixth case, I did not further 
discuss it in the section on the Great Commentary and his standpoint is given in the historical survey.  
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 are connected respectively with the rich, house, Dharma, oneself and tree, a sixth case 
 joins to them. Since [the sixth case] is taught in this [section] above as bsgrub bya, if 
 examined more detailed, the sixth [case’s] morphemes ’i, gyi, kyi should be understood 
 like that which turns into the accomplisher/constructor (sgrub byed) of that which is to 
 be accomplished/constructed/formed (bsgrub bya), i.e. the connection of the wealth, god 
 and body with the rich [as] the possessor, the house [as] the support and the peaceful 
 Dharma [respectively].”941 
Also here it remains unclear whether this is an accurate interpretation of the root text. The whole 
section in TKJ 24.2-28.3 is dedicated to a summarized discussion of the ways in which the 
meaning of subsequent phrases triggers the syntactic links according to their different functions, 
and thus the passage is clearly concerned with the different meanings of these links. The general 
notion of grammatical construction, however, does not provide any information about the 
specific meaning or function of this grammatical category labelled bsgrub bya, may it be the 
sixth case or any other category. Lacking more knowledge about the Sanskritic body of source 
materials, it may therefore be concluded that this is perhaps an instance in which the original 
meaning of the root text has been lost and consequently the commentators have been forced to 
find their own solutions. 
12.2 The Sixth Case in the Great Commentary 
The discussion of the sixth case ’brel ba takes up comparatively little space in GC, since 
compared to most of the other cases, this case is intuitively comprehensible in the context of 
Tibetan language and less problematic historically as well as linguistically. Si tu comments 
upon the notion of ’brel ba’i sa (‘semantic domain of connection’) in SCP 12.3-13.3 and 
following the syntactic link’s morphology: 
 […] gi     kyi/     ’i/     yi/     gyi rnams su grub pa de rnams gang zhig gang dang sgra 
 mthun  pa’i ming mtha’ so so dang sbyar bas/     bdag gi     gang gi     thams cad kyi/     
 rab kyi/    phyogs kyi/     de’i/     de yi/     gtan gyi/     lam gyi/     gser gyi/     dpal gyi 
 sogs su ’gyur te de dag ni gzhung gzhan du rnam dbye drug pa zhes ’byung ba rten dang 
 brten pa’am yan lag dang yan lag can sogs ming don phan tshun ’brel pa brjod pa’i 
 don can gi sgra yin pas ’brel pa’i sa zhes bya’o 
“[…] the resultant gi, kyi, ’i, yi and gyi are applied to the respective word ending (ming 
mtha’)  that is phonologically accordant, thus resulting in (1) bdag gi (‘mine’), (2) gang 
                                                          
941 GC 602.2. 
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gi (‘of  which,’ ‘whose’), (3) thams cad kyi (‘of all’), (4) rab kyi (‘of very’), (5) phyogs 
kyi (‘of direction’), (6) de’i (‘of that’), (7) de yi (‘of that’), (8) btan gyi (‘of permanent’), 
(9) lam gyi (‘of the path’), (10) gser gyi (‘of gold’), (11) dpal gyi (‘of 
glory/magnificence’) etc. These occur as the sixth case in other treatises, and they are 
the morphemes that have the meaning of expressing the mutual connection [of] word 
meanings (ming don phan tshun ’brel pa brjod pa), [such as] support and supported 
(rten dang brten pa), part and whole (yan lag dang yan lag can), etc. Thus, it is called 
‘the semantic domain of connection.’”942 
In view of the preceding tradition, Si tu adds no new information either about the root passage 
of SCP or about the sixth case. The phonological accordance of ’brel sgra with the final sound 
of the preceding word is already mentioned in Zha lu et al. The core definition of the sixth case, 
i.e. ming don phan tshun ’brel pa (‘mutual connection [between] word meanings’), comes close 
to what was encountered in the Smra sgo, a source Si tu was very well acquainted with, although 
the current passage does not provide a direct reference. Moreover, ’brel pa remains the only 
function in his commentary on SCP. Si tu also provided specifications of ming don phan tshun 
’brel pa by providing examples for different semantic types of connection, e.g. 
support/supported (rten/rten pa) and parts/whole (yan lag/yan lag can), however the 
subcategorization of GNT into the connection of common substratum and that of person is not 
further discussed. The eleven examples, which are rather meaningless on their own, are as usual 
a selection of the different morphological forms of ’brel sgra, in order to illustrate the 
morphological application of this link in connection with the ten postscript letters.943 In fact, 
these are part of full phrases which Si tu provided also in SCP 12.3-13.3 as an illustration of 
the syntactic/semantic application of the syntactic link:  
 ’brel sgra de dag tshig grogs dang ji ltar sbyor ba’ang/     bdag gi nor/     gang gi drin/     
 thams cad kyi don/     rab kyi phul/     phyogs kyi glang po/     de’i tshul/     de yi phyogs 
 su ci zhig lhung/     gtan kyi don/     lam gyi yon tan/     gser gyi rgyan/     dpal gyi be’u/     
 kund kyi mchog     rab ’byor kyi tshul/     bka’ stsald kyi snying po sogs te rtogs par 
 sla’o/ 
 “Furthermore, it is easy to understand how these connection morphemes are applied 
 with an accompanying phrase: (12) ‘my riches’ (bdag gi nor), (13) ‘whose/which 
 kindness (gang gi drin), (14) ‘purpose/meaning of all’ (thams cad kyi don), (15) ‘the 
                                                          
942 GC 484.6. 
943 Postscript ’a has two examples, de’i and de yi. 
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 most superior’ (rab kyi phul), (16) ‘Dignāga’ (phyogs kyi glang po), (17) ‘mode of that’ 
 (de’i tshul), (18) ‘whatever falls into the extreme of that’ (de’i phyogs su ci zhig lhung), 
 (19) ‘ultimate purpose’ (gtan gyi don), (20) ‘virtues of the path’ (lam gyi yon tan), (21) 
 ‘golden ornament’ (gser gyi rgyan), (22) ‘knot of glory’ (śrīvatsa/, dpal gyi be’u), (23) 
 ‘the highest of all’ (kund kyi mchog), (24) ‘the way of Subhūti/welfare (?)’ (rab ’byord 
 kyi tshul), (25) ‘the essence of the teaching’ (bka’ stsald kyi snying po), etc.”944 
This is all the information on the sixth case contained in the GC ad SCP 12.3-13.3. The rest of 
Si tu’s commentary on this passage is dedicated to the ‘non-case meaning’ (rnam dbye’i don 
ma yin pa) of the syntactic link, which he renders in terms of phyi tshig ’khal ba’am mi mthun 
par ston pa’i tshig gi rgyan, a ‘phrase ornament which indicates contradiction or discordance 
of the subsequent phrase’:945 
 ’di ni bden gyi gzhan ni gti mug go ‘As regards this, it is true, whereas the other one is 
 dullness.’946 
Turning to the case functions of TKJ 24.4-25.3, the term that Sum rtags commentators have 
associated with the sixth case is the notion bsgrub par bya (‘to be accomplished’).947 Since Si 
tu did not add any new material on this notion in the passage quoted in the historical survey 
above, the only noteworthy information Si tu provided on the sixth case in his summary of the 
case functions following TKJ 25.4-28.3 is an extended and more detailed version of the 
different types of connections: 
 ’brel pa’ang bdag nyid gcig pa’i ’brel pa brjod pa/     chos kyi sku/     rgya mtsho’i chu/     
 gser kyi bum pa lta bu dang/     phyug po’i nor lta bu/     bdag po dang yul gyi ’brel pa/     
 khyim gyi lha lta bu rten dang brten pa’i ’brel pa/     shing gi yal ga dang yan lag can 
 gyi ’brel pa sogs du mar ’gyur ba ste rtog par sla’o/ 
 “It is moreover easy to understand that connection is manifold, [e.g.] the expression of 
 a connection of single identity (bdag nyid gcig pa’i ’brel pa) as in ‘the body of the 
 dharma’ (chos kyi sku, dharmakāya), ‘water of the ocean’ (rgya mtsho’i chu), ‘the pot 
 of golden [colour]’ (gser gyi bum pa), and as in ‘the wealth of the rich’ (phyug po’i nor), 
 the connection of owner and object (bdag po dang yul kyi ’brel pa), [or] as in ‘the god 
                                                          
944 GC 485.2. Examples 23-25 illustrate the use of ’brel sgra after da drag (postpostscript da), which is no longer 
used in Tibetan orthography already long before Si tu’s times. Si tu has nonetheless explained how da drag 
triggers the different allomorphs of ’brel sgra. 
945 Cf. GC 485.4. 
946 My emphasis. 
947 Cf. supra 371ff. 
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 of the house’ (khyim gyi lha), the connection of support and supported (rten dang brten 
 pa’i ’brel pa), [or] as in ‘the branches of the tree’ (shing gi yal ga), the connection of 
 part and whole (yan lag dang yan lag can gyi ’brel pa).”948 
This time, not only are found NGg’s and GNT’s bdag po (‘owner’),949 but Si tu’s bdag nyid 
gcig pa’i ’brel pa (‘connection of single identity’) also corresponds to GNT’s gzhi ’thun pa’i 
’brel pa (‘connection of common substratum’), according to which two entities are connected 
that are substantially indistinguishable, such as the lotus and its blue colour. Yet, Si tu organizes 
the various categories differently in that bdag po is not a separate sixth case function apart from 
’brel pa, but only a subtype. Moreover, Si tu did not introduce a clear and twofold distinction 
of ’brel pa into substantially identical or different, but he started from one general function 
under which a variety of semantic subtypes is then subsumed. Finally, skyes bu’i ’brel pa 
(‘connection of person’ ?) in GNT does not seem to correspond to any of Si tu’s subcategories. 
12.2.1 Résumé on the Sixth Case in the Great Commentary 
Si tu did not dedicate much space to the sixth case in his GC, the main reason being that he did 
not offer any modification or critique of former conceptions. This stands to reason, since, as it 
was said, the Tibetan conception of the sixth case as ’brel ba/pa (‘connection,’ ‘relation’) along 
with its association with the morphological category ’brel sgra is linguistically straightforward 
and does not pose larger problems or questions. There is also no real divergence from the 
Sanskritic conception of the sixth case suffix as sambandha that would have required 
noteworthy reconciliation to confirm Sanskritic authority and the cross-lingual validity of the 
cases. As for the problematic sixth case label sgrub par bya, Si tu directly addressed this 
alternative label but abstained from any effort to further problematize it apart from adhering to 
former strategies that give the impression of a stopgap solution. 
  
                                                          
948 GC 602.5. 
949 In comparison, Zha lu restricted the sixth case function to ’brel ba without mentioning bdag po at all. Rnam 
gling, in contrast, mentioned bdag po in his rendition of the sixth case in the TKJ (cf. supra 372). 
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13 Rnam dbye bdun pa bnas gzhis or rten gnas 
13.1 Historical Survey 
The Tibetan seventh case is known under the two labels gnas gzhi (lit. ‘basis of abiding,’ 
‘abode;’ ‘substratum’) and rten gnas (lit. ‘place of support,’ ‘supporting place;’ ‘substratum’). 
According to the Sum rtags commentarial literature, it is the third and final of the three la don 
cases and thus indicated by the three morphological categories la, na and du and their respective 
allomorphs. In his Mkhas ’jug, Sakya Paṇḍita provided the following simple illustration of the 
seventh case:  
 shing la bya tshang chags zhes bya ba lta bu bdun pa gnas gzhi’i tshig […] 
 “As in ‘there is a bird nest on/in the tree’ (shing la bya tshang chags), the seventh [case] 
 is the syntactic form of abode (gnas gzhi’i tshig).”950 
The precise morphological realization of the seventh case differs in Tibetan grammatical 
sources. The two morphemes la and na were associated with the seventh case already as early 
as in the NG(g) and GNT. Both the root text and commentary of the NG have associated the 
function gnas gzhi with na and la in the kāraka section (=  topic 1),951 but they only provide 
gang la, gang dag la and gang rnams la as the seventh case forms during the vibhakti section 
(= topic 6).952 GNT, in contrast, explicitly elaborates that both morphemes are seventh case 
markers: 
 de gnyis ka la yang bod kyi sgra la ni la dang na gnyis kas ci rigs par bdun par ’gyur 
 te/ 
 “Also for both these [seventh case functions], the seventh [case] results in Tibetan 
 morphology by means of the two, la and na, whichever is suitable.”953 
MVY 4744 and Chos grub’s short text on the eight cases, ’Jug pa’i sgra brgyad bstan pa tshig 
le’ur byas pa, both only provide la, which I see once more connected to the minimalistic 
                                                          
950 KhJ 2009, 25. 
951 Cf. CT 115 – 407f and 418f. The root text provides both the prototypical forms gang na byed (‘to act 
somewhere’) as well as gang la byed (‘id.’) for gnas gzhi, whereas NGg provides morpheme la only in its 
example phrases. 
952 Cf. CT 115 – 412 and 433f. 
953 CT 115 – 460. Note that the two case functions referred to in this passage are not gnas gzhi and rten gnas, but 
represent a subcategorization of the seventh case that thus far I only encountered in this source: mtshan ma dang 
gnas kyi sa (‘semantic domains of characteristic and place’) (cf. CT 115 – 459f.). Only the second subtype 
corresponds to the dominant conception of the seventh case function in the Tibetan tradition, whereas mtshan ma 
(e.g. mchod sbyin gyi lag pa la ’khor lo’i ri mo yod ‘Yajñadatta’s hand has a painting of a wheel’) does not seem 
to have played any significant role outside this source. 
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presentational style of these sources and thus not indicative of na’s and du’s status as a seventh 
case marker.954 None of the mentioned early sources, however, listed du as a seventh case 
marker, also not in any of the sample phrases, although this may also be the result of the 
economical style of many of the texts. 
Turning to the seventh case’s morphology in SCP 9.3-11.4, all three morphemes du, na and la 
occur together with the seventh case function rten gnas. Yet, similar to what was said during 
the fourth case, the question remains whether it should be understood that all three are equally 
associated with this function.955 
The earliest source that unmistakably identified du with the seventh case is therefore the Smra 
sgo, although it only features the statement that the morphemes “du, etc. are accordant with 
la,”956 meaning that du is used in the same way as la, including the three case functions. Any 
further illustration in the Smra sgo is omitted. 
13.1.1 The Tibetan Seventh Case in Relation to Sanskritic Grammar 
The Tibetan seventh case was adopted from the Sanskritic conceptualization of the seventh case 
suffix that represents the prototypical locative marker in Sanskrit: 
 P 2.3.36 saptamy adhikaraṇe ca “A seventh [case suffix occurs] also if there is 
 adhikaraṇa.” 
 K 2.4.19 śeṣāḥ karmakaraṇasampradānāpādānasvāmyādyadhikaraṇeṣu “The 
 remaining [case suffixes occur] if [there is respectively] a karman, an instrument, a 
 sampradāna, an apādāna, an owner, etc., an adhikaraṇa.” 
 C 2.1.88 saptamy ādhāre “A seventh [case suffix occurs] if there is a support/location.” 
The technical term adhikaraṇa that defines the prototypical function of the seventh case suffix 
in Pāṇini and Kātantra is another kāraka that these two grammars define as follows: 
 P 1.4.45 ādhāro’ dhikaraṇam “Adhikaraṇa is the support/location.” 
 K 2.4.11 ya ādhāras tad adhikaraṇam “That which is the support/location is 
 adhikaraṇa.” 
We can see from these latter two definitions that Cāndra’s ādhāra in C 2.1.88 was not an 
innovation, and that this grammar rather omitted the technical term adhikaraṇa and directly 
                                                          
954 Cf. HSGLT 2, 26 and 362. 
955 Cf. supra 264f. 
956 du la sogs pa la dang mthun (Smr̥ti 2002, 92). 
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defined the meaning of the seventh case suffix by means of the more straightforward and self-
explanatory category ādhāra. Exemplifications of the category adhikaraṇa/ādhāra usually 
focus on the instance ‘some entity exists/resides/is located at some location,’957 although it is 
clear from Sanskrit syntax that adhikaraṇa/ādhāra applies to any kind of verb and equally 
covers all the different instances of ‘some action takes place/happens at some location.’ 
The much later Kāśikāvr̥tti derives the notion of ādhāra from ādhriyante ’smin kriyāḥ (‘where 
actions are located’). It explains P 1.4.45 as follows: 
 kartr̥karmaṇoḥ kriyāśrayabhūtayoḥ dhāraṇakriyāṃ prati ya ādhāraḥ tat kārakam 
 adhikaraṇasaṃjñaṃ bhavati “That kāraka which, with regard to the action of 
 supporting, is the location of the kartr̥ or the karman, which are the substrata of the 
 action, receives the designation adhikaraṇa.”958 
Respective examples are provided in Kāśikāvr̥tti on P 1.4.45:959  
 kaṭe āste ‘(s)he sits on the mat’  
 kaṭe śete ‘(s)he lies on the mat’  
 sthālyāṃ pacati ‘(s)he cooks in the pot’ 
While KV’s etymological derivation of ādhāra renders this category as the location of the 
action, the commentary’s explanation of P 1.4.45 states that it is the location of either agent or 
karman. Without the need to inquire into the details of this theory, the reason for the seeming 
inconsistency is another common theory in Sanskritic grammar, according to which every 
action may be classified following the parameter whether it is located in the agent or the 
karman. Taking Kāśikāvr̥tti’s examples of adhikaraṇa as an illustration, kaṭe āste would be an 
instance of the so-called kartr̥sthā kriyā (‘action located in the agent’), whereas sthālyāṃ pacati 
would be an instance of karmasthā kriyā (‘action located in the karman’). The precise 
conception of this difference might vary from source to source, but in the context of the Nyāsa 
commentary, for example, Joshi and Roodbergen mention as the distinguishing criterion where 
the outcome of the action is located.960 In kaṭe āste, it is the agent itself which experiences the 
                                                          
957 Cf. e.g. on K 2.4.11 in Liebich 1919, 44, and C 2.1.88 in Liebich 1918, 111f. 
958 Sanskrit and translation quoted from Joshi and Roodbergen 1995, 127. 
959 Sanskrit examples are quoted from Joshi and Roodbergen 1995, 127. 
960 Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1995, 127f. In his Sanskrit grammatical dictionary on the entry kartr̥sthakriya, 
Abhyankar provides the criterion whether the verb can take a karmakartr̥, that is to say whether a transitive verb 
can be used intransitively (cf. Abhyankar 1986, 109). The following phrase is an example of a karmakartr̥ 
construction: 
 bhidyate kāṣṭham svayam eva ‘the wood is splitting by itself’ (cf. Sharma 1995, 308) 
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outcome, whereas in sthālyāṃ pacati, it is the cooked entity, for example the rice, which 
experiences the outcome, insofar as it becomes softened (viklitti). 
Since Kāśikāvr̥tti’s etymological definition of ādhāra would therefore interfere with this 
classification of verbs, it attempts to reconcile the two theories by stating that the grammatical 
category ādhāra is only indirectly the location of the action, mediated through either the agent 
or karman as the actual location of the action. Thus, agent and karman are the direct location 
of the action, whereas ādhāra represents the direct location of agent and karman and 
consequently the mediated or indirect location of the action. Without additional details, it 
suffices in the current context to note that although Kāśikāvr̥tti defines ādhāra as the place 
where the entities agent and karman are located, rather than the place where an action takes 
place, both types of definition figure in this source and the latter in the etymological derivation 
of ādhāra. Moreover, the examples reveal that Kāśikāvr̥tti did not distinguish between verbs of 
residence/existence and verbs of proper activities, for both the sample phrases kaṭe āste and 
sthālyāṃ pacati have been classified as genuine instances of P 1.4.45. 
Pāṇini originally did not define ādhāra itself as the prototypical seventh case function, since 
according to P 1.4.46-48 the category ādhāra (‘support,’ ‘base,’ ‘location’) not only becomes 
adhikaraṇa but alternatively the kāraka karman with certain verbal prefixes, thus triggering a 
second case. Compare the two following phrases: 
 (a) kaṭe śete ‘s/he sleeps on the mat’ (P 1.4.45) 
 (b) grāmam adhiśete ‘s/he sleeps in the village.’ (P 1.4.46)961 
A detailed analysis of differences and relations between (a) and (b) according to Pāṇini’s 
grammar would lead far deeper into the intricacies of his kāraka model required in the current 
context. It suffices to note that, although both the mat and the village may be considered the 
location or base where the person sleeps, the grammatical constructions differ due to the use of 
the verbal prefix adhi in (b).962 Phrase (a) marks the ādhāra with the seventh case and is a 
                                                          
Abhyankar’s parameter amounts to the point that only transitive verbs that can take a karmakartr̥ qualify as 
karmasthā kriyā (‘action located in the karman’), whereas intransitive verbs (akarmaka) as well as transitive 
verbs without karmakartr̥ construction are kartr̥sthā kriyā (‘action located in the agent’). One simple example 
with a transitive verb without karmakartr̥ construction would be that of rāmo grāmaṃ gacchati (‘Rāma goes to 
the village’), since the verbal root gam (‘to go’) cannot be used intransitively:  
 *grāmo gamyate svayam eva (‘the village is going by itself’)  
To which extent Joshi and Roodbergen’s as well as Abhyankar’s criteria agree or disagree cannot be followed up 
further.  On the difference between karmasthā kriyā and kartr̥sthā kriyā cf. also Sharma 1990, 183ff. and 254f., 
as well as commentaries on P 3.1.87 which cover the category karmakartr̥. 
961 Examples are taken from the respective rules in Sharma 1990. 
962 Cf. German forms like ‘wohnen’ and ‘bewohnen,’ which operate in a similar way. 
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typical instance of adhikaraṇa in Pāṇini’s grammar, whereas the ādhāra in (b) is classified as 
a karman. The reason, why (b) was not simply classified as an exceptional instance of 
adhikaraṇa as a second case trigger is that this is not only a morphological change of case 
suffixes, but also a functional change in terms of the relation between the arguments of the 
sentence. Phrase (b) encodes the village (grāma) not as the location as such, but as the object 
that is affected by the action. Nonetheless, Pāṇini apparently saw a relation between the 
respective constructions in (a) and (b), otherwise he would not have characterized both NP’s of 
(a) and (b) as ādhāra. By introducing this notion to characterize both phrases, his strategy was 
to take recourse to an additional derivational level, underlying that of the kārakas, on which 
both, the mat in (a) and the village in (b), instantiate the same category ādhāra, with this 
category then being expressed in Sanskrit sentences in the form of both kārakas, adhikaraṇa as 
well as karman. According to Pāṇinian grammar, it is ultimately the speaker’s intention 
(vivakṣā) that decides by means of which kāraka, that is to say by which type of participation 
in the action of the sentence, a certain scenario is encoded.963  
Such a nuanced distinction between the different levels of linguistic analysis and the related 
status of kāraka functions is difficult to recognize, even more so in view of the fact that the 
Sanskritic tradition as a whole has pursued this approach in very different ways and to varying 
extents. Already Patañjali’s conceptualization of the kāraka’s in terms of accomplishing 
participants in an action to be accomplished, independently of whether or not he generally 
adhered to the multilayered Pāṇinian approach, puts the focus on a very different aspect of the 
notion kāraka (‘doer,’ ‘cause’); and although Peter Verhagen has argued that Cāndra did not 
dispense with the multilayered derivational scheme in which the kārakas occupy an 
intermediate state between semantics and syntax, Cāndra’s strategy to omit the technical term 
adhikaraṇa and directly associate ādhāra with the seventh case suffix nonetheless inhibited the 
recognition and understanding of the difference between the levels of ādhāra and 
adhikaraṇa.964 Once this subtle and intricate detail is omitted, the basic scheme of Sanskritic 
case grammar amounts to a simple twofold model of case suffixes or forms and their meanings, 
such as in P 2.3.36 or C 2.1.88 as well as in fact in the entire vibhakti section of Sanskritic 
grammars. 
                                                          
963 On the intricate question of the different levels (semantic, syntactic, morphological, etc.) in the Pāṇinian 
derivational model as well as where the kārakas are to be situated therein, cf. chapter 5.4. Cf. also e.g Kiparsky 
and Staal 1969; Cardona 1974; or Houben 1999. 
964 Cf. Verhagen 1992, 838. It should be noted that he pointed out clearly that “at first sight there seems to be no 
intermediate position assigned to the kāraka categories in Cāndra either” (HSGLT 2, 292). 
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It is therefore understandable that no indication of a differentiation between these two notions 
adhikaraṇa and ādhāra is found in any of the Tibetan grammatical sources considered in this 
study. Although neither gnas gzhi nor rten gnas are literal, etymological translations of ādhāra 
or adhikaraṇa,965 mainly gnas gzhi figures as a prominent translation for both Sanskrit terms, 
whereas Tibetan rten gnas is at least reminiscent of the translation of C 2.1.88 in CG 1.966 That 
the term gnas gzhi has been used as a translation for both Sanskrit terms in the Tibetan tradition 
already indicates that, at least generally speaking, Tibetan grammarians were not overtly 
meticulous about the terms’ difference in the Pāṇinian model, although this will have to be 
decided separately for each of the translations.  
A more liberal translation in terms of gnas gzhi and rten gnas also stands to reason, since these 
terms are much more self-evident in Tibetan than the rather artificial kun nas ’dzin pa (lit. ‘to 
hold from all [sides],’ ‘to hold completely/totally,’ ādhāra) and lhag par byed pa (lit. ‘to do/act 
exceedingly,’ adhikaraṇa), since they directly capture the meaning of ādhāra (‘support,’ 
‘location’) as well as adhikaraṇa understood as ādhāra. Apart from ādhāra and adhikaraṇa, 
no indication was encountered in this research that the Tibetan terminology was inspired by any 
other subcategory of adhikaraṇa or by a non-kāraka function of the seventh case suffix.967 It is 
therefore most likely that the terminological shift from adhikaraṇa/ādhāra to gnas gzhi/rten 
gnas was not mediated by any other category, but that the early Tibetan grammarians and 
translators simply took recourse to the technique of don ’gyur (‘intention-based translation’)968 
to directly reproduce the meaning rather than the etymology of the Sanskritic technical terms. 
Tibetan grammarians directly adopted the notion adhikaraṇa/ādhāra. This may be connected 
to several factors, such as the straightforward conception of the kāraka adhikaraṇa as ādhāra 
in common grammatical sources without any secondary meanings, the category’s very 
fundamental and distinct semantic meaning in general as well as its linguistic significance in 
the Tibetan context.  
                                                          
965 Literal translations would be kun nas ’dzin pa and lhag par byed pa respectively, two terms that were 
occasionally used in the translation of Sanskritic grammatical treatises. For illustrations, cf. P 1.4.45, P 2.3.36, C 
2.1.88, K 2.4.11 and K 2.4.19 in HSGLT 2, 355ff. 
966 Cf. ibid. 
967 Note that adhikaraṇa is only defined by a single rule in Pāṇini and Kātantra, which are the quoted rules P 
1.4.45 and K 2.4.11. 
968 Cf. Verhagen 2015, 184. Don ’gyur is a translational method that focuses on the meaning of the translated 
term rather than its morphology and etymology, as opposed to sgra ’gyur (‘convention-based’) that retains the 
original morphology and etymology of the source language as precisely as possible. Both these techniques are 
already mentioned in the edict contained in the SSBP. 
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13.1.2 Tibetan Conceptualizations of the Category Gnas gzhi/Rten gnas pre-Si tu 
Returning to the Tibetan conception of the seventh case gnas gzhi (‘abode,’ ‘location’), there 
exist two major strategies of interpreting this category, which may be rendered as the broader 
and the narrower version. Both versions seem to be connected to the idea of a place where some 
entity exists or resides. In the broader version of this understanding, it makes no difference 
whether the entity is actively performing an action or whether it is nothing but existing, residing, 
etc. at that place. This version of the seventh case includes locations of entities with proper 
actions. The narrower version excludes any performances of actions and restricts the seventh 
case only to those instances in which some entity is statically present (existing, sitting, residing, 
etc.) at some place. Although sources often do not provide enough material to evaluate which 
of the versions they adhered to, both seem to have existed side by side already in early sources. 
The NGg, for example, features a concise prototypical definition of the seventh case as “the 
meaning of the seventh [case is] the meaning that something exists somewhere,” 969  thus 
focusing on the mere existence of something somewhere. However, in the kāraka section, we 
do find the phrase tshang bang na ’tshed par byed pa (‘to cook in the kitchen’) as an example 
of gnas gzhi, which was probably adopted or derived from Sanskritic grammatical sources.970 
GNT, in contrast, offers two subcategories of the seventh case, i.e. mtshan ma’i bdun pa 
(‘seventh [case] of characteristic’) and gnas gzhi’i bdun pa (‘seventh [case] of abode’). The 
latter is defined as follows: 
 gnas gzhi’i bdun pa ni lhas byin la sogs pa gang yang rung ba zhig ’dug gnas sam gzhi 
 ma gang gi steng na ’dug cing gnas pa de nyid ston par byed pa ni gnas gzhi’i ’dug pa 
 [sic!]971 yin te/     de yang ’di ltar lhas byin rang gi stan na sdod cing ’dug ces pa lta bu 
 dang/     de bzhin du lhas byin khang bzang gi steng na ’dug ces pa lta bu dang kun dga’ 
 ra na ’dug ces pa la sogs pa ’dug gnas du ma la ’dug pa ni gnas gzhi’i bdun pa’o/ 
 “Regarding the seventh [case] of abode (gnas gzhi’i bdun pa), it indicates precisely at 
 which abode or basis (’dug gnas sam gzhi ma gang gi steng na) Devadatta, etc., 
 whatever is suitable, stays or resides (’dug cing gnas pa). That is the seventh [case] of 
 abode (gnas gzhi’i bdun pa). Likewise, [such a] residence [is possible] at many abodes, 
 such as ‘Devadatta sits and stays on his mat’ (lhas byin rang gi stan na sdod cing ’dug) 
                                                          
969 […] gang la gang yod pa’i don ni bdun pa’i don to/ (CT 115 – 434). 
970 Cf. CT 115 – 418. 
971 I read gnas gzhi’i bdun pa. 
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 and ‘Devadatta stays in/on/at the palace’ (lhas byin khang bzang gi steng na ’dug), etc. 
 These are the seventh [case] of abode (gnas gzhi’i bdun pa).”972 
The construction sdod cing ’dug in the first of the two provided examples may alternatively be 
interpreted as an auxiliary construction to express the present continuous tense: ‘Devadatta is 
sitting on his mat.’ However, the above version is preferred because the addition of ’dug (‘to 
stay’) is interpreted as a gloss of sdod pa (~ ’id.’) for the sake of an additional emphasis that 
the mat (stan) is one of the many ’dug gnas (‘abode,’ ‘residence’) where an entity may stay 
(’dug). The author obviously wished to maintain the definitional term ’dug pa throughout the 
examples, which can be also seen from the second example, in which he used ’dug alone instead 
of maintaining the auxiliary construction. 
Although not directly contrasted with verbs of action, GNT’s definition and examples suggest 
that the author applied the narrower and literal interpretation of the category gnas gzhi, 
restricting it to the mere residence of an entity at some location without any involved activity. 
The examples for the other category mtshan ma’i bdun pa (‘seventh case of characteristic’) also 
only exhibit the verb frame yod pa (‘to exist’, ‘to have’).973 A counterargument would be that,  
in case the GNT did not apply the broader understanding of the seventh case, arguments marked 
by la don in phrases such as bod na bu skyed (‘a son is born in Tibet’), in which the genuine 
role of karman is already occupied by another argument, would perhaps not be covered by the 
case model – which is in direct contradiction to the claim that the eight cases cover all possible 
terms. 
Whichever one of the two versions was employed in later Tibetan grammaticography in and 
outside Sum rtags will have to be decided separately for each source. Unfortunately, most 
Tibetan sources are rather parsimonious regarding this detail, with the examples as the only 
point of reference. In general, there is the tendency to provide examples with verbs that express 
existence or residence, such as those encountered in Sakya Paṇḍita’s KhJ.974 However, this is 
to be expected, since the instances of ‘something exists somewhere,’ ‘something resides 
somewhere,’ etc. are among the clearest illustrations of the meaning of the seventh case as 
location, but they do not automatically indicate that a grammatical source excluded locations 
of entities involved in actions. 
                                                          
972 CT 115 – 460. 
973 Cf. ibid. 
974 Cf. supra 377. 
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One of the most direct and explicit accounts of the seventh case’s narrower reading is that of 
the much later author Pra ti, who explained the difference between the three cases of la don as 
follows: 
 des na ’di dag gi khyad par ni/     thab la med btang zhes pa lta bu/     gzhi gzhan la bya 
 ba byas pa dang/     byed pa sogs ston pa’i la sgra rnams rnam dbye gnyis pa dang/ 
 mgron po la me btang lta bu bya ba byed pa’i gzhi dngos ma yin par/     de la me bdang 
 ba ni/     de’i ched du me btang ba yin la/     de ltar dgos pa la/     la sgra sbyar te/     bya 
 ba me btang bar ston pa’i la’i sgra ni rnam dbye gzhi pa’o/     thab la me yod lta bu/     
 gzhi thab la me btang ba sogs kyi bya ba byas pa mi brjod par/     me’i ngo bo tsam yod 
 par brjod pa’i la’i sgra ni rnam dbye bdun pa’o […] 
 “Therefore, regarding the difference between these [five functions in SCP 11.3-4], a la-
 morpheme which indicates that an action has been performed or is being performed etc. 
 upon some other substratum (gzhi gzhan la bya ba byas pa dang byed pa sogs) is the 
 second case, as in ‘to light a fire on the stove’ (thab la me btang). In ‘having lit a fire 
 for the guest’ (mgron po la me btang), without being the actual substratum where the 
 action is performed, ‘having lit a fire for him’ (de la me btang ba) [means that] the fire 
 is lit for the sake of him (de’i ched du). Accordingly, a la-morpheme indicating the 
 action of fire-lighting for a purpose (dgos pa) to which the la-morpheme has been 
 applied is a fourth case. In ‘there is fire on the stove’ (thab la med yod), not saying that 
 an action of lighting a fire on the stove etc. has been performed, a la-morpheme 
 expressing that the mere essence of fire exists (me’i ngo bo tsam yod pa) is the seventh 
 case.”975 
His list of seventh case examples under SCP 11.3-4 exclusively covers verb frames without any 
obvious activity: 
 ‘to be/exist in the east’ (shar phyogs su yod), ‘water resides/dwells in the pot’ (bum pa 
 ru chu gnas), ‘[it] is not in front/at the front’ (bdun du mi ’dug), ‘the mirror is clear at 
 the bottom’ (gsham du me long gsal), ‘the salt is much in the north’ (= ‘there is much 
 salt in the north,’ byang du tshwa mang), ‘the Dharma is spread in India’ (rgya gar du 
 chos dar), ‘in Tibet, the woolen cloth is good’ (bod du snam bu legs), ‘the master resides 
 in Rab gsal’ (rab gsal du dpon po bzhugs), ‘the pottery in front is beautiful’ (mdun du 
                                                          
975 Pra ti 2013A, 203f. Note that this passage was already quoted and discussed in the context of the second case, 
supra 207f. 
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 dkar yol mdzes), ‘in China, the banners/scarfs (?) are many’ (= ‘there are many 
 banners/scarfs (?) in China’ (rgya nag tu dar mang), ‘the queen resides in the royal 
 palace’ (rgyal khab tu btsun mo gnas), ‘the beggar is bound to the outside (?)’ (phyi rol 
 tu slong mo pa ’byor)976 
As already mentioned in the context of the second case, Pra ti focused on a narrow and literal 
interpretation of the category gnas gzhi/rten gnas (‘abode/supporting place’). It is most likely 
that the morphological identity of second, fourth and seventh case in the traditional model 
motivated this understanding of gnas gzhi/rten gnas to arrive at clear-cut parameters for the 
cases’ distinction.  
Traces of both the broader and the narrower interpretations of the seventh case gnas gzhi/rten 
gnas are already found in the Sanskritic tradition. The quoted Sanskritic examples reveal that 
verbs which express proper activities are included in the categories adhikaraṇa and ādhāra at 
least in the Kāśikāvr̥tti.977 This Sanskritic source even explicitly defines the latter as the location 
of actions (ādhriyante ’smin kriyāḥ) in its etymological explanation of ādhāra, which makes 
clear that in the Sanskritic taxonomy the seventh case is used in sentences with verbs of proper 
actions. On the other hand, classical examples of adhikaraṇa/ādhāra in Sanskritic grammatical 
treatises commonly focus on instances of residence and existence, which may have given the 
impression that it is restricted to these. Moreover, the Sanskritic theory encountered in the 
Kāśikāvr̥tti, according to which adhikaraṇa/ādhāra is the direct location of the two entities 
agent and karman and only indirectly represents the location of the action, focuses more on the 
location of entities. This focus may then have been generalized and further developed into a 
general function of mere residence or location of entities. On a final remark, the Smra ba kun 
la ’jug pa’i sgra’i bstan bcos offers its own rather unusual typology of the category gnas gzhi, 
but does not restrict the seventh case to a mere location of existence or residence.978 Regardless 
the precise historical genesis of the narrower interpretation of the seventh case in the 
transmission of Sanskritic grammatical knowledge to Tibet and regardless the precise factors 
and actors involved in it, we will see that Si tu took a clear stance in his assessment of the 
seventh case as a mere location of residence. 
                                                          
976 Cf. Pra ti 2013A, 197. 
977 Cf. supra 379f. 
978 Cf. CT 109 – 1713f. 
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13.1.3 On the Linguistic Significance of the Seventh Case and the Distribution of the la don 
Morphemes in Old Tibetan 
The locative uses of all three la don morphemes is in line with most academic studies of Tibetan 
syntax, with the morpheme na certainly as the most distinctive locative marker, since the vast 
majority of this morpheme’s uses is restricted to the indication of a mere static locative without 
movement, either spatially in terms of ‘something is located or happens in/at a certain place’ or 
temporally in terms of ‘something is located or happens at a certain time’:  
 lag na ’phreng ba bzung ‘(X) held a rosary in the hand.’979 
 ’chi ba’i tshe na ‘at the time of dying’980 
Case models such as that of Tournadre’s study even list the locative function as the only case 
function of na.981 Hahn’s textbook for classical Tibetan, in contrast, mentions a very rare 
directional meaning.982  
According to academic studies, the morpheme la may equally encode both spatial and temporal 
locative meaning, and in this function it is interchangeable with na: 
 rgya mtsho la nor bu gnas so ‘Jewels are located in the ocean.’983  
 pha mes kyi dus la ‘at the time of the ancestors’984 
Tournadre more specifically distinguishes between an inessive locative (khyim na/la/du mi med 
‘there are no people in the house’) and a superessive locative (ri la rtswa ni mi ’dug ‘there is 
no grass on the mountain’), attributing the inessive function to la, na and du, while the 
superessive is mostly restricted to la and du and only sometimes expressed by na.985 
Finally, the morpheme du equally and often interchangeably with na and la takes on the 
function of locative: 
 thab tu me ’bar ‘the fire burns in the stove’ 
 de’i dus su ‘at that time’986 
                                                          
979 Example and translation taken from Tournadre 2010, 110. 
980 Example taken from Schwieger 2006, 277. 
981 Cf. Trounadre 2010, 110. 
982 Cf. Hahn 2005, 92. 
983 Example taken from ibid., 95. 
984 Example taken from a longer sample phrase in Schwieger 2006, 310. 
985 Cf. Tournadre 2010, 106ff. 
986 Examples taken from ibid., 108. 
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Regarding the first example, in his study Tournadre equates it with thab na me ’bar (‘the fire 
burns in the stove’), noting that “for this inessive function, du may usually be replaced by the 
locative na.”987 
In sum, a spatio-temporal locative functioning of all three la don morphemes is commonly 
accepted by modern academia, either with or without more detailed attempts to distinguish 
between the morpheme’s precise locative uses such as Tournadre’s inessive/superessive 
subdivision. It is due to this very reason that the merging by Tibetan grammarians of the three 
morphemes under the seventh case is less problematic than in the context of the second and 
fourth case.  
There is, however, one important distributional difference which may be extracted from Hill’s 
study on the la don morphemes in the Old Tibetan Annals. In his paper, Hill lists as trigger of 
na only verb frames with a dominant static meaning without any noticeable activity involved, 
such as bzhugs pa (‘to reside’), mchis pa (‘to stay’) or mkhyud pa (‘to be interred’). 988 
According to Hill’s findings, the morpheme du is used in contrast to mark the location of proper 
actions and destinations of motion verbs, with one example being bltam pa (‘to take birth’).989 
While this distributional difference between na and du does not seem to have survived in later 
stages of WT, additional corpus linguistic research in the future will hopefully bring about 
further insights into whether Hill’s findings have diachronic significance in Old Tibetan. This 
may be an important observation also for future research on Tibetan grammaticography, since 
it may be a factor which must be considered in the development of the narrower notion of gnas 
gzhi as much as in the exclusion of du especially in several early sources. 
13.1.4 Résumé on the Tibetan Seventh Case pre-Si tu 
The Tibetan seventh case gnas gzhi/rten gnas (‘abode/support’) as the representation of the 
category location was directly derived from the two Sanskritic notions adhikaraṇa and ādhāra, 
the former a kāraka function and the latter the semantic definition of this kāraka. The separation 
of the derivational levels on which these two Sanskritic notions operate in grammars such as 
Pāṇini was not maintained. Linguistically, the adoption of this case function does have 
significance, since all the three la don morphemes usually associated with this case have a 
locative function in WT, although synchronic and diachronic differences between the locative 
functions of la, na and du are discussed in linguistic studies.  
                                                          
987 Ibid. 
988 Cf. Hill 2011, 15ff. 
989 Cf. ibid., 25 and 35. 
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The only hermeneutical issues that deserve future scrutiny are the morphological realization of 
this case throughout different Tibetan sources, the question of whether the tradition 
unequivocally classified the morpheme du as a seventh case marker from the very beginning, 
as well as the conceptual question of which of the sources adhered to the narrower or the broader 
meaning of the seventh case. Especially the narrower version raises the question how it was 
developed, since it does not represent the typical Sanskritic understanding of adhikaraṇa and 
ādhāra which is applicable to phrases with proper actions. 
13.2 The Seventh Case in the Great Commentary 
Si tu followed his usual twofold format to discuss the seventh case gnas gzhi/rten gnas first in 
his commentary on SCP 9.3-11.4990 and then in his summary of the case model at the end of 
GC’s part on TKJ. In his paraphrase of the root text SCP 9.3-11.4, he provides the first concise 
rendition of the seventh case: 
 […] shar phyogs su yod lta bu bdun pa gnas gzhi’i don can yin na/     rten gnas kyi sgra 
 dang/ […] 
 “[…] as in ‘exists at the east’ (shar phyogs su yod), if [these seven la don morphemes] 
 have the meaning of the seventh [case], abode (gnas gzhi), [they are] the morpheme of 
 support (rten gnas kyi sgra) […]”991 
In his section on the semantic mode of application (don gyi sbyor tshul) of the la don 
morphemes under SCP 9.3-11.4, Si tu specifies the seventh case as follows: 
 rten gnas te gang zhig gang la brten pa’am yod pa’i don can du ’jug pa rnam dbye bdun 
 pa ni/     shar phyogs su ’od snang/     mer me lha gnas/     lte ba ru rdzing bcas/     lha 
 khang du mchod rten yod/     sa ’og tu stobs ldan gnas/     gzugs khams na tshangs pa/     
 lcags la gser ’byug     lta bu ste go bar sla’o/ 
 “As for support (rten gnas), it is easy to understand: [it is] the seventh case, the joining 
 (’jug pa) [of the la don morphemes] in the meaning that something is supported or 
 exists somewhere (gang zhig gang la brten pa’am yod pa), as in (1) ‘light shines in the 
 east’ (shar phyogs su ’od snang), (2) ‘the fire deity lives in the fire’ (mer me lha 
 gnas), (3) ‘a pond/reservoir is located/exists at the center/core (?)’ (lte ba ru rdzing 
 bcas), (4) ‘there is a stupa in the temple’ (lha kang du mchod rten yod), (5) ‘the Asura 
                                                          
990 SCP 11.3 employs the term rten gnas. Also note that the exact same verse line as SCP 11.3 can be found in 
the Smra sgo on morpheme na (cf. Smr̥ti 2002, 78). 
991 GC 472.2. 
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 live underground’ (sa ’og tu stobs ldan gnas), (6) ‘Brahma [lives] in the form realm’ 
 (gzugs khams na tshangs pa), (7) ‘gold is applied to/spread on the iron’ (lcags la gser 
 ’byug).”992 
The definition of the seventh case as gang zhig gang la brten pa’am yod pa (‘something exists 
or is based/supported somewhere’) is reminiscent of NGg’s definition gang la gang yod pa 
(‘something exists somewhere’),993 the only noteworthy addition being the term brten pa, 
which is probably a gloss to refer to SCP’s rten gnas as the technical term under investigation 
in this passage. In the quotation above, Si tu provided the following list of examples, revealing 
that he has adopted the broader notion of the seventh case: 
 (1) shar phyogs su ’od snang ‘light shines in the east’  
 (2) mer me lha gnas ‘the fire deity lives in the fire’ 
 (3) lte ba ru rdzing bcas ‘a pond/reservoir is located/exists at the center/core (?)’994 
 (4) lha kang du mchod rten yod ‘there is a stupa in the temple’  
 (5) sa ’og tu stobs ldan gnas ‘the Asura live underground’ 
 (6) gzugs khams na tshangs pa ‘Brahma [lives] in the form realm’ 
 (7) lcags la gser ’byug ‘gold is applied to/spread on the iron’  
Si tu listed seven examples, one for each of the seven la don morphemes. He employed five 
different verb frames, namely snang ba (‘to shine’), gnas pa (‘to live/abide’), ’cha’ ba (‘to be 
endowed with’), yod pa (‘to exist’), ’byug pa (‘to spread,’ ‘apply,’ ‘put on’), with gnas pa being 
used twice; and if example (6) is included, in which gnas pa is most probably implicated, this 
verb frame was used three times. The list therefore includes one tha dad pa verb (’byug pa), at 
least two tha mi dad pa verbs (gnas pa, snang ba) as well as yod pa (‘to exist’) which often 
remains unclassified in Tibetan dictionaries, since it is not considered an action in any sense.995 
As for bcas, it is either another tha mi dad verb (’cha’ ba) or the denominalization of bcas pa 
and thus unclassified. The distribution of the three morphemes du, na and la with their 
respective allomorphs in this passage is insignificant, since the restriction to only one example 
per morpheme and the limited number of verb frames does not allow any representative 
                                                          
992 GC 474.2. 
993 Cf. supra 383. 
994 Note that the form bcas, which is understood here as the perfect tense of the verb ’cha’ ba in its tha mi dad 
meaning (‘to settle,’ ‘dwell,’ ‘abide,’ ‘exist’), may be also interpreted as a denominalization of bcas pa 
(‘having,’ ‘being endowed with’): ‘the center/core is endowed with a pond/reservoir (?)’. Presumably, there is an 
etymological relation between bcas pa in the meaning of ‘being endowed with’ and the verb ‘cha’ ba. 
995 The same applies to the copula yin. Cf. e.g. the entries of yin and yod pa in the Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo 
2004, 2578 and 2605 respectively. 
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conclusions about homogeneity or heterogeneity of their uses, neither with regard to Si tu’s 
conception of the seventh case nor with regard to WT. 
Examples (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) are all unproblematic instances of basic locative marking. 
The only two examples that deserve further investigation thus are the remaining phrases (1) and 
(7). 
Example (1) raises the question whether Si tu understood the lexical value of snang ba (‘to 
shine,’ ‘to appear’) as a mere expression of location and without any action or change taking 
place. Although intuitively it may be assumed that the action of shining is more than a mere 
expression of residence or existence, this is a difficult question to address, since it is more a 
matter of the grammarian’s perception of a verb’s semantics and underlying scenario, about 
which often there is insufficient available material. Pra ti, for example in rgya gar du chos dar 
(‘Dharma is spread in India’), classified the verb frame dar ba (‘to be spread’) as a seventh case 
and thus an expression of mere location, although it may be argued that the intransitive-
resultative lexical value of dar ba also includes that an action of spreading was involved in the 
past. 
Due to the passive lexical value of snang ba that exhibits comparatively weak activity, it cannot 
be conclusively decided whether Si tu regarded example (1) as another instance of mere location 
of the light or an actual action performed by the light at a location. 
The instance which deserves the most attention in this list, however, is phrase (7). First of all, 
’byug pa (‘to apply,’ ‘to put on,’ ‘to spread’) is unmistakably a tha dad pa verb expressing an 
action in its most genuine sense that somebody performs an action through which an object is 
affected. This makes clear that Si tu’s definition of the seventh case in the passage quoted above 
was not restricted to the expression of an item’s mere location, place of residence or place of 
existence. The definition gang zhig gang la brten pa’am yod pa (‘something exists or is 
based/supported somewhere’) should be understood in the broader sense that some entity or 
item is based somewhere, regardless of any involvement of this item in an action. This inclusion 
of proper actions in the seventh case, through which Si tu clearly sets himself apart from 
conceptions such as those found in Pra ti or perhaps also in GNT, is further explicated in his 
TKJ commentary.996 
Secondly, Si tu’s classification of this phrase as a seventh case is not unproblematic with regard 
to both the traditional case model and the structures of WT. In fact, Si tu was contested by Tshe 
                                                          
996 Cf. infra 398f. 
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tan zhabs drung.  The scenario referred to in example (7) is that some golden material (gser), 
presumably in molten form or as colour, is spread on or applied to (’byug pa) by an unmentioned 
agent on some iron material (lcags), presumably an item made of iron. As tentatively indicated 
by the English translation, the scenario as such allows a more locative semantic construal and 
thus also a locative syntactic encoding, in the sense that the action of spreading takes place on 
the iron material. Alternatively, the iron may be the INDIRECT OBJECT or DIRECTION of 
the action, in the sense of that item which the gold is applied to. The decisive question concerns 
the information encoded by the morpheme la in example (7). In view of the fact that the 
morpheme la does have locative uses but prototypically encodes the information of either 
INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT or DIRECTION, 997  this question cannot be promptly 
responded to. The verb frame ’byug pa appears in dictionaries mainly with two syntactic 
constructions, one being that of example (7) with an unmarked argument and an argument 
marked by la or its allomorph,998  whereas in his Tibetan verb lexicon Hackett offers the 
alternative construction of an unmarked argument plus the item to be spread marked with byed 
sgra.999 If we apply both constructions to example (7), the difference is as follows: 
 (a) lcags la gser ’byug ‘to apply gold to iron/to spread gold on iron’ 
 (b) lcags gser gyis ’byug ‘to anoint/smear/cover iron with gold’ 
Without being a linguist, I would argue that in phrase (a), the tha dad pa verb ’byug pa rather 
triggers la in its objective or directional function. One argument may be that none of the 
dictionaries list the more distinctive locative marker na as a possible substitute for la, but this 
is not necessarily indicative. Morpheme la’s objective or directional functioning in example (7) 
may also be corroborated by Tshe tan zhabs drung’s correct observation that Si tu inconsistently 
classified rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed (‘to make a picture on/onto the stone’) as an instance of 
the second case las su bya ba but lcags la gser ’byug (‘gold is applied to the iron’) as an example 
of the seventh case gnas gzhi:1000  
 (a) rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed ‘to make a picture on/onto the stone’ (GC: second case) 
 (b) lcags la gser ’byug ‘gold is applied to the iron’ (GC: seventh case) 
                                                          
997 On the question whether la represents more likely an indirect objective marker or a genuine allative marker, 
cf. the second case las su bya ba. 
998 Cf. Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo 2004, 1980; Goldstein 2001, 766. 
999 Hackett 2003, 135. 
1000 Cf. Tshe tan zhabs drung 2005, 121; supra 215 and ft. 557. 
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The two phrases are structurally equivalent as long as the morpheme -r in rdo bar is interpreted 
as an allomorph of la. If thus both phrases are treated as equivalent, the inconsistency of Si tu’s 
classification at least corroborates that a locative interpretation of morpheme la in example (7) 
is not at all necessary.1001 Nonetheless, it cannot be ruled out at this point that lcags la gser 
’byug qualifies as a locative instance in the sense of ‘to spread gold on iron.’ The precise 
meaning of la in example (7) as well as the grammaticality of na and perhaps also that of du in 
this instance will have to be discussed elsewhere. Yet, as a word of caution it must be mentioned 
that in this context also the question might be raised to which extent native speakers in fact 
distinguish between the locative and objective or directional uses of la in instances such as 
example (7), which allow for both readings, since the meaning of the sentence as such remains 
clear and in most contexts does not require any specification of this issue.  
The question remains why Si tu chose to classify example (7) as an instance of gnas gzhi as 
well as the equivalent phrase rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed as a second case in the traditional 
model. While the above linguistic issues surrounding the syntactic value of ’byug pa may have 
figured as one possible factor for his classification, Si tu’s already examined example of bum 
par chu blugs (‘having poured water into the pot’), which he briefly discussed in his summary 
of the second case at the end of TKJ,1002 offers a theoretical-conceptual explanation which is 
more connected to his objectivist approach. The inconsistency encountered in the classification 
of the grammatically equivalent phrases rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed and lcags la gser ’byug, 
namely to classify one as a second and the other as a seventh case, has already previously 
appeared within one and the same phrase bum par chu blugs:1003 
 de bzhin du bum par chu blugs zhes pa lta bu bum pa la bya ba blugs pa’i yul yin pas 
 gnyis pa’am chu brten pa’i cha nas gnas gzhi ste rnam dbye gnyis pa gang rung ’jug 
 […] 
 “Likewise, for example in ‘having poured water into a pot’ (bum par chu blugs), since 
 the pot is the domain of the action of ‘having poured’ (bya ba blugs pa’i yul), the second 
                                                          
1001 It should be noted that Tshe tan zhabs drung did not conclusively decide which of the two classifications is 
correct, but only stated that (a) is in conformity with Si tu’s rendition of the seventh case as bya ba’i rten (cf. 
infra 399) and thus qualifies as a seventh case in Si tu’s model (cf. ibid., 124f.). 
However, from Tshe tan zhabs drung’s own conception of the cases it appears that in his system both instances 
only qualify as a second case. This is, however, less due to la’s and -r’s functioning in the respective phrases 
than his adherence to Pra ti’s conception of the second and seventh case, according to which any type of action-
verb categorically excludes the possibility of a seventh case. This allows him to maintain a clear distinction 
between the traditional la don cases despite their morphological identity (cf. ibid., 130ff.). 
1002 Cf. supra 232ff. 
1003 The following passage was already quoted and translated supra 232f. 
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 [case], or from the perspective of the water being supported, the abode (gnas gzhi)1004 
 – whichever of the two cases – join to [‘the pot’].”1005 
It was argued in the context of the second case that this semantic construal of the underlying 
scenario probably was Si tu’s strategy to find a reason for why Sanskrit language may employ 
a seventh case suffix in such instances. However, the same theory may provide an answer to 
the current issue regarding Si tu’s classification of example (7). If the proposed interpretation 
of Si tu’s analysis of bum par chu blugs is correct, then he conceived the action of pouring 
water as a spatio-temporal continuum in which parts of the action are already accomplished, 
whereas other parts are yet to be accomplished. Instead of the entire water being poured within 
the instance of a single moment, the entire action is constituted through a process in which parts 
of the water are already poured and thus located in the pot, whereas other parts of the water are 
still awaiting to be poured or in the process of being poured and thus outside the pot. Depending 
on which of the two perspectives is taken on, the pot appears as an instance of the second case 
las su bya ba or the seventh case gnas gzhi/rten gnas. The very same semantic construal may 
of course be applied to both the examples rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed (‘to make a picture onto 
the stone’ vs. ‘to make a picture on the stone’) and lcags la gser ’byug (‘to apply gold to iron’ 
vs. ‘to spread gold on iron’). The finished parts of the picture as well as the applied parts of the 
gold are located at the stone and the iron respectively, whereas the respective unfinished parts 
are not. In this sense, it may be asked whether Si tu ultimately allowed for a double classification 
of second and seventh case for all three phrases, or perhaps even for all phrases to which this 
type of semantic analysis applies. If this was indeed Si tu’s point of view, then the opposing 
classifications of rdo bar gzugs brnyan byed and lcags la gser ’byug were not inconsistent but 
rather incomplete, since he lacked to specify the complementary case marking for both phrases. 
However, the lack of such a specification may be also interpreted as an indication that he did 
not allow for any double classification in the context of these two phrases, or that he was 
generally unconcerned with this issue.  
Despite the issues surrounding examples (1) and (7), the basic definition of the seventh case 
gnas gzhi/rten gnas in the part of the GC on SCP remains clearly that of an entity’s location, 
primarily in direct expressions of the form ‘something exists/resides/etc. somewhere,’ but also 
in sentences with proper actions taking place. 
                                                          
1004 I.e. the seventh case. 
1005 GC 599.4. 
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13.2.1 The Seventh Case and tshe skabs (‘time occasion’) 
Si tu did not restrict the seventh case to spatial locations but included the category tshe skabs 
(‘time frame,’ ‘time,’ ‘occasion’), the final one of the five functions mentioned in SCP 11.3-4: 
 tshe skabs te rnam dbye bdun pa nyid dus brjod pa’i don la ’jug pa ni/     tshes gnyis su 
 nyi ma zlog/     nyi ma shar bar ldang/     ’char kha ru dus gdab/     rgyun du kha ton 
 byed/     rtag tu bden par smra/     nam langs pa na chos ston/     srod la bdud btul/     
 sogs mang du shes par bya’o/ 
 “As for time occasion (tshe skabs), that is to say, the very seventh case takes on the 
 meaning of a time expression (dus brjod pa), [it] is to be known as for example in (8) 
 ‘the solstice is at the second day [of the month]’ (tshes gnyis su nyi ma zlog), (9) ‘to get 
 up when the sun shines’ (nyi ma shar bar sdang), (10) ‘an appointment is to be set at 
 dawn’ (’char kha ru dus gdab), (11) ‘to recite continuously/daily’ (rgyun du kha ton 
 byed), (12) ‘to always speak truly’ (rtag tu bden par smra), (13) ‘to teach the Dharma 
 at dawn’ (nam langs pa na chos ston), (14) ‘having tamed the demon in the evening’ 
 (srod la bdud btul).”1006 
The identification of the seventh case with SCP’s tshe skabs cannot be found in the 
commentaries of Zha lu et al. Although also Pra ti did not mention it, this fact has more 
significance in his work, since time expressions in connection with genuine actions such as in 
GC’s examples (9) or (11) could not qualify as seventh cases in his conception of the case 
model. He would have therefore needed to distinguish between time expressions belonging to 
the second case and those belonging to the seventh, a rather cumbersome and artificial 
taxonomy that would also lack any support in the preceding Sanskritic and Tibetan tradition. Si 
tu, who did not adhere to Pra ti’s distinguishing parameter for the second and seventh cases, did 
not face such issues, as is evident from his list of examples which includes instances of 
unmistakable actions. Thus, he was able to subsume the category tshe skabs under the seventh 
case. Si tu’s strategy seems to be reasonable from a linguistic perspective, since it is a common 
feature of languages, including WT, to express spatial and temporal locations through the same 
morphosyntactic means.  
Si tu provided a second set of seven examples, again citing one phrase for each la don 
morpheme. Although the general subsumption of the category time expression under the 
seventh case seems linguistically reasonable and all the examples are temporal specifications, 
                                                          
1006 GC 475.2. 
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the phrases are syntactically more diverse and thus raise questions in terms of their homogeneity 
as instances of one and the same grammatical category.  
Phrase (8), (10) and (14) may be seen as the most explicit expressions of time, where a single 
noun phrase is marked by la don in a simple clause to indicate the time when the action takes 
place. In contrast, phrases (9) and (13) mark entire subclauses with an additional verb, namely 
nyi ma shar ba (‘the sun shines’) and nam langs pa (lit. ‘the day gets up;’ ‘dawn’). The same 
strategy was already encountered in the GC in the context of the third case, where byed sgra in 
its function to indicate a causal relation between clauses was subsumed under the agentive 
function due to its semantic affinity.1007 Although the morphology and the semantic information 
expressed by the morphemes is identical throughout the two grammatical constructions (noun 
phrase vs. subclause), Si tu’s strategy raises the question whether the difference of marking 
noun phrases and marking entire clauses that have an additional verb should be reflected in the 
taxonomy, which requires the consideration of a number of syntactic and distributional features 
such as word order, nominalization of verbs, etc.  
Finally, the two phrases (11) and (12), which both employ the morpheme du or its allomorphs, 
raise the question whether rgyun du (‘continuously, daily’) and rtag tu (‘always’) are more 
accurately adverbial specifications rather than locative cases. While both again unmistakably 
are time expressions, are there any additional features to be recognized that allow a distinction 
of these two specifications from, for example, tshes gnyis su (‘at the second day [of the month]’) 
in example (1)? To point towards one of the possible direction, the forms rgyun du and rtag tu 
figure both very frequently in Tibetan literature and tend to be placed close to the verb and 
commonly right before it, whereas time expressions such as tshes gnyis su are more free in their 
placement, although they tend to appear more often at the beginning of sentences which only 
consist of simple clauses. Word order may therefore be one significant feature that allows us to 
distinguish between these different uses. Even in Si tu’s own taxonomy, the question appears, 
whether (11) and (12) may be equally or even better classified as instances of de nyid, that is to 
say an expression of identity between the marked argument and the verb.1008 It will be assumed 
here that Si tu’s classification was mainly inspired by the mere lexical value of the marked 
words that both have strong temporal meaning and without much consideration of syntactic 
features. This focus on the lexical value is also well in line with Si tu’s objectivist approach. 
                                                          
1007 Cf. e.g. supra 257f. 
1008 Cf. chapter 8.2.5. 
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As a final remark on tshe skabs, with the subsumption of this category under the seventh case, 
all five functions listed in SCP 11.3-4 are classified as case functions in the GC. 
13.2.2 The Seventh Case in the Great Commentary on the Rtags ’jug 
Si tu’s summary of the seventh case starts with a simple illustration of the category gnas gzhi 
(‘abode’) that stays in close proximity to his SCP definition as gang zhig gang la brten pa’am 
yod pa (‘something exists or is based/supported somewhere’): 
 la don drug po [sic!] rnam dbye bdun pa gnas gzhi la ’jug pa ni/     shing la bya/     khyim 
 du mi/     bum par chu/     gdan la ’dug     sa la nyal/     rgyab tu ri yod/     lta bu/     bya 
 mi/ [sic!]1009     chu/     ’dug     nyal/     ri rnams kyi rten gnas sam gnas pa’i gzhi ni/     
 shing/     khyim/     bum pa/     gdan/     sa/     rgyab phyogs rnams yin pas de dag pa 
 [sic!]1010 rnam dbye bdun pa ’jug pa yin […] 
 “As for [how] the six [sic!] la don [morphemes]1011 take on the seventh case abode 
 (rnam dbye bdun pa gnas gzhi), it is as follows. For example, in (15) ‘birds on/in/at the 
 tree’ (shing la bya), (16) ‘humans in the house’ (khyim du mi), (17) ‘water in the pot’ 
 (bum par chu), (18) ‘to sit on the mat’ (gdan la ’dug), (19) ‘to sleep on the ground’ (sa 
 la nyal), (20) ‘there is a mountain at the back’ (rgyab tu ri yod), the support (rten gnas) 
 or abode (gnas pa’i gzhi) of the birds (bya), the humans (mi), the water (chu), the 
 sitting (’dug), the sleeping (nyal) [and] the mountain (ri) are the tree (shing), the house 
 (khyim), the pot (chu), the mat (gdan), the ground (sa) [and] the back (rgyab phyogs). 
 Therefore, a seventh case joins to these [arguments tree, house, pot, etc.] (de dag pa 
 [sic!] rnam dbye bdun pa ʼjug pa yin).”1012 
Si tu explains the seventh case as the support/basis (rten gnas) or place of abiding (gnas pa’i 
gzhi), where something is placed or located. He provided six additional examples, all which 
consist of two arguments, one marked by la don plus either a noun (phrases 15, 16, 17, 20) or 
a verb (phrases 18, 19). As his list reveals, it does not further matter for Si tu whether the seventh 
case syntactically indicates a relation of the location to a noun or to a verb, since word forms 
such as bya (‘bird’), mi (‘human’), ’dug (‘to sit’) and nyal (‘to sleep’) are all equally classified 
as that which is located at a certain place marked by la don. That Si tu did not differentiate 
between these two types of location may be related to the already presented Sanskritic theory 
                                                          
1009 I read bya/     mi/. 
1010 I read de dag la. 
1011 It remains unclear why Si tu only speaks of six instead of the usual seven morphemes in the GC. It may only 
be speculated that he either did not distinguish between the allomorphs du and tu or between the forms -r and ru. 
1012 GC 602.5. 
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that adhikaraṇa is the direct location of either the agent or the karman and consequently the 
indirect location of the action, since the latter is directly located in the agent or the karman.1013 
From this perspective, it makes no difference whether the action, the agent or any other 
participant of the action is located at a certain place, since action and participants of the action 
are located at the same place. Disregarding the difference of direct vs. indirect, this kāraka is 
the location of both entities and the actions performed by them, a perspective which also fits 
well to the objectivist approach, since scenarios in the phenomenal world do not distinguish 
whether the action or its participants are located at a certain place. If it is allowed to apply this 
idea to phrases such as sa la nyal (‘to sleep on the ground’), it probably made no difference to 
Si tu whether it is the sleeping as such or the unmentioned sleeper that is located on the ground, 
and therefore he also saw no difference in whether the seventh case refers to the location of an 
action or the location of an entity. Si tu demonstrates an awareness of the Sanskritic theory of 
direct vs. indirect location at least in his Cāndra commentary on C 2.1.88, where he explains 
the category ādhāra of the root text as follows: 
 byed pa po dang las dag gi bya ba gang la gnas par gyur pa de ’dzin par byed pa ni 
 gzhi’i byed pa can te/ 
 “To contain (’dzin par byed pa) that [location], where the action of the two, agent and 
 karman, is located (gnas par gyur pa), is the kāraka ādhāra (gzhi’i byed pa can).”1014 
Si tu’s identification of ādhāra (gzhi) as a kāraka in the phrase gzhi’i byed pa can is one direct 
demonstration that the Tibetan tradition did not see a difference between ādhāra and 
adhikaraṇa.1015 He gave the etymological explanation of the term ādhāra (lit. ‘that which 
holds,’ ‘contains,’ ‘keeps’) as that it contains (’dzin par byed pa, ‘to take,’ ‘to hold,’ ‘to 
contain’) the place of the action of agent and karman. 
Unlike other sources, such as the quoted Kāśikāvr̥tti, Si tu did not distinguish in this passage 
between a direct location of agent and karman and an indirect location of the action, but the 
idea of a location which is that of the action of agent and karman (byed pa po dang las dag gi 
bya ba gang la gnas par gyur pa) nonetheless refers most likely to the same Sanskritic theory.  
In his summary of the seventh case in the GC, Si tu continues to stress that actions (bya ba) 
equally qualify as seventh cases and are not to be classified as las su bya ba: 
                                                          
1013 Cf. supra 380. 
1014 Si tu 2.53.1. 
1015 Cf. supra 380f. 
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 de bzhin du chu la zhugs/     khung du ’dzul/     gyul du go bgos/     gyul du bsad/     lta 
 bu rnams kyang zhugs pa dang ’dzul ba dang go bgos pa dang bsad pa rnams kyi bya 
 ba de dag gi rten rim bzhin du chu la sogs pa de dag yin pas la don gyi rnam dbye de 
 rnams bdun pa’i don du ’gyur ba yin gyi rnam dbye gnyis pa las kyi don ma yin par shes 
 par bya’o/ 
 “Likewise, as for (21) ‘having entered the water’ (chu la zhugs), (22) ‘to enter/having 
 entered a hole’ (khung du ’dzul),1016 (23) ‘to wear an armor in battle’ (gyul du go bgos), 
 (24) ‘having killed in battle’ (gyul du bsad), the basis of these actions (bya ba de dag gi 
 rten) of having entered (zhugs pa), hiding/entering (’dzul ba), wearing armor (go bgos) 
 and having killed (bsad pa) are the water, etc. respectively. Therefore, these la don
 cases (la don gyi rnam dbye) result in the meaning of the seventh [case], whereas they 
 are not to be understood as being the meaning of the second case karman (las).”1017 
Si tu directly goes against the definition of the seventh case as the location only of a mere static 
residence or existence, and he explicitly criticizes Pra ti’s conception of the seventh case, 
according to which examples (21) to (24) only qualify as a second case. Si tu therefore remained 
closer to the Sanskritic grammatical authority, which defines the seventh case as the (indirect) 
location of action without any difference between static-residential and active verbs. 
Apart from example (24), the underlying rationale for these classifications is difficult to 
evaluate. Example (24) is a clear and unmistakable instance of a genuine action (gsod pa ‘to 
kill’) that was performed at a certain location (gyul du ‘in battle’) and thus a straightforward 
demonstration of Si tu’s argument. The locative meaning of the first three phrases, however, 
raises questions.  
In example (21) chu la zhugs (‘having entered the water’), the form zhugs is the perfect tense 
of ’jug pa in its tha mi dad meaning (‘to enter’). The lexical value of the verb suggests that chu 
(‘water’) is less the LOCATION of the action or agent than the TARGET, DESTINATION. 
Accordingly, the phrase’s locative interpretation is also problematic within Si tu’s case model, 
as it was noticed by Tshe tan zhabs drung who compared example (21) with two of Si tu’s 
second case examples, namely rgya gar du ’gro (‘to go to India’) and mdun na rgyu (‘to move 
in front of’ or ‘to move forward’ ?).1018 Regarding their mere lexical value, all three verbs (’jug 
                                                          
1016 Lit. ‘to enter/get into the hole.’ 
1017 GC 602.6. 
1018 Cf. Tshe tan zhabs drung 2005, 121. 
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pa, ’gro ba and rgyu ba) are equivalent in the sense that they exhibit a strong directional 
value.1019 
If this was based more on an objectivist focus, one reason for Si tu’s classification may be the 
presented theory of an action’s continuum, according to which the accomplished parts are 
already located at the TARGET. Although in instances like example (21) this theory may appear 
somewhat technical and even artificial, the idea would remain that in the process of entering, 
those parts of some item that already entered the water are located in the water (= seventh case), 
whereas with regard to those parts yet to enter the water, the water appears as the domain where 
the yet unaccomplished entering engages (~ bya ba ’jug pa’i yul, second case). This raises the 
question whether example (21), similar to Si tu’s second case example bum par chu blugs 
(‘having poured water into the pot’), allows for a double classification in terms of seventh and 
second case according to his taxonomy. It may be assumed that in an objectivist approach, any 
action in the process of which a spatio-temporal separation is perceived as transitioning into 
some form of contact or placement poses the same taxonomical issue.  
Another related solution to Si tu’s classification may be connected to the use of the perfect tense 
in example (21). The genuine meaning of the perfect tense, a time-related form of the verb that 
is common in different languages, indicates that the action has been already fully accomplished 
in the past. Thus, from the perspective of the present result of the action, the water is not the 
TARGET anymore but indeed the LOCATION. Regardless of its linguistic significance, if this 
was Si tu’s understanding of example (21), then his proposed reading is more accurately 
rendered as ‘being located in the water after having entered it.’1020 If the outlined perfective 
understanding of the verb proves to be linguistically significant, Si tu’s classification of la as a 
seventh case in example (21) directly reflects the structures of WT and its tense system – and 
his classification was then likely inspired by it.   
                                                          
1019 This does not necessarily mean that the grammatical markers la and du both directly encode this directional 
value, nor that verb frames such as ’jug pa,’gro ba or rgyu ba cannot exhibit the value of 
INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT depending on the used marker. 
Without having conducted the necessary linguistic research, it cannot be excluded that the function of the 
morpheme la may still be that of an INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT rather than an ALLATIVE with the 
tha mi dad verb ’jug pa (‘to enter’), since the unmarked argument is not only the agent who enters, but also the 
most or primarily affected participant as the one who undergoes movement, thus making the argument marked 
by la the less affected object. The zero-marking of the agent might be an important indication that such an 
interpretation of this phrase’s syntax may have linguistic significance, be it synchronically or diachronically. In 
any event, although la can have locative meaning in WT, the main point remains that its locative value in 
example (21) is rather counterintuitive from the meaning of the verb and the content as such. 
1020 Since the perfect tense typically focuses on the present result of the action rather than the past performance 
of the action, a resultative interpretation of the verb form zhugs might have linguistic significance. Typical 
example in Latin to demonstrate the perfective meaning of the perfect tense is the verb cōgnōscō (‘I learn,’ 
‘recognize’), of which the perfect tense cōgnōvī (lit. ‘I have learned,’ ‘recognized’) more accurately means ‘I 
know.’ The question is to which extent Tibetan language makes use of this genuine form of the perfect tense. 
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A very similar issue is the case of example (22), khung du ’dzul (‘to enter/having entered a 
hole’), where the verb ’dzul ba (‘to enter,’ ‘to slip in;’ ‘having entered’ ?) has a very similar 
lexical value, and thus khung (‘hole’) appears to be more the TARGET or DESTINATION than 
the actual LOCATION.1021 Yet, the issue is complicated, since the form ’dzul ba does not 
distinguish tense forms, and thus it is difficult to assess without any context which form was 
used in example (22).1022 While this verb’s entries in Tibetan-English dictionaries give the 
meaning of ‘to enter,’ ‘join,’ etc., the Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo gives zhugs pa (‘having 
entered’) as the only meaning. According to the latter, ’dzul ba therefore only has perfect tense 
meaning. If a perfective understanding of ’dzul ba is that of Si tu in example (22), then his 
classification of khung du as a seventh case may have been based on a resultative-perfective 
interpretation in the sense of ‘being located in the hole after having entered it.’ Probably even 
more accurately, the whole example could then be translated as ‘to hide in a hole,’ in which the 
locative meaning comes out clearly.1023 
Si tu apparently interpreted example (23), gyul du go bgos, in the sense of ‘to wear an armor in 
battle,’ thus with the battle as a seventh case, i.e. the location of the action of wearing armor. 
Interestingly, Tshe tan zhabs drung criticized also this classification and contrasted it with Si 
tu’s example of the fourth case shing la chu ’dren, i.e. ‘to pull/bring water to the tree,’ which is 
classified as a fourth case in the meaning of ‘to pull/bring water for the tree.’1024 This is an 
indeed important observation, since it brings up the question whether the purposive marker du 
more likely indicates that the armor in example (23) is worn for the battle rather than in the 
battle. 
Although most dictionaries usually provide the lexical meaning of ‘to put on (clothes, etc.)’ for 
bgo ba, Goldstein also provides ‘to wear.’1025 It is difficult to evaluate at this point whether the 
present tense itself has this second meaning, or whether it is more accurate that only the perfect 
form bgos pa (lit. ‘having put on (clothes, etc.)’) can mean ‘to wear’ in certain contexts due to 
a resultative connotation of this tense. In any case, Si tu certainly understood the perfect form 
bgos pa in example (23) in the sense of ‘to wear,’ since the meaning ‘having put on the armor 
                                                          
1021 Cf. also Tshe tan zhabs drung 2005, 121. Tshe tan zhabs drung compared phrase (22) with Si tu’s example of 
the second case rgyab tu phyogs (‘to turn backwards’). 
1022 Cf. Jäschke 1987, 466; Goldstein 2001, 911; Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo 2004, 2347.  
1023 Cf. the word ’dzul khung (lit. ‘a hole [where somebody] enters/has entered’), which refers to a hole where 
somebody hides, i.e. a hideout. 
1024 Note that Tshe tan zhabs drung (2005, 121) mentions the example zhing la chu ’dren (‘to drag water to the 
field’) and states that Si tu classified it as a second case. Both the version zhing la chu ’dren as well its 
classification as a second case cannot be found in the GC. Due to the phrase’s status as the most common 
example of the fourth case, it is assumed that Tshe tan zhabs drung’s version is more likely a typographical error 
and that he was well aware of Si tu’s classification. 
1025 Cf. the entry bgo (ba) e.g. in Jäschke 1987, 89; Goldstein 2001, 227; Hackett 2003, 60. 
402 
 
in battle’ makes little sense. Therefore, the classification of gyul du go bgos (‘to wear an armor 
in battle’) as an instance of the seventh case is intuitive and understandable. However, this does 
not solve the issue whether alternatively du may have purposive meaning in example (23), in 
the sense of ‘to wear an armor for battle,’ making it an example of the fourth case in Si tu’s 
taxonomy. The conflict between a locative and a purposive classification of example (23) is 
difficult to resolve, particularly since the marker du has both functions. In this context it may 
be asked again whether Si tu was aware of this conflict and would have allowed for a double 
classification of this phrase, similar to the second and seventh case example bum par chu blugs. 
In his summary of the seventh case at the end of the TKJ, Si tu also included as a trigger of this 
case verbs with the lexical value of ‘to fear,’ ‘to be afraid of’: 
 sdig pa la ’jigs/     seng ge la skrag sogs gang las ’jigs pa ’byung ba’i gnas de la rnam 
 dbye lnga pa ’jug pa legs sbyar gyi lugs yin yang/     bod skad la ’jigs pa skye ba’i yul 
 lam rten du gyur pa’i cha nas bdun pa nyid sbyor ba […] 
“[Regarding], for example, ‘to fear harmful deeds’ (sdig pa la ’jigs), ‘to be frightened 
 of a lion’ (seng ge la skrag), although it is the Sanskrit system that a fifth case joins to 
 that place/position/object (lit. ‘place;’ gnas) from where the fear comes forth (gang las 
’jigs pa ’byung ba), in Tibetan the seventh case is applied from the perspective (cha nas) 
that [this place/position/object] is the locus (yul) or basis (rten) [where] the fear arises 
(lit. ‘takes birth;’ ’jigs pa skye ba).”1026 
It was already outlined in the context of the second and fourth cases that verbs of affection form 
a distinct group in WT that triggers an unmarked argument as the experiencer of the affection 
and an argument marked by la or its allomorphs as the object or target of the affection.1027 In 
contrast, in the GC Si tu distinguished the different verbs of affection and associated them with 
different cases in his model: 
 Second case (las su bya ba):  kun la dga’ ‘to like/love all’ 
     de ru skyid ‘to be delighted about it’ 
 Fourth case (dgos ched):  dman par brtse ‘to feel affection for the inferior’ 
 Seventh case (gnas gzhi): sdig pa la ’jigs ’to fear harmful deeds’  
     seng ge la skrag ‘to be frightened of a lion’   
                                                          
1026 GC 603.2. 
1027 Cf. supra 222 and 302f. 
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Under the condition that the morphemes -r and ru are allomorphs of la, the distribution of 
morphemes in these phrases suggests that the syntactic structure of all the examples is identical. 
From this perspective, Si tu’s classification is not representative for the structures of WT. It 
remains unsure whether the very limited set of only five examples with verbs of affection that 
Si tu provided in the GC allows to draw any definite conclusions about the underlying rationale 
of these classifications. The general observation may be made that the second case covers two 
instances of positive affections towards the object that might include aspects such as joy or 
inclination, whereas the fourth case covers one instance of affections that presumably results in 
a benefit for the object. Finally, the seventh case covers two instances of negative affections 
towards the object that might include aspects such as aversion. The classification of dman par 
brtse (‘to feel affection for the inferior’) as a fourth case seems to be the most comprehensible 
one, since the word form brtse ba (‘to show affection for;’ ‘loving kindness,’ ‘compassion’) 
exhibits a noticeable beneficial or purposive character, even more so if it is assumed that this 
type of affection is often accompanied by actions that help the object of affection, such as giving 
alms, etc. However, such an interpretation of the scenario referred to in dman par brtse does 
not reflect the grammatical structure of the sentence.  
At least Si tu provided the basis for his classification of the examples for the seventh case in 
the passage quoted above, according to which that item or more literally that place (gnas) which 
is feared is the locus or basis where the fear comes into being (’jigs pa skye ba’i yul lam rten). 
Si tu obviously attempted to explain his classification by making reference to spatial notions 
such as gnas (‘place, abode’) and rten (‘support, basis’), both which are part of the labels for 
the seventh case. The idea behind Si tu’s explanation becomes more evident as soon as it is 
compared with his conceptualization of the Sanskrit case marking patterns according to which 
a fifth case suffix is triggered. The Sanskrit rationale according to Si tu is that the feared item 
is the place (gnas) where the fear comes from or originates from (’byung ba), an idea which is 
more intuitive than that the feared object is the location of the fear. However, this theory 
demonstrates that the feared item was conceived by Si tu as the source of fear, in the sense that 
it is the place or basis where the fear arises, comes into being or more literally takes birth (’jigs 
pa skye ba’i yul lam rten). This theory amounts to the very point that Sanskrit represents the 
scenario of fear in the form that fear appears out of the feared item – after which the fear 
presumably enters the fearing entity –, while the Tibetan merely focuses on the feared item as 
the ‘birthplace’ of fear. Therefore, the two patterns are not in contradiction but rather equivalent 
in the sense that they offer two fully compatible semantic perspectives of the scenario of 
somebody fearing something. More accurately, both semantic structurings are based on the 
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same underlying constitution of this scenario, namely that the feared item is the source, origin 
or ‘birthplace’ of the fear. 
With regard to Si tu’s distinction of different affections, it is not fully evident how his 
explanation of fear does not apply to his second case examples of kun la dga’ and de ru skyid 
as well as to his fourth case example dman par brtse. Independent of the fact whether the object 
of affection is loved, feared, etc., it still qualifies as the source of the affection and thus its 
‘birthplace.’ Conversely, Si tu’s definition of the second case as that domain which the action 
engages in (bya ba ’jug pa’i yul) equally applies to his fourth and seventh case examples 
regarding affection verbs. 
Regarding his second case affections, one option could be that he understood his definition of 
the second case, i.e. the engagement of an action with an item (~ bya ba ’jug pa pa’i yul) more 
in terms of an actual engagement of the agent with that item. From this perspective, affections 
such as love or delight may have been seen by Si tu as going hand in hand with an active 
engagement with the object of affection, for which reason he may have regarded the instances 
of love and delight closer to the second case las su bya ba.  
Another question in this context is how Si tu understood different case marking patterns with 
affections such as love, delight and others. Sanskrit verbs with the lexical value of ‘to love,’ ‘to 
like,’ ‘to be pleased’ and others – a semantic domain that Si tu classifies as a second case – may 
follow various case marking patterns. For example, already encountered above was the verbal 
root ruc (‘to please’) which triggers a fourth case suffix for the one who is pleased or likes in 
the meaning of sampradāna, with the pleasing object taking a first case suffix.1028 The verbal 
root prī, in contrast, allows for several grammatical constructions to express meanings such as 
‘to please/be pleased,’ ‘to delight in,’ ‘to like’ or ‘to love,’ in which the case marking of the 
object of affection can range from the second to the third, fifth, seventh or even sixth case suffix 
according to Monier-Williams’s dictionary.1029 In contrast, the verbal root snih (‘to be attached 
to,’ ‘to be fond of,’ ‘to feel affection for’) in its active form usually triggers a sixth or seventh 
case suffix to mark the object of affection.1030 Due to the lack of further information in the GC, 
it is difficult to assess whether Si tu regarded one of these or any of the other constructions as 
the generic or most dominant one that represents the actual meaning of love, etc. and 
consequently modelled his Tibetan taxonomy according to it. 
                                                          
1028 Cf. P 1.4.33. 
1029 Cf. Monier-Williams 1981, 709f. 
1030 Cf. ibid., 1267. 
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Certainly, there are several options as to how he has concretely perceived the difference 
between affections and how precisely the resulting taxonomy has been inspired. Unfortunately, 
apart from his theory on fear, Si tu did not offer any additional information. 
However, his elaboration on the instance of fear is most representative for his objectivist 
approach. His classification of Tibetan verbs of fear as seventh case triggers was definitely 
inspired by the Sanskrit fifth-case marking pattern and the attempt to reconcile the two 
languages based on his understanding of the semantic constitution of the phenomenon of fear. 
The instance of fear is an established part of apādāna in Sanskrit grammar.1031 As such, it 
certainly forms the generic Sanskrit case marking pattern and represents the actual underlying 
meaning or understanding of this type of scenario. Since this actual meaning is not rooted in 
any language-specific structures, its validity persists across languages that may deviate from it, 
but only through special conventions. Tibetan language apparently follows this actual meaning 
and not any special conventions,1032 for which reason the Tibetan case marking pattern had to 
be brought in line with the Sanskrit semantic construal of fear in terms of apādāna. To claim 
that la may have the meaning of ’byung khungs would have been too removed from Tibetan 
language and its accepted taxonomies, thus the seventh case was his solution – and certainly 
not a fully artificial one, since a spatial affinity between the categories location and source has 
already been expounded in sources such as Smra ba kun or NGg,1033 and thus the semantic-
conceptual basis of Si tu’s proposed relation was already established to some extent before his 
times. 
Yet again, it is a different question altogether to which extent Si tu was aware of his 
misconstrual of the scenario in the Tibetan context. If the generic case marking pattern and thus 
the actual meaning of fear is established and tested over centuries based on Sanskritic role 
models and it is equally accepted that la has locative meaning, Si tu’s objectivist focus on a few 
selected scenarios and their representation in the language instead of a focus on the overall 
distribution of la may have easily given the impression that Tibetan verbs of fear govern a 
locative. 
13.2.3 Résumé on the Seventh Case in the Great Commentary 
Si tu has adopted the established terminology of gnas gzhi (‘abode’) and rten gnas (‘support,’ 
‘basis’) and thus remained in line with the preceding Tibetan tradition regarding the seventh 
                                                          
1031 Cf. e.g. P 1.4.25. 
1032 On the difference between actual meaning and special convention, cf. also supra 311 and 314f. On Si tu’s 
important claim that Tibetan follows in general the actual meaning of actions without special or exceptional 
conventions, cf. chapter 16. 
1033 Cf. supra 336ff. 
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case’s basic conception as a location or place. Yet, he explicitly distanced himself from those 
conceptions which restrict the seventh case to the mere expressions of an item’s static residence 
or existence, and he included the location of an item’s performance of an action. Therefore, in 
his taxonomy instances such as ‘existing somewhere’ (gang zhig la yod) and ‘killing 
somewhere’ (gang zhig la gsod), etc. equally qualify as examples for the seventh cases. 
Moreover, the GC does not make any noteworthy difference between noun phrases and verb 
phrases as syntactic heads that govern the seventh case, in other words, Si tu allows for both, 
the seventh case as the location of a thing or entity – be it only residing or actually performing 
an action – and the location of the action expressed by the verb. 
Finally, Si tu included objects of fear in the seventh case, a classification which is clearly in 
contradiction to Tibetan syntax. Although the precise rationale of his taxonomy, that is to say 
the distinction between second, fourth and seventh cases with regard to affections, remains 
unclear in this study, Si tu’s theory on the classification of verbs of fear does exhibit 
unmistakable traces of his objectivist approach.  
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14 Rnam dbye brgyad pa bod pa  
14.1 Historical Survey 
The Tibetan eighth case is labelled (’)bod pa (‘address’) and is indicated by the morpheme 
kye.1034 From a morphological perspective, this case holds a special status in the case model, in 
the sense that it is the only marker that usually precedes the word it relates to in the sentence. 
The locus classicus for the treatment of the eighth case in the Sum rtags tradition is SCP 17.2-
3: 
 gang ming brjod pa’i dang po ru/     
 kye sbyar ba ni bod pa yin/ 
 “In front of (dang po ru) an expression of any word form, 
 the application of kye is address.” 
In his SCP commentary Kun bzang dgongs rgyan on the quoted root text, Pra ti encapsulates 
the meaning of the eighth case as follows: 
 gang zag gang yang rung ba’i ming brjod pa’i dang po’am thog mar kye zhes sbyar ba/     
 dper na/     kye rgyal ba’i sras/     kye grogs po/     kye lha’i dbang po lta bu’i kye’i sgra 
 ni rnam dbye brgyad pa bod pa yin no/ 
 “The application of ‘kye’ in front of or at the beginning (dang po’am thog mar) of the 
 expression of a free lexical word form of any suitable individual (gang zag gang yang 
 rung ba’i ming brjod pa) [would be], for example, ‘Dear prince!’ (kye rgyal ba’i sras), 
 ‘Dear friend!’ (kye grogs po), ‘Dear Lord of gods/Dear Indra!’ (kye lha’i dbang po). 
 Such a morpheme kye is the eighth case address.”1035 
In most basic terms, the Tibetan eighth case bod pa refers to the vocative function. However, it 
should be noted that the morpheme kye not only expresses that a speaker directly addresses 
another person in a speech, but that the addressee is recognized by the speaker as higher in rank 
or social status. Thus, it is the most formal and politest form to address a person. Other forms 
like ka ye or kwa ye that exhibit the same morphosyntactic behavior are used to address 
individuals as equal or inferior in social status.  
                                                          
1034 Other designations of this function are gdags pa’i tshig (‘syntactic form of calling out’) in NG’s and NGg’s 
eightfold kāraka-scheme (cf. CT 115 – 418) as well as ’os pa (‘the eligible one,’ ‘the proper one,’ ‘the right 
candidate’ ?) in TKJ 25.3.  
1035 Pra ti 2013A, 214. 
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Although examples such as those found in Pra ti’s grammar are indeed instances of bod pa or 
the vocative function, the case status of kye or the form kye + noun is certainly questionable. 
Although it refers to the argument in the vocative, the morpheme kye is more accurately a 
separate argument of the sentence that emphasizes any vocative meaning in the sentence and 
adds information about the social status of the addressee as well as the politeness of the speaker 
or the formal character of the speech. It has the syntactic value of an interjection such as ‘Oh!’, 
‘Hey!’, ‘Dear!’ and the like. That kye itself is not part of the syntactic word form (tshig) which 
expresses the vocative is apparent from the fact that the mere vocative or bod pa can be 
expressed without the addition of kye.1036 Moreover, since the morphological feature of kye as 
usually being applied in front of the addressee is not shared by any other grammatical marker, 
the morphological distribution supports that kye is not a syntactic marker to express a relation 
to other arguments in the sentence. This may be further corroborated by the fact that kye can 
appear after the addressee in certain contexts as well.1037 A morphological flexibility in the form 
that the case marker may appear before or after the marked argument is not attested for any 
other grammatical marker in WT and would severely impede the identification of the marked 
argument and consequently the grammatical structure of the entire sentence. In contrast to the 
Tibetan traditional case model, it may therefore be more representative to analyze examples 
such as kye rgyal ba’i sras (‘Dear prince!’) as kye + unmarked noun phrase, where the unmarked 
noun phrase alone represents the vocative case form and kye an optional interjection. 
14.1.1 The Eighth Case in Relation to Sanskritic Grammar 
The historical development of the Tibetan eighth case, including its identification with kye, is 
closely connected to Sanskritic grammar. The technical term (’)bod pa (‘address’) is directly 
derived from the two Sanskritic notions sambodhana (‘id.’) and āmantraṇa (‘id.’) that cover 
the vocative function: 
 P 2.3.47 sambodhane ca “Also if [there is] address, [a first case suffix occurs].” 
                                                          
1036 Cf. Hahn 2005, 53. 
1037 Cf. ibid. Si tu also acknowledged that there exist exceptional applications of kye after the addressee in the 
sentence, especially in poetry, where the metre of the verse may require it: 
 ’di’ang thog mar sbyor ba gtso che ba’i dbang gis gsungs pa las/     tshigs bcad sogs sbyor ba’i tshe/     
 bdag la dgongs shig mgon po kye/     zhes pa lta bu mthar sbyar ba’ang yod do/ 
 “[…] Yet, while this has been taught [by master Thon mi] from the perspective that this [morpheme 
 kye] is predominantly (gtso che ba) applied at the beginning [of the first case], there also exists the 
 application at the end during the formation of verses etc. (tshigs bcad sogs sbyor ba) as in (5) 
 ‘Remember/Care for me, lord, dear!’ (~ bdag la dgongs shig mgon po kye).” (GC 498.2) 
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 P 2.3.48 sā’ mantritam “[If there is address,] this [first case suffix is called] āmantrita 
 (‘the addressed’).” 
 K 2.4.18 āmantraṇe ca “Also if [there is] address, [a first case suffix occurs].” 
 C 2.1.94 sambodhane “If [there is] address, [a first case suffix occurs].” 
The quoted rules make clear that there is no separate case suffix that marks sambodhana or 
āmantraṇa according to Sanskritic grammar, but that the vocative is an additional function of 
the first case suffix.1038 This is mainly based on Sanskrit morphology, namely the fact that many 
paradigms of the Sanskrit nominal inflexion do not distinguish between the nominative and 
vocative case forms, and those which do only in the singular form.1039 Accordingly, Sanskrit 
grammatical sources do not provide a separate case form for the vocative and restrict the default 
paradigm of vibhaktis to only seven triplets, i.e. twenty-one suffixes divided into seven groups 
á singular, dual and plural.1040 The different paradigms of the nominal inflexion used in Sanskrit 
language, including possible deviations of the vocative singular from the nominative case form, 
are then derived in Sanskritic grammars through morphological operations such as elision or 
substitution of the twenty-one default suffixes, but these operations remain within the general 
framework of seven triplets. As for the deviation of some of the vocative singular forms, they 
are accounted for by Pāṇini directly following P 2.3.47-48: 
 P 2.3.49 ekavacanaṃ sambuddhiḥ “The singular [of a term called āmantrita is termed] 
 sambuddhi.” 
The separate technical term for the vocative singular allowed Pāṇini to single out these forms 
and refer to them separately during the derivation of vocative word forms wherever they deviate 
from the first triplet of case suffixes (= nominative).1041  
Since the Sanskritic case model is strictly based on the distinction of case suffixes and the 
number of case suffixes remains within the framework of seven triplets throughout the entire 
derivation of any nominal word form, the function sambhodana/āmantraṇa is not a case, nor is 
there a separate case suffix for it. Strictly speaking, Sanskritic grammatical sources therefore 
only accept seven cases (vibhakti). 
                                                          
1038 Note that the application of the first case suffix (prathamā vibhakti) in the quoted rules must be derived 
through the operation of anuvr̥tti from the preceding rule in all three grammars respectively (cf. P 2.3.46, K 
2.4.17 and C 2.1.93). 
1039 Cf. e.g. Mayrhofer 1978, 34ff. 
1040 Cf. P 4.1.2 and 1.4.103; K 2.1.2a; C 2.1.1. 
1041 Cf. e.g. P 6.1.69 or P 7.3.106. 
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Nonetheless, the majority of Tibetan grammatical sources considered in this study refer to the 
Tibetan pendant (’)bod pa together with the morpheme kye as the eighth case (rnam dbye 
brgyad pa), and the notion of rnam dbye brgyad (‘eight cases’) is widely accepted in the Tibetan 
tradition. However, already early Tibetan grammarians were aware of the Sanskritic scheme of 
only seven times three suffixes, as is evident from NGg’s presentation of the eighth case bod 
pa:1042 
 brgyad pa bod pa la ni bsgyur ba med de/     bsgyur ba bdun gang du bsgyur ba rnams 
 la bod pas brgyad pa bod pa’i sa zhes bya1043 ste/     de ltar bsgyur ba bdun bod pa dang 
 brgyad la rnam par dbye ba yin no/ 
 “Regarding the eighth [case], address (bod pa), it has no inflexion/form (bsgyur ba). 
 Since [it] addresses a [term that is] in whichever of the seven inflected forms (~ bsgyur 
 ba bdun gang du bsgyur ba rnams la bod pa ?), it is the eighth [case] called the semantic 
 domain of address (bod pa’i sa zhes bya). Accordingly, the seven inflected forms 
 together with address result in [the number] eight. [These] are the cases (rnam par 
 dbye ba).”1044 
The translation of the phrase bsgyur ba bdun gang du bsgyur ba rnams la bod pa is tentative, 
since its meaning at this point is not fully clear to me. The above reading bears the issue that 
the verb ’bod pa (‘to address’) usually does not trigger the morpheme la for the addressed 
object, but zero-marking. Moreover, the idea that the eighth case may be the address of any 
noun phrase regardless its inflection is certainly against Sanskritic grammar and Sanskrit 
language, but also counterintuitive from a general linguistic perspective. Regardless of these 
                                                          
1042 Since NGg provides the basic morphology of Sanskrit nominal inflexion throughout the topic of vibhakti, it 
can be safely assumed that the following quotation refers first of all to Sanskrit morphology. In the context of the 
topic of vibhakti, NGg does include Sanskrit morphology in the form of the twenty-one default suffixes based on 
Pāṇini’s/Cāndra’s system together with their Tibetan pendants. In contrast, Tibetan morphology seemed to have 
been secondary for the author in this topic, although it cannot be ruled out that at least the following quotation 
equally refers to Tibetan language, since the vocative function also has no separate form in WT.  
However, the dominance of Sanskrit morphology in the topic of vibhakti does not mean that NGg’s case model 
as such was regarded as Sanskrit-specific. Note that in this dissertation NGg is treated as a treatise on general 
linguistic topics not restricted to either Sanskrit or Tibetan language. This holds especially true for the context of 
the presentation of the eight prototypical case functions. 
1043 Note that according to CT, the Sde dge and Co ne editions read bod si zhes bya (‘address called ‘si’’) instead 
of bod pa’i sa zhe bya. This would make sense insofar as the text would then associate suffix si, i.e. the default 
first case suffix in the Kātantra-system, with the vocative case function, which would be in line with Sanskrit 
grammar. However, I prefer the reading of bod pa’i sa zhe bya, mainly because NGg employs the Pāṇinian and 
Cāndrian system of case suffixes for the first case form, i.e. suffix su (cf. CT 115 – 432). Moreover, the 
expression brgyad pa bod pa’i sa zhes bya in its form case number + function + ’brel sgra + sa zhes bya is 
frequently used in the NGg during the other cases and seems to form a more or less consistent pattern (cf. CT 
115 – 432ff.). 
1044 CT 115 – 434. 
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philological-hermeneutical issues, it suffices to note that NGg did acknowledge that there are 
only seven and not eight triplets, yet it included address as the eighth case. 
Independent of whether or not there existed relevant Sanskritic role models, it will be argued 
here that the inclusion of bod pa as a separate case was first of all based on its distinct functional 
value and the fact that the Tibetan case model as a whole is based on a distinction of case 
functions and not -forms or -suffixes. GNT, for example, emphasized the distinctiveness of the 
category bod pa as a separate category in the following: 
 de yang kye gang zhig ces pa lta bu brgyad pa bod pa’i sgra ston pa yin te/     brgyad 
 pa bod pa’i sgra ’di ni sgra rkyang pa’am ngo bo nyid yin pas gcig dang/     gnyis dang 
 mang po’i tshig dang gsum du dbyer yang med la/     gzhan yang brgyad pa ’di rkyang 
 pa’am ngo bo ’ba’ zhig yin pas brgyad pa ’di la gnas bdun po gzhan sbyar la bod 
 par ’gyur ba’i skabs kyang med do/     dper na gos nag po la mtshon gzhan mi ’dzin pa 
 dang ’dra bar brgyad pa ’di la yang sgra gzhan gang yang sbyar la bod par bsgyur ba’i 
 skabs cung zad kyang med de rang gi ngo bo ’ba’ zhig nas ’bod pa tsam du zad do/ 
“Furthermore, the eighth [case/semantic domain] indicates that a term has been 
 addressed (bod pa’i sgra ston pa) as in ‘Dear so-and-so!’ (kye gang zhig). Since this 
 eighth [case/semantic domain], an addressed term (bod pa’i sgra), is a bare term or the 
 mere essence (sgra rkyang pa’am ngo bo nyid), it has no threefold distinction into 
 singular, dual and plural. Moreover, since this eighth [case/semantic domain] is only the 
 bare [term] or essence, it is impossible (skabs med) regarding this eighth [case/semantic 
 domain] to apply the other seven semantic domains and to become the addressed (bod 
 par ’gyur) [at the same time]. For example, just as a black cloth is not taken as [having] 
a different colour, there is also not the slightest possibility regarding this eighth 
 [case/semantic domain] that any other [case] term (sgra) is applied and that [the 
 resulting term then] is turned into the addressed. Apart from the mere self-essence, [the 
 eighth case/semantic domain] is only address.”1045 
If the above reading is correct, then it amounts to the basic argument that although the 
addressing of a person is essentially the reference to that person’s mere essence (ngo bo ’ba’ 
zhig) without any function attributed to it in a sentence’s scenario, this does not mean that this 
person can take any additional function, since it has the function of the addressee. GNT’s 
explanation apparently attempts to account for the special status of the vocative function that 
                                                          
1045 CT 115 – 462. 
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the mere address of a person is not part of any action or scenario expressed in the sentence, and 
thus the vocative item does not have any function in the action. Nonetheless, it remains a distinct 
semantic category and the simultaneous application of any other semantic domain to one and 
the same item is prohibited. Since only one semantic domain may apply at a time and address 
qualifies as a distinctive semantic domain, it forms a separate case in GNT’s case model. 
GNT also features clear traces as to how the interjection kye has become the marker of the 
eighth case in the Tibetan model: 
 bod pa ’di nyid rgya gar gyi sgra la he’am e ston pa yin la/     de la he ston pa ni/      he 
 he bha ga bhan zhes pa lta bu ste/     kye kye bcom ldan ’das zhes pa lta bu dang he 
 badzra zhes pa lta bu kye’i rdo rjer bsgyur ba la sogs pa lta bu’o/ 
 “This very address is indicated in Sanskrit morphology [by] ‘he’ or ‘e’. Regarding the 
 indicator ‘he,’ [this would be] as in ‘he he bhagavan!’ [that translates as] ‘Dear 
 Bhagavan!’ (kye kye bcom ldan ’das) and ‘he vajra’ that translates as ‘Dear Vajra!’ 
 (kye’i rdo rje), etc.”1046 
Kye has been commonly used as the translation of the Sanskrit indeclinable he, a vocative 
particle that is also placed in front of the addressee to emphasize the address by the speaker.1047 
Morphosyntactically, it therefore behaves in a similar way to kye. Despite its clear vocative 
meaning, Sanskritic grammars never classified this particle as a case suffix or case form, 
obviously because it is not part of the nominal inflexion, and vocative word forms still require 
a case suffix to become a complete and functioning word form (pada). However, a look at 
Sanskritic grammatical sources demonstrates that Sanskritic grammarians and commentators 
have typically illustrated the vocative function of the first case suffix in P 2.3.48-50, K 2.1.18 
and C 2.1.93 by help of various vocative particles or interjections such as he, dhik, etc., 
presumably to emphasize and clarify the vocative meaning of the first case suffix.1048 This 
stands to reason, since the first case suffix might be otherwise misinterpreted as the indication 
of its prototypical function, i.e. the mere expression of a nominal stem’s lexical value 
(prātipadikārtha). Tibetan grammarians did not further consider the difference between these 
examples, which are full phrases of the form indeclinable particle + pada, and the actual 
Sanskrit vocative case suffix. Consequently, the morphology of the vocative case form 
transformed into he + pada, and this understanding of the vocative case form was then applied 
                                                          
1046 CT 115 – 463. 
1047 Cf. Negi 1993, 81. 
1048 Cf. Sharma 1995, 151f.; Liebich 1919, 44; Liebich 1918, 113. 
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to the semantically as well as morphosyntactically equivalent form kye + unmarked noun phrase 
in Tibetan, from where it is only a minor step to that grammatical sources such as Pra ti’s SCP-
commentary started providing kye alone as the actual case marker.  
This entire shift of the morphology was probably facilitated by the fact that in both languages, 
Sanskrit and Tibetan, the vocative case does not have any distinct morphology, and the actual 
indicator of the meaning sambodhana/āmantraṇa or bod pa in the quoted examples are the 
indeclinable particles he and kye. Moreover, that Tibetan grammarians have disregarded the 
precise morphological derivation of these forms as well as the morphological status of Sanskrit 
he and Tibetan kye clearly reveal how in Tibetan conceptions of the case model morphology 
has faded from the spotlight in favor of the case functions. The Tibetan traditional conception 
of the eighth case form would have been allowed neither in a strict adherence to Sanskritic 
derivational procedures nor in Tibetan morphology. Apart from the lack of a distinct vocative 
case marker in Tibetan (and Sanskrit), kye attained its case status mainly due to its vocative 
meaning. 
14.1.2 Résumé of the Eighth Case pre-Si tu 
The Tibetan eighth case (’)bod pa (‘address’) was directly adopted from Sanskritic grammar 
and the category sambodhana/āmantraṇa (‘id.’). It has a special status in the traditional model, 
since it is the only case of which the case marker, i.e. the interjection kye, precedes the marked 
argument in the sentence. Although against Sanskritic grammatical sources as well as Tibetan 
morphology, the case’s form was derived from Sanskritic sample phrases in grammatical 
sources on sambodhana/āmantraṇa. Sanskritic sources usually employed indeclinable word 
forms, such as he, in order to emphasize the vocative meaning. This served the purpose of 
avoiding any ambiguity between the two categories sambodhana/āmantraṇa and 
prātipadikārtha, which both trigger the first case suffix according to Sanskrit grammatical 
sources. Tibetan grammarians did not further consider this merely didactic application of 
Sanskrit he, etc. and have associated the Tibetan pendant kye with the eighth case form. 
Secondly, since Sanskritic grammar based the case model primarily on case suffixes and the 
category sambodhana/āmantraṇa triggers no separate case suffix, Sanskritic sources usually 
only distinguish seven cases. Independent of whether or not there existed any Sanskritic role 
models, Tibetan grammarians introduced (’)bod pa (‘address’) as a separate case, presumably 
based on its distinct semantic value. 
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14.2 The Eighth Case in the Great Commentary 
The only presentation of the eighth case (’)bod pa in the GC is located at SCP 17.2-3. Except 
for a short remark, the eighth case (’)bod pa has not been discussed at the end of TKJ-GC in 
the summary of case grammar. Si tu glossed SCP’s root text as follows: 
 gang yang rung ba’i ming brjod pa’i thog mar kyi [sic!]1049  zhes bya ba sbyar ba ni bod 
 pa’i rnam dbye gsal bar byed pa’i sgra yin no/ 
 “As for the application of ‘kye’ at the beginning of the expression of any suitable 
 word stem (= free lexical word form, ming), [it] is the morpheme that clarifies the eighth 
 case ‘address’ (bod pa’i rnam dbye gsal bar byed pa’i sgra).”1050 
Si tu’s definition is close to that of Pra ti.1051 The only important difference is that Si tu does 
not classify the morpheme kye as the eighth case as such, but only as that morpheme which 
makes the eighth case clear, visible, distinct, intelligible or explicit (gsal bar byed). This 
terminology of gsal bar byed pa’i sgra was already encountered briefly in the context of the 
fourth case dgos ched, where Si tu classified periphrastic constructions such as ched du, phyir 
du, etc. as terms making explicit the meaning of dgos ched (dgos ched gsal byed kyi sgra), and 
later, in his summary of the cases, he distanced himself from former grammarians who did not 
distinguish between the seven la don morphemes as fourth case markers and these non-case 
periphrastic constructions.1052 Regarding the morphological realization of bod pa, Si tu goes on 
to explain: 
 de’ang rnam dbye gnyis pa la sogs pa’i mtha’ can la ni mi ’jug cing bod skad kyi rnam 
 dbye dang po dang ming tsam la khyad par med pas de’i sngon du sbyor ba/     kye lha’i 
 lha/     kye kha lo sgyur ba/     kye lha/     khye rgyal po chen po/     lta bu ste […] 
 “Furthermore, [this morpheme kye] does not join any [word form] ending in the second 
 case, etc. and since there is no difference between the Tibetan first case and the mere 
 word stem (ming tsam), [it] is applied before this [word stem] as in (1) ‘Dear deity of 
 deities!’ (kye lha’i lha), (2) ‘Dear helmsman!’ (kye kha lo sgyur ba), (3) ‘Dear deity’ 
 (kye lha), (4) ‘Dear great king!’ (kye rgyal po chen po) […].”1053 
                                                          
1049 I read kye. 
1050 GC 498.1. 
1051 Cf. supra 407. 
1052 Cf. supra 294f. and 299. 
1053 GC 498.2. 
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Si tu first acknowledges the fact that kye cannot be applied to any word form in the sentence 
that is already marked by one of the case markers. Thus, an argument in the second to the 
seventh case cannot take kye. Presumably, the reason is that such arguments already express 
other functions than bod pa (‘address’) and consequently interfere with the vocative meaning 
of kye. The only remaining case that kye may be applied to in Si tu’s model is the first case, 
which in Tibetan falls together with the mere word stem. If kye is only a clarifying form attached 
before the word stem qua first case form, it can be inferred that the eighth case form is that of 
the first case. 
At the beginning of his case summary at the end of TKJ, Si tu addresses the eighth case only 
with the following remark, stressing that kye is not part of the eighth case form and that the 
latter is not distinguishable from the first case: 
 […] cing/     brgyad pa bod pa zhes zer yang bod pa’i yul la rnam dbye dang po nyid 
 ’jug cing kye dang kwa dang sogs ni bod pa gsal byed kyi sgra yin gyi rnam dbye ma 
 yin pas logs su dbyer med do/ 
 “[…] and although the eighth [case] is called ‘address,’ the first case[-form/-ending] 
 itself joins to the object of address (bod pa’i yul) and kye or kwa, etc. are clarifying 
 morphemes, yet no cases. Therefore, [the eighth case form/-ending] is not to be 
 separated [from the first case form/-ending].”1054  
Si tu’s argument is about the eighth case’s morphology. However, his use of the term rnam 
dbye in terms of either case form or case function is rather ambiguous. If the above reading is 
correct, he first states that the eighth case in general (regardless its form or function) is called 
bod pa, yet with regard to the case’s morphology, it is not to be differentiated from the first 
case form, since it is no other than the first-case form that is used. Si tu’s argument would have 
been easier to understand, if he would have clearly distinguished the occasions in which he 
refers to the cases in their forms and in their functions, particularly in such contexts where the 
more common use of rnam dbye as case function does not apply. The focus of rnam dbye as 
case form is corroborated by the phrase bod pa’i yul la rnam dbye dang po nyid ’jug that 
describes a morphological operation, and moreover any functional identity between first and 
eighth case cannot be part of Si tu’s argument.  
The eighth case address shares the same morphological realization as the first case, which is an 
intuitively comprehensible and also linguistically more accurate point. In this sense, first and 
                                                          
1054 GC 598.1. 
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eighth case are similar to the triad of second, fourth and seventh case that also share the same 
morphological realization la don. 
Returning to Si tu’s discussion of bod pa in his commentary on SCP 17.2-3, he directly 
criticized the assumption that kye is an actual case form, for which he provided the following 
reasons for his own taxonomy: 
 skabs ’dir ’grel byed phal cher gyis/     kye/     zhes pa bod pa’i rnam dbyer ’dod kyang 
 mi ’thad de/     rnam dbye ming gi thog mar sbyar ba med pa dang/     bod pa’i rnam 
 dbye legs sbyar gyi gcig tshig la khyad par yod pa tsam ma gtogs ngo bo rnam dbye 
 dang po las logs su dbyer med cing bod skad la dang po’i gcig tshig gi rjes mi gsal yang 
 gnyis tshig dang mang tshig gi rjes cha mthun yod par ma zad rnam dbye zhig nges par 
 ’jug dgos shing gnyis pa sogs gzhan mi ’jug pa’i rgyu mtshan las don thob kyis de dang 
 mthsungs par ming mtha’ rnam dbye dang po nyid du nges pa la slar rnam dbye sbyin 
 mi dgos pa’i phyir ro/     des na kye zhes pa rnam dbye ma yin zhing bod pa gsal byed 
 kyi sgra yin te/     legs sbyar gyi he bho bhos sogs dang mthsungs par shes dgos so/ 
“Although most commentators claimed in the context of this passage [in SCP] 
 (skabs ’dir) that ‘kye’ [would be] the case of address (bod pa’i rnam dbye), this is 
 incorrect for the following reasons:1055 (1) The application of a case at the beginning of 
 a word stem (ming gi thog mar) does not exist. (2) [In] Sanskrit, only the singular has a 
 different [morphological form], apart from which [the morphological form of the case 
 ‘address’ in its] essence is not to be separated from the first case suffix. And although 
 in the Tibetan language, the ending of the singular of the first [case] is not 
manifest/visible (mi gsal yang), not only are the dual and plural endings equivalent (~ 
cha mthun) [as regards the non-manifest first case ending], but a case (rnam dbye zhig) 
must join obligatorily. Yet, no other [case such as] the second, etc. joins, for which 
reason [the Tibetan system is] in fact (don thob gyis) equivalent with this [Sanskrit 
system and] no case must be additionally (~ slar) given to a word stem’s ending that is 
fixed as the first case itself (rnam dbye dang po nyid du nges pa). Therefore, ‘kye’ is no 
case, [it] is a morpheme that clarifies address. [It] has to be understood as [being] 
equivalent with Sanskrit he, bho, bhos, etc.”1056 
                                                          
1055 The following numbering of the arguments was added by Graf. 
1056 GC 498.4. 
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In this passage, Si tu again used the term ‘case’ (rnam dbye) as a reference to the case forms or 
more accurately now case endings and thus treated the technical term as a morphological 
category. Si tu expounded two arguments why, according to him, kye cannot qualify as the 
eighth case form or a part of it. The first argument is the simple fact that all case markers are 
placed after the marked argument. This holds true for Sanskrit, where the case suffixes that 
complete a word form are only affixed at the end of the stem, as well as for the first seven 
Tibetan cases – although the first remains unmarked – and must therefore also apply to the 
eighth. This argument is certainly valid, and as already discussed during the historical survey 
of this case, kye’s status as a case marker is incorrect from a linguistic perspective.  
Although Si tu’s argument is linguistically valid, his switch from function to morphology 
regarding the notion of rnam dbye results in an inconsistent understanding of this notion in the 
GC. The distinction of the Tibetan case model into eight cases is first of all based on the case 
functions, which is directly evident from the fact that three cases distinguished in the model are 
marked identically. Based on the Tibetan case model as a model of functions or meanings, kye 
does express vocative meaning and would consequently belong to the eighth case, regardless 
of its morphological usage before or after the marked word form. Yet, kye does not qualify as 
a case in Si tu’s taxonomy because of its morphological features. Strictly speaking, former 
grammarians were indeed more consistent within the framework of the traditional case model 
to classify the form kye + unmarked argument as an eighth case. Yet, Si tu’s strategy included 
a morphological parameter to bring the eighth case more in line with the morphological 
structures of Tibetan and Sanskrit. This adaptation of the eighth case is illustrative for the 
conflicts that may emerge between features of the Tibetan traditional taxonomy and the attempt 
to refine it for a more accurate representation of Tibetan (and Sanskrit) language. 
Si tu’s second argument discusses in more detail the actual eighth case form and the vocative’s 
zero-marking in Tibetan language by taking recourse to Sanskrit morphology. As he correctly 
notes, with the exception of the singular, the Sanskrit vocative forms are mostly that of the first 
case suffix. Although Tibetan does not have separate first case endings, neither in the singular, 
dual, nor plural, it exhibits the same feature that the first case forms and that of the vocative are 
identical. Si tu explains this feature by arguing that a case (rnam dbye), i.e. a certain case ending, 
must be applied to a word stem, yet, no other case morpheme such as la, etc. joins to Tibetan 
vocative arguments, for which reason the vocative form remains an unmarked stem form. As 
an unmarked stem form, the eighth case form is fixed as a first case form or more accurately, 
the stem’s final letter takes over the role of the first case ending. 
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His reference to Sanskrit morphology does not seem to have any deeper conceptual foundation 
other than that Si tu can illustrate and clarify his own taxonomy based on a comparison with 
Sanskrit morphology. Although SCP and TKJ have left all hermeneutical freedom to interpret 
kye as a non-case marker due to the lack of the term rnam dbye, a variety of Tibetan grammars 
throughout the centuries have regarded kye as an established and integral part of the eighth case 
form, for which reason Si tu perhaps has felt the need to prove that his adaptation is 
linguistically feasible against the backdrop of at least one language that is accepted to be a 
reliable source and exhibits the same morphological feature.  
However, it may be inquired in this context whether a narrower reading of Si tu’s proposed 
taxonomy against the backdrop of Sanskritic case grammar is to be preferred. Is his argument 
perhaps less that the first and the eighth case share the same morphology, resulting in two cases 
with the same morphology like the three la don cases, and more that they are one and the same 
case based on morphology? In other words, perhaps inspired by Sanskritic case grammar in 
which the notion of vibhakti is restricted to case suffixes and not functions, did Si tu accept only 
seven cases? Even more so in view of the fact that there are seven case suffixes in Sanskritic 
grammar, was this his attempt to accommodate the number of cases to Sanskritic role models?  
This understanding would be highly inconsistent within the framework of the Tibetan case 
model. The first case is then a morphological case that has two case functions, while the 
remaining six cases are single case functions that may or may not share their morphological 
realization with the others. Since it is unlikely that Si tu required such direct correspondence 
between Sanskritic and Tibetan case models that is merely based on the number of cases, a 
broader reading as outlined above is strongly preferred. On its own, the number of cases would 
not add any explanatory power to the Tibetan case model. The multilingual validity of the cases 
is based on their functional value and the significance these functions have with regard to an 
objective understanding of actual scenarios. Any differences in number of the cases between 
the respective models remains minor, since the eight functional categories remain pivotal in 
both models, no matter how they end up counting their cases. 
14.2.1 Résumé on the Eighth Case 
Si tu’s conception of the eighth case bod pa (‘address’) is constituted by his adaptation of the 
morphological form of the case. His classification of the traditional eighth case marker kye as a 
morpheme that only clarifies the vocative meaning is fully reasonable from a linguistic 
perspective and represents a refinement of the Tibetan case model with regard to Tibetan 
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language, even though it is not fully consistent within the traditional case model that 
distinguishes the cases based on functions and not morphological features.  
Both arguments through which Si tu has renounced the case status of kye are based on the notion 
of case as a morphological category, more specifically in terms of case endings or suffixes. 
While the first argument simply states that cases are endings and must be applied at the end of 
the marked word form, the second one demonstrates how the the eighth case form is that of the 
first case, i.e. zero-marking. Among the two proposed readings of Si tu’s understanding of the 
eighth case, it was argued for a broader reading that accepts bod pa as a separate case, despite 
its morphological identity with the first case and similarly to second, fourth and seventh case 
that share the same morphological realization la don. 
Si tu’s modifications have brought to light that his notion of case (rnam dbye) was not only 
based on the meaning of the eight cases, but included at least the morphological parameter that 
case markers can only be applied after the marked word form. The exclusion of kye from the 
eighth case form is perhaps the clearest instance in the GC that morphological and functional 
parameters intermingled and were not clearly kept apart in the question which morphemes 
qualify as a case forms for one of the eight case functions. 
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15 Summary of  Part II – Major Features of Tibetan Case Grammar in and 
before Si tu’s GC 
Part II offered a detailed analysis of the entire eightfold Tibetan case model in and before Si tu 
against the background of Sanskritic grammatical systems. It was structured along the lines of 
the traditional order of cases for a comprehensive and referenceable account of each case. 
However, structure, length and depth of the analysis made it difficult to provide a coherent logic 
of the major findings and arguments in this second part of the dissertation. The present chapter 
addresses this shortcoming by extracting and collecting the main hypotheses on the features of 
Tibetan case grammar from the investigations in chapters 6-14. It summarizes the eightfold 
Tibetan case model and its heterogeneous manifestations in and before Si tu’s work, including 
major continuities and discontinuities between Tibetan and Sanskritic grammatical knowledge. 
Selected cross-references to part II for each of the following arguments and hypotheses serve 
as supporting evidence. 
1) Tibetan case grammars including Si tu’s GC have not clearly defined the grammatical 
category case (rnam dbye, vibhakti) as either case form or case function, and the GC employs 
the term in both meanings depending on the context and the line of reasoning. 
In contrast to classical Sanskritic grammars such as Pāṇini, Cāndra or Kātantra, in which 
morphological suffixes are unmistakably the reference point of the notion vibhakti, the Tibetan 
case model from its earliest time was based on the distinction of eight basic case functions. 
Consequently, in grammatical works like Si tu’s GC the notion of rnam dbye frequently and 
primarily refers to the case functions. Yet, a closer examination of case classifications in the 
GC reveales that the notion of rnam dbye in certain contexts refers to the case morphemes as 
well. In less clear contexts, this ambiguity of the notion of case may lead to a severe impediment 
of an accurate reading of Si tu’s argumentation, and he himself has frequently refrained from 
offering clear-cut distinctions. One important ramification of this bivalent understanding of 
rnam dbye is that the case status of grammatical constructions is governed by both 
morphological as well as functional considerations.  
The perhaps clearest instances of rnam dbye qua case form in the GC is Si tu’s discussion of 
the eighth case and his linguistically correct observation that the actual form of the eighth case 
bod pa (‘address’) is the unmarked argument without preceding interjections such as kye.1057 In 
this statement, rnam dbye is not only a clear reference to case markers as morphological 
                                                          
1057 Cf. supra 416ff. 
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categories, but morphological considerations are also the foundation to exclude kye from the 
eighth case form. 
Another example of the ways in which morphological and functional features constitute Si tu’s 
notion of rnam dbye and intermingle in the classification of cases is Si tu’s classification of the 
verbal uses of byed sgra in the meaning of rgyu mtshan as a third case, arguing for its functional 
affinity to the agentive meaning in terms of an accomplisher or establisher of something (rgyu 
mtshan des de ltar ’grub par byed pas byed pa po dang mtshungs pa).1058 In contrast, verbal 
uses of na as a causal connector are classified neither as second, fourth or seventh case, despite 
the morphological identity with these cases, nor as third case despite Si tu’s labelling of this 
use with the grammatical category rgyu mtshan. Such comparisons of the causal functioning of 
na and byed sgra after verbs reveal that Si tu’s respective classifications were not exclusively 
based on the morphemes’ meanings, but also on the fact that byed sgra is the only third case 
marker in the established taxonomy, whereas na belongs to la don which only marks the second, 
fourth and seventh cases. 
In sum, examples such as the above reveal how the ambiguous value of rnam dbye as either 
case form or case function has created conflicts and sometimes resulted in inconsistent 
classifications within Si tu’s taxonomical system. It may be concluded that GC’s distinction 
between case and non-case usages of grammatical morphemes is primarily determined by two 
parameters: is the morpheme an established case marker also accepted by Si tu 
(morphological)? And if so, is the applied marker’s value in a sample phrase related to the 
marker’s established case function (functional)? If one of these two parameters is not met, a 
morpheme loses its case status, either in general (no established case morpheme), or only in a 
particular function (particular functional value does not match the morpheme’s established case 
function).  
2) The GC did not retain the strict demarcation between nouns and verbs, which represents the 
very foundation of the Sanskritic grammatical derivational system including its case grammar. 
Based on Sanskrit-specific morphology, there is a strict distinction between nominal and verbal 
inflection in terms of two separate sets of suffixes that has been unequivocally followed by the 
Sanskritic grammatical schools. Although in Pāṇini’s grammar the notion of vibhakti may refer 
                                                          
1058 Cf. supra 258. 
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to the entirety of nominal and verbal inflections,1059 the established use of the term refers mostly 
to the nominal inflection and thus to the case suffixes.  
Already in Tibetan grammatical sources before Si tu that provide more extensive lists of 
examples, different applications of the case markers following proper and nominalized verbs 
were frequently classified as cases,1060 and Si tu has gone on to argue explicitly for the inclusion 
of proper verbs into the case model in the context of his discussion of the first case.1061 Although 
Si tu based the inclusion of verbs on the argument that it agrees with the Sanskritic derivational 
model, the main reason is more likely to be seen in the combination of two points: first, there 
is the Tibetan-specific feature that all case markers except for the eighth may be used following 
nouns and verbs, and consequently that Tibetan nouns and verbs cannot be distinguished in 
terms of two separate sets of suffixes that join them; secondly, the objectivist focus on the 
semantic value of the case functions and their manifestation in the underlying meaning of 
sample phrases also moved morphosyntactic considerations about different word forms into the 
background. 1062  Thus, as long as the proposed underlying semantic structure of linguistic 
expressions (single words, phrases, sentences) suggests a mere essential, agentive, purposive, 
etc. meaning, it may be classified in this sense. Any difference between nominal and verbal 
forms in Si tu’s case grammar has become secondary, a fact which resulted in numerous 
classifications of marked and unmarked, nominalized and proper verb forms as first, third or 
fourth cases in the GC.1063  
3) The eight case functions of the Tibetan model all have explanatory power with regard to the 
structures of written Tibetan, yet, from the earliest period onwards, the precise distribution of 
case markers in written Tibetan as well as the distribution of the eight functions onto the 
markers has been severly blurred in Tibetan taxonomies. 
The linguistic significance of the case functions is to varying degrees corroborated by modern 
academic research which despite its critique of traditional case grammar employs a 
terminological apparatus strongly reminiscent of the Tibetan case categories. For example, 
categories such as AGENT, PURPOSE, SOURCE, ORIGIN or LOCATIVE figure prominently 
in modern studies on Tibetan language, and also the European term ‘genitive’ to render the 
sixth case marker ’brel sgra is certainly in line with Tibetan conceptions of ’brel ba.1064 
                                                          
1059 Cf. P 1.4.104. 
1060 Cf. e.g. supra 269. 
1061 Cf. supra 162ff. 
1062 Cf. point 5 in the current list, infra 424ff. 
1063 Cf. supra 161ff. (first case), 258 (third case) and 303f. (fourth case). 
1064 Cf. chapter 12. 
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Equally, the vocative (~ bod pa, ‘address’) is a relevant use of unmarked word forms in Tibetan 
language,1065 and while word forms that only express lexical meaning (= first case) are not 
incorrect per se, they have only limited relevance in WT when it comes to syntax and case 
grammar as part of syntactic theory.1066 Even concerning the category of las/las su bya ba, 
although it conflates the distinct syntactic uses of Tibetan case marking such as DIRECT 
OBJECT/PATIENT, INDIRECT/SECONDARY OBJECT or DIRECTION and thus results in 
a broad and imprecise objective function, the fact cannot be denied that its prototypical value 
PATIENT/DIRECT OBJECT, in which it was known to Tibetan grammarians from Sanskritic 
role models, is a linguistically significant category in WT.  
This does not mean to say that these eight case categories exhaustively represent the functional 
side of Tibetan case grammar or that a more accurate representation of Tibetan case grammar 
could not be accomplished through the addition, splitting or further specification of case 
functions and perhaps also the change of traditional case functions into non-cases, etc.  
However, the general linguistic relevance of these functions also for Tibetan is evidence for the 
fact that the primary flaw of the model is less these case categories than their association with 
the traditional case markers. In fact, this has resulted in a variety of problematic classifications 
such as morpheme na as an objective and purposive marker, the merging of la, na and du into 
a single morphological category as well as several others.1067 This issue may be traced back 
already to sources such as SCP, NG(g), GNT and the Smra sgo, but it prevailed in the entire 
tradition up to and beyond Si tu’s GC.  
4) Si tu conceived the cases as universally valid across all meaningful languages. He was not 
the first to explicate the universal character of the cases, since at least GNT shows clear 
evidence of this assumption. Despite such claims in Tibetan grammaticography, the question of 
the cases’ status as linguistic universals and how it may be related to different Indo-Tibetan 
schools of thoughts (e.g. grammarians, Madhyamaka, Yogācāra or Pramāṇa, etc.) has not been 
further addressed in the tradition. 
This point, which is closely connected to the following one, is pivotal to a proper understanding 
of traditional Tibetan case grammar. Already before Si tu, there is testimony that GNT 
explicated in even more radical terms that there is not a single meaningful word which does not 
come under one of the eight cases.1068 Regarding Si tu’s GC, this required not only a certain 
                                                          
1065 Cf. chapter 14. 
1066 Cf. supra 153 and 167f. 
1067 C.f. e.g. supra 197f., 214ff. and 219ff. (second case), as well as supra 271 and 306f. (fourth case). 
1068 Cf. supra 95f. 
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conceptual convergence between Sanskritic and Tibetan taxonomies, but occasionally also the 
reconciliation of divergent case marking patterns between Sanskrit and Tibetan language. This 
has led him to taxonomical choices such as his double classification of bum par chu blugs as 
either a second or seventh case,1069 his classification of the Sanskrit sixth case suffix in the 
meaning of nirdhāraṇa as an exceptional use of comparison that prototypically triggers a fifth 
case1070 or the classification of la with verbs of fear as a seventh case.1071 Although many 
grammarians did not explicitly commit to the universality of the cases, an idea of such 
multilingual validity must have existed throughout Tibetan grammaticography which accepted 
the case’s applicability to Tibetan.  
On different occasions, the cross-lingual, universal validity of the cases raised questions in 
terms of linguistic universals and their ontological status.1072 Although this validity as such and 
the ways in which it was negotiated in different sources (see next point) was likely informed by 
one or several linguistic and/or philosophical schools, Tibetan grammatical sources do not go 
deeper into the conceptual foundation of it. There was no systematic attempt to build the case 
model and its multilingual validity on a consistent linguistic-ontological theory of language, the 
world of phenomena and the relation between these two. Apparently, this was not deemed 
relevant in the context of grammatical investigation.  Unfortunately, the general silence on these 
matters severely inhibits the speculation on the conceptual roots of the cases’ universally 
applicable character. The only exception in this context may be the NGg, which provides more 
detailed material on nature and relation of terminology such as meaning (don), linguistic sign 
(brda) and others which may be compared to Buddhist theories of language.1073 A second 
direction to follow may be the Smra ba kun la ’jug pa’i sgra’i bstan bcos which appears to be 
concerned with general or universal (?) linguistics in a more philosophical fashion, yet opacity 
of its history and content do not allow for any conclusions at this point.1074  
The question of how, then, any such multilingual or universal validity of the cases was 
negotiated leads on to the following and most crucial insight of this research. 
5) The eight case functions of the Tibetan case model are predominantly references to eight 
fundamental semantic domains (gnas, sa). They are typically negotiated through an objectivist 
approach accompanied by metalinguistic-semantic investigations of case categories and the 
                                                          
1069 Cf. supra 232f. 
1070 Cf. supra 354f. 
1071 Cf. supra 402f. 
1072 Cf. supra 194 and 316f. 
1073 Cf. NGg topic five, CT 115 – 425ff. Cf. also infra 427f. for a short exemplification in the context of don. 
1074 Cf. supra 32. 
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underlying phenomena expressed in sample phrases, without a clear distinction between 
different derivational levels such as syntax, semantics, underlying scenarios etc.  
This decisive feature of the Tibetan case model may be traced back to the early period of Tibetan 
linguistic analysis, and various grammarians have followed it more or less systematically in 
different forms and extents. The investigation of sources that provide more elaborate material 
on the case functions, such as GNT, GC or also Zha lu et al.,1075 has revealed that the case 
functions are not merely treated as intrasentential information carried by a grammatical marker 
about the syntactic or semantic relation between an argument and its head,1076 but as direct 
semantic representations of the phenomenal basis underlying a linguistic expression. Semantic 
structures along the lines of the case functions were understood as the representative, actual 
construals of the underlying  phenomena and everything that may be said about them.1077 The 
eight case categories such as agent, karman, source, etc. as well as the classification of case 
markers in specific sample phrases are often determined through investigations of the categories 
agent, karman, etc. as such and the constitution of the phenomenal scenarios as such, in other 
words, largely disconnected from the specific structures of a language or sample phrase.1078 
The validity of the cases on the level of phenomena immediately explains their multilingual or 
even universal applicability, since the constitution of phenomena persists across languages. A 
semantic construal that is deemed representative of a particular scenario is then applied to the 
semantic and equally to the morphosyntactic surface structure of a language-specific sentence.  
This approach was defined in this dissertation as objectivist in nature based on DeLancey 
(1991), 1079  since it directly reads a certain semantic interpretation of a phenomenon into 
grammatical structures of a language without any further mediation. The objective character 
stems from the fact that the semantic construals of phenomena are deemed representative for 
these phenomena as such in one way or another and are thus assumed to be shared among 
different languages and its speakers.1080  Equally, the cases are treated as a representative 
analytical framework for the formation of such semantic construals. Consequently, language-
specific grammatical structures are obscured by directly reading such ‘objective’ construals of 
phenomena into the morphosyntactic surface structure of a language. If the objectivist approach 
was rendered problematic or even erroneous in the present work on different occasions, then 
                                                          
1075 Cf. e.g. chapters 8.1.2.5 and 10.2.2. 
1076 Cf. chapter 5.2. 
1077 On the use of the term phenomenon in this dissertation, cf. ft. 302. 
1078 Cf. the investigation of GNT’s second case as a particularly illustrative example, supra 192ff. 
1079 Cf. supra 105f. and ft. 302. 
1080 On the definition of ‘objective’ in this dissertation, cf. supra 194f.  
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not because of any assumption of the universal or objective character of the cases per se. 
Linguistic issues arise from the fact that Tibetan grammarians assumed that a semantic 
interpretation of a phenomenon, may it be objective or not, can be directly applied across 
languages to language-specific grammatical structures without further mediation. 
The use of this approach manifests in grammatical sources in various ways. The GNT, for 
example, argues for a radical version of it and states the assumption that there is no linguistic 
expression about the world of phenomena outside the scope of the eight cases.1081 This is 
demonstrated through providing an entire range of subcategories and sample phrases that are 
covered by these eight cases, often adding that these lists are extendable without limit. In the 
context of the second case karman, it was revealed that the applicability and significance of this 
category – despite noticeable sensitivity for the structures of WT – was not focused on Tibetan-
specific morphosyntax, but the author instead classified the various la don morphemes based 
on his understanding of the underlying scenarios expressed in selected sample phrases. The 
classification of la don as a second case was therefore based on GNT’s direct association of 
Tibetan language-structures with the phenomenal world as construed by the text’s author. 
Si tu’s GC features a form of conceptualization of the difference between language structures 
and underlying scenarios. Through his distinction of generic and exceptional case marking 
patterns, Si tu clarifies that languages do not always follow the meaning of underlying scenarios 
and may develop special conventions. Nonetheless, he followed an explicit and systematic 
objectivist approach which starts from the idea of an actual meaning of actions that persists 
across languages and governs the generic case marking patterns of linguistic expressions 
throughout languages, in contrast to exceptional or special conventions that do not follow the 
actual meaning.1082 Based on the second assumption that Tibetan follows more the generic case 
marking patterns, he then applies his understanding of the actual meaning of an action to the 
sentence and its markers. Although Si tu’s work exhibits more sensitivity at least for the 
difference between the morphosyntactic surface structure and the underlying semantic structure 
through his acknowledgement of special conventions of case marking, he did not further 
distinguish between a language-specific semantic structure of a sentence and the idea of an 
actual meaning of the underlying scenario. However, despite the presupposed direct correlation 
of different derivational levels involved in the meaning of linguistic expressions, on different 
occasions Si tu allowed for a difference between language-structures and the actual meaning of 
                                                          
1081 Cf. supra 95f. 
1082 Cf. supra 310f. and 314f. Cf. also supra 402ff., where Si tu reconciles competing Tibetan and Sanskrit case-
marking patterns for verbs of fear through the objectivist approach, treating both patterns as generic. 
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scenarios. Apart from the general distinction into generic case marking patterns and special 
conventions in his work is most notably the fifth case ’byung khungs, in which he argued that 
the function of dgar ba is to be subsumed under the case, yet not as an actual instantiation of 
source but only due to syntactic application (tshig sbyor ba).1083 It is also evident that he 
considered clearly non-semantic, syntactic parameters (as defined in chapter 5.2) in his 
exclusion of slar bsdu from the first case, a clear sign that he not only focused on the underlying 
scenarios but also was aware of the sentence and its structure.1084  
In other sources that often offer less material on their understanding of sample phrases and the 
case functions, the objectivist focus was followed perhaps less systematically, yet it still 
surfaced in a variety of semantic construals of scenarios underlying the sample phrases that are 
in clear conflict with these phrases’ syntactic and semantic structures. 
At this point, the question arises to which extent the frequent and direct association of the two 
levels of phenomenal world and language structures in Tibetan case grammar is connected to a 
deeper theoretical foundation in Tibetan scholarship. Traces are scarce, but characterizations of 
the category don (‘meaning’) in linguistic sources – typically the counterpart of sgra 
(‘morphology’) in linguistic and epistemological fields – give the strong impression of an 
objectivist focus in which the meaning of the cases is not clearly kept apart from the 
phenomenal world. The root text of the Gnas brgyad (NG) defines don in topic number five (yi 
ge’i ’jug pa’i gnas ‘the topic of the domains pertaining to letters/sounds/phonemes’), i.e. the 
topic concerned with the eight linguistic notions for which letters are integral, as follows:1085 
 don ni chos rang gi ngo bo ji ltar gnas pa’o/ 
 “Regarding meaning (don, artha), it is how the self-essence of a phenomenon (chos 
 rang gyi ngo bo) abides (gnas).”1086 
Zha lu’s paraphrase of this passage in his TKJ commentary renders don as follows: 
 don ni chos rnams kyi gnas lugs ji ltar gnas pa nyid do/ 
 “Regarding meaning, it is precisely how the mode of abiding (gnas lugs) of phenomena 
 (chos rnams) takes place (gnas).”1087 
                                                          
1083 Cf. supra 353f. 
1084 Cf. supra 156ff. 
1085 On topic 5 in the NG(g), cf. also ft. 99. 
1086 CT 115 – 411. 
1087 Zha lu 2013B, 39. 
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Both quotations make clear reference to the level of phenomena and the mode of their abiding. 
Zha lu even goes on to explain how letters pertain to or engage in these eight linguistic notions 
outlined in the NG, elaborating the relationship between morphology and meaning, form and 
function (sgra and don): 
 de ltar sgra dang skad la sogs pa brgyad po de dag la yi ge ji ltar ’jug na sgra dang don 
 gcig tu bsres nas ’dzin pa’i blo’i dbang gis ’jug ste/ 
“Likewise, if [we are to ask] how letters engage in these eight [notions], 
 sound/morphology (sgra), language (skad), etc., they engage through the power of the 
 intellect (blo) that grasps [meaning] after having merged sound/morphology and 
meaning (sgra dang don) into one.” 
The merging of sgra and don, the former consisting of yi ge as phonemes or letters, results in 
sgra as meaningful linguistic expressions. As made clear by Zha lu, his understanding of don 
refers to the level of phenomena and their mode of abiding. Without reference to any 
intermediate levels such as language-specific semantic construals or the standardization and 
consolidation of semantic construals into more syntactic functions, such passages give the 
impression that e.g. case meanings as present in the morphosyntactic surface structure of 
linguistic expressions are more or less direct representations of the phenomenal world.  
As mentioned under the previous point of this chapter, NGg topic 6 which comments the quoted 
passage on don from NG may provide some more material to trace the linguistic-philosophical 
foundation of the cases universal validity, and also of the objectivist approach in Tibetan 
grammar.1088 However, the Tibetan grammatical tradition in general was not concerned with 
the philosophical intricacies and implications connected to this objectivist approach. 
Definitions of basic terminology such us phenomenon (chos, dngos po), action (bya ba, las), 
language (sgra, skad), etc. and which (Buddhist) school of thought grammarians followed in 
their use of such terms are scarce, condensed and often missing in grammatical sources. The 
lack of a deeper theoretical foundation of Tibetan case grammar also seems to be confirmed by 
the fact that in practice, grammarians typically do not derive semantic construals of phenomena 
for the classification of sample phrases through any systematic methodology.1089  
                                                          
1088 A second direction to follow may be the Smra ba kun la ’jug pa’i sgra’i bstan bcos which appears to be more 
philosophical in nature. However, its opaque character does not allow any more concrete conclusions at the 
current state of research. 
1089 Cf. supra 315 and 316. 
 429 
 
Overall, this gives the impression that the linguistic-philosophical foundation and its 
implications for grammar and linguistics only survived in the form of remnants without active 
problematization. Possible candidates which may have informed the objectivist approach 
include the various Sanskritic kāraka-theories, discourses in the larger context of śābdabodha 
(‘verbal cognition’), or perhaps even Buddhist linguistic-philosophical discourses in the context 
of Madhyamaka, Yogācāra or Pramāṇa.1090 In particular, we have seen that the notion of 
kāraka evoked metalinguistic investigations into the nature of actions in the Sanskritic 
context.1091 In addition, it should also be remembered that the use of kārakas in grammars such 
as Pāṇini, Cāndra and Kātantra differs significantly, including the question of where they are 
located on the continuum stretching from actual phenomenon to morphosyntactic surface 
structure.1092 
Since investigations into the case categories based on the semantic constitution of the 
phenomenal world are not strictly bound to any language-specific structure, they may be 
informed by Sanskritic role-models, particularly the kāraka-theory with its own investigations 
into the nature of action, as well as language-specific case marking patterns in Tibetan and 
Sanskrit, philosophical discourses on action, agency, etc., as much as a grammarian’s own 
intuitive perception and experience with regard to concrete underlying situations or scenarios 
referred to in linguistic expressions.1093 However, the ‘objectivity’ of semantic construals and 
of the cases was never fully elaborated in grammatical sources, nor was it related to any 
(Buddhist) philosophical school of thought to my knowledge. 
Other than these traces mentioned here, the philosophical roots of the objectivist approach as 
well as related questions such as the universal and ontological status of the cases, or the 
methodological foundation how to derive any form of ‘objective’ representation of a 
phenomenon are intriguing and important issues, but they go far beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.1094 Future research will hopefully be able to put together the scarce bits and pieces 
scattered across grammatical sources and lead to further insights.  
If some form of the objectivist approach as outlined above was indeed the underlying 
understanding in Tibetan linguistic analysis, then Tibetan case grammar is rooted in a 
conception of language according to which linguistic expressions are more direct 
                                                          
1090 Note for the GC, however, that Si tu did not author any work in the fields of Madhyamaka, Yogācāra or 
Pramāṇa (cf. supra 52). 
1091 Cf. e.g. supra 135f. and 250f. 
1092 Cf. supra 380ff. 
1093 Cf. e.g. supra 315. 
1094 Cf. therefore also the rather pragmatic definition of ‘objective’ in this dissertation, supra 194f. 
430 
 
representations of phenomena than generally accepted in modern linguistic research. In any 
case, it may be concluded in more simple terms that in Tibetan case grammar language 
description and phenomenal description strongly intermingle and were not clearly kept apart in 
the often metalinguistic-semantic investigations concerning the nature of case categories and 
the semantic construals of phenomenal scenarios. 
Putting together what was said thus far about the Tibetan notion of rnam dbye, we can see the 
following dimensions important in case grammar: 
It will have to be decided separately for each source, where precisely the notion of rnam dbye 
is situated in this figure and how much sensitivity there is for the differences and relations of 
these levels. Generally speaking, rnam dbye in grammatical sources is both a morphological 
form and its meaning, the latter which combines morphosyntactic surface structure, any form 
of intermediary structures and phenomenal world in one way or another. 
In sum, when it is was mentioned under point 3 of this chapter that the major taxonomical issues 
of the traditional Tibetan case model are largely connected to an inadequate mapping of the 
eight case functions against Tibetan morphemes, 1095  this resulted from the following two 
                                                          
1095 Cf. supra 423. 
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Figure 10: Dimensions of the category rnam dbye ('case') in the Tibetan case model 
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closely related factors: The objectivist approach in its different manifestations and the 
insufficient differentiation between the different derivational levels of linguistic expressions 
without clearly defining on which level the Tibetan category of rnam dbye operates. 
6) The fact that the eight cases represent eight basic semantic categories also implies that case 
grammar in Tibetan linguistic studies is not part of syntactic theory in the strict sense. 
The focus on the semantic value of the case categories is most evident from the first case. Many 
grammars leave open the syntactic status of the first case as an intrasentential, syntactically 
functioning word form in Tibetan language.1096 The focus is more on the semantic value which 
is the reference to the essence of a word meaning or phenomenon. In his derivational model, Si 
tu has further reduced the first case to stem forms and presents this case as merely the basis for 
the formation of the remaining cases.1097 Likewise, the objectivist focus in the classifications 
of sample phrases makes clear that the semantic value of the cases with regard to the ‘meaning’ 
of the sentence prevails over intrasentential relations. To repeat this point in all its clarity: 
traditional Tibetan case grammar is not a theory of the sentence.  
7) The majority of cases (both in their form and function) in the Tibetan model have undergone 
noteworthy adaptations in the adoption of Sanskritic grammatical knowledge already before Si 
tu, starting to surface from the earliest period of Tibetan grammatical theory formation. 
The eight Tibetan case functions are unmistakably the Tibetan reflection of the Sanskritic 
prototypical case functions of the seven distinct case forms, namely the six kārakas as the main 
block plus prātipadikārtha (first case function), sambandha (sixth case function in Cāndra) and 
sambodhana (vocative case function belonging to the first case suffix). Except for the Tibetan 
sixth case ’brel ba (‘connection’), which may be directly related to Cāndra’s sambandha in C 
2.1.95 and the use of the same notion in Sanskritic grammatical commentarial literature, all the 
remaining cases of the Tibetan traditional case model neither fully nor directly correspond to 
classical Sanskritic grammars.1098  Such adaptations range from terminological shifts (first, 
fourth, fifth case) to conceptual adaptations of different degrees (first, second, third, fourth, 
fifth, seventh cases), to morphological changes (eighth case) and even to a change of the 
syntactic status as an intrasentential argument (first case). Even seemingly minor changes of 
technical terms, such as the shift from sampradāna to dgos ched/ched du bya ba (fourth 
                                                          
1096 Cf. supra 149f. 
1097 Cf. supra 153ff. 
1098 Cf. the respective historical surveys in chapters 7-14. 
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case)1099 or from apādāna/avadhi to ’byung khungs (fifth case),1100 reflect a reinterpretation and 
shift of focus regarding these categories. 
Nonetheless, many of these modifications are most likely still rooted in the conceptual 
framework offered by the Sanskritic tradition. The reinterpretation of the fourth and fifth case 
functions may be traced back to additional kāraka and non-kāraka uses of the respective case 
suffixes in Sanskritic grammar. The second case karman as the resultative part of a bivalent 
action-model with the agent’s activity being its counterpart as well as the conceptual fusion of 
the kārakas kartr̥ (‘agent’) and karaṇa (‘instrument’) under the agentive case (= third case) 
were compared in this dissertation to models in Nyāya literature in order to demonstrate that 
conceptual antecedents in some form have already existed in India.1101 Concerning the first case 
ngo bo tsam, there is a clear relation to the same notion in the Abhidharmic tshogs gsum 
model.1102 
In most of these instances, the current study has not gone beyond a demonstration of the fact 
that similar theories or related discourses have already existed in the Sanskritic tradition. The 
actual sources of inspiration in many cases could not be identified due to limited information 
about source materials offered by Tibetan grammarians. Without additional knowledge about 
the accessibility or availability of written and oral knowledge and the interactions between 
actors and sources, in this dissertation the ways in which the outlined adaptions have precisely 
emerged must remain open. While the most concrete link between Sanskritic and Tibetan case 
grammar certainly remains the Smra ba kun la ’jug pa’i sgra’i bstan bcos, its problematic 
historical status as either a Sanskritic or Tibetan source as well as the opacity of its content 
severely impede more concrete conclusions about this source’s involvement in the transition 
from classical Sanskritic to Tibetan conceptions of the cases.  
This study has also identified adaptations of case functions that were not necessarily or 
exclusively inspired by Sanskritic knowledge but also involved other factors. The shift from 
prātipadikārtha to ngo bo tsam, for example, reflects the grammarians’ recourse to the authority 
of the Buddhist tshogs gsum model, and Tibetan grammarians like Dpang Lotsāwa or Si tu also 
explicated the inexistence of separate stem forms in WT.1103 It is not unlikely that already in 
early Tibetan grammaticography the terminological adaptation of the first case involved the 
                                                          
1099 Cf. chapter 10.1.1. 
1100 Cf. chapter 11.1.2. 
1101 Cf. supra 250f. 
1102 Cf. supra 145. 
1103 Cf. supra 142 and 153. 
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Tibetan-specific feature that the idea of separate stem forms as incomplete word forms is not 
applicable to Tibetan language, a fact which renders the notion of prātipadikārtha rather 
meaningless. Possibly, language-specific features may have been involved in the Tibetan 
conception of the fourth and fifth cases, since the categories of purpose (dgos ched/ched du bya 
ba; fourth case) and source/origin (apādāna/avadhi; fifth case) do have stronger explanatory 
power in WT than their Sanskritic counterparts sampradāna and apādāna/avadhi. However, 
the historical surveys of these two cases have not been able to provide any conclusions in this 
regard. Although this requires future scrutiny of the distribution of the la don morphemes, the 
seventh case as a mere static location of existence or residence in several grammatical sources 
may also be related to the specific functioning of morpheme na in Old Tibetan.1104 
It must be noted that the Tibetan sources considered in this dissertation do not exhibit any 
noticeable signs that such terminological and conceptual adaptations were regarded as 
deviations from the Sanskritic conception of the prototypical case functions. Such deviations 
were only acknowledged in the context of the Tibetan first case form that equals stem forms as 
well as in certain classifications of sample phrases that deviate from Sanskritic classifications 
of equivalent samples, yet not in the context of the cases’ conception as such.  
  
                                                          
1104 Cf. chapters 13.1.2-3. 
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16 Concluding Observations – On the Conceptual-Theoretical Mechanisms 
which Shaped the Development of the Tibetan Case Model and the Dis-
/Continuation of Sanskritic Grammatical Knowledge 
This thesis started in part I from the broader context of Tibetan intellectual history and its 
knowledge production which is intimately related to Sanskritic authority. In the context of 
grammatical knowledge production and more particularly that of case grammar, this issue 
manifested as an adherence to Sanskritic models which lacks important adaptations for a more 
precise representation of the written Tibetan language. It was the obvious – and perhaps the 
only rational – choice to start with and draw from the experience of Sanskritic linguistic 
knowledge. However, the diversity and complexity of this knowledge and the substantial 
differences between the two languages have not necessarily facilitated this task. Part II of the 
current study has revealed ample instances in which the Tibetan case system deviates from 
Sanskritic role models, but the adherence to Sanskritic models of description remained strongly 
discernible in and before Si tu.  
Following these investigations into Tibetan case grammar and the specific processes of 
adoption and adaptation that have shaped it, what is the emerging picture of the cross-cultural 
transfer of grammatical knowledge from India to Tibet? In view of the collected features of 
Tibetan case grammar, what conceptual-theoretical mechanisms may be extracted for an 
understanding of why and how grammatical knowledge has been adopted from the Indian 
tradition and adhered to as a valid description of Tibetan language? And how do these 
mechanisms connect to scholastic-methodological factors, e.g. SCP’s and TKJ’s fully 
authenticated status in the GC or the ‘secondary’ authority of Sanskritic knowledge? 
The major theoretical mechanism that has shaped Tibetan case grammar is its foundation in the 
presupposition of the multilingual applicability of the case model across all meaningful 
languages which has been negotiated based on an objectivist focus. The Sanskritic grammatical 
case categories have been adopted because they offered an established analytical framework 
representative for an analysis of the content or meaning of linguistic expressions, but without 
differentiating between the linguistic derivational levels involved.  
The eight adopted cases, particularly the kāraka-functions, were proven and accepted to have 
strong explanatory power in the analysis of semantic structures of linguistic expressions. Yet, 
once no clear difference is being maintained between the semantic structure of linguistic 
expressions and the underlying scenarios that may be represented through multiple semantic 
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structures, there is sufficient freedom in grammatical analysis to focus more on the underlying 
scenarios and the metalinguistic investigations of categories such as agent, etc. Already 
Sanskritic sources have strongly varied in their approach to the kārakas and in their degree to 
which they have differentiated between the Sanskrit semantic structural framework the 
scenarios as such. Certain presentations and uses of the kāraka-theory have given rise to the 
impression that they are more concerned with actions as such rather than Sanskrit-specific 
semantic structures.1105 In these investigations, language-specific considerations intermingle 
with general semantic, philosophical, etc. arguments. Within in the Sanskrit linguistic 
environment, such approaches did comparatively little harm to the description of the language, 
since any metalinguistic negotiation of grammatical categories and phenomenal world have 
evolved out of and remained embedded in the constraints offered by Sanskrit language. 
However, problems started arising with the decontextualization of this approach and its 
application to Tibetan language: Tibetan grammarians seemed to have strongly held the notion 
that linguistic expressions directly represent the phenomenal world with all its possible 
scenarios. If languages directly relate to the world of experience shared by speakers regardless 
of their language, then at least principally the structures of one language are shared among all 
languages. Consequently, any difference between grāmaṃ gacchati and grong la ’gro vanishes 
and the same analysis applies to both.  
As a result of this general objectivist approach, the morphosyntactic surface structure of WT 
and the distribution of grammatical markers has become severly blurred. Likewise, many of the 
Tibetan case classifications of sample phrases in grammatical sources are based on this 
approach, applying morphosyntactically insensitive semantic construals of underlying 
scenarios directly to the case markers.  
A final passage in Si tu’s GC will assist our understanding of the foundation of his objectivist 
approach: 
 legs sbyar la’ang spyir btang gi ’jug yul ’di dang mthun kyang dmigs bsal mi mthun pa 
 ni/      mgo bor dbyug pas bsnun pa’i don la/     masta kā ya daṇḍaṃ da dā ti/     mgo 
 bor dbyug pa sbyin zhes dang/     bum par chu blugs pa’i don la/     gha ṭā ya ja laṃ da 
 dā ti/     bum par chu sbyin/     zhes pa lta bu yod pa ni sbyin pa’i yul la bzhi pa ’jug pa 
 spyir btang pas ’dir bsnun pa dang/     blugs pa la sbyin pa’i sgras bstan pa’i tshe tshig 
 tsam gtso bor byas nas de’i yul la bzhi pa sbyar ba yin gyi skabs de’i sbyin pa sbyin pa 
                                                          
1105 Cf. e.g. chapter 5.4. 
436 
 
 dngos ma yin pa bzhin du de’i yul gyi rnam dbye bzhi pa’ang bzhi pa dngos ma yin te/     
 snga ma gnyis pa dang phyi ma bdun par don gyis ’thob pa la bzhi pa sbyar ba tsam yin 
 pa’i phyir ro/     de bzhin du na mas sogs kyi yul la bzhi pa ’jug pa’ang don thob kyi 
 bzhi pa’i ’jug yul dngos ma yin yang/     ’jig rten pa’i nyer spyod las de bzhin du ’jug pa 
 ste skabs ’dir ma zad rnam dbye gzhan dang gzhan la’ang ’di ’dra’i rigs mang du ’byung 
 ba rnams rnam dbye de dngos kyi don du mi ’gyur bas tsam po pa zhes bya’o/     bod 
 ’dir ni dmigs bsal de ’dra dbye ba la dgos pa med pas don ’thob  nyid kyi dbang du 
 byed dgos pa yin no 
 “Although also in Sanskrit [the object of application of the fourth case] agrees with this 
 generic object to which [the fourth case] joins, [there are] special/exceptional [instances] 
 that deviate [from this generic use] for the following reason: there are e.g. mastakāya 
 daṇḍaṃ dadāti, [literally] ‘to give a stick to the head’ in the meaning of ‘to hit with a 
 stick at/on the head’ or ghaṭāya jalaṃ dadāti, [literally] ‘to give water to  the pot,’ in 
 the meaning of ‘to pour water into the pot.’ When here hitting and pouring are indicated 
 by the term ‘giving’, the fourth case is applied to the [object of giving] only based on 
 the syntactic [structure] (tshig tsam), because generically a fourth case joins to the object 
 of giving (~ sbyin pa’i yul; = recipient). Yet, as the giving of these instances is not an 
 actual giving (sbyin pa dngos ma yin pa), also the fourth cases of the objects of these 
 [givings] are no actual fourth [cases]. The former is a second and the latter is a seventh 
 [case], based on the meaning [don gyis ’thob pa] to which [then] only a fourth case has 
 been applied. Likewise, also the fourth case which joins to the object/locus of 
 namas, etc. joins in this way (de bzhin du) out of worldly practice/necessity/custom (’jig 
 rten pa’i nyer spyod), even though there is no actual object/locus of the fourth [case] in 
 its actual meaning (don thob kyi zhi pa’i ’jug yul dngos) [here]. Not only in this context 
 [of the fourth case], but also with some of the other cases such types [of case marking] 
 occur frequently. These [uses of the] cases do not represent the actual meaning (dngos 
 kyi don du mi ’gyur) and are therefore called tsam po pa (lit. ‘mere’ in the meaning of 
 ‘merely by designation,’ i.e. ‘fake’ ?). Here, in Tibet, there is no need for such special 
 distinctions, for which reason the actual meaning itself (don ’thob nyid) has to 
 govern.”1106 
Si tu distinguishes between an actual fourth case and one that is only based on syntactic 
construction (tshig tsam gtso bor byas nas). It is the employed verb and its semantics that govern 
                                                          
1106 GC 600.5. 
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the case marking pattern, but in Si tu’s two samples the verbs’ semantics are not representative 
of the ways in which the underlying scenario is understood by speakers. Such instances reveal 
that not only the morphosyntactic surface structure but also the underlying semantic structure 
of a sentence do not directly fall together with the underlying scenarios that may be represented 
in various ways. Si tu’s strategy of dealing with this tricky example was to distinguish between 
a sentence structure that follows special conventions and an actual meaning connected to his 
indeed correct construal of the scenario as understood by speakers. Accordingly, the fourth case 
here is not an actual fourth case in Si tu’s analysis, because the scenario as such prescribes a 
second and seventh case respectively, obviously because there is no benefit for the head being 
hit, nor for the pot being filled with water.  
The scenario referred to seems not to have been directly represented in these sentences as 
understood by the speakers, thus the semantic value of giving is not the semantic construal 
intended in these sentences. There seems to be an additional semantic level involved in the 
sense that there is a semantic surface structure governed by the verb’s semantics, and this 
structure then also connects to – yet not directly represents – the semantic construal of the 
phenomenal scenario as actually understood by speakers.  It is mainly the lexical value of the 
noun phrases that tell us that the intended semantic construal is not directly that of the action of 
giving.  
Si tu’s analysis is accurate insofar as the sentence does not exhibit a fourth case in the sense 
that the speaker actually meant that there is a purposive meaning involved in the expressed 
scenario. But what does this intricate example teach us about Si tu’s case grammar? It is correct 
to say that there is a semantic construal which is a speaker’s actual understanding of an 
underlying phenomenon, although this understanding may significantly differ also among 
speakers of the same language. The problem arises (1) when this is equated with the idea that 
there is an actual construal of the scenario as such that persists across languages and may be 
captured through the eight cases, and (2) when Si tu assumes that languages have or perhaps 
even must have (?) forms to directly express these actual construals, especially in the case of 
Tibetan which according to him generally follows this actual construal of scenarios without the 
use of special conventions. The fact that both of these are underlying assumptions in Si tu’s 
case grammar becomes evident through a few occasions in his work where he has attempted to 
reconcile Tibetan and Sanskrit case marking patterns based on a shared semantic construal that 
governs the case marking-patterns of both languages.1107 It is difficult to assess Si tu’s argument 
                                                          
1107 Cf. e.g. chapter 10.2.2 and supra 402ff. 
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that Tibetan generally follows such actual construals. Perhaps it is to be understood as the 
observation that Tibetan language is more semantically based compared to Sanskrit,1108  a 
possibly worthwhile point also for future linguistic research. Yet, he still treated the semantic 
structures of Tibetan as a direct representation of a scenario’s actual construal persisting across 
languages. 
It is intuitively comprehensible to say that all speakers refer to the same phenomenon and that 
everyone must have some shared basic understanding of it regardless of what language is 
spoken. I am not a linguist, but perhaps also modern linguistics and the search for universal 
semantic categories has some notion of this.1109 The fact that the eight cases were regarded as 
a valid framework to capture this shared understanding is understandable from the given 
historical context. Therefore, the main issue in Si tu’s case grammar was his assocation – 
perhaps conflation – of language-specific structures with such an underlying universal shared 
understanding of the world of experience, and the consequent application of this understanding 
to language-specific semantic and syntactic structures. What appears as an issue from a 
linguistic perspective was from a historical perspective an important mechanism that has 
propelled the adoption and adherence to Sanskritic grammatical knowledge. 
However, how was it possible for Tibetan grammarians in general to follow such an objectivist 
approach and remain unaware of the highly inaccurate description of the Tibetan language that 
resulted from it, particularly as they are native speakers? Are sample phrases such as Si tu’s 
tshogs na nor ’gyed (‘to distribute the riches in/among the community’; fourth case) or perhaps 
even more so Rnam gling’s ’tshang rgya ’dod na chos gyis (‘If [you] want to become 
enlightened, practice Dharma!’; fourth case) not simply stopgap solutions to maintain the 
authority of the case model as contained in SCP and TKJ? Such sample phrases were certainly 
inspired by the proposed taxonomy in the root texts, however, not necessarily only to maintain 
their authority. Any authoritative source, may it be fully authenticated or not, motivates a 
scholar to confirm or refute a theory through critical evaluation. If a source like SCP proposes 
that na is a fourth case marker, it is only natural to look for representative instances. Following 
an objectivist approach, representative examples will sooner or later be found which confirm 
the proposed taxonomy. The problem is that without a thorough distributional analysis that 
focuses on the marker itself and its behavior throughout the language, phrases such as ’tshang 
rgya ’dod na chos gyis may give the impression that na has a purposive meaning in this clause 
                                                          
1108 On the notion of semantically based case marking, cf. supra 102f. 
1109 On universals in modern linguistic theory, cf. e.g. Bach and Harms 1968. 
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and thus an at least rare purposive function in the language. As clearly revealed in the work of 
Si tu, Tibetan grammarians have often focused only on one or two examples for each 
morpheme, which reveals that they mainly focused on testing whether a morpheme may have 
the function proposed in SCP and TKJ. Grammarians would have needed to focus much more 
on the morphemes and their distribution rather than simply their functions and how they might 
be manifest in certain sample phrases.  
Although native speakers presumably have some form of intuitive understanding of the 
distribution and meaning of case markers, this is anything but accurate or extensive, as 
DeLancey has clearly revealed in his discussion of the objectivist error common among his 
students of English grammar.1110 Likewise, Si tu may have indeed sensed that the unmarked 
PATIENT is different from the INDIRECT OBJECT or DIRECTION marked by la in Tibetan, 
but the focus on case functions rather than the case forms had him conclude that while this was 
a Tibetan specific-variation to distinguish these two types of karman, it was not sufficiently 
representative to compromise the multi-lingual validity of the cases. Perhaps there was some 
awareness of the possible shortcomings of the traditional Tibetan case model, perhaps Si tu’s 
tshogs na nor ’gyed had an artificial flavor even for himself, but was it sufficiently concrete 
and strong to accept that there was something fundamentally wrong and in need for change? Or 
was it more in the sense that some details had to be changed, categories to be redefined and 
sample phrases reclassified? In view of this approach to case grammar, was any possible 
awareness about shortcomings and inconsistencies of the established Tibetan case model 
enough to retreat from the unquestioned authority of SCP and TKJ? Or was it more a matter of 
correct reinterpretation, finding the right sample phrases, etc. and taking the side of the accepted 
authority in difficult and inconclusive subject matters that could not be answered 
straightforwardly? It is difficult to address where within all these options the correct answer is 
ultimately situated, and the response may differ from grammarian to grammarian, but I hope 
this study has made it clear that this is a matter of degree and nunances. 
In sum, Sanskritic grammatical knowledge remained authoritative in the Tibetan context 
because the adopted analytical framework was proven to provide a representative account of 
linguistic expressions, partially because they in fact represented linguistically significant 
categories in Tibetan language and partially because linguistic expressions were understood 
from their reference to the world of scenarios as their semantic basis.  
                                                          
1110 Cf. DeLancey 1991, 339. 
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Returning to the initial question of the Indo-Tibetan relationship and the principle of scriptural 
authority, it was elaborated in chapter 4 that the authority of Sanskritic knowledge was mediated 
through SCP and TKJ in a source like Si tu’s GC. Following the investigation into Si tu’s case 
grammar in part II, it can be added that the authority of Sanskritic case grammar as presented 
in foundational sources such as SCP and TKJ was further mediated through the objectivist 
approach and the universal validity of the eight cases in their adopted form. This approach not 
only allowed the case model to become part of sources such as SCP and TKJ, it also allowed 
commentators to reconfirm the authority of this model and the texts in which they figure.  
In the context of Si tu, it should be further specified that the adherence to Sanskritic knowledge 
was not only mediated through the objectivist approach, but more accurately through an 
objectivist approach in which he argued for the existence of actual meanings of actions which 
are prototypically followed in the grammatical structures of Tibetan.1111  Si tu allowed for 
language-specific peculiarities to a certain degree, even distinguishing which facets of 
Sanskritic knowledge are applicable in the Tibetan context, but he still presupposed that there 
are generic case marking-patterns based on actual or genuine semantic construals of the 
underlying world of phenomena which persists across languages. In this model, the eight cases 
represent those categories which are capable of capturing the actual semantic constitution of 
phenomena. 
It was also stated in chapter 4.5 that especially the basic constellation of GC’s double value as 
a commentary on two fully authenticated root texts as well as a grammar of Tibetan language 
constrained its grammatical theory formation first of all to the conceptual framework of SCP 
and TKJ. Based on the investigation of part II, it may now be stated more accurately that the 
focus of explaining Tibetan language through an explication of the contents of SCP and TKJ 
constrained grammatical theory formation in the form that it only fostered the objectivist focus. 
As just stated above, with the focus on an authoritative source and the attempt to test or even 
defend it, an author or commentator will have naturally started searching for those linguistic 
expressions, language structures and definitions of categories that fit together and prove or 
disprove the root texts. Especially in the context of an established authority, commentators were 
inclined to confine themselves to basic definitions and exemplary lists of sample phrases that 
confirm a taxonomy. Starting from the case functions and their markers, a commentator may 
simply search for a small selection of representative sample phrases in which a morpheme has 
the proposed meaning; yet, without accurate knowledge about a marker’s distribution, he will 
                                                          
1111 Cf. supra 314f. and 436. 
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easily take recourse and adhere to the objectivist focus of explaining language structures based 
on morphosyntactically insensitive semantic construals of scenarios, even more so if this was 
already a recurrent feature in linguistic analysis and there possibly existed a strong notion of 
language as a more direct representation of the expressed scenarios.1112 In this way, the feature 
of the commentary inhibits further attention to distributional features and consequently fosters 
the objectivist focus. In turn, this objectivist focus then also confirms and fosters the authority 
of the root texts and their contents. Through this cycle, Sum rtags commentaries such as the GC 
are imbedded in their own dynamic and promote the continuous adherence to grammatical 
knowledge that from an outside modern linguistic perspective appears inadequate and artificial. 
In this way, historical features such as the promotion of the Thon mi narrative, the Tibetan 
scholastic features of commentary and scriptural authority, together with the theoretic-
conceptual foundation in the objectivist focus have all intermingled and interacted in Tibetan 
case grammar in and before Si tu. 
Even if a source like Si tu’s GC perhaps did not arrive at a “definitive explanation” of the two 
roots SCP and TKJ, both linguistically as well as historically, it may nonetheless be concluded 
that he has kept his word and has critically approached these two authorities by means of reason 
in that very form Tibetan scholastic methodology and the conceptual foundation have enabled 
him.1113   
  
                                                          
1112 Cf. supra 427f. 
1113 Cf. supra 62ff. and chapter 4.2. 
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Appendix – On the Numbering of ślokas in Sum cu pa and Rtags kyi ’jug pa 
Modern academic research on SCP and TKJ demonstrates significant disagreement as to the 
ways of numbering and citing the two root texts. Perhaps the most established version goes 
back to Bacot’s study of an anonymous post-Si tu Sum rtags commentary entitled Sum rtags 
gzhang ’chan legs bshad nor bu’i phreng ba (?),1114 in which also the first separate, full edition 
of the two root texts is provided in Europe. His numbering was followed by scholars like R.A. 
Miller and Peter Verhagen. In his introduction, Bacot counted a total of 65 so-called “articles” 
that are “inappropriately called ślokas.”1115 He defines a śloka as an “article comprising an 
indefinite number of verses from one two fifteen,”1116 presuming that this would be the Tibetan 
understanding he deliberately preserved also in his study. A look at Bacot’s edition of the root 
texts at the end of his study reveals that indeed the 65 identified articles vary from single verse 
lines up to 15 verse lines. According to his numbering, SCP counts 29 such ślokas and TKJ 36. 
Bacot’s numbering was contested by Tillemans in his article on Tibetan verb theory, namely 
TKJ’s bdag/gzhan and Si tu’s tha dad min.1117 In another article, Tillemans informs us that his 
alternative numbering was (partially or fully?) based on another post-Si tu commentator, 
namely the well-known Dngul chu Dharmabhadra, who wrote a famous subcommentary on the 
GC, entitled Si tu’i zhal lung (‘Si tu’s Words’).1118 The two counting systems have not only 
resulted in differences such as ślokas 12-15 in Bacot’s version of TKJ becoming verse 12 in 
Tillemans’s study, they have further evoked an unresolved controversy between Miller and 
Tillemans about the citation of the root texts.1119 Additional numberings are also found, such as 
that contained in Zeisler’s study of las/karman in Tibetan grammaticography, in which she 
adhered to the notion of śloka in its common use as a verse consisting of four lines, which she 
consistently applied to the root texts as contained in Si tu’s GC.1120 In view of these competing 
counting systems, I therefore agree with Tillemans’s assessment already in 1994 that “one thing 
is clear: the usual numbering of the ślokas badly needs some serious re-examination.”1121 
                                                          
1114 This is the title provided by Bacot 1928, 1 and 109. Unfortunately, I lacked access to any other edition of the 
Tibetan commentary, but the term gzhang ’chan appears more like a typographical error and should be 
substituted with gzhung mchan (‘text annotation’), resulting in the title ‘Precious Garland of Elegant Sayings: 
Annotations/Comments [on] the Sum rtags [Root] Texts.’ 
1115 “Toute la loi du langage y est incluse sous une forme parfois énigmatique, en 65 articles improprement 
appelés ślokas.” (Bacot 1928, 1; transl. Graf) 
1116 “Nous conservons ce nom de śloka, adopté par les Tibétains, à des articles comprenant un nombre 
indéterminé de versets depuis un jusqu’à quinze.” (Bacot 1928, 1; transl. Graf) 
1117 Cf. Tillemans and Herforth 1989. 
1118 Cf. Tillemans 1994, 121f. 
1119 Cf. Miller 1991, 372; Miller 1992; Cf. Tillemans’s reply in Tillemans 1994. 
1120 Cf. Zeisler 2006, ft. 2. 
1121 Tillemans 1994, 122. 
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At this point, it is helpful to introduce an important distinction regarding the organization of 
any type of commented texts in Tibetan commentaries, namely sa bcad (‘topical outline’) on 
the one hand and śloka (‘verse,’ ‘stanza’) on the other. The first category is a commentator’s 
attempt to segment the commented text into logical units for a better understanding of its 
meaning. These topical outlines can vary significantly from commentator to commentator and 
are not bound to any restrictions in terms of number or range of verse lines. Ultimately, they 
are the result of a commentator’s hermeneutical-philological examination. Considering the term 
śloka, in contrast, The Student’s Sanskrit-English Dictionary of Apte provides entries such as 
‘verse of praise,’ ‘proverb or saying,’ ‘a stanza or verse in general,’ and ‘a verse in the Anuṣṭubh 
metre in particular.’1122 In Apte’s Appendix I on Sanskrit prosody, it is further stated that 
Sanskrit stanzas are also called padya and generally consist of four verse lines or four pādas 
(‘legs,’ ‘parts,’ ‘quarters’), and variations in the number of syllables or syllabic instants result 
in different metres.1123 In its most technical sense, śloka is mentioned in Apte’s appendix as an 
alternative label for the Anuṣṭubh metre that consists of eight syllables per pāda. Therefore, 
there seems to be a broader and a narrower understanding of śloka, but generally speaking it is 
a category that belongs to the domain of compositional style and refers to a verse or stanza. 
Tibetan compositional style adopted the four-lined version of stanzas, translating both terms 
padya and śloka with Tibetan tshigs (su) bcad (pa) and pāda literally with rkang pa (‘leg’),1124 
but without restricting it to one particular type of metre. 
Both Bacot’s and Tillemans’s numbering are based not on the number of ślokas but on the sa 
bcad of different authors, namely one anonymous author and Dngul chu Dharmabhadra. 
Interestingly, it is ascertained that both commentators were inspired by Si tu’s GC, although 
they did not directly follow his topical outline.1125 As for Bacot’s study, it should be added that 
it is more difficult to discern from where precisely he has adopted his numbering, since the Sum 
rtags gzhang ’chan legs bshad nor bu’i phreng ba (?) as such does not segment the text in 
Bacot’s proposed form, but instead quotes and annotates the SCP and the TKJ word by word. 
However, a comparison with Si tu’s GC reveals that Bacot’s numbering follows exactly the sa 
bcad of Si tu.1126 The only noteworthy differences are that Si tu has omitted Bacot’s TKJ 7, 
                                                          
1122 Cf. Apte 2012, 567. 
1123 Cf. ibid., 648ff., who provides a more detailed account of the different classes and metres in Sanskrit 
prosody. 
1124 Cf. Negi 1993, 137. 
1125 Cf. Bacot 1928, 164f.; As for Dngul chu’s grammar, already the title Si tu’s zhal lung unmistakably indicates 
a relation, although this does not mean that there are no noteworthy theoretical deviations between them.  
1126 This statement is not considering spelling differences or minor deviations in the phrasing of single verse 
lines. 
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which is nonetheless included in Si tu’s separate edition of the root texts in his collected works, 
as well as Bacot’s TKJ 17.1-2, which does not occur in any other edition or commentary to my 
knowledge, in fact not even in the Sum rtags gzhang ’chan legs bshad nor bu’i phreng ba (?) 
in Bacot’s study, thus most likely a typographical error in which he mistakenly repeated his 
TKJ 22.1127  
The dependence on different commentators and their respective sa bcad thus explains the 
discrepancy in the counting systems of Bacot and Tillemans. However, the two systems do not 
sufficiently distinguish between a numbering based on the sa bcad and a numbering based on 
ślokas. As has been stated, Bacot went as far as to claim that the topical organization represents 
nothing but the number of ślokas according to the “inappropriate” Tibetan understanding. 
Inappropriate indeed, but this is simply not the generic understanding of śloka (tshigs bcad) in 
the Tibetan tradition, and also not in the field of Tibetan grammar. This is best demonstrated 
by Bacot’s proposed numbering itself that ultimately goes back to Si tu’s GC. Although Si tu 
introduced a topical outline (sa bcad) and segmented SCP and TKJ precisely into the 64 articles 
(65 minus Bacot’s TKJ 7) of one to 15 verse lines, Si tu is unmistakably clear about the fact 
that a śloka (tshigs bcad) consists of exactly four verse lines (pāda, rkang pa). First, he argues 
that the title Sum cu pa (‘The Thirty’) is derived from the fact that SCP consists of precisely 33 
ślokas, of which the first three are not counted by Si tu because he argues that they contain four 
opening homages (mchod brjod) and the opening declaration (dam bca’ ba) that all equally 
pertain to the remaining – mostly lost apart from TKJ – grammars written by master Thon 
mi.1128 This results in precisely 30 verses à four verse lines, instead of Bacot’s 29 verses (also 
omitting the three homages) à one to 15 verse lines. Secondly, Si tu closes his quotation of TKJ 
16.3-19.4 (Bacot’s TKJ 23), 14 verse lines in total, with the following comment: 
 shlo ka gsum dang rkang pa gnyis kyis bstan te/ 
 “Through [these] three ślokas (shlo ka) and two pādas (rkang pa) the following is 
 taught: […]”1129 
This statement makes clear that a śloka only consists of four pādas, no more and no less. 
However, it should be noted that the term is not necessarily employed based on the absolute 
number of ślokas in a source, but relatively within a quoted passage of the root texts. Tillemans 
                                                          
1127 Cf. Bacot 1928, 173 and 174; Si tu 6.444.2 and 6.444.4. 
1128 Si tu’s entire discussion of the reason for SCP’s title, including the critique of other interpretations, starts 
with GC 452.2. It will not be further investigated here, whether Si tu’s interpretation of the title is the most 
reasonable or whether other interpretations – of which there exist several in Sum rtags – are preferable. 
1129 GC 570.5. 
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mentions, for example, two Tibetan commentators who explicitly refer to TKJ 11.4-12.3 as one 
śloka, 1130  four verse lines that form a single unit in the topical outline of Dngul chu 
Dharmabhadra. The same may even apply to our final quotation of Si tu. On an absolute basis, 
Si tu’s quoted passage (TKJ 16.3-19.4) would be one half and three full ślokas and not Si tu’s 
three and a half. It may be argued that this amounts to the same, but it is equally possible – if 
not more likely, in view of the fact that Tibetan scholars memorize but not necessarily number 
or count the root texts – that he simply did not consider any absolute number of verses and thus 
based his numbering only on the volume of this particular passage. It also cannot be 
categorically excluded that Tibetan authors have never used the term śloka (tshigs bcad) more 
freely to refer to a logical unit in the sa bcad regardless of its size, since Apte’s dictionary has 
demonstrated that a śloka may refer to a versified saying in general also in the Sanskritic 
tradition. Tshigs bcad or śloka as a relative category and as an indefinite one may cause 
confusion and complicates the numbering of root texts. However, despite any occasional free 
usage of this terminology, it is safe to assume that Tibetan scholars in general had a clear 
understanding of what a śloka is and how to distinguish it from the sa bcad of a commentary. 
Since topical outlines are numerous and not bound to any unanimous criteria that allow for a 
consistent and standardized numbering, I agree with Zeisler’s solution to base the counting of 
the root texts more neutrally on the number of ślokas in their generic form of four pādas,1131 
also because this is Si tu’s understanding of the terminology in his GC as the main text of this 
dissertation.  
In the following, I propose a numbering of SCP and TKJ based on a śloka consisting of four 
pādas. The edition of both texts is based on the one contained in volume 6 of Si tu’s collected 
works, immediately preceding his GC. The edition counts exactly 33 ślokas (= 132 verse lines) 
for SCP and 34 ślokas plus one pāda (= 137 verse lines) for TKJ, in total 67 ślokas and one 
pāda (= 269 verse lines). In addition, SCP and TKJ each feature a title and translator’s homage 
at the beginning as well as a colophon that indicates the end of the texts. Si tu’s edition does 
not number or segment the ślokas, and the full texts of SCP and TKJ are provided right after 
each other without any partition in and between them. I have deliberately chosen a separate 
edition of the texts and not one contained in a commentary, since commentaries may omit parts 
or even swap passages for various reasons. Both has happened in the GC, where Si tu, for 
example, has omitted the title, translator’s homage and 1.1-2 in TKJ. For some reason, he also 
                                                          
1130 Cf. Tillemans 1994, 122. 
1131 Cf. Zeisler 2006, ft. 2. 
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omitted (or forgot?) TKJ 8.3. As evident below, in his GC he has also swapped SCP 19.3-22.1 
with 22.2-23.2, something I am unaware of happening in any of the other commentaries.  
All deviations between the root texts in Si tu’s separate edition and his GC in terms of phrasing, 
spelling, omissions, swapping of passages, etc. were annotated. Obvious orthographical, 
typographical or grammatical errors were corrected but also annotated and compared with Si 
tu’s GC. Likewise, Si tu’s topical organization (sa bcad) of the root texts in GC was indicated 
on the right side. Not further indicated are deviations and typographical errors of ba/pa, bo/po 
that are particularly common in word endings as well as those of da/nga, because any such 
accurate assessment is often severely impeded by the readability of passages. Typographical or 
errors and deviations are in these cases only indicated if they result in a noteworthy change of 
meaning. The use of shad follows the standard use in Si tu’s separate edition, although two 
special uses were neglected: (1) Occasionally, double shad appears randomly, typically after ’o 
and ro in the edition, but neither always nor after other allomorphs of slar bsdu; thus the 
rationale of double shad in this text is not comprehensible to me. (2) A special form of shad is 
used only if the final syllable before the shad is truncated due to the end of a folio’s line and 
thus the syllable was placed in the next line. Since this issue does not occur below, this use of 
shad was also neglected. 
As a final remark, the following edition and numbering of the root texts is not a critical edition. 
It simply follows and compares the root texts in Si tu’s separate edition and the GC as they are 
both contained in volume 6 of his collected works published in 1990 by Sherab Gyaltsen. A 
critical edition of SCP and TKJ definitely is a desirable future project, since deviations between 
different versions used in commentaries are multiple, significant and have even evoked debates 
on the correct reading of selected passages. 
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Sum cu pa (SCP) 
 
śloka pāda Text 
Si tu’i sa 
bcad 
Title རྒྱ་གར་སྐད་དུ། བྱཱ་ཀ་ར་ཎ་མྱཱཱུ་ལ་ཏྲིཾ་ཤད་ནཱ1132་མ།  1 
  བོད་སྐད་དུ། ལུང་སོན་པ་རྩ་བ་སུམ་ཅུ་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ།  1 
    
Translator’s homage ངག་གི་དབང་ཕྱུག་འཇམ་པའི་དབྱངས་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལ།ོ  2 
    
1 1 །གང་ལ་ཡོན་ཏན་མཆོག་མངའ་བའི།  3 
 2 །དཀོན་ཅོག་ད་ེལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ། 3 
 3 །གང་གིས་སྒྲ་དབྱངས་ཀུན་གསུངས་པའི། 4 
 4 །འཇམ་པའི་དབྱངས་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ། 4 
    
2 1 །གང་གིས་མིང་གཞི་སོན་གསུངས་པ།  5 
 2 །རྟག་ཞི་བ་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལ།ོ  5 
 3 །སེབ་སོར་ལེགས་མཛད་མཁས་རྣམས་དང༌།  6 
 4 །བླ་མ་ལ་ཡང་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ནས།  6 
    
3 1 །བསླབ་པ་ཀུན་གི་གཞ་ིའཛིན་ཅངི༌།  7 
 2 །རིག་བྱེད་སྨྲ་བ་རྣམས་ཀི་རྒྱུ།  7 
 3 །མིང་ཚིག་བརོད་པ་ཀུན་གི་གཞ།ི  7 
 4 །ཡི་གེའི་སོར་བ་བཤད་པར་བྱ།  7 
    
4 1 །ཡི་གེ་ཨཱ་ལི་ཀཱ་ལི་གཉིས།  8 
 2 །ཨཱ་ལ་ིགསལ་བྱེད་ཨ་ིསོགས་བཞི།  8 
 3 །ཀཱ་ལི་སུམ་ཅུ་ཐམ་པའོ།  8 
 4 །དེ་ལ་རེས་འཇུག་བཅུ་ཡིན་ཏེ།  9 
    
5 1 །དེ་ལས་ལྔ་ན་ིསོན་དུའང་འཇུག  9 
 2 །མི་འཇུག་པ་ན་ིཉི་ཤུའ།ོ  9 
 3 །ཀཱ་ལི་ཕྱེད་དང་བརྒྱད་སེ་ན།ི  10 
                                                          
1132 6.440.1: na GC 451.4: nā 
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 4 །བཞི་བཞི་དག་ཏུ་ཕྱེ་བ་ལས།  10 
    
6 1 །དང་པོ་གསུམ་པ་བཞི་པ་ལ།  11 
 2 །མས་གཉིས་དྲུག་པའ་ིགསུམ་པ་དང༌།  11 
 3 །བདུན་པ་ལ་ན་ིཤ་མ་གཏོགས།  11 
 4 །རེས་འཇུག་ཡི་གེ་བཅུ་རུ་འདོད།  11 
    
7 1 །རེས་འཇུག་ཡི་གེ་བཅུ་ཉིད་ལས།  12 
 2 །དང་པོ་གསུམ་པ་ལྔ་པ་དྲུག  12 
 3 །བདུན་པ་རྣམས་ནི་སོན་དུའང་འཇུག  12 
 4 །མིང་གཞི་གཉིས་སམ་གསུམ1133་སེལ་ལམ།  13 
    
8 1 །དེ་ལ་དབྱངས་ཀ་ིབཞིར1134་ལྡན་ཡང༌། 13 
 2 །གང་དུའང་འཇུག་མིན་སར་བའང་མིན།  13 
 3 །རེས་འཇུག་ཡི་གེ་བཅུ་པོ་ན།ི  14 
 4 །མིང་གང་ག་ིནི་མཐར་སར་བ།  14 
    
9 1 །དེ་ལ་ཨཱ་ལི་བཞི་པ་སར།  14 
 2 །སླར་བསྡུ1135་བར་ནི་ཤེས་པར་བྱ།  14 
 3 །རེས་འཇུག་ཡི་གེ་བཅུ་རྣམས་ལས།  15 
 4 །གང་མིང་མཐའ་ན་བཅུ་པ་གནས།  15 
    
10 1 །དེ་ལ་ཨཱ་ལི་གཉིས་པ་སར།  15 
 2 །གང་མིང་མཐའ་ན་བརྒྱད་པ་གནས།  15 
 3 །དེ་ལ་གཉིས་པ་ཨུ་ཡང་སར།  15 
 4 །གང་མིང་མཐའ་ན་གསུམ་པ་གནས།  15 
    
11 1 །དེ་ལ་ཨཱ་ལི་གཉིས་པ་སར།  15 
 2 །བཞི་པ་དགུ་པ་དངོས་ཀང་སེ། 15 
 3 །ལས་དང་ཆེད་དང་རྟེན་གནས་དང༌།  15 
                                                          
1133 GC 466.1: sum 
1134 GC 466.1: bzhi 
1135 6.441.2: ’sdu ? GC 467.5: bsdu 
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 4 །དེ་ཉིད་ཚ་ེསྐབས་ལ་སྒྲ་ཡིན།  15 
    
12 1 །རེས་འཇུག་ཡི་གེ་བཅུ་པོ་ནི1136།  16 
 2 །ཨི་དང་མཐུན་ལུགས་འད་ིཞེས་བྱ།  16 
 3 །དང་པོ་གཉིས་ལ་དང་པོ་མཐུན།  17 
 4 །གསུམ་ལྔ་བཅུ་ལ་ཀ་དང་སར།  17 
    
13 1 །བདུན་པ་ཉིད་ལ་བདུན་པ་སེ།  17 
 2 །ལྷག་མ་རྣམས་ལ་ག་སར་བ།  17 
 3 །དེ་དག་ཨི་སར་འབེལ་བའི་ས།  17 
 4 །དེ་ཉིད་ལ་ནི་བཅུ་པ་སར།  18 
    
14 1 །བྱེད་པ་པོ་རུ་ཤེས་པར་བྱ།  18 
 2 །ཨཱ་ལ་ིཕྱིས་ནས་གཉིས་པ་སར།  19 
 3 །ཚིག་རྒྱན་གཉིས་དང་སྡུད་པར་འགྱུར།  19 
 4 །ལ་དོན་སུ་ལ་ཨུ་ཕྱིས་ནས།  20 
    
15 1 །དེ་ལ་གསུམ་པའི་དང་པོ་སར།  20 
 2 །དེ་ལ་ཨཱ་ལི་གསུམ་པ་སར། 20 
 3 །དེ་ནི་ལྷག་དང་བཅས་པའོ། 20 
 4 །རེས་འཇུག་ཡི་གེ་བཅུ་པོ་ལ།  21 
    
16 1 །དྲུག་པ་སར་ན་འབྱེད་སྡུད་ཡིན།  21 
 2 །རེས་འཇུག་ཡི་གེ་བཅུ་པོ་ཡ།ི  22 
 3 །བཞི་པ་དགུ་པ་ལ་བཅུ་པ། 22 
 4 །སར་བ་འབྱུང་ཁུངས་ས་ཡིན་ཏ།ེ 22 
    
17 1 །དགར1137་དང་སྡུད་པའང་དེ་བཞནི་ནོ1138། 23 
 2 །གང་མིང་བརོད་པའི་དང་པོ་རུ།  24 
 3 །ཀེ་སར་བ་ནི་བོད་པ་ཡིན།  24 
                                                          
1136 GC 484.2: la 
1137 6.442.2: dga’ ? GC 493.3: dgar 
1138 GC 493.3: yin 
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 4 །གང་མིང་མཐའ་དང་མཐུན་པ་ཡི།  25 
    
18 1 །བཞི་པ་ལ་ནི་ཨི་སར་བ། 25 
 2 །དགར་དང་བརྣན་པའ་ིཚིག་ཏུ་འགྱུར།  25 
 3 །མིང་གང་རུང་བའ་ིབར་མཚམས་སུ།  26 
 4 །གསུམ་པ་ལ་ནི་གཉིས་པ་སར།  26 
    
19 1 །དེ་ནི་སྡུད་དང་འབྱེད་པ་དང༌། 26 
 2 །རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཚ་ེསྐབས་གདམས་ངག་ལྔའོ།  26 
 3 །གང་མིང་བརོད་པའི་དང་པོ་རུ། 281139 
 4 །དང་པོ་ལ་ན་ིགཉིས་པ་སར། 28 
    
20 1 །སི་ལ་ཁྱབ་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར།  28 
 2 །གང་མིང་ག་ིནི་མ་མཐའ་ན།  29 
 3 །པུ་ལིངྒ་ཡི་སྒྲ་མེད་པ།  29 
 4 །དེ་ལ་པུ་ལིང་ྒསར་ན། 29 
    
21 1 །བདག་པོའི་སར་ནི་ཤེས་པར་བྱ།  29 
 2 །གང་མིང་བརོད་པའི་ཡ་མཐའ་རུ1140།  30 
 3 །ས  ི
1141་ལིངྒ་ཡི་སྒྲ་མེད་པ།  30 
 4 །དེ་ལ་ས  ི
1142་ལིངྒ་སར་ན། 30 
    
22 1 །དགག་པའི་གནས་སུ་ཤེས་པར་བྱ།  30 
 2 །གང་མིང་ག་ིནི་ཡ་མཐའ་རུ།  27 
 3 །གསུམ་པ་ལ་ནི་ཨེ་སར་བ། 27 
 4 །ཐ་སྙད་དབང་དུ་གསུམ་ཡིན་ཏ།ེ 27 
    
23 1 །དངོས་པོའི་དབང་དུ་བཞི་རུ་འགྱུར། 27 
                                                          
1139 The rule ordering of SCP 19.3-23.2 that contains the presentation of the four syntactic links gang sgra, bdag 
sgra, dgag sgra and de sgra, is altered in Si tu’s GC. There, after finishing his discussion of dang sgra (SCP 
18.3-19.2), he first starts with de sgra (SCP 22.2-23.2) and then goes on to quote and explain SCP 19.3-22.1 on 
gang sgra, bdag sgra and dgag sgra. 
1140 GC 512.1: na 
1141 6.442.4: stri GC 512.1: strī 
1142 6.442.4: stri GC 512.1: strī  
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 2 །དུས་ཀི་དབང་དུ་གཉིས་ཡིན་ན།ོ 27 
 3 །ཚིགས་སུ་བཅད་པའི་མཚམས་སོར་རྣམས།  31 
 4 །ཅུང་ཟད་བསྡུས་པ་ཡོད་ན་ཡང༌།  31 
    
24 1 །དེ་ནི་དེ་བཞིན་སར་བར་བྱ།  31 
 2 །སོན་འཇུག་ཡོད་དམ་མེད་ཀང་རུང༌།  32 
 3 །མིང་གཞིའི་ཡ་ིགེ་གང་ཡིན་ལ།  32 
 4 །ཉིས1143་འབེལ་ཡོད་དམ་སུམ་འབལེ་ཡོད། 32 
    
25 1 །ཨཱ1144་ལི་བཞི་ལས་གང་ལྡན་ཡང༌།  32 
 2 །རེས་འཇུག་བཅུ་པོ་མ་ཞུགས་ན།  32 
 3 །མིང་གཞན་སོར་བ་ཡོད་མི་སིད།  32 
 4 །རེས་འཇུག་བཅུ་ཡ་ིདོན་ཤེས་ན།  33 
    
26 1 །འབི1145་དང་ཀོག་དང་བཤད་རྣམས་ཀི།  33 
 2 །མཚམས་སོར་སྒྲ་ལ་ཐོགས་མེད་ཅིང༌།  33 
 3 །འབེལ་པ་སྨྲ་བའི་མཆོག་ཏུ་འགྱུར།  33 
 4 །གཞན་ཡང་རེས་འཇུག་ཤེས་པ་ཡིས།  33 
    
27 1 །དོན་གི་སོར་བ་མ་མཐོང་ཡང༌།  33 
 2 །དོན་དང་མཐུན་པའི་སོར་བ་ཤསེ།  33 
 3 །རེས་འཇུག་སོར་བ་མཁས་པ་ན། 34 
 4 །ལུང་གི་དོན་དང་སོར་བ་དང༌།  34 
    
28 1 །བླ་མའི་མན་ངག་གསུམ་སར་ནས།  34 
 2 །དོན་གི་ཐོག་ཏུ་དབབ་པར་བྱ།  34 
 3 །བསླབ་ལ་བརྩོན་པའི་གང་ཟག་གིས།  35 
 4 །དང་པོར་ང་རོ་རྣམས་ལ་སང༌། 35 
    
29 1 །སོན་འཇུག་མིང་གཞི་རེས་འཇུག་གསུམ།  35 
                                                          
1143 GC 514.3: gnyis 
1144 6.442.5: a GC 514.3: ā 
1145 6.442.6: ’di GC 515.2: ’bri 
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 2 །ཀོག་གི་ཆེད་དུ་བསླབ་པ་ཡིན།  35 
 3 །རེས་འཇུག་བཞི་ཡ་ིསོར་བ་ནི། 35 
 4 །མཉན་བསམ་བསན་པའི་དོན་དུ་སར།  35 
    
30 1 །ཡན་ལག་ད་ེདག་མཐུ་ཡིས་ནི།  35 
 2 །འབས་བུའི་ཆེད་དུ་དོན་ལ་དབབ།  35 
 3 །བསླབ་པའི་རིམ་པ་འདི་ཡིས་ནི།  35 
 4 །གང་ཞིག་འབད་པ་ཆུང་ངུས་ཀང༌།  35 
    
31 1 །ཤེས་རབ་མྱུར་དུ་གོལ་བར་འགྱུར། 35 
 2 །དེ་ཕྱིར་དང་པོར་འད་ིཉིད་བསླབ།  35 
 3 །དེ་ནས་རྒྱས་པའང་མཉན་བྱས་ཏེ། 35 
 4 །བསླབ་པ་གང་ལ་དད་པ་ཡི།  35 
    
32 1 །གཞུང་ཉིད་བླ་མ་དག་ལས་མཉན།  35 
 2 །སློབ་དཔོན་དེ་ཉིད་དུ་འཛིན་ཅངི༌།  36 
 3 །ལེ་ལོ་གཡེང་བ་རྣམ་པར་སྤངས། 36 
 4 །ཟོ་བཟང་དད་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་པ། 36 
     
33 1 །སེས་བུ་དེས་ནི་མྱུར་རྟགོས་ཏེ།  36 
 2 །དེ་ལ་དུས་སུ་འདམོས་པར་བྱ།  36 
 3 །ཅིག1146་ཤོས་དེ་ལས་ལྡོག་པའོ།  36 
 4 །དེ་ལྟར་ཀུན་གིས་རྟོགས་གྱུར་ཅགི  om. 
    
Colophon 
།བྱཱ་ཀ་ར་ཎའ་ིརྩ་བ་ཤ ོ་ཀ་སུམ་ཅུ་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སོླབ་དཔོན་ཨ་
ནུས་མཛད་པ་རོགས་སོ།།  om. 
 
  
                                                          
1146 GC 522.3: gcig 
 453 
 
Rtags kyi ’jugs pa (TKJ) 
 
śloka pāda Text 
Si tu’i sa 
bcad 
Title རྒྱ་གར་སྐད་དུ། བྱཱ་ཀ་ར་ཎ་ལིངྒ་བ1147་ཏཱ་ར་ནཱ1148་མ། om. 
  བོད་སྐད་དུ། ལུང་སོན་པ་རྟགས་ཀི་འཇུག་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ།  om. 
     
Translator’s homage བྱཱ་ཀ་ར་ཎའི་དབང་ཕྱུག་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ།  om. 
     
1 1 །སྨྲ་བའི་སེས་མཆོག་སྨྲ་བའ་ིརྒྱལ།  om. 
 2 །ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ།  om. 
 3 །ཕོ་ཡི་ཡི་ག་ེའབའ་ཞིག་ལ།  1 
 4 །སེ་པ་ཕྱེད་དང་བརྒྱད་གནས་པའང༌།  1 
    
2 1 །སེ་ཚན་ལྔ་རུ་དིལ་བྱས་ནས།  1 
 2 །ཕོ་དང་མ་ནིང་མོ་དང་ན།ི  1 
 3 །ཤིན་ཏུ་མ་ོདང་བཞི་བཞི་རུ། 1 
 4 །སེ་པ་བཞི་པ་ཡན་ཆད་དབྱེ།  1 
    
3 1 །ལྷག་མ་བཅུ་བཞ་ིགནས་པ་ལ།  1 
 2 །ཙ་སོགས་གསུམ་ནི་ཅ་སོགས་སར།  1 
 3 །ཝ་ནི་བ1149་དང་སར་བར་བྱ།  1 
 4 །ལྷག་མ་དྲུག་ནི་མོ་རུ་སར།  1 
    
4 1 །ར་ལ་ཧ་ནི་མ་ོགཤམ་ས།ེ  1 
 2 །ཨ་ན་ིམཚན་མེད་ཅེས་ཀང་བྱ།  1 
 3 །མོ་ཡི་ཡ་ིགེའི་ནང་ནས་ནི།  2 
 4 །འཇུག་པའི་ཡི་གེ་བཅུ་དབྱུང་བྱ།  2 
    
5 1 །འཇུག་པ་བཅུ་ཡ་ིནང་ནས་ན།ི  2 
 2 །སོན་འཇུག་ཡི་གེ་ལྔ་དབྱུང་བྱ།  2 
                                                          
1147 6.443.4: pa 
1148 6.443.4: na 
1149 6.443.5: pa ? GC 523.5: ba 
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 3 །སོན་འཇུག་ཡི་གེ་ལྔ་པོ་ལ།  3 
 4 །ཕོ་དང་མ་ནིང1150་མོ་དང་ན།ི  3 
    
6 1 །ཤིན་ཏུ་མ་ོདང་བཞི་རུ་དབྱ།ེ  3 
 2 །དེ་དག་རེ་རེའང་བཞི་བྱེད་ད།ེ  4 
 3 །གང་ལ་འཇུག་བྱེད་གང་གིས་བྱདེ།  4 
 4 །ཇི་ལྟར་འཇུག་བྱེད་ཅི་ཕྱིར་བྱེད།  4 
    
7 1 །གང་ལ་འཇུག་པར་བྱེད་ཅེ་ན།  5 
 2 །ཕོ་ནི་ཕོ་དང་མོ་ལ་འཇུག  6 
 3 །མོ་ནི་མོ་དང་མ་ནིང་ལ།  6 
 4 །མ1151་ནིང་ཡང་ནི་ཕོ་མོ་ལའ།ོ  6 
    
8 1 །ཤིན་ཏུ་མ་ོནི་མ་ནིང་དང༌།  6 
 2 །མོ་དང་ཤིན་ཏུ་མོ་ཉིད་ལའོ།  6 
 3 །མི་འཇུག་པ་ན་ིའདི་ལྟ་ས།ེ  om. 
 4 །ཕོ་ནི་མ་ནིང་ལ་མི་འཇུག1152  7 
    
9 1 །མོ་ཡང་ཕོ་ལ་འཇུག་མི་འགྱུར།1153 7 
 2 །མ་ནིང་རང་ལ་རང་མི་འཇུག  7 
 3 །རང་གི་སེ་དང་འཕྲད1154་པ་ན།  7 
 4 །ཕོ་ཡང་མོ་ལ་འཇུག་མི་འགྱུར།  7 
    
10 1 །མ་ནིང་མ་ོཡང་དེ་བཞིན་ནོ།  7 
 2 །ཇི་ལྟར་འཇུག་པར་བྱེད་ཅེ་ན།  8 
 3 །ཕོ་ནི་དག་པའ་ིཚུལ་གིས་ཏ།ེ 9 
 4 །མ་ནིང་རན་པར་འཇུག་པ་ཡིན།  9 
    
11 1 །མོ་ནི་ཞན་པའི་ཚུལ་གིས་ཏེ། 9 
                                                          
1150 6.443.6: rang ? GC 528.1: ning 
1151 6.444.1: mi GC 529.1: ma 
1152 6.444.2: ’dzug GC 533.3: ’jug 
1153 GC 533.3: mo ni pho la ’jug pa min/ 
1154 6.444.2: phrad ? GC 533.3: ’phrad 
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 2 །ཤིན་ཏུ་མ་ོནི་མཉམ་པས་ས།ོ  9 
 3 །ཅི་ཕྱིར་འཇུག་པར་བྱེད་ཅེ་ན།  10 
 4 །ཕོ་ནི་འདས་དང་གཞན་བསྒྲུབ་ཕྱིར།  11 
    
12 1 །མ་ནིང་གཉིས་ཀ་ད་ལྟར་ཆེད།  12 
 2 །མོ་ནི་བདག་ད་མ་འོངས་ཕྱིར།  13 
 3 །ཤིན་ཏུ་མ་ོནི་མཉམ་ཕྱིར་ར།ོ  14 
 4 །རེས་འཇུག་ཡི་གེ་བཅུ་པོ་ལ།  15 
    
13 1 །ཕོ་མོ་མ་ནིང་གསུམ་དུ་དབྱ།ེ  15 
 2 །ཕོ་ལ་སེས་བུ་རབ་འབིང་གསུམ།  16 
 3 །མོ་ལ་མོ་དང་ཤིན་ཏུ་མོ།  16 
 4 །མ་ནིང་འགྱུར་དང་མཚན་གཉསི་དང༌།  16 
    
14 1 །མཚན་མེད་དག་དང་གསུམ་དུ་འདོད།  16 
 2 །དེ་ཡང་བྱེད་པ་བཞི་བྱེད་ད།ེ  17 
 3 །གང་ལ་འཇུག་བྱེད་གང་གིས་བྱདེ།  17 
 4 །ཇི་ལྟར་འཇུག་བྱེད1155་ཅི་ཕྱིར་བྱེད།  17 
    
15 1 །གང་ལ་ཡ་ིགེ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ།  18 
 2 །གང་གིས་བཅུ་པོ་ད་ེདག་གིས།  19 
 3 །ཇི་ལྟར་རྣམ་པ་གཉིས་ཡིན་ཏེ།  20 
 4 །སྒྲ་ཡི་འཇུག་ཚུལ་དོན་གི་ཚུལ།  20 
    
16 1 །ཕོ་གསུམ་མོ་གཉིས་མ་ནིང་གསུམ།  21 
 2 །དག་ཞན་བར་མ་གསུམ་དུ་འཇུག  21 
 3 །དག་པ་གསུམ་ཉིད་ནང་ཕྲད་དམ།  22 
 4 །གལ་ཏེ་ཞན་པ་ནང་ཕྲད་ན།  22 
    
17 1 །དེ་ལའང་ནང་གི་ཆ་ཤས་ཀིས།  22 
 2 །དེ་ཡང་དག་ཞན་གཉིས་སུ་དབྱ།ེ  22 
                                                          
1155 GC 568.2: byad/byang ? 
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 3 །མ་ནིང་གསུམ་དུ་གང་གཏོགས་པ།  22 
 4 །དག་དང་ཕྲད་ན་དག་པར་འགྱུར།  22 
    
18 1 །ཞན་དང་ཕྲད་ན་ཞན་པར་འགྱུར།  22 
 2 །གཉིས་ཀ་དག་ནི1156་ཕྲད་གྱུར་ན།  22 
 3 །དེ་ནི་གཉིས་ཀ་ཅན་དུ་འགྱུར།  22 
 4 །གཉིས་ཀ1157་དག་དང་མ་ཕྲད་ན།  22 
    
19 1 །གང་དུ་ཡང་ནི་མི་འགྱུར་ར།ོ  22 
 2 །དེས་ན་འགྱུར་དང་མཚན1158་གཉིས་དང༌།  22 
 3 །མཚན་མེད་དག་དང་གསུམ་དུ་འདོད1159།  22 
 4 །དེ་ནི་སྒྲ་ཡ་ིའཇུག་ཚུལ་ལ།ོ  22 
    
20 1 །དོན་ནི་རྣམ་པ་གཉིས་ཡིན་ཏེ།  23 
 2 །ས་མ་གང་ལྟར་གྱུར་པ་དང༌།  23 
 3 །ཕྱི་མ་གང་ལྟར་འགྱུར1160་བའོ།  23 
 4 །ས་མ་སོན་འཇུག་ལྔ་བཞིན་སར།  24 
    
21 1 །ཕྱི་མ་དག་ག་ིའདེན་ཚུལ་ནི།  25 
 2 །ཕོ་ཡིས་ཕོ་ཡི་མིང་མཐའ་དང༌།  26 
 3 །མོ་ཡིས་མོ་ཡ་ིམིང་མཐའ་དང༌།  26 
 4 །མ་ནིང་གིས་ན་ིམ་ནིང་ང༌ོ།  26 
    
22 1 །མིང་མཐའ་ད་ེདག་ཉིད་ཀིས་ནི།  27 
 2 །དེ་ཉིད་རང་ག་ིསྒྲ་མཐུན་པའ།ི  27 
 3 །ཆོས་དངོས་ལས་དང་བྱེད་པ་དང༌།  27 
 4 །སིན་དང་འབྱུང་ཁུངས་འབེལ་པ་དང༌།  27 
    
23 1 །གནས་དང་བོད་པའ་ིསྒྲ་ཡང་དང༌།  27 
                                                          
1156 GC 570.4: dang 
1157 GC 570.4: pha 
1158 6.445.1: mtshad GC 570.4: mthsan 
1159 6.445.1: mdod GC 570.5: ’dod 
1160 6.445.1: ? GC 575.1: ’gyur 
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 2 །གཞན་ཡང་སླར་བསྡུ་ལྷག་བཅས་དང༌།  27 
 3 །འབྱེད་སྡུད་བསྣན་དང་བདག་པ་ོདང༌།  27 
 4 །དགག་སྒྲུབ་རྒྱན་དང་དུས་ལའང་འཇུག  27 
    
24 1 །དེ་དག་ས་ཤུགས་འདེན་པས་འབྱུང༌།  27 
 2 །དེ་དག་ནང་གསེས་གང་འཇུག་པ།  28 
 3 །མཐར་སར་འོག་མའ་ིམིང་དོན་ལས།  28 
 4 །སི་འཇུག་ཡོད་དམ་བྱེད་པ་ཡོད།  29 
    
25 1 །དེ་བཞིན་ཆེད་བྱེད་རྟེན་བྱེད་དང༌།  29 
 2 །ལས་བྱ་བླང་བྱ་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ།  29 
 3 །སོན་དུ་འོས་པ་གནས་པའམ1161།  29 
 4 །གཞན་ཡང་ཚིག་དོན་འོག་མ་ལས།  30 
    
26 1 །བསྡུ་རྒྱུ་ཡོད་དམ་མེད་པ་དང༌།  30 
 2 །གོང་མ་ལས་ཀང་དེ་བཞིན་ཏེ།  30 
 3 །རྣམ་གངས་དག་ཀང་བཀོད་པ་ལས།  30 
 4 །བསར་བ་ཡོད་དམ་མེད་པ་དང༌།  30 
    
27 1 །ཕོ་སྒྲ་དང་ནི་མོ1162་སྒྲ་དག  30 
 2 །མིང་གི་མཐའ་ན་ཡོད་མེད་དང༌།  30 
 3 །རྒྱན་དུ་གྱུར་པ་རྣམས་ལ་ཡང༌།  30 
 4 །དོན་ལ་བསྙེགས་པ་ཡོད་མེད་དང༌།  30 
    
28 1 །བསན་བྱ་ལྷག་མ་ཡོད་མེད་དང༌།  30 
 2 །ཚིག་དོན་རོགས་དང་མ་རོགས་ཀིས།  30 
 3 །དེ་དག་ནང་གསེས་རྣམ་པར་དབྱེ།  30 
 4 །ཅི་ཕྱིར་འཇུག་པར་བྱེད་ཅེ་ན།  31 
    
29 1 །ཡི་གེའི་ཁོངས་ནས་མིང1163་དབྱུང་སེ།  31 
                                                          
1161 GC 591.6: pa ’am 
1162 594.5: mro 
1163 6.445.5: med/meng GC 608.1: ming 
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 2 །མིང་གི་ཁོངས་ནས་ཚིག་ཕྱུང་ནས།  31 
 3 །ཚིག་གིས་དོན་རྣམས་སོན་པར་བྱེད།  31 
 4 །མོ་ཡི་ཡ་ིགེ་མེད་པ་ན།  32 
    
30 1 །ཕོ་ཡིག་བརོད་པ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར།  32 
 2 །ཕོ་ཡིག་དེ་དག་རྣམས་ལ་ཡང༌།  32 
 3 །འཇུག་པར་བཅས་པ་མེད་པར1164་ནི། 32 
 4 །མིང་དང་ཚིག་ཀང་གསལ་མ་ིནུས།  32 
    
31 1 །མིང་ཚིག་གསལ་བ་མེད་ན་ན།ི  32 
 2 །དོན་རྣམས་བརོད་པར་མ་ིའགྱུར་རོ།  32 
 3 །དེ་ལྟར་གྱུར་ན་འཇིག་རྟེན་དུ།  33 
 4 །དོན་མཚན1165་བརོད་པ་ཀུན་ཀང་མེད།  33 
    
32 1 །རིག་བྱེད་སྨྲ་བའང་ཡོད་མི་འགྱུར།  33 
 2 །ཉན་ཐོས་རང་རྒྱལ་སངས་རྒྱས་ཀི།  33 
 3 །བསླབ་པ་རྣམས་ཀང་མེད་པར་འགྱུར།  33 
 4 །ཇི་ལྟར་འཇིག་རྟེན་སེམས་ཅན་དག1166 34 
    
33 1 །ཕུང་པོ་ཁམས་དང་ས་ེམཆེད་དང༌།  34 
 2 །གྲུབ་མཐའ་གཞན་ཡང་ཡོད་ན༌ཡང་།  34 
 3 །རང་ཉིད་ཀིས་ན་ིམི་ཤེས་བཞིན།  34 
 4 །དེ་བཞིན་ཡི་གའེི་འཇུག1167་ཚུལ་རྣམས།  34 
    
34 1 །སྨྲ་བ་ཀུན་ལ་གནས་གྱུར་ཀང༌།  34 
 2 །རང་ཚུལ་དེ་ཉདི་མི་ཤེས་པས།  34 
 3 །དོན་ལ་སོར་བ་ག་ལ་ཤེས།  34 
 4 །དེ་ཕྱིར་སྨྲ་བའི་དབང་ཕྱུག་གི1168།  34 
    
                                                          
1164 GC 612.2: na 
1165 GC 613.4: mtshon 
1166 GC 614.5: rnams 
1167 6.446.1: ngjug ? GC 614.5: ’jug 
1168 GC 614.5: ga 
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35 1 །རེས་སྨྲས1169་ 34 
  འདི་ཀུན་རྟོགས་གྱུར་ཅིག 35 
    
Colophon 
བྱཱ་ཀ་ར་ཎའི་རྩ་བ་བརྒྱད་པ་ལས་ཀུན་ཏུ་བཟང་པོའི་བྱཱ་ཀ་ར་
ཎ་གཉིས་པའི་སྐབས་ཏེ་དྲུག་པའོ།། །། om. 
 
  
                                                          
1169 6.446.2: ? GC 614.6: smras 
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